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Dissertation Abstract Pakistan is regarded widely today as a country in continuing turmoil, in which multiple centres of political and armed power compete with each other, using violence as much as due democratic processes to settle their differences. And yet, as this dissertation seeks to show, there is also a tradition of democracy that has been fought for and won in ongoing nonviolent movements.  For almost half its life since its creation in 1947, military dictators, of whom there have been four in all, have ruled Pakistan.  Amongst these, General Zia-ul-Haq ruled the longest at more than eleven years from July 1977 to August 1988.  He not only executed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister but he was also able to bring about fundamental changes in the legal, political, religious, social and cultural affairs of the country.  His rule is often considered a 
‘dark	   age’	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Pakistan.	  Two movements – the campaign to save Bhutto 1977-79 and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 1981-1988 – were launched and led by political parties, of which the Pakistan 
People’s	   Party	   (PPP)	  was	   the	   leading	  member,	   against	   Zia’s	   rule.	     Historians have generally considered both these movements to have been a failure.   In this dissertation, it is argued that although MRD took much longer than the originally-envisaged three months to achieve its aim, it did not in the end fail.  It should, rather, be seen as a gradualist democratic movement, which eventually brought the country back to democracy in 1988.  The process took longer than expected for several reasons, the most important of which were a lack of unity amongst the leaders of its constituent political parties, particularly the PPP, the absence of an operational corps, and Zia-ul-Haq’s	   ruthless	   response	   to	   the	  nonviolent resistance to his rule. Additionally, Zia’s	   regime	  was	   supported	   for	  many years by international powers of the Western bloc, due to the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  
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Dissertation Introduction 
Scope of the Research:  I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to  the Constitution and Dominion of Pakistan and that I will as in duty bound  honestly and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan Forces and go  within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land  or sea and that I will observe and obey all commands of any officer set  over me...  (Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah quoting the oath taken by members  of the Defence Forces of Pakistan in his address to the Forces in Quetta 14  June 1948.  Emphasis added.)  This thesis examines civil resistance to the military rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq from 1977-88.  This is commonly regarded as the most oppressive of the periods of such rule in the history of Pakistan.1   Politicians, and 
human	   rights	   activists	   have	   declared	   this	   period	   the	   ‘Dark	   Ages’	   of	   Pakistan.2  Under the rule of General Zia, nine political leaders were murdered,3 thirteen committed suicide,4 fourteen were executed,5 and sentences were given of a total forty-five thousand punitive lashes.6 This research focuses on the courageous 
                                                        
1 For references see section 2, below. 
2 Ethan Casey, Alive and Well in Pakistan (London: Vision, 2004), pp.98-99; Khan Abdul Wali Khan, 
quoted by Khadim Hussain, Interview, 3 February 2012, Peshawar. Malik Sikander Hayat Khan Bosan, 
Interview, 18 February 2012, Multan; Karamat Ali, PILER, Interview, 15 March 2012, Karachi; Mairaj 
M.Khan, Interview, 15 March 2012, Karachi. 
3 Mirza Abdul Qadeer Baig, Ch. Zahoor Ellahi, Arbab Sikander Khalil, Zahoor-ul-Hassan Bhopali, 
Shahnawaz Bhutto, Fazil Rahu Allama Aihsan Ellahi Zaheer, raja Meer Zaman Khan, and Ghaus Bakhsh 
Raisani. Cited in Shabbir Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal (Karachi, Shibbal Publications: 1988), pp.189-
90.  
4 Unpublished papers of Dr. Mehdi Hassan, Interview, 3 March 2013, Lahore; Israr Shah, 19 April 
2012, Islamabad. 
5 Israr Shah, Interview. 
6 Al-Fatah, and Jahan; cited in unpublished work of Dr. Mehdi Hassan, Interview; few of my interviews 
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resistance	   of	   those	  who	  were	   ‘prisoners	  without	   names’,	   held	   in	   ‘cells	  without	  
numbers’.7     Historians and political scientists have already noted that there was opposition to this regime by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which was at its height between 1981 and 1984, but have generally judged it to have been a failure as the dictator repressed it ruthlessly.8   There was opposition from a wide range of civil society groups such as progressive students against Islami-Jamiat	  Tulba’s	  association	   to	  Zia’s	   Islamisation	  process;	  
lawyers’	   for	   the	   restoration	  of	  1973	  constitution	  as	  well	   as	   against	  Provisional Constitutional Orders; journalists against the Press and Publication Ordinance 1963, and women rights movement against Hudood Ordinances 1979.  This thesis, however, will provide the first full-length	   study	  of	  political	  parties’	   civil	  resistance to Zia’s	  rule	  throughout	  his	  time	  in	  control,	  up	  until	  his	  sudden	  death	  in an air crash in 1988.   The opposition evolved and changed over time, as will be shown in the thesis.   In this, it provides an original contribution to our knowledge of the history of modern Pakistan. Furthermore, and again originally, it will be argued that far from being a failure, civil resistance paved the way for a 
restoration	  of	  democracy	  after	  Zia’s	  demise.	  	  The	  resistance	  had	  above	  all	  forced	  
                                                                                                                                                              
stated more numbers such as Shahid Sheikh said 75,900 lashes, 17 April 2012, Islamabad; Israr Shah, 
Interview, 10000 lashes 
7 Prisoners in Shahi Qila did not have any identity or any existence for the outer world. Comment of 
one of the interviewees, Javed Iqbal Mo`azzam, 23 February 2012, Lahore. 
8 Stephen   Zones,   ‘Movement   for   the   Restoration   of   Democracy:   1981-84’,   International Center on 
Nonviolent Conflict available at https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-
campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=24 (24 March 
2013); Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), and Interview, 9 
July 2013, Coventry; Stephen P. Cohen, Interview, 20 November 2013, Washington DC.; William L. 
Litcher,   ‘Domestic   Politics   in   the   1980s’,   in   Craig   Baxter,   and   Syed   Raza   Wasti   (eds.), Pakistan: 
Authoritarianism in 1980s (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991); Shahid Javed Burki, Historical Dictionary of 
Pakistan (3rd Edition, Toronto, Oxford, Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006). Omar Noman, 
Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947(London: Kegan Paul International, 1992). 
P.L.Bhola, Benazir Bhutto: Opportunities and Challenges (New Delhi: Yuvraj Publishers, 1989). 
 3 
Zia to hold an election, albeit non-party based, in 1985 in an attempt to legitimise his rule with a parliamentary veneer, and this provided the necessary leverage to bring a transition to democracy once Zia was removed from the scene.     Pakistan, and the area covered by Pakistan before 1947, has seen a number of nonviolent struggles during the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  Before independence, there was that of the Khudai Khidmatgar of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.  After independence, there were strong students protest in 1968-69 that culminated in the removal of General Ayub Khan,9 and 
the	   successful	   show	  of	   people’s	   power	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   lawyers’	  movement	  against General Pervez Musharraf.   Pakistan has seen many such struggles in its troubled life.   While the resistance of the Khudai Khidmatgar was against British imperial rule, subsequent movements have often been directed against military 
rule.	  	  	  There	  have,	  in	  addition,	  been	  movements	  for	  women’s	  rights,	  notably	  the	  Women Action Forum against discriminatory laws.  It can be argued that the precedence for ongoing periods of military rule in Pakistan were set by Sir Sikander Mirza when he invited General Muhammad Ayub Khan to impose martial law in 1958.10   Nonethelsss, following the hiatus caused by the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the country had a chance to re-establish itself as a healthy democracy under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.    He was in 
many	  respects	   the	  architect	  of	  present	  Pakistan	   implementing	   ‘Islamic	  Socialist	  
Democratic’	  policies,	  based	  on	  his	  slogan	   ‘Islam is our religion, socialism is our 
economy	  and	  democracy	  is	  our	  politics’.	  	  This	  was	  all	  negated	  by	  the	  declaration	  of martial law by General Zia in 1977, and in the following eleven years – the                                                         
9 M. Rafiq Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969, vol.II, (Islamabad: National Institute of 
Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), p.13. 
10 Roedad Khan, Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998), p.46. 
 4 
longest period under one ruler, military or civil, in the history of the country till today – democracy was suppressed, opponents crushed, and secular culture attacked.   The damaging legacy of this period continues to the present day.   Despite this, the principle of democracy was never eradicated, and a democratic polity was restored in 1988.     This was in large part due to the ongoing 
resistance	   to	   Zia’s	   rule	   throughout	   his	   time	   in	   control,	   as	   I	   hope	   will	   be	  demonstrated in this thesis.     The study also investigates the philosophy of nonviolence and its application in Pakistan. Pakistan has inherited three types of civil resistance – that of Gandhi, Jinnah, and Baacha Khan. If the first invokes people for resistance 
through	  ‘direct	  action’,	  the	  second	  followed	  the	  Constitutional	  way,	  whereas	  the	  last started in bringing social change through education and then took up Gandhian methods. Qayum Nizami also defines the difference between Jinnah 
and	  Gandhi’s	  political	  philosophy	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  former	  struggled	  to	  remove	  the British in constitutional and democratic ways while the latter believed in forging a democratic system through agitation and civil disobedience.11 These 
three	  strands	  are	  visible	  in	  Pakistan’s	  civil	  resistance	  movements.	  	  For	  example,	  Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) – whilst gathering people for the mass movement like Gandhi – filed various petitions time to time to challenge the Junta.   And, the other towering personality Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, famously known Bacha Khan,12 was a deeply religious Muslim who spent 
                                                        
11 Qayyum Nizami, Quaid-i-Azam Behesiat Governor General: Nai Riyasat ki Tashkeel, Faisle aur 
Iqdamat, (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2010), p.19. 
12 Makulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research 
Press, 2000); Eknath Eswaran, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, A Man to Match his 
Mountains (California:   Nilgiri   Press,   1984);   Syed   Wiqar   Ali   Shah,   ‘The 1930 Civil Disobedience 
Movement  in  Peshawar  Valley  from  the  Pashtun  Perspective’,  Studies in History, Vol.29, No.1 (2013), 
pp. 87-118. 
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his life preaching what he saw as the message of Allah and his last Messenger, Prophet Muhammad.  He held that the greatest weapon of the Prophet was patience and righteousness, and he established the first modern nonviolent peace force – the Khudai Khidmatgars (the Servants of God) – in 1929 to fight against imperialism through nonviolence.13  This body reached in its peak of more than 100,000 members in the 1940s, with offices all over the Northwest Frontier Province.  However his political affiliation with the Indian National Congress made him an arch-opponent of the demand for Pakistan, and after Partition in 1947 he became marginalised in the new nation state.   The history of the Khudai Khitmatgars and their nonviolent legacy were largely written out of the mainstream histories of Pakistan.  Despite this, his brother went on to form a ministry in NWFP,14 which kept alive to some extent this tradition in this particular part of the country.   Studies of the politics and history of Pakistan have largely ignored the topic of nonviolent civil resistance.   Pakistani political scholarship have tended to focus either on the Pakistan Movement and its inherited problems after independence15 or the strengthening of a strong bond between Islam and the ideology of the country.16  There are a number of political autobiographies17, 
                                                        
13 Robert  C.  Johansen,   ‘Radical   Islam  and  Nonviolence:  A  Case  Study  of  Religious  Empowerment  and  
Constraint among Pashtuns’,  Journal Of Peace Research, vol. 34 no.1 (1997), pp. 53-71. 
14  The new name of NWFP is Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa.   From   now,   it’ll   be   named   as   Khyber-
Pukhtoonkhwa. 
15 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst and Company), Ayesha Jalal, The Sole 
Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994).  Recent in this series is Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British 
Empire in India (New York, reprinted edition 2009). 
16 Akber S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (London and New 
York:   Routledge,   1997);   Lawrence   Ziring,   ‘From   Islamic   Republic   to   Islamic   State   in   Pakistan’,   Asian 
Survey, vol.326, No.9 (September, 1984), pp.931-46; Charles   H.   Kennedy,   ‘Islamisation   in   Pakistan:  
Implementation  of  the  Hudood  Ordinances’,  Asian Survey, vol.28, No.3 (March, 1988), pp.307-316; 
17 Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (Lahore: 2000 reprinted), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I am 
Assasinated (online version) http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/If-I-am-assassinated-by-Shaheed-Bhutto.pdf; 
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biographies18,	   and	   memoirs	   that	   define	   the	   country’s	   issues	   and	   remedies	   in	  terms of individual figures.  Scholars have understood the truncation of democracy in Pakistan in terms of the imbalance between the civil and the military, the malign role of Pakistan army, and/or the venality of politicians, 
among	   other	   things.	   	   Pakistan	   has	   been	   portrayed	   as	   a	   ‘failed’	   state	   between	  
‘Allah,	   Army	   and	   Terrorism’ 19  or	   a	   ‘corrupt	   medieval	   empire’	   ruled	   by	  
mansabdars.20  In all this, very little attempt has been made to analyse the way in 
which	  people’s	  power	  has	  managed	  to	  restrict	  the	  continuation	  of	  military	  rule	  in	  the country. 
Research questions and methodology The thesis generally adopts a diachronic approach, with chapters that advance from one period to another of the Zia era.   It is qualitative in nature, relying on the collection of whatever material I could access, and interviews with a wide range of actors who were prepared to meet and talk with me.  There were inevitable lacunae in the material that I was able to collect, so it cannot be claimed to be exhaustive.  It is however extensive, as I hope will be revealed in section 6 below on sources, and thus an adequate base for such a doctoral thesis. One of the main research questions is that of the comparative efficacy of nonviolent and violent methods. This relates to the wider literature on civil                                                                                                                                                               
Benazir Bhutto, The Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: reprinted 2008); Pervez 
Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
18 Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1993); –, Jinnah Of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
19 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s  Drift   into  Extremism:  Allah,   the  Army  and  The  America’s  War  on  Terror  
(New York: Routledge, 2004); Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The US 
and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); Ayesha 
Jalal, Partisan of Allah: Jihad in South Asia (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010) traces the history 
of jihad in the region to Syed  Ahmed  Rai  of  Bareilly’s  declaration  to  this  effect  against  British  colonial  
rule. 
20 Ilhan Niaz, The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008 (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
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resistance and nonviolent movements all over the world.  More will be said about this literature in section 4 below.  In this respect this research provides a case study that sheds light on the efficacy of nonviolent methods as against violent forms of struggle.    In this particular case, the comparison is between the civil methods of MRD and the terrorism of Al-Zulfiqar.   The other main research questions relate to the characterisation of 
Pakistan’s	  politics	  and	  the	  vitality	  and	  viability	  of	  its	  democracy.	  	  	  	  In focusing on civil resistance in Pakistan, I challenge the widespread notion that the politics of Pakistan has almost since its foundation been characterised by violence. Also, that it is inherently unstable as a state, and in danger of collapse.  Pakistan is 
tagged	  as	  a	  country	   ‘producing	  terrorism’	  and/or	  of	   ‘safe	  havens	  for	   terrorists’,	  and the presence of	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	   in	  Abbotabad	  (Pakistan’s	  garrison	   town)	  has appeared to support this argument.  Scholars associated with the American Intelligence community such as Stephen P Cohen and Bruce Riedle believe that the country is likely to disintegrate in the near future due to its chaos and complexity.21  It is the argument of this research project that both civil society and democracy have proved remarkably tenacious in Pakistan, and that this is in no small part due to an ongoing history of civil resistance by a range of social 
groups.	   	  Nonviolent	  people’s	  power	  has	  always	  existed	  in	  a	  climate	  of	  potential	  and actual violence, and indeed much of its vitality has come from this, as it has provided a potent demonstration that alternative methods could be used to resolve conflicts without the use of physical violence.  The task is to investigate                                                         
21  Bruce   Riedel,   ‘Battle   for   the   Soul   of   Pakistan’,   India Today, 4 January 2013. 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/battle-for-the-soul-of-pakistan/1/240733.html (4 January 2013). 
Stephen P.Cohen in his book, the Future of Pakistan predicts that Pakistan will collapse as a state by 
2015. However, in an interview with me, he extended this by five years. Stephen P. Cohen, Interview, 
20 November 2013, Washington DC. 
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the history of these strands, to see both how and when such nonviolence has succeeded, and also to understand the reasons why it has also failed in certain circumstances.  How and in what circumstances, it may be asked, has nonviolence survived in the present world, particularly in a so-called	   “age	   of	  
terrorism”	  in	  which	  military	  responses	  are	  generally	  seen	  as	  providing	  the	  only	  effective counter-strategy?   In such a situation, the ongoing vitality of nonviolence requires us to address such convictions in a critical manner.    
Main Arguments Apart from a few exceptions,22 most observers have seen the Movement for Restoration of Democracy as a failure.23  Against this, I shall argue that rather 
than	   being	   a	   failure,	   it	   was	   part	   of	   a	   process	   of	   ‘gradualist	   democratisation’.24  Analysing the three major objectives of MRD – lifting of martial law immediately, holding of free and fair election within three months, restoration of 1973 constitution along with power of the four federating units – we find that all of these demands were eventually met but over a longer time-frame than envisaged initially.  One immediate success was that on 12 August 1983, two days before civil disobedience was launched across the country, General Zia-ul-Haq announced a political roadmap.   At the same time, the Pakistan army high command started considering a replacement of General Zia with another army 
leader	   so	   as	   to	   save	   their	   face	   before	   people’s	   power. 25   Chapter 3 and 6 will                                                         
22Asif Butt, Interview, 26 February 2012, Lahore; Shahida Jabeen, Interview 26 February 2012, Lahore; 
Aziz Shaikh, Interview, 12 March 2012, Karachi;  
23 Ethnicity and Democracy, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.21 No.52 (27 December 1986), 
pp.2236-2264; Ilyas Shakir, MRD Kamyabian aur Nakamian (Karachi: Shabal Publications Ltd, 1985); 
Aabid Zuberi, Convener of MRD 1983, cited in Ilyas Shakir, MRD. 
24 The term is used by Stephen Zunes for those movements which failed to bring down a dictator 
immediately, but despite this paved the way for eventual democratization. Stephen Zones, presented 
in a seminar, attended via webinar on 31 Mach 2015 from Washington DC. 
25 Robert   M.   Gates   (Deputy   Director   for   Intelligence),   ‘Pakistan:   Scenario   for   Dramatic   Political  
Change’,  Directorate of Intelligence, 7 March 1984, CIA Record Research Tool at National Archives and 
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examine this in detail.    According to the roadmap, there was to be an election in March 1985.  The regime, which had withheld its promises of such a step seven times previously,26 did hold the election in 1985 as per the plan due to the ongoing pressure of MRD on the regime. Seeing his previous record of reneging on promises, Zia could easily have done the same in 1985 but for this pressure.  Moreover, my research suggests that if Zia had not been killed in an air-crash, he would	   have	   had	   to	   resign	   from	   office	   after	   the	   dissolution	   of	   Junejo’s	  government,27 making	  a	  supposed	   ‘“honourable”	  exit	   from	  the	  political	  scene	  of	  
Pakistan’.28  Chapter 6 further elucidates this argument.  Relevant to the first argument, my second argument is that the Government of the United States supported the rule of General Zia until his sudden demise in 1988.  This goes against a common belief that the US administration was losing patience with Zia over his handling of the Afghan war 
and	   ‘dissimulations	   on	   the	   nuclear	   issue’.29  Rather than support the civil opposition to Zia, as is often argued, the Reagan government in Washington was 
suspicious	   of	   what	   they	   saw	   as	   allies	   of	   communists.	   Consulting	   the	   CIA’s	  archives in Maryland, my research uses confidential messages and various reports sent to the US State department, as well as interviews with Stephen 
                                                                                                                                                              
Record Administration, College Park, MD-USA (NARA) CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3. Robert M. 
Gates  (Deputy  Director  for  Intelligence),  ‘Pakistan:  Scenario  for  Dramatic  Political  Change’,  Directorate 
of Intelligence, 7 March 1984, NARA, CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3. 
26 5 July 1977, 23 August 1978 during the tour of Makkah, 23 March 1979, 16 May 1979 after six days 
tour of Baluchistan, 21 August 1979 on Jeddah trip, 30 August 1979 while declaring the Political 
Parties Act 1979, on 17 November 1979 postponement of the election for indefinite period. Collected 
from various media news sources.  
27 Directorate   of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   Prospects   for   the   New   Political   System’,   Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, September 1985, NARA, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, p.9. Directorate of 
Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Elections  at  Last’,  Near East and South Asia Review, 15 February 1985, NARA, 
CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6. 
28 Dawn, 18 August 1988. 
29 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Massachusetts, 
London: Harvard University Press, 2014), p.257. 
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Cohen	  and	  Aparna	  Pande.	  	  Following	  the	  ‘bleeders’	  and	  the	  ‘defeaters’30 school of thoughts in US administration both the sources suggests that the US government believed that it was easier to overcome the bitter legacy of the Vietnam war by dealing with a dictator in Pakistan.  They distrusted the links that the civil opposition in Pakistan had with the USSR and China.31  CIA in its secret reports32 had discerned links between the MRD and the Soviet Union and India, and reported that both probably funded the party.   They saw the Jama`at-i-Islami as the better option if the army was to be replaced by another group.33  The report concluded that the best option for the USA was that the rule of General Zia or another military commander should continue.  As it was, as late as 1988 President Reagan certified the unavailability of nuclear devices in Pakistan.34  The weekly reports from the Pakistan embassy to the US State Department on human rights abuses were completely ignored.35 The role of international powers during the period in investigation is underscored in chapters 1-5 of the thesis.  The thesis will also shed new light on the relationship between the pro-democracy movement and the armed struggle of Al-Zulfiqar that was headed by 
Zulfiqar	  Ali	  Bhutto’s	  two	  sons	  Mir	  Murtaza	  Bhutto	  and	  Shah	  Nawaz	  Bhutto.	  	  	  The	  major published work on Al-Zulfiqar is by either ex-Al-Zulfiqar members such as 
                                                        
30 Cohen explains the terminologies stating that the State department was divided into these two 
groups – bleeders and the defeaters, when he entered the department in 1985. Bleeders wanted to 
bleed and weaken the Soviet Union through its continuing military engagement in Afghanistan; 
whereas the defeaters wanted to break up the Soviet Empire. And for both, they needed a strong 
man in Pakistan. Stephen P. Cohen, interview. 
31 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition,  March  1984’,  NARA,  p.iv. 
32 cit.,loc. 
33 ibid., p.12. 
34 Viewpoint, XIII (24), 21 January 1988, p.34. 
35 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  NARA,  p.12. 
 11 
Raja Anwer,36 Asif Butt,37 and Fakhanda Bukhari,38 or by scholars such as B.M.Kutty,39 Ilyas Shakir,40and  K.M.Arif.41  None of this work has discerned the clandestine relationship that existed between Benazir Bhutto and Nusrat Bhutto over the launching of an armed struggle against Zia-ul-Haq.  Even Benazir Bhutto completely avoided referring to Al-Zulfiqar in her autobiography covering the 
struggle	   years	   except	   stating	   ‘All	   hijacking	   is	   bad,	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   plane	   or	   a	  
nation’,42 which does not categorically condemn the act either. The present research seeks to show that following the death sentence on ZAB delivered by the Lahore High Court in March 1978, PPP workers initiated the militant struggle parallel with nonviolent resistance after receiving the green signal from Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto. In this, they adhered to a common belief in the efficacy of armed struggle that was fashionable at that time at a global level.43   Salman Taseer also stated that this option was on the table in the meeting of senior leaders of the party with BB in Larkana	  on	  the	  fortieth	  day	  anniversary	  of	  ZAB’s	  death; but no firm decision was reached on the matter.44  Nusrat Bhutto claimed 
in	   support	   of	   such	   a	   struggle	   that	   she	   could	   contact	   ‘fourteen	   underground	  
organisations,	   if	   we	   needed.’	   	   	   Sardar	   Abdul	   Qayum,	   and Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti actually quitted the MRD after the PIA plane hijacking due to his firm 
                                                        
36 Raja Anwar, Dehshat Gard Shehzada (The Terrorist Prince: Life and Death of Murtaza Bhutto) 
(Lahore: Classic, 2007). 
37 Asif Butt, Kai Soolian Sar-i-Rah thin (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2013). 
38 Farkhanda Bukhari, Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2012).  
39 B.M.Kutty, Sixty Years in Self-Exile: No Regrets A Political Biography (Karachi, Pakistan Study Center, 
University of Karachi, 2011).  
40 Shakir, MRD. 
41 K.M. Arif, Working with Zia-Urdu translation (Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2008). 
42 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.169.  
43 Mushtaq Lasharie, interview, 12 January 2013. He was the messenger between the armed group 
and BB due to his job in PIA. 
44 Salman  Taseer,  ‘Around  Al-Murtaza’,  Viewpoint, 24 June 1979, p.9. 
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opposition to the armed struggle, commenting that the PPP already knew about the hijacking.45    Maulana Kausar Shah,46 a	   PPP’s	   worker	   from	   Lahore,	   approached Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya in 1978 – who had been a close ally with ZAB – and requested his support for armed resistance to General Zia-ul-Haq. Agreeing to 
the	  proposal,	  Col.	  Qaddafi	  asked	  him	  to	  bring	  ZAB’s	  sons	  on	  board	  from	  London.	  The main purpose of establishing such an organisation was initially to save the life of ZAB, this was unsuccessful.   PPP workers who had returned from a four-week trip to Libya were charged in the so-called Libya Conspiracy Case.47  Despite this, work on this project continued,	  and	   the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  (PLA) was formally established during the summer of 1979.  Later on, it was renamed Al-Zulfiqar.48 The PIA hijacking49 was organised to put pressure on General Zia.  One of my interviewees quoted Benazir Bhutto as referring to the 
militant	   struggle	   of	   her	   brothers	   as	   ‘a	   guarantee	   of	   her	   life	   in	   Pakistan.’50 Likewise, another interviewee, Muhammad Agha Waseem,51 told me that the hijackers of the PIA aircraft had already been ordered to execute their plan at the same time as the MRD was being established as an alternative democratic platform to fight against the regime.  Since it was winter, so to postpone the                                                         
45 Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, Nawai-Waqt 21 March 1981. The Muslim, 2 March 1981. Shakir, MRD, 
pp.118-121. 
46 Maulana Kausar Shah was already involved in sabotage of Train tracks. Agha Muhammad Waseem, 
Interview, 1 December 2012, Stockholm. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.  
47 Kaneez Yousaf, Vice-Chancellor Quaid-i-Azam University, Kishwar Naheed, poetess and human 
rights activist, and Brig. Osman were the members who recruited for the training in Libya.18 men and 
women were sent to learn Green Book of Col. Qaddafi. See, for example Farkhanda Bukhari, Ye Bazi 
Ishq ki Bazi hai. interview, 27 February 2012, Lahore. Muhammad Agha Waseem, interview; Jahangir 
Badar, interview; Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview; 
48 The name has double meaning. In Arabic, it means sword, while it was also after the name of ZAB. 
49 Many PPP workers and leaders still understand that it was the act of the army to crush the civil 
resistance of MRD. See, for example, Sardar Shaukat Ali, Pakistan: Issues of Government and Politics 
(Lahore: Fiction House, 2012), p.91.  
50 Javed Iqbal Mo`azam, 27 February 2012, Lahore; Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview. 
51 Interview, 22 February 2012, Lahore and 1 December 2012, Stockholm;  
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hijacking plan after seeing the outcome of MRD, Benazir Bhutto sent a code 
message	   to	  Murtaza	   Bhutto	   and	   said	   ‘Yahan sardi kum hu gai hai, kumbulon ki 
abhi zarurat nahi (cold wave had reduced here, we do not need blankets for now) which means do not act upon the plan at that juncture.  The Bhutto family was no stranger to using violent means to achieve their targets, as seen in the illegal and extra-judicial killings of the Federal Security Force (FSF), a paramilitary state-run actor, established by the ZAB government in 1972 that became a terror force for both his opponents and members of his own party.  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  It has been often argued that the MRD failed because it was only really strong in Sindh province.52  Indeed, Sindhi nationalists have counted this as a case of betrayal by the people of Punjab to wider cause. It is true that the Zia regime did its best to divide-and-rule by setting Punjab against Sindh, holding that Sindhis were anti-Pakistan and secessionist.53  My research comes to a different conclusion in this respect.   The argument for a divide focuses on the civil disobedience movement in August to December 1983.   I argue that before this struggle to save ZAB from execution – Bhutto Bachao Tehreek (Save Bhutto Movement) – was in fact stronger in Punjab than much of Sindh.   While there was a strong movement in Karachi City, other parts of Sindh hardly participated at all.54   The main Punjabi leaders and workers had already exhausted their energies or were in prison as they had been the focus of repression by the 
                                                        
52 See, for example, Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.) and Translated by Gillian Beaumont, A History of 
Pakistan and Its Origins (London: Anthem Press, 2008). Ian Talbot, Pakistan; Mahmood Mirza, Aaj Ka 
Sindh: Pakistan ke Yukjehti ke Masail (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986). Ayesha Jalal, Democracy 
and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.106.  
53 Syed Munawar Hussain Shah, Bhutto, Zia and Islam (online at www.bhutto.org ), p.222. 
54 Mushtaq Lasharie, interview, 12 January 2013, London. 
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regime before 1983.  Reports of Amnesty International between 1977-198355 and in Viewpoint magazine estimated that during the four years before 1983 the number of political prisoners held at any one time was between several hundred and several thousand. In 1977-79 over four-fifths of the participants in protests against the regime were from Punjab.  Of the seven who committed suicide between March 1978 and April 1979, all, all were from Punjab except Abdul Aziz from Sukher.  Among nine political workers executed by the regime, four were Punjabi, while two were settlers in Karachi from KPK and the rest were from Sindh. All four of the journalists who were flogged were from Punjab.  Of the total 192 sentences to floggings, all but 18 were from Punjab.  Above all, of the seventy-three prisoners interned in Shahi Qila – the mother of all jails –ninety five per cent were from Punjab. My interview evidence suggests that out of 250 commanders of Al-Zulfiqar in Kabul, 186 were from Punjab. 56  And, then from KPK and FATA, 40-50 and 30-35 from Sindh. Likewise, among the release of political prisoners in exchange for plane hostages, the majority were from Punjab.  Additionally, the majority who went into exile were from Punjab the cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Gujranwala.57   Furthermore, despite Zia-ul-
Haq’s	  open	  opposition to PPP in the local elections of 1979, in which he stated 
“Yeh	  Mumlakate	   Khudad	  Hey- Roti,	   Kapra	  Makan	  mumlakat	  Nahi	   hai”58 (this is 
Allah’s	  land,	  not	  the	  land	  of	  Bread,	  Cloth,	  and	  a	  house)	  PPP-Punjab	  under	  ‘awam	                                                          
55 ‘Short   Report   of   an   Amnesty   International   Mission   To   the   Islamic   Republic   Of   Pakistan   20-25 
January   1978’,   Amnesty International,   Modern   Record   Center   (MRC),   MSS.34/4/1/pk4.   ‘Pakistan  
Update (since January 1982-December   1982)’,   Amnesty International, (December 1982), MRC, 
MSS.34/4/1/Pk  17  ASA  33/22/82.  Report  on  Pakistan  ‘Human  Rights  violations  and  the  decline  of  the  
rule  of   law’, Amnesty International,  MRC,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk14.   ‘Arrests,   Imprisonment  and  Flogging   in  
Pakistan (August-September  1983)’,  Amnesty International (October 1983), MRC, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 20, 
ASA 33/14/83. 
56 Asif Butt, Lahore, and Muhammad Agha Waseem, Lahore and Stockholm.  
57 Interviews with Mushtaq Lasharie, Mian Muhammad Iqbal, Shahid Nadeem, Farkhanda Bukhari. 
58 Zia-ul-Haq, 24 September 1979, Lahore, cited in Viewpoint, V (8), 30 September 1979, p.14. 
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dost’	   title	   won	   the	   election.	   72	   of	   the	   100 seats in Lahore were won by PPP candidates.59  Chapter 3 examines this argument in detail.   Little has been written about the struggle of the PPP in exile at this time.  The 
main	   source	   for	   information	   about	   this	   comes	   from	   Benazir	   Bhutto’s	  autobiography in her treatment of her period in exile.   Recently, Farkhanda Bukhari narrated her struggle abroad in her autobiography Ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi 
hai. This research underscores the importance of this aspect of the struggle as well.  For example, on the day of the sentence of death on 18 March 1978 the two Bhutto brothers — Mir Murtaza and Shah Nawaz Bhutto — sped up their 
struggle	  to	  mobilise	  international	  support	  to	  save	  their	  father’s	  life.	   	  From	  their	  base next to the Pakistani High Commission in London, they travelled around the world meeting government functionaries — Iran, USA, UAE and Libya — and requested them to put pressure on the Zia government.60  After the final decision of Supreme Court, to explain the flaws in ZAB case, Bhutto brothers planned to organise an international convention of constitutionalists on 7 April 1979, however, that turned into a posthumous convention.61 Post-burial funeral prayers were held in Hyde Park on 8 April, followed by a protest demonstration of 40,000 people organised and led by the two sons, Tariq Ali and other exiled PPP workers.62  Later, there was a convention of exiled/immigrant party workers in London, headed by Mir Murtaza Bhutto.63 The	   ‘Movement	   for	   the	  Restoration of Democracy-London	   Chapter’	   was	   launched	   in	   1982	   under the 
                                                        
59 Viewpoint, V (8), 30 September 1979. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. Shahida Jabeen, interview  
60 Asad Munir Bhatti,  Bhutto Ka Beta (unpublished), p.13-14. 
61 Ibid., p.15. 
62 Viewpoint, 15 April 1979, p. 16. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. 
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presidency of Afzal Bangash. 64   A	   ‘Release	   and	   Relief	   Committee’ 65  also campaigned to free detainees with some success, as when Khalid Chaudhry was released.66 Most importantly, the permission of Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto to go abroad on medical grounds was mainly brought about through the work of exiled activists in London, as described well by Farkhanda Bukhari.67 Magazines such as Azad68 (Freedom) (started in 1979 in London), Nusrat69 (started in London in 1982), and Baazgasht70 (Echo) (started in Berlin) provided pro-MRD publicity abroad.  Chapter 4 articulates this aspect of the struggle.   Besides challenging the specialist literature on Pakistan, this thesis seeks to add to the scholarship on the civil resistance in general.   Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan argue71 that the percentage of a population of a country as a whole that is mobilised and the consistency of its participation has a marked impact on the success-rate of struggles.  My research suggests that it is not so much the proportion of the population of the entire nation but the relative weight of particular populations that can be crucial.   In the politics of Pakistan, it is above all necessary to mobilise Punjabi support.   In particular the axis that                                                         
64 Dr. Zafar Niazi, Justice Safdar Shah (General Secretaries), Shahid Nadeem (Secretary), Mushtaq 
Lasharie (office secretary), and Kalim Dil Khan provided a space for the office in his hotel in London. 
Brig Osman Khalid issued Inquilab paper, Hamraz Ahsan, Major Imtiaz, Zahir Hassan Dar, Nayyar 
Hassan  Dar  (brothers,  in  charge  of  People’s  Guard),  Rana  Shamim  Ahmed  Khan  (ex-Deputy Speaker-
Punjab). Mian Iqbal (senator),  Bashir Riaz. Dr. Nasir A. Shaikh. 
65 The committee was set up by the exiled workers. Interviews with Shahid Nadeem, Fakhanda 
Bukhari, Asif Butt, Mushtaq Lasharie. 
66 Khalid Chaudhry got married to a German girl during his studies in Germany, whose father was the 
Second highest authority in German Church. Such connection also helped in his release. His wife is the 
same person who smuggled ZAB’s   jail   diary   along   with   her   Swedish   friend,   which   was   later   on  
published  with  the  title  of  ‘If  I  am  assassinated’.  Khalid Chaudhry, interview. 
67 Farkhanda Bukhari, Interview, A memorandum was handed in to the Indian High Commission 
London requesting Indira Gandhi to use her office for the release of Nusrat Bhutto on humanitarian 
grounds, cited in Farkhanda Bukhari, Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai (Lahore, 2012), pp.147-49. Shahid 
Nadeem, Interview. 
68 Shahid Nadeem, Interview. 
69 Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview. 
70 Found copies from the archive of South Asian Research and Resource Center (SARRC), Islamabad. 
71 Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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stretches in Punjab from Lahore to Rawalpindi along the major highway is vital in all this – it being often referred to as Grand Trunk Road politics.  The province 
accounts	  for	  56	  per	  cent	  of	  Pakistan’s	  population,	  and	  an	  estimated	  75	  per	  cent	  of personnel in the army and the civil bureaucracy. Besides, it is the agricultural heartland of Pakistan, producing a high proportion of its wheat, cotton, and rice cash crops.  People from other provinces have always struggled to achieve equal 
status	   in	  Pakistan’s	  national establishment. Sindh provides the main resistance to complete Punjabi dominance; however, according to a US intelligence report, 
‘the	   Sindhis	   will	   have	   to	   come	   to	   terms	   with	   Punjabi	   dominance,	   perhaps	  surviving as the Welsh have in Great Britain as a culturally	  rich	  minority.’72   This bias in the politics of Pakistan has to be borne in mind in any analysis.  My research also augments our knowledge about the sort of strategies that can be adopted in nonviolent struggles to circumvent oppression.  Among other methods we shall examine are political meetings under the guise of birthday parties, marriages, mock funerals, mock graves, death anniversaries, and annual ceremonies at Sufi shrines.  While Chenoweth and Stephen highlight the frequent failure of the international community to support nonviolent movements against autocrats, showing that less than the ten per cent nonviolent movements that they have recorded over the past century have received material support from foreign governments in comparison to thirty-five per cent of violent movements, 73 other leading authorities such as Sharp, Ackerman, and Kruegler have argued that international support is very important for a successful nonviolent movement.  I                                                         
72 Directorate  of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan  People’s  Party:  Pretenders   to   the  Throne’,  Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, 21 November 1986, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, NARA, p.34. 
73 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, p.54. 
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shall argue that the direction from which international support comes matters most of all.   MRD enjoyed support from the political left, which included the Soviet Union,74 the International Transport Federation,75 and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions – which funded the pro-socialist and PPP labour unions in Pakistan.76  This support did not translate into success for the movement.77   BB, by contrast, adopted a different tactic. She looked for support to the capitalist bloc.   The problem with this strategy was that General Zia enjoyed firm support from the USA, Saudi Arabia and other important pro-capitalist powers.   There will be a separate section in each chapter from 1 to 5 that deals with the issue of international support.   Furthermore, my research argues that civil resistance that is initiated and led by coalitions of opposition political parties has a much lower chance of success.   The reason for this is that there is almost invariably mistrust between party leaders caused by their individual ambitions for power.   This was not the 
case	   either	   in	   the	   Students’	   Movement	   against	   General	   Ayub	   1967-8, and 
Lawyers’	   Movement	   against	   General	   Pervez	   Musharraf	   2007-9, which were launched and led by civil society groups, with political parties joining and consolidating their success subsequently. Internationally, we find this is true also 
of	  movements	   such	  as	   that	   of	   the	  mothers	  of	   the	   ‘disappeared’	   in	   the	  Plaza	  de	  Mayo in Argentina, the students movement against Pinochet in Chile, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the Otpor movement against Milosevic in Serbia,                                                         
74 Directorate of Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  NARA,  p.12. 
75 Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview,  
76 Correspondence between International Confederation of Free Trade Union and Pakistani Trade 
unions  in  ‘Trade    ‘Trade  Union  in  Pakistan:  Historical  Background’,  MSS  292D/954.5/4,  Modern  Record  
Center, The University of Warwick (MRC). 
77  Directorate of Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   Zia’s   Divided   Opposition’,   March   1984,   NARA,   p.12. 
Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Global Showdown:  The  Russian  Imperial  War  Plan  for  1988’,  24  July  1985,  
NARA, p. 190. Stephen P. Cohen, Interview. 
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the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the youth movement of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunis.   In all these cases, the protests started with civil society groups, with political parties becoming involved only when the movements were on the verge of success.  In the case of Pakistan, movements that were initiated by political parties, such as the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) against General Musharraf, and the Combined Opposition Parties against General Ayub were relatively unsuccessful.  This was due to the lust for power of the political leaders, leading to a lack of the unity.   My argument is informed by the literature that has burgeoned in recent years on strategies of nonviolent resistance throughout the world over the course of the past century.  This field of study has been associated in particular with Gene Sharp, who has been a prolific writer on the theme.  Sharp, an American, was a conscientious objector during the Korean War (for which he was jailed)	   who	   went	   on	   to	   study	   Gandhi’s	   nonviolent	   movement	   for	  independence in India.   His first book, published in 1960, was titled Gandhi 
Wields the Weapon of Moral Power.78   This provided an analysis of the strategy that Gandhi adopted in India, with lessons being learnt for application in future struggles.   This emphasis on the strategy of protest is found particularly strongly in the seminal book that Gene Sharp subsequently went on to write – a massive study, 902 pages in length, on ‘the	   politics	   of	   nonviolent	   action’.	   	   This	   was	  published first in 1973 and it is still in print.79  In these writings, Sharp depicts Gandhi as devising an unconventional approach to politics that operates by mobilising the power of the masses nonviolently, in contrast to the top-down 
                                                        
78 Gene Sharp, Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960). 
79 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). 
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form of political power that ruling elites have in general sought to impose.  Many Indian nationalists before Gandhi are seen to have had such an elitist approach.80  Sharp also brought out how Gandhi maintained discipline in nonviolent struggles.  Sharp is interested primarily in ends, arguing that nonviolent resistance is preferable not out of principle but because it is more expedient in both taking on an opponent and ensuring a more lasting result subsequently.  This is in contrast to Gandhi, who insisted that the means were what mattered above all, rather than the ends.  For Sharp, nonviolent means are important because they get better results, not because they are intrinsically superior morally or spiritually.  Sharp only began to be taken up in a big way during the 1980s, which was a period that saw some dramatic examples of successful nonviolent protests that brought down highly oppressive regimes, as in the Philippines, Chile, and Eastern Europe.  The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan occurred at the same time as this, but because it was seen as a failure, it was not studied in the way that these other movement were.  A growing number of scholars began to take an interest in this field.81  The focus was on post-World War II campaigns.  Until now, this field and method of study has been a relatively unknown field amongst those who study the modern history and politics of South Asia.                                                          
80 See Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist: With Essays on Ethics and Politics (Boston: Porter 
Sargent, 1979), pp. 43-59.   
81 For example, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics 
of People Power in the Twentieth Century (Connecticut, Westport: Praeger, 1994); Peter Ackerman 
and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: a Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York and Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2000); Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, Nonviolent 
Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective (Malden, Mass.: Willey-Blackwell, 1999); Mark 
Kurlansky, Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Idea (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006); Kurt Schock, 
Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies ( Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005). 
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Mainstream historians and political scientists who work on the region have in general shown little interest in nonviolence as an effective force for change.   In the case of India, while liberal-nationalist and Nehruvian socialists tend to 
admire	  Gandhi	  as	  the	  ‘father	  of	  the	  nation’,	  they	  have	  not	  in	  general	  regarded	  his	  protest techniques as having a place in the modern parliamentary democracy of India.   More radical thinkers have generally acknowledged that Gandhi was a brilliant mass mobiliser, but believe that his philosophy of nonviolence ensured that he was unable to push what he had started to its logical end in a violent revolutionary upheaval, so that in the end he let his supporters down.  They have therefore focused in their research and writing on the gap between popular demands and what the Gandhian movement was prepared and able to actually deliver.82   They	   have	   not	   been	   interested	   in	   any	   serious	   analysis	   of	   Gandhi’s	  techniques as a guide to future action.  In the case of Pakistan, Gandhi is widely regarded as the person who fought against the establishment of Pakistan, and thus an enemy.  There has been and continues to be little political mileage to be gained in appealing to Gandhian values and methods in Pakistan.   This is despite the existence of a particularly strong Gandhian-style movement in the North-West Frontier Province (KPK, hereafter) that was led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the period before independence.   He became marginalised in post-independence politics, and indeed was at times persecuted and jailed.   Civil resistance in Pakistan has therefore had to plough its own path in a situation in which more violent and militaristic forces have often been to the fore.   Despite this, as I argue in this thesis, it has been at times a dynamic force that has brought real 
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political change.   I intend to advance this argument through the lens of nonviolent resistance studies.    
Literature Review Despite the rich culture of civil resistance, both successful and unsuccessful, nonviolence and civil resistance scholars have largely ignored Pakistan, despite an ongoing history of such struggle, often against great odds. While a good deal has been written about the resistance led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the KPK in the pre-1947 period, probably the only such Pakistani resistance after 1947 that has caught the attention of the world in a major way has been that of the 
courageous	   struggle	   for	   girl’s	   education	   associated	   with	   Malala	   Yousafzai	   in	  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.  Yet, there has been an ongoing resistance by Pakistani women to various forms of patriarchal oppression that stretches back many years, and which has involved women from all parts of the country.  Abdul Ghaffar Khan also continued his resistance after 1947, and there have been other preachers of nonviolence of his ilk, notably Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, also known as the Baluchi Gandhi.  Most scholarship on Pakistan has focussed on topics such as partition and the legacy of the two-nation theory,83 militarization-cum-military rule,84 and Islamisation-cum-extremism.85 In the past two decades the country has been tagged as a haven for Muslim extremists, jihadists, and 
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terrorists, and in consequence a security threat to the rest of the world.86  While political scientists typically regard Pakistan as a country that has staggered from crisis-to-crisis	  and	  is	  in	  constant	  danger	  of	  a	  ‘descent into	  chaos’,87 a few scholars such as Ian Talbot and Anatol Lieven88 believe	   that	   it	   is	   above	   all	   Pakistan’s	  vibrant civil society that has kept it alive through its many vicissitudes.  Broadly speaking, the historiography on Zia period can be divided into a number of categories.   The first is that of histories written by his cronies in the military and politics. Unlike Ayub Khan,89 and Pervez Musharraf,90 General Zia did not himself write any autobiographical work.  Instead, we have books by close associates such as K.M. Arif, Vice-Chief of the Army Staff and Chief of Staff under Zia, 91  and Faiz Ali Chishti, head of 111 Brigade – who implemented martial law’s	  order	  in	  1977	  and	  the	  Election	  Cell	  under	  Martial	  law.92  These two books seek to justify martial law and refer to the civil resisters as a mob.  Chishti nonetheless resigned from the army in 1980 due to his personal grievances against General Zia, and criticised Zia for not holding elections and handing political power back to the politicians. He hardly mentions the political struggle, 
however.	  	  Ghafoor	  Ahmed	  of	  Jama’at-i-Islami (JI) provides a vivid account of the 
Zia’s	  era	  through	  both	  a	  military	  and political perspective.93   In his two books, he 
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provides many facts and much description, with a focus on the real politik of the country.  He was the first author who revealed that the agreement between PNA and ZAB had been approved on the night of the imposition of the martial law.  The books are however biased by the fact that the JI worked hand-in-hand with the regime, and they are completely silent on the way that education was bent in an Islamic direction against the opposition of progressive students’	  groups.	  	  His	  main grumble against Zia is that he did not take Islamisation far enough.   On the other hand, Golam W. Chaudhry – whose work was facilitated by the Zia regime – praised his Islamisation and his supposed moves towards democracy while ignoring the pro-democratic struggle of the MRD.94 
 In the second main category are the memoirs of oppositional political leaders and workers. Of these, the most prominent was Benazir Bhutto (BB), whose autobiography Daughter of the East was widely read.95  Previously, she had in 1983 written Pakistan: The Gathering Storm, but this had much less impact.  Daughter of the East provided a complete account of the struggle for justice and democracy in Pakistan against Zia. It highlighted human rights violations, the work	  of	  PPP’s	  jyalas (partisan), their imprisonment and execution, 
and	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	  Zia’s	  alteration	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  1973.	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  in its first edition, published when she had gained power in Pakistan, she avoided discussing some controversial issues. In her previous book in 1983, she condemned Pakistan Generals in general for the murder of her father, and she described her struggle for democracy as being against an unholy alliance                                                         
94 Golam W. Chaudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1989). 
95 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: Simon and Schuster, 1988).  –, 
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between American imperialism allied to the Pakistan military.96 In her later book she adopts a lenient approach towards America and the CIA, and blames General Zia primarily.97  She	  is	  also	  critical	  about	  her	  ‘uncles’	  – Mumtaz Bhutto, Mustafa Khar, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada – who had their own ambitions to take control of the party.98   This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  fill	  some	  of	  the	  gaps	  in	  BB’s	  narrative;	  for	  example	  about her relationship with Al-Zulfiqar, the agreement that paved the way for her departure from Pakistan, and her return after an understanding or deal with the USA.  
 Books written by other PPP leaders and workers focus mainly on the internal differences within the party.  Kausar Niazi, who broke with the PPP to 
forge	  the	  National	  People’s	  Party,	  writes	  about	  the	  clandestine	  nuclear	  operation	  
of	  ZAB’s	  government,	  the rigging of the 1977 election, and the betrayal by Abdul Hafiz Pirzada of the PPP over the execution of ZAB.99   Aslam Gordaspuri, besides 
providing	  comprehensive	  details	  of	  the	  workers’	  opinions	  and	  their	  sacrifices	  in	  the anti-Zia movement, blames Niazi for his secret alliance with the army which led him to counter PPP with his newly established party.100   The recently published autobiographies of PPP workers Farkhanda Bukhari and Asif Butt provide useful account of, in the first instance, a struggle by a PPP woman and her exile, while the latter mainly describes his journey from nonviolent democratic activism to a violent armed struggle. 101   Raja Anwer has written 
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perhaps the best book on Al-Zulfiqar; being one of its members who eventually fell out with Murtaza Bhutto and the PPP, and had to flee their Kabul camp to save his life.102  It exposes the bloated ambitions of Al-Zulfiqar, with its delusions 
about	  becoming	  a	  force	  on	  a	  par	  with	  Palestine’s	  Al-Fatah or the Irish Republic Army, and the constant fear of	   infiltration	   by	   Zia’s	   agents	   among	   Murtaza’s	  guerrillas.103    Some of Al-Zulfiqar’s	  members	  accused	  Anwer	  of	  being	  an	  agent	  for Zia and blamed him for its organisational leaks.104  In general, these various accounts by PPP workers provide some acerbic critique of the PPP leadership, but are very self-focussed.  
 The third main category is that of scholarly appraisals by national and international academics of the General Zia period and the resistance to his rule. Amongst Pakistanis, the works of Ilyas Shakir, Nadeem Akhtar and Azhar Abbas utilise oral histories of key players, mainly the MRD leaders.105  The interviews provide a rich contribution to our knowledge about the formation of MRD, the launching of civil disobedience, and the successful boycott of the Presidential referendum 1984 in a way that counters the distortions propagated by the Zia regime through its Press and Publication Ordinances of 1963.   However, the authors do not analyse the events, leaving the judgement of their information largely to the reader.  Moreover, none of the two books includes a history of the 
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people’s	   resistance	   to	   the	   regime.	   	  Azhar	   Sohail	   and	  Shabbir	   Ibn-i-Adil analyse 
the	  civil	  resistance	  as	  well	  as	  the	  regime’s	  harsh	  tactics	  against	  it.106   Describing the PNA movement, and taking the circumstantial evidences, Sohail argues that the imposition of martial law was engineered by American intelligence to teach a 
lesson	  to	  ZAB,	  following	  Henry	  Kissinger’s	  threat	  of	  1976.107 Likewise, he holds that the execution of ZAB was the joint plan of the USA and Pakistan Army.   My thesis examines these claims in chapter 1. Besides books, there have been a range of scholarly articles that have observed this history. Aijaz Ahmad examines civil disobedience over the period August-December 1983, adding some historical background on the formation of the MRD, the strategies that it adopted, and its outcome.108   Ahmad, and also Omar Noman argue that Punjab played no significant role in the civil disobedience movement of 1981 and 1983 because the province benefitted economically from the Zia regime.109  Scholars have in this respect noted a forty-one percent increase in income in Pakistanis that was concentrated in the Punjab, as this was the major area receiving remittances from outside the country.110   As it was, except for a couple of initial years in the post-Afghanistan war period when the 
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regime was supported by the temporary influx of petro-dollar111 and taxes were gradually reduced, gross rates of poverty increased for the mass of the people due to the lavish spending on the military.112  Amir Ahmed Khuro, and Imtiaz Ahmed Qureshi provide a description of the movement led by BB, but do not provide useful analysis or attempt to evaluate whether or not it succeeded.113 
 Books by international scholars have largely focused on issues such as 
General’s	   Zia’s	   Islamisation,	   his	   firm	   control	   over	   domestic	   politics,	   and	  
Pakistan’s	   role	   as	   a	   front-State ally.114   There has by contrast been little on popular anti-Zia movements.  Ian Talbot has in his book Pakistan: A Modern 
History looked at the Zia era in Chapter 9.115    There is a brief reference to civil resistance during this period, including the MRD and the Women Action Forum.  
Talbot	   argues	   that	   the	  movement	   failed	   because	   of	   Punjab’s	   non-participation.  In a later book, however, Talbot gives credit to the firmness of the resistance movement, which Zia never managed to crush completely. 116  Moreover, 
referring	   to	   Tehmina	   Durrani’s	   book	   My Feudal Lord, Talbot claims that the hijacking of the PIA plane in 1981 was engineered by the Inter-Services Intelligence to defame the MRD.117 James Wynbrandt and Stephen P. Cohen hardly mention the movement in their writing on Zia. 118  Cohen states                                                         
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115 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp.256-57. 
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117 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p.259. 
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erroneously that the MRD was created by the Jama`at-i-Islami.119   Bruce Reidle has a lot to say about the involvement of the CIA in jihad during the Zia era; he 
does	   not	   however	   look	   at	   the	   interference	   of	   the	   CIA	   in	   Pakistan’s	   domestic	  politics.120   Emma Duncan provides an anthropology of social change in respect to businessmen, politicians, army officers, and landlords during the period. 121   
 To a large extent, even the scholarship on nonviolent resistance has ignored Pakistan.  The much-acclaimed recent book by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan that has analysed 226 campaigns and movements against authoritarian rulers that have occurred all over the world between 1900 and 2006 has failed to mention the MRD in Pakistan.122   An exception to this rule is Stephen Zones, who has looked at the MRD but has described it as a failed Movement.123   He claims that it was limited to Sindh only, with no Punjab participation.    
Theoretical Framework Distinguishing between conventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla struggle and armed insurrection, Randle characterizes civil resistance as involving 
collective action which avoids violence.124   It can be reformist – seeking redress from particular injustice – or revolutionary where the antagonists seek to topple 
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an existing regime.125   It involves mass protest that has a clear political objective, and it is characterised by street protests, non-cooperation, strike action, boycott, symbolic acts of dissent, courting arrest, and the like.   It is also 
popularly	   termed	   ‘non-violent	   action’,	   ‘non-violent	   resistance’,	   ‘civil	  
disobedience’,	   ‘people	  power’	  and	   ‘satyagraha’.126   ‘Mass	   civil	   resistance	  aimed	  
at	  achieving	  a	  variety	  of	  political	  and	  social	  objectives’	  has	  acted	  as	  a	  significant	  force for change in many parts of the world in modern times.127  The protests have been directed against a variety of opponents, ranging from colonial rulers,128 military-occupiers,129 dictators,130 the communist state apparatus,131 racial oppressors,132 and abusers of human and minority rights.133   They may be directed against governments that abuse their power, or be waged over specific issues, such as nuclear armaments, environmental degradation, or economic 
‘liberalisation’	   policies	   that	   adversely	   impact	   large	   numbers.	   	   	   They	   are	   social	  movements that aim to build and exercise a counter-power that either persuades                                                         
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or forces powerful individuals or ruling elites to relinquish their power or reform their ways.   In the process, social movements affect the balance of power, give people a sense of their own power.   Theorists of civil resistance have 
argued	   that	   power	   in	   society	   lies	   ultimately	   with	   the	   ‘people’	   and	   that	   if	   the	  masses withdraw their support, rulers can no longer maintain their control.134    
 Civil resistance has become popular in the past century as it has been seen to work.    In a comparative study of 285 violent and nonviolent campaigns during the twentieth century, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephen have concluded that fifty-five per cent of the nonviolent campaigns were successful, as against only twenty-eight per cent of the violent campaigns.135 Other studies 
have	  endorsed	   these	   findings.	   	  Adrian	  Karatnycky	  argues	   that	   ‘nonviolent	   civic	  
force’	   has	   been	   pivotal	   in	   last	   thirty-five years in replacing fifty authoritarian regimes with democratic regimes.136   There has been a growing interest in the role of nonviolent civil protest and conflict resolution in the creation of strong democratic cultures.  It is argued that a society that is able to express and resolve its differences in a controlled nonviolent manner is likely to be a more tolerant and better-functioning one.137  Many scholars have also directed their attention to the actual techniques and strategies deployed in such movements.  The most                                                         
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notable theorist has been Gene Sharp, who has argued that nonviolence deployed in a strategic manner has provided a powerful and practical means to overcome even the most autocratic of regimes and most entrenched forms of social injustice.138  Sharp’s	   insights	   have	   been	   reinforced	   and	   given	   greater credence in several subsequent books.139  Others have described the potential for nonviolent intervention between conflicting parties, and for mediation and conflict resolution.140 These various studies have all brought out the many positive and important successes achieved by nonviolent protests and interventions during the second half of the twentieth century.     
While	  those	  within	  the	  Gandhian	  tradition	  of	  protest	  stress	  their	  ‘nonviolence’	  as	  an ethic and way of life, political theorists generally maintain that its strength derives from other sources.   John Rawls, for example, argues that it appeals to a common sense of justice:    
 Being an appeal to the moral basis of public life, civil disobedience is a political and not primarily a religious act.  It addresses itself to the common principles of justice, which men can require one another to follow, and not to the aspirations of love which they cannot.  Moreover by taking part in civilly                                                         
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disobedient acts one does not foreswear indefinitely the idea of forcible resistance; for if the appeal against injustice is repeatedly denied, then the majority has declared its intention to invite submission or resistance and the latter may conceivably be justified even in a democratic regime.141 
 Following such an approach, Gene Sharp argues that the majority of participants in nonviolent movements and actions do not have to be believers in nonviolence as an ethical principle, but merely agree to act under nonviolent discipline for the duration of the conflict.142 It is in these two senses that the concept of predominantly nonviolent civil resistance will be understood in this research project – that is, as a form of protest and conflict resolution that seeks tactically to avoid the use of physical force and which, moreover, appeals to a strongly democratic sense of political justice.  
 The literature points out the serious shortcomings with violent forms of resistance.  Revenge attacks on individual oppressors, for example, merely invite counter-violence by the police and army, and they rarely provoke a successful wider revolt.  In terrorism, violence is generally the method deployed by small cliques that lacks popular strength and depth.   This principle has been well understood by some leading revolutionaries, even those with no commitment to nonviolence. Leon Trotsky, for example dismissed terrorism, distinguishing it 
pointedly	  from	  the	  mass	  action	  seen,	   for	  example,	   in	  worker’s	  strikes.143  In the case of mass revolt, it is argued by proponents of nonviolence that that unleashing violence is like letting a genie out of a bottle; once released, it is not                                                         
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easy to put back.   Violent revolutions often have to be maintained by the continuing application of violence by the new rulers.  Revolutionaries who have learned to settle matters using violence frequently find it hard to adapt to more peaceable means after a change of power has occurred.  In this case, the means of resistance determine the eventual outcome.   Proponents of nonviolence also point out the far greater mobilisational power of the strategy.   Violence is most suited to able-bodied males, with women, the elderly and very young unable, as a rule, to play much part.  The need for arms and training similarly excludes many.   Violence is either the method preferred by small and secretive terrorist cells that can ignore the need for mass mobilisation in its politics of terror, or it is the method of relatively isolated groups such as marginalised indigenous peoples, who may create liberated zones in their forest and mountain tracts, but have little or no capability of extending such a politics into the wider society beyond, except through terrorism – which tends to alienate that society.   Nonviolence also encourages dialogue and negotiation, and does not alienate potential allies.  It is thus held to be a far more effective force for building a future democracy.144   
Sources I have used a variety of sources in writing this thesis, located over three continents – in Pakistan, the UK, and the USA.   Pakistan yielded the largest chunk of my material.    In Islamabad, I found information on the role of the Zia regime in the National Archives of Pakistan and the Cabinet Library. Files in the National Archives of Pakistan contained some copies of newspapers, such as the dailies Jang (Rawalpindi and Karachi editions), Nawai-Waqt, Musawat (Urdu),                                                         
144 For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 594-810 
 35 
Dawn (Islamabad), Muslim (Islamabad, in English), and a few copies of weekly magazines, such as Me`yar, Al-Fatah, and Viewpoint (Lahore).  This press material was not however kept in any systematic order in the archives.    I could not obtain much in the way of government records from the Zia material, except for a few reports on Sharia from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The National Documentation Centre started declassifying its record of the first two 
years	   of	   Zia’s	   regime	   only	   last	   year.	   The	   employees	   of	   the	   library	   claimed	   in	  response to my queries that there were no declassified records available from the Zia era.   Since I uncovered some appropriate material in the conventional archives, I collected government reports, conference proceedings, and newspaper files from different sources.  I found useful government reports and legal documents in the library of the Establishment Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and in the National Assembly Library. These 
materials	   helped	  me	   to	   build	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   government’s	   role.	  	  The library of the daily Jang in Rawalpindi, though in a dilapidated condition and affected severely by a flood of 2010, provided useful material.  The libraries of political parties relevant for this period were generally disorganised, an exception being Jama`at-i-Islami’s	   library	   in	   Ichra	   Lahore.	   Taj	   Haider,	   PPP’s	  founding member, claimed that the regime was responsible for the chaos of its 
library.	   	  However,	   I	  was	  able	   to	   locate	  a	  private	  established	  archive	   the	   ‘South	  Asian Research and Resource Center (SARRC)’	  run	  by	  Ahmed	  Salim	  in	  Islamabad,	  which has a huge collection of primary and rare secondary sources on the post-1947 period.  I consulted the weekly Viewpoint magazine’s	  copies	  of	  1977-88, the daily Musawat, and `Amal (published from London).  The Centre for Peace and 
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Civil Society library in Hyderabad – run by Jami Chandio, a renowned human rights activist from the city – provided me a couple of rare sources in Sindhi145 and English. Being a Seraiki speaking, which is closer to Sindhi, and I understood them with the help of my Sindhi friends.   I also consulted the Bacha Khan Library in Peshawar, but found little on the Zia period there.  The second major unofficial source was the collection of private papers from various stakeholders, such as ex-Army officers, members of Majlis-i-Shura, and opposition leaders and activists.   Although many of interviewees revealed that they had to burn their private papers through fear of the regime, I was given access to the private papers of Dr. Aslam Naro of Rahim Yar Khan, a former prisoner of Shahi Qila-Lahore; Shahid S Sheikh of Lahore, a PPP member and prisoner of Shahi Qila-Lahore; Dr. Mehdi Hassan of Lahore, Professor at Beaconhouse University; Javed Iqbal Moazzam of Lahore, a member of Al-Zulfiqar; some pictures	   from	  Mairaj	  M.Khan’s	   collection	   in	  Karachi,	   a	   founding	  member of PPP; Begum Naseem Wali Khan of  Peshawar, a member of ANP; Honey Begum of Peshawar, a member of ANP; and Tahira Abdullah of Islamabad, a human rights activist.  However, despite my best efforts, I could not consult 
Fatehyab	  Ali’s	  personal	  archive,	  which	  is	  now	  managed	  by	  his	  wife,	  Dr.	  Masooma	  Hassan, in Karachi. Since much of the information on the civil resistance of this period is classified or destroyed by the regime I found the best way to obtain information was through interviews with key pro- and anti-Zia figures from that period, many of whom are still alive.  This presented its own set of methodological                                                         
145 Jail diaries of Rasool  Bakhsh  Paleejo’s  Kot Lakhpat ju diary,  Maula  Bakhsh  Chandio’s  Zinda ju Qaidi, 
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conundrums.  I had to be selective in whom I interviewed due to time constraints in my time.  So as to be objective, I tried to interview people representing a range of backgrounds – from different regions, sexes, professions (including administrators), political parties, and political persuasions.  These are all listed in the bibliography, with brief notes on their backgrounds.  In total, I managed to interview thirty-five political leaders and workers, eleven academics, three lawyers, six human rights activists, eight journalists, and one from the defence forces, one civil administrator, and an artist.  Besides recording the interviews in an audio-recorder, I also made a point of observing their body language and facial expressions to see if it matched their anecdotes.  Most of the political interviewees were enthusiastic about recalling what they regarded as their heroic struggle, and a few were nostalgic for the time of struggle.  There were a range of people whom I would like to have interviewed but failed to respond to my telephone requests.  These include Rao Irshad, Editor of Al-Fatah magazine, Dr. Jaffar Ahmed, Director Pakistan Study Centre-Karachi University; Prof. Amin Mughal, founding member of the exile committee in London, Pervez Rasheed, whom I was told had a role in the engineered self-immolation in Rawalpindi after the Lahore High Court had passed the death sentence on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Raja Anwer who was an active member of Al-Zulfiqar and author of a book on the subject.   I was unable to interview Majid Nizami, Chief Editor of the rightist Lahore newspaper Nawai-Waqt, Ghinwa Bhutto, widow of Murtaza Bhutto, and Rasool Bukhsh Paleejo, leader of Awami Tehreek, who were found to be not available on the previously-arranged days for various reasons.     In the UK, I made use of the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the University	   of	  Warwick,	  which	  holds	   a	   full	   catalogue	  of	  Amnesty	   International’s	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archive, copies of magazines such as The Struggle and Hartal, which were 
published	   by	   the	   exiled	   workers	   of	   Pakistan	   People’s	   Party.	   These	   provided	   a	  source of distinctive material covering the activities of Benazir Bhutto and exiled activists abroad, none of which was available in the Pakistani archives.  The MRC also keeps the records of correspondence of the Labour Union of England, which funded labour unions in Pakistan, first against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and later on against General Zia. Moreover, Mushtaq Lasharie, PPP exiled to London, and Muhammad Agha Waseem, exiled to Denmark, member of Al-Zulfiqar provided original material to me on the relationship between Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto with Al-Zulfiqar, which I look at in Chapter 3.   As I felt that international pressure, particularly from the US government, was a very important element in the politics of this period, I applied for and received a Trans-Atlantic Fellowship in 2013 to access the records of the Central Intelligence Agency for 1977-88 that are held in the National Archives and Records Administration Maryland, USA.   I found a vast quantity of material in reports, confidential memoranda, and much more besides. The abundance of this information reveals the importance of Pakistan in US foreign affairs at that time.  Without this excellent material that shed a light on a range of critical issues, my thesis would have been much poorer.    The fellowship also gave me the opportunity to carry out interviews with some key figures residing in America, such as Professor Stephen P. Cohen – who had been in Pakistan in 1979-81 to collect information for his book on the Pakistan Army and who had praised General Zia for his statesmanship – Moeed Yousaf, who was responsible for Pakistani affairs at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) – and Dr. Aparna Pande, who worked with Hussain Haqqani on Pakistan at the Hudson Institute in 
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Washington DC. They all disclosed various information not documented in any archives.    Lastly, I draw widely upon published sources. Such sources, mentioned earlier in section 4, were essential to evaluate the dominant discourses on the Zia regime.   
Roadmap In this final section of the introduction, I shall briefly set out the themes of the chapters. 
 Ch. 1. The Campaign to Save Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On 5 July 1977, Pakistan witnessed its third declaration of martial law by the army (the first after the separation from East Pakistan) under the Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia-ul-Haq.  Amidst the political chaos that resulted from allegations of rigging in the General Election for the National Assembly of 7 March 1977 and the failure to come to any agreement between the winners – the	   Pakistan	   People’s	   Party	  under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – and the losing Pakistan National Alliance under Mufti Mahmood, the army seized power with the stated objective of holding free and fair elections within ninety days as given by the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.  However, the election was postponed, being replaced by a policy of accountability – phele 
aihtesab phir itikhab (first accountability, then election) – being then followed by the judicial killing of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 4 April 1979.  This chapter analyses the resistance of the PPP to Martial Law and the efforts made to save the life of its founder.  
 Ch. 2. Formative Phase of Collective Action 1979-81. The death of ZAB 
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was a great setback both for the PPP and for democracy in Pakistan in general. ZAB had helped restore the morale of the people after the defeat in war of 1971, and he had become known as Quaid-i-Awam, 
Fakhr-i-Asia through his reputation for working for the poor and 
depressed	  classes.	  	  	  ZAB’s	  family	  could	  have	  accepted	  the	  new	  regime	  and gone into exile, but chose instead to fight the dictator.   To do this, they had to build and maintain a strong opposition movement, which involved in winning over those who had initially supported General Zia but who had become increasingly exasperated by his failure to restore democracy.  
 Ch. 3. New Struggle 1981-84: Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).  The year 1981 saw the start of a new struggle for democracy in Pakistan. Opposition parties and like-minded political groups or parties created a joint strategy to get rid of the dictatorship and restore democratic norms in the country. In December 1980, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was planned by a cluster of opposition political parties to operate under one agenda for restoring democracy in the country. Announced publicly on 6 February 1981, the movement faced a ruthless reaction from the regime but it was able to inspire the citizens to struggle for their democratic rights.  Most historians and political scientists have considered that this movement was ultimately a failure.  This dissertation argues however that it was part of a continuum in a 
‘gradualist	   democratic’	   movement	   that	   eventually	   paved	   the	   way	  towards holding elections and ending martial law in 1985. This 
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chapter analyses the structure, strategies, and the results of the movement during the 1981-84 period, as well as, the	   dictator’s	  oppression of the predominantly unarmed resisters. 
 Ch.	  4.	  Decline	  of	  Dictator’s	  Power	  1984-86. Despite the sudden calling off of the civil disobedience movement in December 1983 by Nusrat Bhutto and other MRD leaders without achieving its objectives – namely the holding of free and elections, the end of martial law, and the revival of the Constitution of 1973 – during the previous period, the grip on power of the Zia regime began to loosen during the period 1984-86.   He held a controversial Presidential referendum on 19 December 1984, followed in February 1985 by a long-awaited general election in February 1985, and then the lifting of martial law in December 1985. It is argued that these developments were the 
consequences	  of	  the	  people’s	  struggle over the previous seven years. 
Zia’s	  own	  support	  within	  the	  army	  also	  began	  to	  waver.	  The	  chapter	  examines the struggle that was carried on in exile by some of the leading opponents of Zia, looking at its effect on the ground in Pakistan.  
 Ch. 5. Revival of Democracy 1986-88.  When martial law was lifted on 
30	  December	  1985,	  Khan	  Abdul	  Wali	  Khan	  commented	  that	  “it	  is	  like	  facing a person who has not used his gun for some time but who 
continues	  to	  hold	  it	  in	  his	  hand	  and	  can	  wield	  it	  any	  moment”.146  As it 
was,	   this	   ‘gun’	   was	   turned	   on	   the	   handpicked	   Prime	   Minister	   of	  
                                                        
146 Khan Abdul Wali Khan, at a political gathering in Lahore on 2 February 1986. cited in Viewpoint, XI 
(26), 6 February 1986, p.15. 
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General Zia, Muhammad Khan Junejo, when the General dismissed his government and called fresh elections after three months, in June 1988.  Zia continued to oppress his opponents and stifle the press, even in the run-up to the elections. This chapter will examine the response of the MRD to these developments.  On 10 April 1986 Benazir Bhutto received a mammoth welcome on her return from exile, which set off alarm bells for Zia.  She asked the General	  ‘to	  leave	  
the	  country	  gracefully’147, as she did not believe in revenge.  Two years later, Zia was dramatically killed in a suspicious air crash.                       
                                                        
147 Benazir Bhutto, Speeches to Public gathering in Punjab. cited in Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, 
p.13. 
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Ch. 1. The Campaign to Save Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
Zulfiqar	  Ali	  Bhutto’s	  great	  achievement	  was	  to	  restore	  the	  morale	  of	  the	  people	  of West Pakistan after the disastrous defeat in the Bangladesh War of 1971 and loss of East Pakistan.   After the Pakistan Army had surrendered to the Indian Army in Dhaka, the military ruler General Yahya Khan, who held the post of Chief Martial Law Administrator, called on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then in New York defending Pakistan in the United Nations, and appointed him the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) as well as President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971.    Bhutto was a very popular politician who had established the centre-left	  Pakistan	  People’s	  Party	  in	  1967.	  Its	  mission	  statement	  was	  ‘Islam	  is	  our religion, Socialism is our economy, and Democracy is our	  politics’,	  and	  had	  the slogan roti, kapra aur makan (Bread, Clothing, and Housing). 148   Between December 1971 and 5 July 1977, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) accomplished much. He brokered the Simla Agreement with India, arranged the repatriation of 90,000 prisoners	   of	   war	   from	   Indian’s	   prisons,	   gave	   the	   first	  constitution approved unanimously by all political parties in 1973, held an Islamic summit, enhanced the nuclear capability of the country, and carried through economic and social reforms, among many other achievements.149                                                          
148 See, for example,  http://www.ppp.org.pk , Philip E. Jones, Pakistan  People’s  Party:  The  Rise   to  
Power (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Aslam Gordaspuri, Shaheed Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto ki Dastaan-i-Hyat  aur  Pakistan  People’s  Party   (Lahore: Fiction House, 2010); Abdul Ghafoor 
Bhurgri, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: The Falcon of Pakistan (Karachi: SZABIST, 2002); Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi 
Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993). We might note that 
some  political  parties  such  as  Jama’at-i-Islami, and a few military authors such as K.M.Arif, blamed 
ZAB as much as Yahya Khan for the break-up of Pakistan. See, for example, K.M.Arif, Working with 
Zia Pakistan: Power Politics 1977-88 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
149 See, for details, Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History; V.Y.Belokrenitsy, and V.N.Moskalenko, A 
Political History of Pakistan, pp.210-234; Gordaspuri, Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; Kausar  Niazi, Aur 
Line Cut gai; Niazi, The Last Days of Premier Bhutto (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991); Jones, Pakistan 
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Hoping to capitalise on this, and giving very short notice to his opponents, ZAB announced in January 1977 that there would be elections in March 1977, a year before they were due.  There were many vested interests in Pakistan that opposed his policies, such as land reforms, nationalisation, building nuclear capability, control over military and civilian administration, and religious issues, and there was also political jealousy.150  Some of the opposition parties were already in an alliance	   called	   the	   ‘United	   Democratic	  
Front’	  (UDF)	  but	  it	  had	  been	  inactive	  for	  the	  past	  one	  year.151 Some parties had also been banned.  The UDF immediately reacted to the call of election and launched a new alliance of nine parties named the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)152 along with some other parties such as the defunct NAP on 10 January 1977, within three days of the announcement of the election.153   ZAB judged that the amalgamation of four secular parties154 out of nine155 to be a short-term 
                                                                                                                                                             
People’s   Party; Bhurgri, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Kamaleshwar Sinha, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Six  Steps to 
Summit (New Delhi: unknown publisher, 1972); Syed Rasul Raza, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: The Architect of 
a New Pakistan (Sarhad Publications, 1977). 
150 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Delhi: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 
pp.194-217; Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: McMillan Press, 
2000); Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp.218-234. Belokrenitsy, and Moskalenko, A Political 
History of Pakistan, pp.234-254. 
151 Established in 1973, the alliance held Jamiat-i-Ulemai Islam (JUI), Jamiat-i-Ulemai-Pakistan (JUP), 
Jama’at-i-Islami (JI), National Awami Party, Khaksar Tehreek (KT), Pakistan Muslim League-Council 
(PML-C), Pakistan Muslim League-Convention (PML-Con.) Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). 
The Pakistan Democratic Movement was itself an opposition alliance established against General 
Ayub  Khan’s   government  under  Nawabzada  Nasrullah  Khan  on  30  April   1967.  Me’yar, 5-12 March 
1977, National Archives of Pakistan (NAP) NAP/BRR/P-2821, pp.26-27. See, For example, Akhtar 
Hussain, Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999 [unpublished, PhD Thesis] (Quaid-i-Azam 
University, 2008), p. 64. 
152 PNA consisted of the three religious parties – Jama’at-i-Islami (JI), Jamiat-i-Ulemai Islam (JUI), 
Jamiat-i-Ulemai Pakistan (JUP) – and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Pakistan Democratic Party 
(PDP) Khaksar Tehreek (KT) of Modern Islamists, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal, and National Democratic Party 
(NDP) of secular, leftist parties.  
153 Hussain, Politics of Alliances, p.93. 
154 Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Tehreek-i-Istiqlal (TI), National Democratic Party (NDP) and 
National Awami Party (NAP). 
155 Jama’at-i-Islami   (JI),  Muslim  Conference  (MC),  Pakistan  Muslim  League  (PML),   Jamia’t-i-Ulema-i-
Pakistan (JUP), and Jamiat-i-Ulemai-Islam (JUI-Fazal) 
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‘political	  honeymoon’.156   PPP leaders, and workers, therefore, chanted a slogan 
Nau Tare Hair Pher, Adhe Teetar Adhe Batair (nine stars are swindles comprising of half quails, and half partridges).157  Fully confident of his public popularity and party position,158 ZAB allowed PNA to contest the election under one emblem so that it became a contest between two main groups, the PPP and the PNA.  7 and 10 March were 
set	   as	   the	   dates	   for	   the	   National	   and	   Provincial	   Assemblies’	   election	  respectively. PPP won the National Assembly’s	  election	  by	  155	  out	  of	  196	  seats	  while PNA got only thirty-six seats. 159  Some	  of	   PNA’s	  party	  heads	  were	   even	  defeated in their home constituencies. Some opposition leaders had boycotted the election on grounds that the PPP had rigged the ballot.160  Two days after the results were declared, they launched a movement demanding the re-holding of free and fair elections.  Their demand soon took on a religious colour when the PNA leaders demanded the promulgation of Nizam-i-Mustafa (System of Muhammad, the Prophet).    Their agitation spread, becoming a threat to law 
                                                        
156 ZAB’s speech, March 1977, Me’yar, 5 March-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p.6. 
157 Viewpoint, 15 April 1979, p.8. 
158 There were 200 seats in the national assembly, and PPP had already won 19 seats uncontested 
(15 from Sindh and 4 from Baluchistan).  Eight seats from Tribal belts went to the winning party 
automatically. Therefore, PPP needed only 74 more seats for a simple majority in the National 
Assembly, whereas, his opponents required 101 seats out of the 169 constituencies in which its 
candidates were contesting the election,  Me’yar, 5 March-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p.6. 
159 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and Sultan Ahmad Chandio, Makhdoom Zaman Talib Mola 
(Hala-Hyderabad), Matar Mujtasa Jatoi (Nawab Shah), Matar Sultan Chandio (Larkana), Mir Mehrab 
Khan Bajrani (Jacobabad), Abdul Fatah Memon (Nawabshah), Noor Muhammad Lund(sukker), Mir 
Sikander Khan (Dado), Taj Muhammad Jamali (Sibi), Aman Ullah Gajki (Qalat), Mohiyuddin (Qalat) – 
in total 10 leaders – were declared uncontested winner since no one submitted application for 
running the coming election against them in their respective constituencies.  All were from Sindh 
except  two  from  Qalat  and  Sibi.  According  to  the  official  sources,  80%  voters  cast  their  vote.  Bhutto’s  
victory was also praised in the editorial of Jang on 22 January 1977 for solving the crisis of the 
leadership in the country. Later, the same newspaper supported the unconstitutional coup of the 
Pakistan Army.   
160 In a joint press conference in Karachi, the opposition leaders Mian Mahmood Qasoori, Ch. 
Rehmat Ali and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad accused PPP of stopping opposition candidates submitting 
their papers for the election. Jang, 21 January 1977. 
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and order.  It took a violent turn after ZAB imposed martial law in three big cities, Karachi, Hyderabad, and Lahore. Law enforcement agencies including the Army opened fire on the public in the March and April, killing four civilians.   It was at this juncture that the army chief General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq began to consider overthrowing the government.161  Seeing the situation getting worse, ZAB and PNA leaders started a dialogue to resolve the political turmoil.  Even after very long deliberations, they failed to produce any political solution to the issue.162  On	   5	   July,	   General	   Zia	   carried	   out	   a	   coup	   d’état	   that	   he	   named	  
‘Operation	  Fair	  Play’.163 The constitution was suspended rather than abrogated and martial law was imposed, supposedly on a temporary basis, so that free and fair elections could be held within ninety days and the government handed over to whoever won.   As it was, Zia was in power for the next eleven years, continuously promising to hold an election soon.164  After the imposition of the martial law, the political scenario in the country turned against ZAB and PPP.   The opposition parties aligned themselves opportunistically with Zia leaving ZAB and PPP isolated.  This allowed Zia to take out a case against ZAB for the alleged murder in 1974 of Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri, the father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, an ex-PPP member, and then one of the opposition leaders.  ZAB was duly found guilty and executed on 4 April 1979.                                                           
161 Azhar Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara Saal (Lahore, year and publisher is missing), pp.23-26. General 
Zia-ul-Haq, Interview to Altaf Hassan Qureshi, September 1977. Cited in Shabbir Ibne Adil, General 
Zia k dus saal, (Karachi: Shabbal Publication, 1988), pp.17-20. 
162 The longest, on 2-3 July 1977, lasted 13½ hours. Jang, 2 July 1977.  
163 Zia was at that time poorly-regarded in Pakistan, being seen as a malleable appointee of ZAB. Arif 
stated   in   his   book   that   he   was   of   ‘moderate   intelligence,   dual-personality   and   sluggish’.      Arif, 
Working with Zia, p. 178. 
164 He did eventually hold the election in 1985 on non-party basis. For details, Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, 
General Zia k Aakhri Das Saal (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993).  This is discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
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This chapter examines the period between 5 July 1977 and 4 April 1979.   It adds to the existing historiography on the reasons for the imposition of the 
martial	   law,	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   resulting	   protest	   led	   by	   PPP,	   and	   the	   regime’s	  tactics to suppress the resistance. The chapter also looks at the way that the regime went ahead and hanged ZAB, despite all the mercy appeals to spare him. 
Imposition of Martial Law:  
At	  2.30am	  on	  5	  July	  1977,	  ZAB’s	  valet	  was	  alarmed	  to	  see	  that	  the	  police	  guard	  
on	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   house	   was	   no	   longer	   there	   and	   he	   rushed	   to	   ZAB’s	  bedroom to inform him.   ZAB, who was still awake, tried to telephone General Zia to ask what was happening, but found the lines were dead.  He managed to find one functioning line – which was the private line of his second daughter Sanam – and	  called	  Zia,	  who	  told	  him:	  ‘I’m	  sorry,	  Sir,	  I	  had	  to	  do	  it.	  […]	  We	  have	  to hold you in protective custody for a while.	  But	   in	  ninety	  days	   I’ll	   hold	  new	  
elections.	   You’ll	   be	   elected	   Prime	   Minister	   again,	   of	   course,	   Sir,	   and	   I’ll	   be	  
saluting	  you’.165  He was taken to the hill station of Murree later that day, where 
– though	   under	   temporarily	   ‘protective	   custody’	   – he was provided all the facilities of his previous position.166  
                                                        
165 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East: An Autobiography (London: reprinted, 2008), p.92. 
166 BB mentioned he was taken to Murree at 9am (Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p. 96), whereas Arif 
said it was at 4pm (Arif, Working with Zia, p. 147).  Arif, Working with Zia, p. 147. Protective 
Detention is the holding of a person or persons without trail when the evidence available is not 
sufficient to charge them or convict them by legal proof, but under which persons can still be 
confined in order to prevent them from acting in a particular way, for reasons connected with the 
security of the state or the maintenance of public order. This law is often found in countries formerly 
under British rule. It was introduced in the sub-continent during WWI and WWII, and its provisions 
became an integral part of Pakistan law after independence. Amnesty International,  ‘Islamic  Republic  
of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-
12   May   1976’,   May   1977,   MSS.34/4/1/Pk1,   Modern   Record   Center,   The   University   of   Warwick  
(MRC), p.33. 
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Why was the night of 4-5 July chosen?  The post-election disturbances appeared to have died down by then after semi-martial law was imposed in the cities of Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad.  Zia was asked right after he had seized power at what juncture he had decided to impose martial law and had replied 
that	   ‘he	   took	   action	   “after	   listening	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   talks	   between	  Bhutto	  
and	  PNA	  in	  the	  press	  conference	  at	  5pm	  on	  4	  July”’.167  However, in September 1977 General Zia answered the same question by stating that it was in May that 
he	  had	  started	  to	  consider	  the	  feasibility	  of	  toppling	  ZAB’s	  government.168    
Responding	  to	  Zia’s	  claim	  that	  negotiations	  had	  broken	  down	  on	  4	  July,	  some of those involved such as Professor Ghafoor Ahmed (represented PNA), and Maulana Kausar Niazi (represented PPP) denied that this was the case.   Instead, according to Ghafoor Ahmed, they were well on the way to reaching a settlement.169  Niazi stated that ZAB had already announced at a press conference at the Prime Minister Residence held at 23.30 on 4 July his readiness to sign the agreement with PNA the next morning.170  The hostile slogans had been replaced with ‘Mufti-Bhutto	  Bhai	  Bhai’ (Mufti Mahmood and Bhutto are brothers).171  Unfortunately, by next morning no agreement was possible.   Instead, a satiric slogan composed after the coup declared: Na hul aya na talwar, 
agai poncho wali sarkar (Neither plough nor sword came, only a government of the moustache).172  
                                                        
167 Newsweek,  19  July  1977,  quoted  in  Arif’s  Working with Zia, p.133.  
168 General Zia-ul-Haq, Interview to Altaf Hassan Qureshi, September 1977. 
169 Ghafoor Ahmed, Aur Phir Marshal Law agya, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1988), p. 249. 
170 Niazi, Aur Line Cut gai, p. 170. 
171 Ashraf  Shad,  ‘Qaumi  Ittehad-Samjhote  k  Ba’ad’,  Me’yar, 25June-2 July, NAP/BRR/P-2837, p.7. 
172 Plough was the election symbol of PNA while the sword was of PPP. Whereas, General Zia had 
Mostache. Sometimes, the joke carries the line agai Booton wali Sarkar (the  army  of   ‘Black  boots’  
has come) in the second verse. 
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Although, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate in depth the reasons for the imposition of martial law, we may say a little on the subject.  One of the reasons was the presence of some black sheep in both parties, such as Asghar Khan and Begum Naseem Wali Khan of PNA, and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada of PPP.   Asghar Khan, head of Tehreek-i-Istiqlal (TI), played a critical role, sending a well-publicised letter to the Pakistan Army on 25 April 1977 in which he emotionally and in patriotic terms exhorted it to refuse to act 
on	   the	   ‘unlawful	   orders’	   of	   ZAB’s	   ‘unlawful’	   government.173  According to one anecdote, Asghar Khan attended a dinner meeting hosted by Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan, one of the deal-brokers on 4 July at which he opposed the deal done with ZAB and said that they should resume the public movement to bring down the government.174 Likewise, Begum Naseem Wali Khan, representing the National Democratic Party (NDP), declared	   the	   agreement	   was	   ‘just	   a	   simple	  
paper’.175 For them, the main aim was to get rid of ZAB.176  Interviewing her, she confessed that she was against signing any agreement with ZAB.177  Although the head of the NDP, Sher Baz Mazari, was prepared to sign the agreement, she openly went against him in this.  Once, the news spread that PPP and PNA had come	  to	  an	  agreement,	   she	  protested	  and	  said	   to	  Mufti	  Mahmood	   ‘back in our province the people will not leave hair on	  my	  head	  and	  in	  your	  beard’.178  When he refused to respond to her favourably, she contacted Pir Pagara and asked for 
                                                        
173 For read the full letter see: M. Asghar Khan, We’ve  Learnt  Nothing  from  History  Pakistan:  Politics  
and Military Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 133-34. Roedad Khan, Pakistan- A 
Dream Gone Sour (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
174 Ahmed, Aur Phir Marshal Law agya, pp. 250-53. 
175 Me’yar, 25June-2 July 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2837, p.7. 
176 Me’yar, 26 March-2 April 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2824, p.7. 
177 Begum Naseem Wali Khan, Interview, 4 February 2012, Charsadda. 
178 Begum Naseem Wali Khan, Interview. 
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the same help.  On being asked by the researcher the reasons for her opposition to the agreement, she said that nothing was said about Balochistan or the release of Wali Khan.  She confirmed that every party except TI and NDP had agreed to sign the agreement the next morning.179   Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, who was negotiating for the PPP, wanted – for his part – to wrest yet more concessions from the opposition before signing the agreement.180  The upshot of this was that all the political leaders lost out.   An	   important	   element	   in	   ZAB’s	   fall that is generally ignored related to 
Pakistan’s	   ambition	   to	   build	   nuclear	   weapons	   capability.	   	   ZAB	   had	   initially	  favoured such a programme, as revealed in books by himself and Niazi.181  The US government had opposed this strongly, with Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, threatening severe consequences if Pakistan attempted to become nuclear.  Not wanting to fall out with the USA, ZAB met with the US Ambassador on 3 July 1977 and stated next day that Pakistan had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.182   Zia and other Army top brass were alarmed 
at	  ZAB’s	  announcement,	  as	   they	  wanted	   to	  develop	  nuclear	  weapons	   in	  secret	  
and	  felt	  that	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  was	  undermining	  Pakistan’s	  security	  by	  talking	  about the issue in public.  Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema has claimed that Zia was 
subsequently	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  ‘ambiguous	  nuclear	  policy’	  of	  Pakistan.183   By                                                         
179 Begum Naseem Wali Khan, Interview. 
180 Niazi, Aur Line Cut gai, p. 167-69. 
181 See, Niazi, aur line cut gai, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1969). 
182 Jang, 3 July 1977; Memorandum from the White House Washington, 4 July 1977. Top Secret. 3pp. 
‘Shah  Conversation  with  Bhutto’,  1078,  NLC-1-2-4-9-5, NARA, p.2; Memorandum for the President 
from Zbigniew Brzezinski,   5   July   1977.   ‘Information   items’.   Top   Secret.   4pp.  Department   of   State,  
1181, NLC-1-2-4-10-3, NARA, pp.1-4. 
183 Pervez  Iqbal  Cheema,  ‘Pakistan’s  Nuclear  Policy  under  Z.A.Bhutto  and  Zia-ul-Haq:  An  Assessment’,  
Strategic Studies, cited in Peter R.Lavoy, Douglass D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the 
Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (New York: 
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seizing power on 5 July, the military forestalled any attempts by ZAB to roll back the nuclear programme. Although, Zia did not immediately abrogate the constitution, he replaced key civilians with high-up military commanders and issued fourteen ordinances in less than a week, which indicated that he had long-term plans for his rule.  To administer the country, he divided the country into four provincial zones under Provincial Martial Law Administrators (PMLAs),184 with District Martial Law Administrators (DMLA) under them.  Punjab was divided into five units.185  Summary military courts (SMC)186 and special military courts (Sp.MC)187 were constituted under Martial Law Ordinances (MLO) number 4, 5, and 6 to try 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cornell Studies Press, 2000), pp.161-63. 
184 Zone-A Punjab Lt. General Sawar Khan, HQ, Punjab Martial Law Administration Lahore, and Mr. 
Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain, Acting Governor of Punjab; Zone-B (NWFP-KPK) Lt.General Fazle Haq, 
HQ, NWFP Martial Law Administrator, Justice Abdul Hakim Khan, Acting Governor of NWFP, Zone-C, 
Sindh Lt. General Sadiqur Reshid Mohammad Abbasi, HQ, Martial Law Administrator, Justice Abdul 
Kadir Sheikh, Acting Governor of Sind, and Zone-D Balochistan Lt. General Rahimuddin Khan, HQ 
Martial Law Administrator, Justice Mir Khuda Bux Marri, Acting Governor of Baluchistan. 
185 Sector I, Civil Division of Lahore, under DMLA Major General Ahmad Jamal Khan, HQ Lahore 
Cantonment; Sector II, Civil Division of Sargodha under DMLA Major General S F S K Lodhi, HQ 
Sargodha; Sector III, Civil Division of Multan, DMLA Major General Ijaz Azeem, HQ Multan Cantt; 
Sector IV, Bahawalpur Civil Division, DMLA Major General Ghulam Muhammad, HQ Bahawalpur; 
Sector V, Civil Division Rawalpindi and Federal Capital DMLA Major General Shah Rafi Alam, Sitar-i-
Jurat, HQ Rawalpindi. DMLA can appoint Sub Martial Law Administrators at district levels. Nawai-
Waqt, 10 July 1977. 
186 Jang, 11 July 1977. SMC consisted of one member only. The accused could address the courts and 
cross-examine witnesses, but only a memorandum of the evidence was needed to be taken down. 
The accused had no right of representation by a lawyer, although the accused might have a person 
to  assist  him,  who  could  be  a  legal  adviser.  He  might  be  present  during  proceedings  as  a  “friend  of  
the  accused”,  and  may  advise  him  in  that  capacity.  The   friend of the accused could not address the 
court directly. Maximum punishment under SMC was one year, and 10-15 lashes. No provision of 
appeal, but the proceedings of the summary military court could be sent to the Provincial Martial 
Law Administrator for review. Cited in Amnesty International,   ‘Short   Report   of   an   Amnesty  
International Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 20-25   January   1978’,   MSS.34/4/1/pk   4,  
MRC. 
187 SpMC consisted of three persons, one magistrate, and two of the rank of a Major or a Lieutenant 
Colonel.  Only   a   summary   of   the   evidence  was   needed   to   be   recorded   and,   if   necessary,   “may   be  
dispensed  with  in  a  case  and  in  lieu  thereof  an  abstract  of  evidence  may  be  recorded”  (Martial  Law  
Order No.5, 11 July 1977). The courts may impose all punishments, including death penalty, and 
amputation of a hand, however, these last two was needed to be confirmed by CMLA. Any question 
on the court could be referred to CMLA (MLO No.13), whose decision was final. Cited in Amnesty 
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contraventions of martial law orders and regulations and other offences.188  Fourteen martial law ordinances were issued on 11 July,189 such as Martial Law Regulation (MLR) 1 banning political meetings, processions, issuing any political statement, agitating at any educational institutions, with violators receiving up to five years rigorous imprisonment and/or whipping not exceeding five lashes.   MLR 5 prohibited participation in political meetings or processions taken without prior permission of the martial law administration, on pain of punishments of up to seven years imprisonment and/or a maximum ten lashes.  Likewise, under MLR 12 agitations and protests by trade unions could be punished with up to three years imprisonment and/or ten lashes. Financial help to political parties and attacks on civil officials or members of the military could be punished with death.   Under MLR 4, publication of any 
material,	  “calculated	  to	  promote	  feeling	  of	  enmity	  or hatred between provinces, 
classes,	  sects	  or	  religious	  order”	  was	  liable	  to	  up	  to	  ten	  years	  of	  imprisonment	  and/or thirty lashes.  On 22 July, three more ordinances were issued that made any activity that undermined the security of the country or attempted to foment rebellion by the armed forces against the government or Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) a capital offence.  MLO 12, which was later augmented with MLR 23 was the most oppressive and most frequently exercised ordinance 
                                                                                                                                                             
International,  ‘Short  Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
20-25  January  1978’,  MSS.34/4/1/pk  4,  MRC. 
188 Amnesty International, ‘Martial   Law   orders   and   Regulations   Introduced   Since   5   July   1977   of  
Concern  to  Amnesty  International’,  October 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC, p.5. 
189 Amnesty International, ‘Martial   Law   orders   and   Regulations   Introduced   Since   5   July   1977   of  
Concern  to  Amnesty  International’,  October  1977’,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk3,  MRC. 
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of the regime enforced by the SMC.190 It empowered the CMLA, PMLA and DMLA to order the detention of any person on very broad grounds: For the purpose of the preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the purpose for which Martial Law has been proclaimed or interest, the defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of Pakistan of the efficient conduct of martial law. Initial detention: 3 months, extendable by PMLA up to 12 months as per the MLO No.27.191 Whipping and amputation were also introduced as legal punishments.192   All of this indicated that Zia had plans for a long period of rule, despite his continuing promise to hold free and fair elections.193   K.M.Arif has written that Zia was impressed by the supposed benefits of long-term dictatorial rule, as in countries such as Nigeria, North Korea and Romania.194 Azhar Sohail noted 
that	  headed	   letter	  pads	   for	   the	  CMLA’s	   secretariat	  were	  printed	   in	   thousands,	  enough to last for years.195  Some analysts predicted that Zia would hold on to power for a long time, something he continued to deny.196                                                           
190 Issued on 21 September 1978, repealed the earlier martial law regulations no.12, prohibited any 
strikes or lockouts. Maximum punishment was 3 years imprisonment, and/or flogging upto 10. 
Amnesty International,  ‘Short  Report  of  an  Amnesty  International  Mission  To  the  Islamic  Republic  Of  
Pakistan 20-25 January 1978’,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk3,  MRC,  p.11. 
191 Amnesty  International,  ‘Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission TO the Islamic Republic 
Of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978’,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC, p .10. 
192 MLR Nos.6, and 7, issued on 11 July 1977, introduced the amputation of one hands as possible 
punishment for persons convicted of theft, robbery, and dacoit (Armed robbery with five or more 
persons).  It had to be carried out by a qualified surgeon under local anaesthetic, in public or in jail. 
Amnesty International, ‘Martial Law orders and Regulations Introduced Since 5 July 1977 of Concern 
to  Amnesty   International’,  October   1977,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk3,  MRC,   pp.3-4. Public Flogging was later 
abolished in all cases on 2 October 1995 by the then Federal cabinet. Amnesty International, 
‘Pakistan  appeal  to  ban  public  flogging’,  November  1995,  MSS.  34/4/1/Pk120,  MRC. 
193 Jang, 15 July 1977. 
194 Arif, Working with Zia, p.177.  
195 Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara Saal, p.102. Nafees Siddiqui, interview with Ilyas Shakir, cited in Ilyas 
Shakir, MRD Kamyabian Nakamian (Karachi: Shabal Publications, 1985), p.74. 
196 Jang, 15 July 1977. 
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Initially the reaction to the imposition of Martial Law was muted, with no public condemnation by any political leaders,197 businessmen, union leaders, students,198 or civil society actors.199  Rather people, including a few PPP members, distributed sweets in the streets while pro-democratic people remained silent.200 Mahmood, speaking on behalf of all political leaders asked them to obey the martial law ordinances.201 The next day Begum Naseem Wali Khan visited the shrine of Imam Bari202 and replaced her black chaddar with a white one.203 Tribal leaders and the people of Balochistan largely welcomed martial law. Women esteemed the act of General Zia of not arresting Begum Naseem Wali Khan. Furthermore, leading newspapers failed to condemn the imposition of martial law.204  Rather, the American magazine Time reported that the majority of opposition parties and politicians celebrated it.205 Even Amnesty International welcomed the new regime and its actions of abolishing special tribunals, revoking Emergency and the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) and 
                                                        
197 Mian Muhammad Tufail, Ameer Jamat-i-Islami  Pakistan,  Maulana  Mufti  Mahmood  (head  of  PNA’s  
delgates), Shah Ahmad Noorani and Nawab Sher Baz Mazari. Jang, and Nawai-Waqt, 6 July 1977. 
Jamiat-i-Ulmai Islam published a press release, while Maulana Mufti Mahmood welcomed general 
Zia and his promise of holding election and implementing Islamic punishments. 
198 Siddique  Al  Farooq,  President  Punjab  Student’s  Federation  Rawalpindi  Chairman  (currently  he   is  
PML-N).  Jang, 7 July 1977.  
199 At a time of torrential rain, the army, and the political parties especially JI provided extraordinary 
care to the affected people that brought approval for the regime. 
200 Jang, 13 July 1977.  
201 Jang, 17 July 1977. 
202 Shrines of Sufi Saints have a sacred place in the hearts of people of Pakistan. The majority 
believes in asking divine help through these saints for fulfilling any wish. If fulfilled, they visit the 
shrine and offer prayers and money.  
203 Black colour is a symbol of protest, whilst the White is for ending a protest. Her change of colour 
gave a welcoming message to the martial law regime. Me’yar, 25June-2 July, NAP/BRR/P-2837, p.8. 
Jang, 7 July 1977. 
204 The researcher looked at Daily Jang, Daily Nawai-Waqt, and Daily Dawn, the most read 
newspapers in Pakistan. Rather, the editorials   approved   the   regime’s   martial   law   having   the  
objective of holding free and fair election under the military.  
205 Jang, 15 July 1977. 
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restoring constitutional powers to the higher judiciary and safeguarding their independence, which had been curtailed under ZAB.206 
Zia’s	   cunning	   move	   caused	   confusion in Pakistan.  Firstly, since the government as well as the three chiefs of the armed forces had publicly announced their loyalty to the democratic process and government a few days before the coup; the public, and even PPP parlimentarians, were of the opinion that ZAB himself asked the army to take over so that he could force his opponents to agreement to his conditions.207  Lacking any forewarning, PPP 
workers	   failed	   to	   react	   immediately.	   Secondly,	   General	   Zia’s	   invention	   of	   the	  
term	  ‘protective	  custody’ lulled possible opposition.  Ghafoor Ahmed stated that 
he	   had	   felt	  when	   put	   into	   ‘custody’	   that	   it	  might	   be	   a	   tactic	   to	   lock	   the	   party	  leaders in one room until they solved the political deadlock, and indeed this option had been suggested by some newspaper editors few days earlier.208  Lastly, the stated purpose of the martial law was to hold free and fair election within ninety days, and political parties and workers did not see any reason to 
doubt	  this.	  Mehdi	  Hasan	  said	  that	  seeing	  ZAB’s	  scornful	  behaviour in a meeting with General Zia on 15 July cast doubt on the idea of his blessing for the military action.  Nevertheless, the unexpected declaration of martial law failed to 
                                                        
206 Those are the issues which AI raised in its report of early 1977, and recommended the then 
government to abolish them. However, the Military regime replaced the laws by Martial Law Order, 
especially MLO 12 serves the regime similarly as DPR 1972, 1973, and 1974 against the political 
opponents. Political prisoners including ZAB and others were arrested under MLO-12 afterwards. 
Amnesty International,  ‘Islamic  Republic  of  Pakistan:  An  Amnesty  International  Report  including  the  
findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12  May  1976’,  May  1977,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk1,  MRC,  pp.1-2. 
207 Interviews with Dr. Mehdi Hasan, 3 March 2013, Lahore; Shahida Jabeen, 26 February 2012, 
Lahore; Qazi Sultan, 17 April 2012, Rawalpindi; Aslam Gordaspuri, 6 May 2013, Lahore. And Sindh 
parliamentarians asked the question from Nusrat Bhutto once they met her in Clifton. Ex-Senator 
PPP, Kamal Azfar Alhaj Dilawar Khan was amongst the parliamentarians. Jang, 8-10 July 1977. 
208 Ahmed, Aur phir martial law agya, pp.254-55. 
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provoke any immediate reaction from any believers in democracy, and especially PPP workers.  All political leaders were released from protective custody within a short period – ZAB on 27 July.   He decided to launch a campaign of public speeches, political gatherings, and protest meetings, and political noncooperation.209   During these two months, ZAB demonstrated his clear leadership abilities and clarity of purpose, qualities that Ackerman and Kruegler hold as being extremely important in civil resistance leadership.210  
For	  ZAB,	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  mobilise	  people’s	  power	  in	  his	  favour,	  as he had alienated many people in Pakistan, as we shall see later in this chapter.   It was noticeable, for example, that no one turned up to the PPP relief camps after heavy rain in the country at this time.211   A crowd did however come to receive ZAB when he reached Karachi on 27 July, which was in itself a defiance of MLO 5 banning public gatherings.212   This restored his confidence.  He arranged a plan of public speeches and political gatherings at stops on a railway journey from Karachi to Peshawar, which again was an open violation of martial law orders. Starting from Multan on 6 August, he reached Lahore on 8 August, and he ended up in Peshawar on 11 August.213 A large crowd including men, women, and children gathered at each of his stops especially outside Lahore Airport.214  
People	   chanted	   the	   slogan	   ‘Sada	   Bhutto	   Awai	   i	   Awai’	   (Bhutto remains 
                                                        
209 ibid., pp.119 and 163-65. 
210 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People 
Power in the Twentieth Century (Connecticut, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994) , p.27. 
211 NewsWeek, July 1977.  Jang, 15 July 1977. 
212 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, pp. 97-102. 
213 Nawai-Waqt, 7 August 1977; Arif, Working with Zia, p. 190. 
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forever).215   While newspapers gave no numbers for those who attended these rallies, BB later estimated that about three million people in all came out.216  In his speeches, ZAB condemned martial law as well as the deceitful role of PNA.217  He demanded that the regime hold free and fair elections within the stated time limit, otherwise he would boycott them.218   In a speech in Islamabad on 26 August 1977 he responded to reports that the regime intended to arrest him on various charges by declaring that there would be dreadful consequences if it did so. In all this he appears to have forgotten what he had said to BB on the night of 
the	   coup	   “Armies	   do	   not	   take	   over	   power	   to	   relinquish it. Nor do Generals commit high treason in order to hold election and restore democratic 
constitutions”.219  The regime tried to stop all this by arresting die-hard members of the PPP, known as the Jyalas (partisans) of the party.  On	  the	  eve	  of	  ZAB’s arrival in Lahore, forty-three	   PPP’s	   workers	   were	   arrested	   on	   the	   charge	   of	   attacking	  Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Javed Hashmi and Hanif Ramay who were also at the airport at the time.220 Jahangir Badar, a student leader and the general secretary of the party later on, was among them. The next day under the SMC, the detainees were sentenced to one-year rigorous punishment and ten lashes. That was the first martial law decision in Lahore.221 In Peshawar, police 
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dispersed the crowd by throwing gas.222  These punitive measures failed to stop the agitation.  Zia had calculated that ZAB had lost his popularity after the PNA movement, and was alarmed by the enthusiastic public reception on his tour.223   He decided that he needed to find some way to remove him from the scene for good.224   Arif considers that Zia had no option but to re-arrest him.225   So, the 
regime	   encouraged	   ZAB’s	   opponents	   to	   bring	   cases	   against	   him,	   and	   several	  did.226    Zia had himself since 17 July being looking into the murder of Ahmad Khan Kasuri on the night of 10-11 November 1974 which had been alleged ZAB was involved in.227  Though an FIR had implicated ZAB, no evidence could be found to prove his culpability and the case against him had been abandoned on 1 October 1975.   Rao Rashid, ex-chief of Punjab Police and Masood Mahmood, 
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Director-General Federal Security Force (FSF)228, who were then under arrest, were allegedly tortured into acting as approvers in this case and agree to testify against ZAB.229   The latter in the end acted as the chief approver.     
On	  10	  September,	  commandos	  burst	  into	  ZAB’s	  house	  and	  arrested	  him	  on the charge of murdering Muhammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri.230  Justice K.M.A. Samdani of the Lahore High Court released him on bail on the 13th, but he was rearrested on 17 September.   He was in jail from that day until his execution on 
4	  April	  1979.	  	  	  	  	  The	  movement	  then	  became	  one	  of	  saving	  ZAB’s	  life	  – known as 
Bhutto Bachao Tehreek (BBT- Movement to Save Bhutto).    It incorporated the wider aim of restoring democracy, and also the style of government associated with ZAB when he was in power.  From this emerged the doctrine called 
Bhuttoism, under which label the PPP has identified itself to this day.   The leadership of	   the	   movement	   now	   rested	   with	   ZAB’s	   wife	   Nusrat	   and	   their	  
daughter	  Benazir.	   	   	   	   They	  had	   already	   stepped	   in	  during	  ZAB’s	   first	   period	  of	  
arrest	   with,	   respectively,	   Nusrat	   Bhutto’s	   first	   meeting	   with	   ex-members of 
Sindh’s	  assembly	  at	  70	  Clifton,	  Karachi,231 and	  BB’s	  maiden	  press	  conference	  in	  Karachi on 15 July.232   
                                                        
228 Federal Security Force, a paramilitary force, which was established in 1972 to assist the Federal 
Security Force (FSF) for maintaining law and order situation in the country without the intervention 
of Pakistan Army. But it had become a terror force for his  opponents   including   for  his  own  party’s  
members.   
229 Jang, 23 July 1977; Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.102-3. 
230 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.105. 
231 Jang, 8-10 July 1977. 
232 On that day, she merely conveyed a message from her father to PPP workers to carry out social 
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decided  by  ZAB.’  Daily Jang, 16 July 1977. 
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Bhutto Bachao Tehreek: Gene Sharp in his Dictionary of Power and Struggle defines a civil resistance 
movement	  as	  “non-cooperation with, and disobedience of, policies and practices of any level of government, based on the belief that the body is question is 
violating	   its	   avowed	   moral	   or	   political	   principles”.233 His three-volume book, 
The Politics of Nonviolent Action, provides a foundational text on the theory and practice of civil resistance. 234  Such action is described in a number of ways by 
different	   authorities,	   variously	   ‘unarmed	   insurrection’,235 ‘people’s	   power’,236 
‘nonviolent	   revolution’,237  a	   ‘weapon	   of	   moral	   power	   and	   bravery’,238  or 
‘nonviolent	   resistance’.	   	   	   Though	  each	   term	  has	   slightly	  different implications, they all refer broadly to the same phenomena.   The movement launched by the PPP to save Bhutto was clearly in this broad category.   It had, however, some formidable problems to overcome, as we shall see here.  
Unpopularity of Bhutto: One major problem that the two new leaders faced – and one that the movement to save ZAB never really overcame – was that he was widely                                                         
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distrusted in Pakistan.    According to Ackerman, and Kruegler, objectives are the driving force for a nonviolent movement, and that they must therefore be 
‘well-chosen,	   defined,	   and	  understood’.239  In this case, the objective of saving ZAB was well-defined but not necessarily well-chosen as it failed to appeal to a wide enough spectrum of the people.240   ZAB was both hated and feared by many who held privileged positions in society, such as large landlords, tribal and religious heads, and capitalists.241    He alienated the large feudal landlords when he fixed a ceiling on land-holding of over 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of acres of unirrigated land for individual landholders.242  Although only one percent of all cultivable land was in fact distributed to tenants under this measure, the resentment remained.243   
Businessmen	   opposed	   his	   policy	   of	   nationalisation	   that	   involved	   ‘government 
control	  of	  financial	  and	  industrial	  assets	  of	  over	  Rs.	  2	  billion	  ($200	  million)’.244  They provided generous financial backing to the PNA opposition to ZAB.245 ZAB also caused great resentment amongst a wide spectrum of politicians and their followers.   Khalid B. Sayed and Surendra S. Kaushik describe him as following a Bonapartist strategy in consolidating his power ruthlessly after 1971.246  I.A. Rehman has pointed out two reasons for the 
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distrust of ZAB amongst politicians.   First, when in power he had done his best to undermine the regional political parties so as to strengthen his political grip.   
Secondly,	  he	  had	  sought	  to	  extend	  PPP’s	  political	  base	  by	  removing	  his	  political	  rivals through means other than political.247 He used the FSF to terrorise his opponents. According to an Amnesty International fact-finding report, the methods deployed included severe beatings, threats of execution, insertions of chili in the anus, assaults on sensitive parts of the body and threats to maltreat 
members	  of	  the	  prisoner’s	  family.248   He ran his own party in an authoritarian way that hurt many party members.   He acted discourteously towards his ministers in cabinet meetings, abusing them and giving them ill-mannered nicknames, and even humiliated them in public.  Six ex-PPP parliamentarians and their family members were threatened that cases of corruption would be taken out against them. Three dissidents, including Ghulam Mustafa Khar, and Mian Mohammad Aslam, managing director of the newspaper Musawat, went missing in October 1975.249  Amnesty	  International	  declared	  them	   ‘prisoner	  of	  
conscience’.250 They were subsequently released by the military regime.251 Later on, most of them became approvers against ZAB. Hearing one of the cases, Supreme Court Judge was shocked to learn about the brutal torture and the 
beating	  by	  the	  official	  agency	  responsible	  for	  maintaining	  law	  and	  order”.252   
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Political parties that opposed him such as UDF (United Democratic Front) experienced a reign of terror.  For example, eleven persons were killed and eighty were injured when a public meeting of UDF in Rawalpindi was fired at on 23 March 1977.253  UDF was mainly an alliance of rightist parties, and 
ZAB’s	   antagonism	   can	   be	   explained on ideological grounds. In other cases, however, he tried to crush people merely because of their independent popularity. This was the case with the revered Sindhi religious leader, Pir Pagaro, whom ZAB ordered be arrested for not paying his agricultural tax.254  Pir Pagora was subsequently a strong supporter of Zia, as we shall see later in this dissertation.  In Punjab, Ch. Zahoor Illahi was his worst enemy.  He was arrested on 7 February 1976 and charged with forty-seven offences, and his family had eighty-three police cases registered against them.255 In a secret meeting on 30 September 1977, Pir Pagara and Illahi agreed to oppose the holding of any election so that the politicians could be kept in their place.256  ZAB also alienated the ruling political parties in Baluchistan and KPK.   He dismissed the JUI government in Baluchistan and declared the party to be anti-Pakistan and guilty of criminal offences.257   The chief minister of KPK, 
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Mufti Mahmood, resigned in protest because of illegal action of the central government towards the province and its ruling National Awami Party (NAP).258   Dalai Camp near Kashmir, Warsak Camp (Peshawar), and Army Investigation Centre (Quetta) were major detention centres for opponents of ZAB.259 The	  Amnesty	  reports	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘Defence	  of	  Pakistan	  Rules	  – part of emergency law and the Article 10 (preventive detention) are the most widely 
applied	   to	   detain	   political	   prisoners	  without	   trial’.260 The Leader (Karachi) for 14 November 1975, as cited in this report, stated that there were 30,166 detainees in 1972, 34,547 in 1973, and 36,279 in 1974.  The Economist of 29 November 1975 said that there were 38,000 prisoners.261  Amnesty declared that three journalists and seven political opponents were prisoner of conscience, and recommended their release.  The final straw in all this proved to be the alleged rigging of the March 1977 election. Zia claimed that this was the main reason for his removal of ZAB.   ZAB denied emphatically that he was guilty of this, though there is evidence to show that rigging was carried out by PPP party members in some 
constituencies.	  	  The	  unopposed	  victories	  for	  nineteen	  of	  PPP’s	  candidates	  was	  in	  itself suspicious, as this never had happened before or again subsequently.262  
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These unopposed returns ensued that PPP had a huge advantage in the election, as after that the party only needed to win in 74 out of 172 constituencies to gain a simple majority and 105 to gain two-thirds, as under the constitution the winner gained the eight seats from tribal areas automatically.  Conversely, PNA needed to win 101 seats out of 169,263 and 132 for a two-thirds majority.264  This all tilted the balance against the opposition.  Furthermore, there were cases of intimidation of opposition candidates, such as threats of kidnapping unless they stood down.   For all these	   reasons,	   ZAB	   was	   known	   by	   many	   as	   a	   ‘civil	   dictator’.	  	  
Amnesty	   International	   refused	   subsequently	   to	   accept	   him	   as	   ‘a	   prisoner	   of	  
conscience’,	  arguing	  that	  he	  was	  tried	  and	  found	  guilty	  of	  a	  criminal	  offence.265  General Zia built on the antipathy felt by many political leaders towards ZAB by reversing the discriminatory policies against them.  He returned land confiscated in Baluchistan and granted a general amnesty to armed insurgents.266  Few political leaders or their followers were prepared to agitate to save ZAB from his sentence of death.  Indeed, Mian Tufail (head of JI), 
commented,	  after	  meeting	  with	  Zia	  a	  day	  before	  ZAB’s	  execution,	   ‘once	  Bhutto	  
was	  hanged	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  national	  would	  easily	  fall	  in	  line.’267 Arif quoted Wali 
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(NA-198 Sibbi-ii), Prince Mohyudin (NA-199 Qallat-i), and Amanullah Gachki (NA-200 Qallat-ii). 
Me’yar, 5-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p.41. 
263 PNA did not run the election from Balochistan 
264 Me’yar, 5-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p. 6. 
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Khan	  as	  telling	  Zia	  “Had Bhutto not been buried, your body would have been the 
one	  in	  the	  grave”.268 Nafees Siddiqui however attributed this statement to Khair Bakhsh Marri.269  PNA leaders requested that the election be postponed until 
ZAB	   was	   out	   of	   the	   way	   under	   the	   slogan	   ‘Phele Aihtsab, phir Intikhab’ (first accountability, later election).270 Zia complied by announcing on 1 October, three weeks before the scheduled date, that the election would be postponed because of the law and order situation.271   Hasan Askari Rizvi, Aijaz Ahmed, Ian Talbot, and some other scholars have shown how ZAB alienated the army by trying to control it and even humiliate it.272  He allowed a film to be shown of the surrender of the Pakistan Army at Pulton Ground, Dhaka, in December 1971.   He shamed the former Chief Martial Law Administrator, Yahya Khan, by publicising unsavoury details of his private life.    He removed forty-three senior military officers and established a separate para-military force under FSF.273   He promoted General Zia-ul-Haq over the heads of six more senior army leaders when he appointed him as Chief of Army Staff in May 1976.  This was despite negative reports about Zia by the previous Chief, General Tikka Khan. This all caused resentment among the displaced generals.  According to a CIA report, General Iqbal Khan, Commander 
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of the Fourth Corps and General Chishti, Commander of Tenth Corps, were those who were	   most	   strongly	   in	   favour	   of	   ZAB’s	   removal	   and	   subsequent	  execution.274  The refusal of three brigadiers to fire on PNA protestors in Lahore revealed the resentment amongst other senior officers against the government as well.275   Ian Talbot argues if ZAB had implemented the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on the defeat in East Pakistan, Pakistan might not have undergone two further periods of martial law, as this would have helped to have 
buried	  the	  army’s	  interference	  in	  civil	  government	  for	  good.276   ZAB	  similarly	  alienated	  Pakistan’s	  civil	  servants.	   	  Under	  the	  guise	  of	  his	  socialist agenda of ending Naukar Shahi (civil-kings)277 and making them the servants of the people, he restructured the civil service in ways that brought it more firmly under his control.278   He also dismissed 1,300 senior civil servants.279  
Failure to Cultivate International Support: Ackerman and Kruegler, Sharp, and Nepstad280, have placed great emphasis on the need for civil resisters to secure external support for their movement.  In case of Pakistan – which had remained under the influence of the USA from its 
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creation,281 support from the USA was vital for BBT.  Such support was not however forthcoming for reasons that will be discussed in this section.   In her interview to Sunday Times on 25 July 1977, and as she stated later in her book, BB considered that the US had played a major role in encouraging the coup against her father, due to his ambition of acquiring nuclear capability.282  She appears to have regarded it in a similar light to the CIA-backed coup against the Allende government in Chile in 1973.283     Most of the current historiography suggests that the US government was adopting a hard line against any possible nuclear armament by Pakistan.   Henry Kissinger had 
threatened	   ‘to make	  him	  [ZAB]	  an	  example’.284  Despite	  wishing	  ZAB’s	  well	  on	  taking his oath as a President of USA,285 Jimmy Carter continued to pursue a zero-tolerance policy towards any nuclear expansion.  A secret American diplomatic message was intercepted that said of the	   coup	   against	   ZAB:	   “the	  
party	   is	   over!	   He’s	   gone”.286   The USA regarded Zia as someone whom they could work with.287  Zia was invited in the US Independence Day celebrations on 
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4 July 1977, and he was the last to leave the embassy.288   The US government was also	  wary	  of	  ZAB’s	  quest	  to	  establish	  a	  strong	  Islamic	  bloc	  for	  economic	  and	  defence purposes, and take the country towards Islamic socialism.289 After holding a successful conference of the Organisation of Islamic Countries in 1974, ZAB had visited Arab countries in June of that year to propose a defence pact between leading Muslim countries and Pakistan.  The Shah of Iran, President Daud Khan of Afghanistan, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, and Zaid Bin Sultan of UAE agreed on this agenda.  The western powers were alarmed by this activity.290   In	   an	   interview,	   Taj	   Haider	   compared	   Zia’s	   ‘Operation	   Fair	   Play’	   to	  
remove	   ZAB	  with	   ‘Operation	   Ajax’	   of	   the	   CIA	   and	   ‘Operation	   Boot’	   of	   the	   SIS	  (MI6) to remove Mohammad Massadegh when he was about to nationalise the oil company AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) after passing a resolution in the 
Majlis (Iranian National Assembly) in 1951. 291  In August of that year, the CIA spent ten million dollars bribing politicians, soldiers, mobs, and newspapers through the British embassy in Tehran and organized a riot, which gave the Shah of Iran an excuse to remove Mosaddeq.292  In the case of Pakistan, 
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Naseerullah Babar, ex-Governor	   KPK,	   and	   PPP’s	   leader	   also	   claimed	   that	   the	  USA was involved in the political chaos leading to martial law. Rafi Raza had already communicated with ZAB about the American plan to remove his government at any cost.293 A sudden	   transporter’s	   strike	   and	   decrease	   of	   the	  dollar exchange rate in the open market from seven rupees to six rupees per dollar due to a flood of currency into the country were seen  by some as suspicious in this respect.294 The	  tactics	  of	  ‘operation	  wheel	  jam’295 was applied in Pakistan, similar to the overthrow of President of Chile Salvador Allende on 
11	  September	  1973.	  Referring	  to	  Walter	  Schwarz’s	  essay	  in	  the	  Guardian (UK) on 27 April 1977, Niazi stated that America was supporting the opposition parties in Pakistan	  to	  dislodge	  ZAB’s	  government.	  The	  cancellation	  of	  the	  selling	  of tear gas to Pakistan by America was presented as evidence to that. The 
Washington Post disclosed the similar story.296 Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Afghan rebel leader operating from Peshawar, also supported the anti-Bhutto movement.297   Adeem Suhail in his MA thesis revealed the channel used to pour money into labour unions through the American Institute of Labour and its affiliates.298 The present research has found evidence of this from labour union correspondence between the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and Pakistani labour                                                         
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unions that on 12 April 1977 twenty-six trade unions organisations joined 
together	   and	   established	   the	   Pakistan	   Labour	   Alliance	   against	   ZAB’s	  government headed by the Pakistan National Free Trade Union (PNFTU) President Muhammad Sharif.299  Subsequently, Sharif and subordinate trade union leaders went missing. The union called out a procession of 600,000 people on 19 April to protest. The document states that the army kidnapped them to worsen the strikes against ZAB.  They appeared again after martial law was imposed.  Sharif and his companions were later on sent on a worldwide tour by the Ministry of Labour on the direction of Director General (DG) Intelligence Bureau.  Moreover, Pukhton Baluch Union-London in a letter to Mr. Len. Murray, General Secretary of TUC on 26 February 1977 asked for their help against the atrocities of ZAB.300  The embassies not only provided financial support to trade unions to stoke disorder in the country but also offered them a place to hold secure meetings.301  The US authorities believed that a dictator in Pakistan was more likely to stand up firmly to the Soviet Union.  Robert Brister has revealed the Nixon administration plan to destabilise the Soviet-backed Kabul government with the help of CIA and Iranian intelligence agency SAVAK in early 1970s.302  CIA funded the training of rebels to overthrow the government.  Kunhanandan Nair stated that five thousand persons in Panjsher valley had been trained by the agency by                                                         
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1975.303  The	  accession	  of	  People’s	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Afghanistan	  (PDPA)	   in	  Afghanistan in a popular insurrection directed against the dictatorship of President Mohammed Daud Khan strengthened its relationship with Soviet Union, and followed	  similar	  policies	  to	  ZAB.’304  The American State department commented on the coup against ZAB of 5 July 1977 that it was an internal affair for Pakistan and hope was expressed for future friendship between the two countries.305  Not a single country, including those of the Arab world, condemned the imposition of martial law.  Suhail has pointed out the involvement of Arab money in implementing the creed of Islam, especially to JI, which was supported by the army.306  India and Turkey considered that this was Pakistan’s	   internal	  affair and continued the same relationship as under civil government.307 General Zia met almost all-important ambassadors, including those of China and Saudi Arabia, the day after the coup.308  The French embassy invited him to its Independence Day ceremony on 14 July. President also wrote letters to the heads of governments of various countries inviting the continuation of friendly relations. Canada signed two loan agreements with the regime on 10 July. Agha Shahi, Secretary General of Foreign Affairs in the Martial Law government, was 
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sent to tour some important countries to brief them about the political situation in the country.   International newspapers in UK, France and other countries welcomed martial law, stating that it was an unavoidable step by the army to save the country from further turmoil. They praised the General for being both a professional and competent leader and a devout Muslim and professional person, while condemning ZAB for his arrogant behaviour towards all opposition.309  The New York Times and New York Post published the news of martial law on their front pages on 7 July 1977 where they referred to Zia as a devotee of Islam who had no political aim.310 Amnesty International’s refusal to 
declare	   ZAB	   a	   ‘prisoner	   of	   conscience’	   indirectly	   supported	   the	   regime.311 Indeed such welcoming or neutral behaviour after the coup reduced pressure on the regime, and it gave the green light for Zia to execute ZAB later on.  US interference in the politics of the region continued after Zia had 
seized	  power.	  	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  getting	  at	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  through	  Afghanistan	  
via	   Iran	   was	   maintained	   during	   Carter’s	   term	   as	   President.312   Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former	   National	   Security	   Advisor,	   stated	   “the	   first	   directive	   for	  secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul was signed on 3 July 1979 by President Carter. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a 
Soviet	   military	   intervention”. 313   The Carter administration did stop 
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development	  aid	   to	  Pakistan	   in	  April	  1979	  because	  of	  Zia’s	  nuclear	  ambitions,	  but President Ronald Reagan reversed this subsequently by sanctioning the flow of $3.2 billion funding during the 1979-85	   period.	   	   Despite	   US’s	   extra-ordinary diplomatic pressure on France to cancel the Nuclear deal with Pakistan,314 and the celebrations of the US authorities on successfully achieving the task,315 Cohen, quoting the opinion of the State Department, told this researcher that the main objective of the US was to defeat the Soviet Union and socialism, and in pursuit of this they kept their eyes closed to the continuous ambition of General Zia to acquire nuclear capability after 1980.316  
The Campaign: Nusrat Bhutto with the aid of BB took charge of the scattered and 
panicked	   party	   after	   ZAB’s	   arrest	   	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   faced	   all	   the	   problems	   of	  female leadership in a deeply patriarchal society, as will be discussed in chapter 2 and 3.  Despite its claims to be a revolutionary socialist party, the PPP – as is often the case in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, as well as of other countries such as North Korea – was a family affair. Despite the suggestion by M.K. Gandhi after Indian independence that elections should be held within the Congress Party, the Nehru family has kept its hold on the party to this day.  There are in these elements that relate to a long history of kingship, a feudal social culture, and the importance of the family as the chief unit of welfare and                                                                                                                                                              
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kinship.  Moreover, the control of financial assets of the party by the family, including foreign bank accounts, is crucial for running an election in such countries.   Although civil resistance movements have succeeded without one charismatic leader such in as in the movement of the mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo	   in	   Argentina,	   and	   in	   the	   lawyers’	   movement	   in	   Pakistan;	   charismatic	  individuals are often crucial for the success of a movement.317  In case of Pakistan, the public looked for someone	  from	  ZAB’s	  family	  to	  lead	  them	  instead	  of a person such as Sheikh Rashid, the then Vice-Chairman of the party.  Nusrat Bhutto was made Acting-Chairperson of the party. Before this, Nusrat Bhutto 
had	  been	  active	  in	  the	  women’s	  wing	  of	  PPP,	  whilst	  Benazir tasted political life for the first time.   Nusrat	  Bhutto	  told	  her:	  “Darling,	  you	  have	  to	  campaign.	  We	  
have	  to	  divide	  up	  your	  father’s	  schedule”.318  BB stated of her feelings about her 
maiden	  speech	  in	  Faisalabad	  that	  ‘I	  was	  terrified	  […]	  I	  did	  not	  think	  of myself yet 
as	  a	  political	  leader	  or	  a	  public	  speaker’.319  BB was placed in charge of the task of mobilising support from like-minded civil society groups, labours, lawyers, students and journalists.  Some individuals from these groups were already protesting in the streets or were writing against the regime, especially about the way that the judiciary was handling the case against ZAB.   The biggest task for the Bhutto ladies was to unite the party through a strong and active programme.   Since PPP had already decided to take part in the proposed election in a meeting held on 3 August under the chairmanship of ZAB,320 both	  women	  continued	  with	  the	  rhythm	  of	  ZAB’s	  nonviolent	  protest	  and	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persuasion strategy in this respect.  Nusrat threatened Zia with dire consequences.   In a gathering in Nishtar Park in Karachi on 28 September, she declared that forcing Zia to retire would be the first action of PPP government after its success in the election.321 The following day in Okara, she warned the 
government	  that	  the	  “five	  rivers	  will	  be	  filled	  with	  the	  blood”	  if	  ZAB	  was	  hanged. 
322  Such threats rang alarm bells with Zia.  To exploit the craze for cricket in Pakistan, Zia organised a cricket match at the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore in February 1978 to give the impression of a peaceful situation in the country.323  Nusrat Bhutto saw that this provided a good opportunity to expose the benign image of General Zia and its regime before sixty thousand enthusiastic spectators as well as the national and international media.   She secretly occupied a place in the VIP enclosure.  When 
the	  spectators,	  as	  saw	  her,	  they	  stood	  up	  and	  started	  chanting	  ‘Jiye	  Bhuto’ (Long live Bhutto), Jernal Zia Murdabad (death to Zia).  The police moved in to seize her in a baton charge, and she was knocked unconscious.324  The moment of attack on her was caught by the photographers who were there for the match coverage and next day the picture was all over the media — print and electronic 
— including the international press.  This put the regime on the defensive.325   The Patriot Democratic Lawyers Alliance in Lahore326 was established under the direction of Nusrat Bhutto to mobilise lawyers to counter the 
regime’s	  use	  of	   the	   judiciary	  against	  ZAB.	   	  Although	   the	  ZAB	  regime	  had	   itself	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been guilty of harassing lawyers who took up the cases of the political opponents of ZAB,327 the lawyers of Pakistan are one of the best-organised groups in its civil society that is able to defend its own freedom and integrity.  Divided into three major branches – the District Bar Councils and the High Court Bar Councils for each province, and the Supreme Court Bar Council for Pakistan as a whole, the group organise annual elections that create a tier of leadership at each level.328   Lawyers passed a resolution in favour of ZAB that regarded him as a political victim instead of a criminal and which exposed the way that the Lahore High Court was operating as a tool of the regime in the prosecution of ZAB.329  A People’s	  Legal	  Aid	  Society	  was	  established	  at	  district	  levels	  to	  provide	  free aid assistance to imprisoned PPP workers.330  Likewise, some individual journalists, especially in Musawat were also to the fore in reporting on the brutalities of the regime.331  The Pre-Censorship Ordinance332 promulgated by the regime demanded that all print media 
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including private and national trust papers had to be scrutinised by someone from the office of the Chairman of the Scrutiny Committee before publication.  Papers and journals that published material that was seen to be against the 
‘ideology	  of	  Pakistan’ were closed down.  The objective of imposing censorship 
was	   to	  bring	   the	   supposedly	   “irresponsible	   journalism”	  on	   the	   “right	  path”.333  PTV broadcasts had to include prayer calls and the wearing of dupattas was banned.334 Voluptuous pictures/advertisements of women were banned.  In 
response	  to	  the	  journalists’	  campaign	  for	  a	  free	  media,	  General	  Zia	  commented	  
that	  ‘pre-censorship,	  self	  censorship	  or	  silent	  censorship’	  was	  imposed	  to	  check	  irresponsible reporting in news media, while others were free to publish what they liked.335  The Federal Union of Journalists of Pakistan (FUJP) played a key 
role	   in	   a	   continuing	   protest	   against	   the	   ordinance	   throughout	   Zia’s	   period.336  When the press of the PPP paper Musawat was closed and confiscated and its editor, deputy editor, and printer, were arrested, the FUJP and All Pakistan Newspaper Employees Union (APNEU) adopted method of nonviolent intervention by calling for a hunger strike on 1 May 1978. Twenty-six journalists337 were arrested on the same day under Martial law Regulation No.23 that prohibited strikes and locks-out, and four of them 338  were 
                                                                                                                                                             
1963.  The Ordinance was enforced until the time of the Junejo government, which repealed the law 
and freed up newspaper publication.  
333 Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal, p.193. 
334 Mehtab Rashidi, an employee of the TV, was a conscience objector against the order. Mehtab 
Akber Rashidi, interview, 16 March 2012, Karachi. 
335 General Zia-u-Haq, cited in Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal, p.194. 
336 Minhaj Barna, Nisar Usmani, Khalid Chaudhry, Khawar Naeem Hashmi Khalid Chaudhry, Interview, 
24 February 2012, Lahore. Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview, 12 January 2013, London. 
337 Amnesty International,   ‘Amnesty   International’s  Concern   at   Large-Scale Arrests of Journalists in 
Pakistan’,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, p.5. 
338 Nasir Zaidi, Khawar Naeem Hashmi, Masood Ullah Khan, and Iqbal Jaffry.  Nasir Zaidi, interview, 
30 April 2012, Rawalpindi. 
 79 
subsequently flogged.339  During the next few weeks the regime rounded up seventy-one journalists, and thirty newspapermen.340 Amnesty declared four 
journalists	  to	  be	  a	  ‘prisoner	  of	  conscience’.341  Similarly, employees of PTV, the only TV station in Pakistan that was run by the state, adopted nonviolent direct action by occupying its building, and controlling transmission on 16 February 1978. Shahid Nadeem, one of the protestors, stated that on the call for a strike by PUFJ over the ban on the press, the TV union employees seized control of the TV stations in Lahore, Quetta, Peshawar and Karachi (partially), but not in Islamabad. They asked newscasters to wear black bands.  Being the government vehicle of information, the protest had a marked impact at home and abroad.  The government machinery was mobilised quickly and forty protestors from Lahore, twenty from Rawalpindi and a few from Karachi were arrested under Martial Law Order 10.342  After summary court trials, they were sentenced one-year imprisonment and fifteen lashes.  They were incarcerated in the notorious Mianwali Jail, where the British used to jail freedom fighters.343  The protest attracted global attention and helped reveal the oppressive face of the Zia regime to the outside world.  Similarly, eight thousand labourers of the Karachi Shipyard called a strike in November 1978.  In Multan, many textile workers died when their                                                         
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protest was fired on in January 1978. During the Zia period 22 textile mills were shut down making 100,000 labourers unemployed. 344  The Pakistan International Airline (PIA) labour union under its president Abdul Hasee was in contact with BB through Irshad Rao and Masroor Ahsan, who directly supported the activities of the union. Mushtaq Lasharie, a PIA union member and 
supporter	  of	  PPP’s	  confidents	  stated	  that	  they	  started	  a	  campaign	  of	   	   ‘go-slow’	  that was intended to ground PIA aircraft, including those with high government functionaries on board, and even Zia himself. In April 1981, they burnt the plane that had been made ready to take Zia on a foreign trip. In response, the regime promulgated MLR no.52 and banned unions in PIA,345 and 1,040 employees were fired from the national airline.346  Some supported BBT through conscientious objection.  Ghulam Ali Memon, Advocate General of Sindh, and D.M. Awan, Advocate General of Punjab, resigned from their posts in protest on 7 July 1977.347  From the army, Brigadier Osman Khalid, Colonel Ismail Shamim, and Major Iftikhar, and one Senior Superintendent of Police Kalim Dil Khan resigned from their posts in protest against the death sentence passed on ZAB by the Lahore High Court.348 Later on, Brigadier Osman and Major Iftikhar tried to launch an armed struggle that fed into the campaign of Al-Zulfiqar – which will be discussed in Chapter 3. While the case against ZAB case was being heard in the Lahore High Court, twenty to thirty women protested in front of the court on his every 
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appearance.349  Women political prisoners chanted slogan in support of Bhutto and against the dictatorship when being tried in court and also in jails so that they could differentiate themselves from criminals.350 Three hundred and fifty351 women were imprisoned during the early phase of martial law, the 
largest	  such	  numbers	  in	  what	  became	  West	  Pakistan	  since	  the	  time	  of	  Gandhi’s	  historic Salt March of 1930.  Now it was the Pakistan army that was punishing such protestors.  While PPP was the only mainstream political party fighting against the dictatorship during this period while the rest enjoyed a cosy relationship with the regime, some small regional groups did join hands in the struggle.  Sindhi 
Awami Tehreek was one of them.   The Sindhi Hari Committee had been established on 9 January 1977 in response to the arrest of Rasool Bakhsh Palijo and Fazil Rahoo for championing the grievances of the haris (landless peasants) of the province.  The committee had two main demands – the release of these two and genuine land reforms.  Its first convention called for genuine land 
reforms	   from	   ZAB’s	   government.352 These landless peasants argued that they were kept as bonded labourers by Sindhi waderas (landlords) on land that their forebears had once held freely. They were treated oppressively and were prevented from speaking up against the landlords.  The movement was launched to restore their right to what they claimed as their ancestral land.  
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Rasool Bakhsh Palijo of Hyderabad was the chief instigator of the movement.353  Although, ZAB was the son of a Sindhi landlord, his policy of land reform had given hope to the movement of landless peasants in the province.   Farmers of Naseerabad (Sindh) for example had seized land in Naseer Abad, which was being controlled by the Jamali landlord family. The police/administration could 
not	   come	   to	   the	   landlord’s	   rescue	  due	   to ZAB’s	  unwillingness	   to	   intervene.	   	   It	  was known as the Pat Feeder Movement of Naseerabad.  However, once General Zia came in, the Jamali family took the land back from the peasants.354 Martial law was however imposed before the landless peasants had managed to launch a major movement.  They were among the first political groups to condemn martial law. The Sindhi Hari Committee registered as a political party named 
Sindhi Awami Tehreek with the Election Commission of Pakistan to contest the election in October 1977.   The party planned to field its candidates mainly near the coastal areas of Sindh.355 After the postponement of the election, they joined 
PPP’s	  movement	  against	  the	  regime. SAT played a crucial role in BBT in mobilising the public in favour of democratic rule in the coastal area of Sindh. Belonging to the lowest class, and 
benefiting	   from	   ZAB’s	   nationalisation	   of	   education, 356  their women and 
students’	  groups	  organised	  a	  systematic	  campaign.	  	  The	  regime	  considered	  SAT	  to be a major threat. Hundreds of its members – men and women – were arrested for protesting against the sentence of death passed on ZAB on 22                                                         
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March 1978.357  Its founder, Rasool Bakhsh Palijo, remained in prison from 1977 to 1985 with a brief gap of only two months.358  In solidarity with the protests of PPP workers in Punjab, SAT activists courted arrest on 27 April 1978 in Hyderabad.359 The police carried out baton charges and rounded up thirty-students.360 Sindhi Shagird Tehreek, later	  on	  joined	  the	  students’	  struggle	  under	  
the	  Pakistan	  Progressive	  Students’	  Alliance.	  	  Although	  SAT	  later	  joined	  MRD	  at	  a	  very late stage, it continued to struggle against the regime throughout the period under investigation. 
The	  first	  exclusively	  women’s	  protest	  was	  organised	  in	  Hyderabad	  under	  the leadership of Zarina Baloch, who was later honoured with the title of Madre 
Sindh (Mother of Sindh). Belonging to the famous bangle-making cottage industry of Hyderabad, these women offered bangles to policemen.   In one respect this represented an attempt to shame them, as bangles are considered in South Asia a symbol of femininity.  Alternatively, it could be regarded as a plea to the police to show solidarity for motherhood.  The Las Madres de Plaza 
de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) in Argentina made a similar appeal to motherhood in their protest against the military regime, to powerful effect.361    The movement saw some new forms of resistance by PPP jyalas (partisans).  There were cases of self-immolation – something that is regarded as the most extreme form of nonviolent resistance by authorities such as Sharp.  
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He examines ways in which self-inflicted suffering can advance a cause – for example hunger strikes and protest fasts.362  For Gandhi, self-sacrifice was demanded of a satyagrahi at all levels, and he himself went on several fasts. It is thus seen as being an acceptable part of nonviolence to invite violence on oneself. April Carter has traced the history of such extreme self-suffering in the Koreans Confucian tradition, arguing that this valorised hunger strikes by South Korean against their military rulers in 1986.363 Tibetan monks have used this method since 2011.364   Nonviolent theorists do not however include suicide bombing in this category, as it causes harm to others in a violent way.     In Pakistan, nine die-hard	  PPP’s	  followers	  committed	  suicide	  by	  burning	  themselves in various cities of Punjab in protest of the Lahore High Court decision.365  The	   regime	   held	   PPP	   responsible	   for	   such	   ‘violence’.	   	   BB	   herself	  stated that self-immolation was not encouraged by the party; she said however that it was a reaction to the ruthless policies of the regime.366 As it was, evidence suggests that the People’s	   Action	   Committee,	   which	   worked	   under	  Raja Anwer and some other members from Faisalabad, were culpable in this.   My interviewees claimed that Anwer and Pervez Rashid367 encouraged some of the workers to do this, while promising them as soon as they set themselves on                                                         
362 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp.357-367. 
363 April Carter, Political Power and Political Change: Key issues and Concepts (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2012), p.13. 
364  Mail online http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2221784/Tibetan-monk-dies-setting-
protest-Chinese-rule.html (15 January 2013). 
365 Mian Muhammad Iqbal, interview, 25 January 2013, London. Rashid Nagi and Abdul Waheed 
Qureshi carried out this act 2 October 1978 in Rawalpindi, and on the same day Yaqoob Pervez 
Masih and Abdur Rashid Ajiz dod so in Lahore. A newspaper photographer, Aziz Malik, did the same 
in Rawalpindi, and also Munawar Hussain in Okara, and Abdul Aziz in Sukker. Gordaspuri, Shaheed 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, pp. 340-42. 
366 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.148. 
367 Both are now in Pakistan Muslim League (N).  Anwer was a Chairman of Punjab Education board 
(2008-13) and joined Al-Zulfiqar and the group that believed in violent methods, whilst Rashid 
became a Senator (2008-).  
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fire, they would be saved by blankets being thrown over them.  Unfortunately, they could not save them as the regime got to know their plans and removed the blankets from the scene.368   How did ZAB inspire such devotion?   Aslam Khwaja, a Sindhi, told me in an interview that ZAB was revered because he had given a new sense of pride and dignity to many ordinary people.  Before he came to power, it was impossible to see a Deputy Commissioner who behaved as a naukarshahi (official-cum-king) but afterwards they could open their office doors with a kick.  Likewise, his educational policy was beneficial for laypersons. Aslam Khwaja 
narrated	   his	   own	   story	   ‘I	   was	   a	   student	   of	   a	   private	   school,	   I	   used	   to	   pay	  seventeen rupees per month in class 6, but in class seven, I paid only one rupee due to the nationalization of schools. Along with, many new students belonging 
to	   lower	  class	  of	  my	  society	  entered	  the	  school’.369 ZAB’s	  industrial	  and	   labour	  policies had a similar levelling effect. As it was, the bravery of these activists was negated by the PPP leaders who spent their energy in jostling for position within the party.  Grouping in the party was quite visible. For example, one landlord was unhappy to sit with another landlord of his province, as was the case with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Mumtaz Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada in Sindh. Moreover, there were rivalries over becoming Chair of the party in succession to ZAB.  Kausar Niazi, Ex-Federal Minister for Religious affairs, was to the fore in this, and was backed by landlords of the central executive committee.  When thwarted in this, he                                                         
368 Mian Muhammad Iqbal, founding member of PPP and Senator (1973-77) from Anwer and 
Rashid’s   home   city   of   Faisalabad.      He   was   exiled   during   the   Zia   period   in   London.   Interview,   25  
January 2013; Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview, 12 January 2013, London.  Arif, Working with Zia, p. 284. 
369 Aslam Khwaja, interview. 
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established a new party, the National Progressive Party in 1978, which was the first split in PPP after the coup.370   He along with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada had been in secret contact with the regime.371 Chapter 5 analyses this. Some of them372 asked the election commission to postpone the election as well.373  Gordaspuri, Farkhanda Bukhari, and Asif Butt tried to augment their own power by criticising the leadership of the struggle against General Zia.374 In all this, the party was hoist on its own petard.   There were also ideological differences between socialists and the right in the party – and this divide continued throughout the struggle against Zia.   The right-wingers, such as the traditional landlords, pirs and industrialists, were generally in the driving seat in the party. There was little room for ordinary 
jyalas to rise up within the party.  The rightists controlled the distribution of party tickets in the election promised for October 1977, but in the end not held.375   The only strong socialist voice was of Shiekh Muhammad Rasheed, but he was unable to get much exposure for his views.  Moreover, the gradual 
resignations	   from	   PPP	   of	   ZAB’s	   close	   associates during his period of government, such as J.A.Rahim (first Secretary General of PPP), Dr. Mubashar Hassan (co-founder	   of	   PPP),	   Malik	   Mairaj	   Khalid	   (Law	  Minister	   during	   ZAB’s	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term), Mairaj Muhammad Khan (Minister for Manpower) meant that the rank-and-file party workers lost many of their socialist leaders.  Instead, ZAB was encircled increasingly by traditional feudal lords and the pawns of the establishment such as Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureishi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Jam Sadiq, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mumtaz Bhutto, and General (rtd) Tikka Khan.  On top of all this, Zia hounded and persecuted all prominent leaders of the PPP, jailing them or placing them under house arrest.376   Nusrat Bhutto and BB were either under house arrest or in jail at this time, and were also banned from entering Karachi and Lahore.377  This made it hard to coordinate strategy between the central leadership and the party workers.   
Zia’s	  oppression: As discussed earlier, the promulgation of various MLOs and MLRs launched a 
‘reign	   of	   terror’	   in	   Pakistan.	   	   Public	   lashes	   and	   public	   executions	   were	  introduced for the first time in Pakistan. There were precedents for this that dated back to British times. The Rowlatt Acts – known	   as	   the	   ‘Black	   Acts’	   by	  Indian nationalists had allowed for summary trials of nationalists by secret tribunals. Public whipping and public hangings were already established colonial punishments. The people of Punjab had been traumatised by a spate of public whippings in the aftermath of the Rowlatt Satyagraha, which was in itself a protest against the Rowlatt Acts.378   Zia’s	  Ordinances	  and	  Regulations	  could	  almost have been inspired by the methods used by the British.  In this way, Zia introduced public hangings, public lashing and the humiliation of alleged                                                         
376 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p. 7,156. 
377 Ibid., p.5. 
378 On the Rowlatt Satyagraha, see Alfred Draper, Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj 
(London: Cassell 1981). 
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criminals.    Zafar	  Omer	   in	  his	  article	   ‘The	  Creed	  of	  Violence’	  pointed	  out	  how	  this dehumanised the society, with people becoming callous about the way that people were subjected to judicial violence.379   Amnesty International reported that 161 people were sentenced to be flogged in May 1978 alone,380 and a further 527 on 9-10 August 1978.381  Likewise, the first public execution was carried out on 2 March 1978 in front of Camp Jail, Lahore.382 Nineteen executions were carried out in August 1978 alone.383  Four hundred criminals	   were	   hanged	   during	   Zia’s	   first	   eighteen	  
months	  of	  rule	  due	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  culprits’	  appeals.384  While on the one hand the regime was releasing political prisoners who 
were	   imprisoned	  during	  ZAB’s	  period	  under	  DPRs,	  on	  the	  other	  PPP	  followers	  were being arrested and tortured under MLRs and MLOs.  For example, on 1 January 1978, 11,109 prisoners were released under general amnesty; 385 whereas over thirty thousand were sent to prison.386  Many of these were tortured in jail.  Likewise, the promulgation of a supposedly Islamic law to allow amputation of a hand for robbery led to three people being so sentenced in Karachi on 29 March 1978, though the sentences were never carried out.387   
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 The most contentious punitive measure carried out by the regime was the death sentence awarded to ZAB and four other co-accused, who were members of FSF, on 18 March 1978. The sentence was imposed by the Lahore High Court on a narrow margin of four votes to three. The Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected the appeal on 2 February 1979 and ZAB was executed on 4 April 1979. The eighteenth-month-long case was regarded as a travesty of justice both within and outside of Pakistan,388 and it was widely regarded as a 
‘judicial	  murder’.389 A day before the decision of the Supreme Court, the regime arrested five hundred second-tier PPP leaders and jyalas on top of the hundreds already in jail.390 Even under the strictest security measures with double security checks outside the Supreme Court on 6 February, one jyala got inside disguised in a military	  uniform	  and	  shouted	  ‘if	  Bhutto	  is	  hanged,	  I	  would	  kill	  all	  
senior	  military	  Generals’.391   Before executing him, the regime tried to diffuse his popularity within and outside of the country, especially in Arab countries.  The junta published a 2771 page-long	   ‘White	   Paper’	   on	   25	   July	   1978	   highlighting	   the	   alleged	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corruption and rigging of the March 1977 election.392  ZAB rejected this.393   He tried to get acquiescence from political opponents in Pakistan by appointing two or three from each political party into the Federal Cabinet, which he dismissed on 2 April 1979, and declared that a general election would be held in the following November. The declaration of the election was a tactic to divert the attention of political parties, and their workers including PPP following 
ZAB’s	  execution.	    ZAB turned down the offer of the regime to send him into exile with the condition that he played no part in Pakistan politics for ten years, and made no appeal for mercy.394 Dozens of others did appeal on his behalf, including head of states,395 governments,396 international human rights organisations and civil society groups,397 and Pope John Paul II.398   These appeals were all ignored.   
Many	   were	   not	   even	   delivered	   to	   the	   President’s	   secretariat	   by the foreign office, including the appeal of Shah Khalid of Saudi Arabia, which might have 
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been decisive.399 Zia was seen by many to be in a close contact with Saudi 
Arabia	   and	   that	   ‘without	   the	   green	   signal,	   the	   regime	   cannot	   kill	   ZAB’.400  Crucially, the government of the USA was pointedly silent on the issue.  ZAB was not discussed in the meeting between Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, and General Zia on 1-2	  March	  1979.	  	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  letter	  to	  General	  Zia	  on 21 March 1979 stated that a meeting between them at the White House 
would	  be	  facilitated	  if	  ‘without	  reference	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Bhutto	  affair…as	  a first step you suspend the program you are undertaking for uranium enrichment.401  In a telephone call between the two on 3 April 1979 the reversal 
of	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  programme	  was	  discussed	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  ZAB’s	  case.402 As it was, no country called back their ambassador in protest against the 
rejection	   of	   ZAB’s	   appeal.	   	   My	   interviewees	   saw	   these	   appeals	   by	   foreign	  governments as routine diplomatic ones, without substance. 403    
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Figure 1 After the execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Los Angeles Times cartoon image 
published on 16 April 1979.  
None	   of	   ZAB’s	   political	   opponents	   condemned	   the	   sentence,	   but rather 
saw	  it	  as	  being	  in	  tune	  with	  a	  ‘system	  of	  accountability’.404  Nor did they object to the inhuman treatment of the regime of PPP workers and partisans.  They, rather, were looking forward to an election with ZAB off the scene.405  On 2 
                                                        
404 Aijaz  Ahmed,  ‘The Rebellion  of  1983’,  p.34. 
405 News In Brief, Viewpoint, 1 April 1979, IV(34), p. 16.  
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April, Maulana Mufti even said that PNA ministers should now resign as their objective had been achieved.406   
 
Figure 2 General Zia-ul-Haq, dancing in real after executing ZAB. Courtesy, Shahid Sheikh 
Lahore 
                                                        
406 Maulana Mufti Mahmood, cited in Viewpoint, 8 April 1979, IV(35), p. 16. 
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Conclusion The campaign to save Bhutto failed to generate the necessary momentum that 
might	   have	   saved	   him	   from	   execution.	   	   ZAB’s	   overbearing	   style	   of	   leadership	  and confrontational methods had alienated many in Pakistan, and his leftist rhetoric and policies had alarmed powerful landlords, businessmen and religious leaders.   Because of this, the political opposition to Zia was not united.  
ZAB’s	   removal	   had	   left	   a	   leadership	   vacuum	   that	   his	  wife	   and	   daughter	  were	  unable to fill adequately at that juncture.   They failed to win any significant allies in the armed forces who could bring pressure to bear on Zia.   They failed to generate, also, any strong diplomatic pressure on Zia on the issue from the USA and its western allies.    The Zia regime was therefore able to hang ZAB without serious repercussions at that juncture. They failed, however, to bury 
important	  aspects	  of	  ZAB’s	  legacy.	  	  The	  PPP	  and	  its	   jyalas now struggled in the 
name	  of	  ‘Bhuttoism’.	  	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  with	  ZAB’s	  death,	  socialism	  in	  Pakistan	  had	  had its brief day.  Only left-wingers had fought to save ZAB.  The opposition that subsequently emerged in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) included right-wingers who were once part of PNA.                
 95 
Ch. 2. Formative Phase of Collective Action 1979-81:  Borrowing from the writings of La Boétie, Machiavelli, and John Austin, Sharp 
underscored	  the	  importance	  of	  removing	  the	  pillars	  of	   ‘obedience,	  cooperation	  
and	   submission’	   to	   a	   regime	   in	   civil	   resistance	   movements.407  Likewise, Ackerman and Kruegler argued that building alliances within and outside of a country against a military dictatorship, and alienating the opponents vis-à-vis an autocratic regime from its strong pillars of support – such as police, army, and political allies – by civil resisters are necessary to achieve the return of democracy in a country.408  In case of Pakistan between 1979 and 1981, PPP struggled to achieve these goals.  It rallied around the memory of its dead leader ZAB under a rubric that could inspire its supporters and activists, that of 
‘Bhuttoism’.409       
Re-organisation of PPP: Instead of moving abroad or adopting a quietist attitude, Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto vowed to continue their struggle after the execution of ZAB.  Nusrat 
Bhutto	  asserted	  very	   clearly	   ‘I’ll	   fight	  until	   the	   last	  drop	   of	  my	  blood’.410  This was a brave move, given that the movement was in disarray after the death of ZAB.   He had been the Quaid-i-Awam (People’s	  leader)	  and Fakhr-i-Asia (Pride of Asia) in the eyes of the poor and disadvantaged people of Pakistan whom he had projected himself as standing up for when he was in office.  He had restored the morale of the war-defeated Pakistani nation during his seven years in 
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power.411  After he was executed, the situation of his heirs – Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto – was comparable to that of ZAB after the debacle of East Pakistan. The 
PPP’s	   followers	   were	   in	   a	   big	   shock,	   just	   as	   West	   Pakistanis	   had	   been	   in	  December 1971.412  In	  the	  first	  meeting	  held	  after	  ZAB’s	  execution	  on	  25-27 May under the chairmanship of Farooq Leghari, Acting Secretary General of PPP, party workers denounced the Central Executive Committee (CEC) for failing to save their leader and demanded their resignation.  As it was, only one, Malik Saeed Hassan, resigned from the committee.413  The meeting also elected Nusrat Bhutto as the chairperson of the party.414  The left-wing of the party led by Sheikh Rasheed (vice-Chairman), and Ghulam Hussain blamed the moderate leaders, many of whom were big landlords such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Farooq Leghari, for being culpable	  in	  ZAB’s	  death.415  The moderates had been 
uncomfortable	   with	   Nusrat	   Bhutto’s	   refusal	   to	   bargain	   with	   the	   regime	   to	  diffuse its hostility, believing that ZAB could be saved through compromises, whilst the radicals had wanted to undermine the regime through confrontation and even violence.416  Zia had also given an appearance of wanting to reach out to the moderates so as to undermine the resistance of the PPP in general.417  Swallowing this bait, the moderates had suggested that Nusrat and Benazir 
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Bhutto defuse the situation by leaving the country after handing over power in the party to them.418    The radical-moderate divide was not the only one in the PPP. There was internal strife between the big landlords who held important positions in the party. Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, two big landlords from Punjab and Sindh respectively, were in conflict with Mumtaz Bhutto and Farooq Leghari, two landlords of Sindh and Punjab respectively.   Despite such serious internal conflicts, Nusrat Bhutto and BB successfully manoeuvred to establish a broad based alliance that bore fruit eventually in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which will be discussed in later chapters.   The two leaders were faced initially with leading a fractious and disunited opposition that was faced with a highly disciplined opponent, the army under General Zia.   They had to build up a movement with comparable levels of organisation and unity.  As Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, famously known Bacha Khan, had always emphasised, effective nonviolent resistance requires alliances, unity, and discipline to defeat the opponent, just as an army does.  His own Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) were in this vein in their struggle against the British and their local allies in the North West Frontier Province from the 1920s onwards.  They wore a uniform of red shirts, took oaths of loyalty to the cause, and divided the force into various battalions to keep discipline and unity under one command.419 Although such para-
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419 See, for example, D.G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is Battle (Bombay [Mumbai]: 
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military organisation fell out of favour amongst progressive nonviolent political activists after World War Two due to its resonances with fascism, the underlying principle was still good – namely that an ill-disciplined and disunited movement has little chance of success against a highly-discipline ruling power.   Building such an oppositional force was a daunting task in the case of the PPP, as it was so riven by internal groups and factions.  Neither Nusrat Bhutto nor BB ever really managed to achieve this throughout the period covered in this dissertation. Nonetheless, they managed to restore party morale 
in	   the	   three	   years	   following	   ZAB’s	   death	   and	   rebuild	   the	   support	   among	   the	  general public that had been lost during the PNA movement, all of which was a major attainment in itself.    Nusrat Bhutto was expected to observe iddat – the Islamic requirement of a widow to keep herself away from male strangers and going out for four 
months	  and	  ten	  days	  after	  her	  husband’s	  death.	  As	  it	  was,	  she	  was	  under	  house	  arrest until 28 May.420   During this period, BB also spent two hours each day meeting the mourners who came to their house in Karachi.421  This built her confidence.   Though she consulted her mother on each matter, she took administrative decisions on reorganising the party.  For example, she decided that the CEC should meet monthly and at every provincial capital in turns.  The first meeting was held in the Bhutto residence at Clifton in Karachi on 19-20 May, which allowed Nusrat Bhutto to attend without violating house arrest. 
Paying	  homage	  to	  her	  husband	  at	  the	  first	  CEC	  meeting,	  she	  declared:	  ‘He	  lived	  and died true to his principles. He showed how a son of the Indus, a leader of the                                                         
420 Viewpoint, 3 June 1979, p.11. 
421 Musawat, May 1979. 
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people, a symbol of liberation, an embodiment of emancipation, a soldier of Islam – lives	  like	  a	  mujahid,	  and	  dies	  a	  martyr’.422  She reiterated her passion to carry out his mission.423 Several important decisions were taken at this meeting.  Provincial legal aid committees were established to look after the cases of political prisoners and help the families of the imprisoned workers to fight for their release.  A drive was launched to recruit more party members at all levels, and it was ordered that weekly meetings should be held at grass-roots level to mobilise the workers.  Likewise,	  the	  meeting	  criticised	  the	  regime’s	  economic	  policies	  as	  well	  as the budget which raised the prices of the basic commodities.424  Due	  to	  Zia’s	  promise to hold elections before the end of the year, the environment was somehow conducive for holding corner meetings. Utilising the tradition of religious meetings in the form of Iftar (Muslim fast-breaking time) during 
Ramadan (9th Month of Islamic calendar), BB advised the local leaders across the country to hold iftaris to spread their message to the general public. Taseer stated that this was even converted into a business opportunity, as vendors sold Eid (Islamic festival at the end of Ramadan) cards with the images of ZAB and BB. And the most expensive card was thirty-five to eight rupees (US$4 to $1) per card.425  ZAB was buried in the family graveyard at Garhi Khuda Bakhsh, and this became a place of pilgrimage for his admirers.  Soon after his death, BB herself went by rail from Karachi to the grave.  Besides being an act of personal                                                         
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mourning, this also helped to raised public sympathy.  Honouring a dead person in an ostentatious and public way is a form of protest often employed in campaign of civil resistance, as in Argentina in 1943 and South Africa in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre, with people gathering at the gravesides of their loved ones in an act of protest against their killings by, respectively, Perón and the apartheid regime.426  Visiting burial places in big groups on the death anniversary of a popular leader is another way of registering dissent in a public 
but	  peaceful	  manner.	  	  	  When	  BB	  travelled	  by	  train	  to	  her	  father’s	  grave	  in	  1979,	  the public came to the stations at the four stops on the way to Larkhana and 
shouted	  ‘Revenge!	  Revenge!’427   She	  reiterated	  at	  each	  station:	  ‘Now we have all been orphaned. Our father has left us. All of you are my brothers. Until yesterday it was my father who guided me;	  now	  you	  will	  guide	  me.’428  Despite attempts by the police to stop them, over a hundred thousand mourners turned up on the Chehlum (fortieth mourning day service).429   The mobilisation of such large crowds expressing such devotion to their lost leader was a set-back for 
Zia,	  showing	  that	  ZAB’s	  execution	  – rather than demoralise the movement – had backfired.   His loss of support was revealed in the local body elections held in September 1979, which will be discussed below. Once her house arrest was lifted, Nusrat Bhutto ended her seclusion, though the conventional period of mourning had not yet ended.   Starting in June 1979, she held public meetings at which she declared that she would never 
surrender	   and	   that	   it	   was	   only	   through	   ‘people’s	   struggle,	   sacrifices and                                                         
426 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp.155-63. 
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endeavour’	   that	   ‘positive	   and	   people’s	   revolution’	   could	   be	   achieved.430 ZAB’s	  
rule	   had	   raised	   people’s	   consciousness	   as	   to	   their	   rights,	   and	   she	   reminded	  them of this so as to recharge their resolution in the fight against the brutal regime of Zia.	   	   JI’s	  leader	  publicly	  admitted	  that	  the	  party	  had	  been	  revived	  by	  
Nusrat	  Bhutto’s	  strong	  intervention	  at	  this	  juncture.431   This all demonstrated that despite the death of their founder, PPP was still the leading popular force in the country, and that the nation had become 
polarised	   into	   ‘murderers’	   and	   ‘mourners’.	   	   	   The	   PPP	   leader	   Qayumi	   Nizami	  divided Pakistani society at this time into those who were progressive and with 
the	  PPP,	  whom	  he	  called	  ‘awam dost’	  – meaning friend of the common people – and janta dost – the friend of the regime.432    This divide stretched into every sphere of life including within civil society, in the media, and among students and labourers. For example, daily newspapers such as Aman (Urdu-Karachi), 
Sadaqat (Urdu-Karachi), Masawat (Urdu-Lahore and Karachi), The Muslim (English-Islamabad), and  weekly magazines such as Al-Fatah (Urdu-Karachi), 
Me’yar (Urdu-Karachi), and Viewpoint (English-Lahore) were mainly favourable towards the PPP movement or at least found some way to report their activities despite the strict censorship of the Press.  The dailies Dawn (English-Karachi), 
Pakistan Times (English-Lahore), Nawa-i-Waqt (Urdu-Lahore), and the weeklies such as Zindagi, and Urdu digest were on the other hand die-hard supporters of the regime.  The government sought to control the media through its National Press Trust.   Mehdi Hasan remarked on the daily Jang that in conforming to the 
                                                        
430 Viewpoint, 10 June 1979, p. 11. 
431 Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, cited in Viewpoint, IV (51), 29 July 1979, p.5. 
432 Qayyum Nizami, Musawat, 15 August 1979. 
 102 
official	  diktat	  ‘their	  policy	  is	  there	  is	  no	  policy’.433 Likewise, student bodies were classed as either liberal-progressive,	  	  such	  as	  People’s	  Student	  Federation	  (PPP),	  National Student Federation (NSF), and Democratic Student Alliance (DSA), or pro-regime, such as IJT (Islami Jamiat Tulba,	   JI’s	   student	   body).  In a similar manner, trades unions were split along such lines, with some being in the progressive camp, such as All Pakistan Labour Representative Organisation, others in the regime camp, such as the National Labour Federation (NLF) of Pakistan.  Lawyers mainly supported the progressive groups, and hardly any case was reported of a group of lawyers not supporting the anti-Zia struggle. The main reason for this appears to have been that they had a strong commitment to the rule of law, and resented the many ways in which Zia was violating the Constitution of 1973.  It is crucial for organisations engaged in nonviolent struggle to have a strong operational corps that connects the leaders with their rank-and-file supporters and which leads and guides according to an overall strategy.  They are responsible for disseminating proper and accurate objectives amongst the masses, and for instructing theme in nonviolent techniques and maintaining nonviolent discipline.434  For example, the successes of maintaining nonviolence 
amongst	  the	  public	  during	  Gandhi’s	  Salt	  Satyagraha	  and	  in	  the	  Danish	  resistance	  against Nazi occupation were because of strong operational corps working actively throughout the movement.435  The violence that erupted during the 1983 MRD civil disobedience campaign in Sindh, which will be discussed in Chapter 3, was mainly due to the disruption of the operational corps.                                                         
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Understanding this need, BB held personal meetings, speeches, and conferences to develop a strong operational corps.  She also directed provincial heads to meet regularly with union leaders and gain their support, as unions were generally relatively disciplined and well-ordered organisations.436  Pro-PPP unions won the unions election during the 1979-81 period and also fought courageously during MRD.  For example, progressive alliance and liberal front 
candidate	   Rafique	   Patel	   defeated	   IJT’s	   candidate	   in	   Karachi	   University:437 and Quaid-i-Azam	   Student	   Federation,	   a	   progressive	   parties’	   alliance,	   won	   in	   the	  Lahore educational institutions.438 Likewise, the pro-Jama’at	   union	   in	   Karachi	  Steel Mill lost the referendum on 7 July 1979 against the progressive labour alliance.439  
 
Figure 3 BB receiving and meeeting with PPP's workers after the death of ZAB in June 1979. 
Courtesy SHahid Sheikh 
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BB	  also	   tried	   to	   reach	  out	   to	   the	  army	  by	  stating	  categorically	   that	   ‘the	  Generals [Pakistan Army high command] should not live in fear, their names 
won’t	   be	   on	   the	   death	  warrant	   of	   ZAB’.	   	   However,	   she	   added,	   if	   they	   did	   not	  return power to people, Pakistan would be further divided.440  She said this in an attempt to assure the Generals that she and her party did not want revenge against the army as a whole, and that they had a mutual interest in the welfare of Pakistan.441   Zia allowed elections to local bodies to be held in 1979 on a non-party basis.  PPP did not nominate candidates for the election but rather encouraged sympathetic people to stand as candidates under a broad Awam Dost rubric.442 The pro-Zia candidates identified themselves by contrast as Islam Pasand 
(devotees	   of	   Islam).	   This	   group	   had	   strong	   links	   with	   Jama’at-i-Islami.   Zia himself openly favoured those in the Islam Parsand camp in a campaign that he 
conducted	  in	  person	  all	  over	  the	  country	  voicing	  the	  slogan	  of	   ‘Yeh Mumlakate 
Khudad Hey – Roti, Kapra Makan mumlakat Nahi hai’	   (This	   is	   Allah’s	   land,	   not	  the land of bread, cloth, and a house).443  Zia’s	  partisan	  campaign	  was	  an	  open	  denial of his own Political Parties Act (Amendments-PPA) 1979, passed before the holding of the non-party based elections.444  The results went strongly in favour of Awam Dost and a humiliation to the regime. The election did not pass                                                         
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off without violence in some places.  18 were reported killed and hundreds injured in different places in Punjab, Sindh and KPK.445   The Awam Dost panel won more than eighty percent seats unopposed in Sindh. More than 1000 were returned unopposed from six districts of Sindh.446 Having turnout of sixty-five per cent, the panel won 60-70 per cent of the seats in Lahore.447  Following	   Zia’s	   threats	   during	   the	   election	   campaign	   of	   not	  
handing	  over	  the	  government	  to	  the	  elected	  representatives	  if	  he	  felt	   ‘they	  are	  not capable of maintaining national integrity,448 the regime stopped the sessions of local government bodies and did not devolve political powers at the local levels.  For example, Justice Aamer Raza Khan, Lahore High Court Bench directed the Punjab Local Bodies Election authority to withhold the result of 
Sahiwal	   until	   it	   was	   decided	  whether	   ‘Awam Dost’	   came	   under	   the	  non-party 
based	  election’s	  rules	  or	  not.	   	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  pro-regime elements had used 
the	   nomenclature	   ‘Islam Pasand’	   and	   declared	   a	   common	   loyalty	   to	   the	   post-Quaid concept of Pakistani ideology, was ignored.449  Likewise, the Governors of Sindh and Baluchistan barred the newly elected councillors from taking part in politics, which seemed oxymoronic.450   The governor of Punjab, going one step 
further,	   told	   the	   elected	   representatives	   that	   they	   had	   ‘to	   justify	   people’s	  
confidence’,	   immediately	   after	   they	   had done exactly that in an election!451 
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Despite being in a minority and using malicious tactics, candidates of JI were made Mayors of Karachi452 and Lahore.453  Had Awam Dost not contested, the regime would have been able to 
demonstrate	   a	   cheerful	   picture	   of	   ‘democracy’	   to	   observers	   at	   national	   and	  international level and claim that the public supported it.454  Cohen felt that Zia was trying to exhibit a good picture to America whilst having little change on the ground.455 Despite	   the	   regime’s	   using	   every	   means	   open	   to them to stop those aligned with Awam Dost in taking their deserved positions after the elections, their victory had brought great confidence to the anti-Zia movement in the next phase.  
The	  Regime’s	  ‘Islamic’	  Repression: In an interview with The Economist, General Zia explained the reason for his 
‘Islamisation’	  programme: ‘Pakistan	  is,	  like	  Israel,	  an	  ideological	  state.	  Take	  out	  the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would	   collapse’.456 A new slogan was 
propagated	  of	   ‘enforcement	  of	   Islam	   first	   and	  democracy’	   to	   supplement	  Zia’s	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earlier	   ‘accountability	  first	  and	  election	  later’.457  Much has been written about the way that Zia tried to create a strong national identity through Islamisation and the repercussions of this on Pakistani society.458  Opinion is divided on this, with people like Ghafoor Ahmed claiming that Zia was too lenient in his Islamisation, while others depict it as being used cynically by Zia to perpetuate his rule.  He started introducing Islamic principles, as he understood them, into every key institution of the country between 1979 and 1981. He implemented 
Zakat and Ushr in 1979,459 the Hudood Ordinances in 1979,460 the Law of Evidence in 1983,461 the Ramadan Ordinance in 1979,462 Salat (prayer) and 
Zakat committees at the grass roots level in 1979; and restructured the Council of Islamic Ideology.463 Sharia courts (1979) were established parallel to those that tried cases under the secular law, which was based on the British Penal Codes.  Islamic punishment such as amputation and lashes were introduced. His                                                         
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every	  step	  and	  ordinance	  was	  given	   the	   tag	  of	   ‘Islamic’.	  As	   it	  was,	  most	  of	   the	  types of judicial and extra-judicial punishments inflicted in Pakistan under Zia were a continuation of longstanding ones dating back to colonial times and earlier.  Zia replaced the parliamentary cabinet with an advisory council that was selected after a search for fifty saleheen (the most pious) to be its members.464  Later, in 1981, he increased the number of these saleheen to 350.  
Likewise,	   he	   sought	   to	   revamp	   the	   education	   system	   according	   to	   ‘Islamic’	  teachings. 465   Religious preachers were invited to the military training centres.466 However, neither he nor his cronies tagged the repression of the 
people	  under	  his	  rule	  as	  ‘Islamic’,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  a	  complete	  negation	  of	  the	  Quranic injunction that the slaying one person, unless in retaliation for murder, is the slayer of all mankind.467   The	  incorporation	  of	  Sharia’	  into the legal system of Pakistan by Zia and his allies caused legal chaos in the country.  There was already a plural legal system, with the co-existence of the secular law inherited from the British, military law, special tribunals, and Jirga (the community councils of KPK and 
FATA).	   	   Into	   this	   mix,	   Sharia’	   law	   was	   introduced	   suddenly	   with	   no	   proper	  preparation or training of judges. Instead of providing solace to the public, it 
rather	   made	   them	   more	   vulnerable.	   	   The	   Sharia’	   courts	   began	   to	   be	   used	  frequently for political and personal vendettas.  They could also be used to undermine the legal rights of the poor.  For example, the protection provided to 
tenants	  in	  ZAB’s	  land	  reform	  law,	  clause	  D	  of	  sub-para III of para 25 of MLR 115                                                         
464 Viewpoint, V (14), 11 November 1979, p.12. 
465 Haqqani, Pakistan, p.224. Ravia Kalia, Pakistan: From the Rhetoric of Democracy to the Rise of 
Militancy (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011), p.11,  
466 Cohen, The idea of Pakistan, p.84. 
467 The verse in Quran has been reiteration of the teaching in Judaism. Al-Quran 5:32.  
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of 1972,468 was ruled by the	   Peshawar	   Sharia’t	   Bench	   in	   July	   1979	   to	   be	  
incongruous	  to	  Sharia’.469    The Shia community is the second largest sectarian community group after the Sunni in Pakistan.  The Shiites saw the Sharia law as an imposition on them by Sunnis, especially the deduction of a compulsory 2.5 per cent Zakat on every first of Ramadan from all savings banks accounts.470  They argued that the concept of Zakat in Islam is a voluntary one.  In response, they launched a movement, Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Jafria (TNFJ-Movement for the Implementation of Shia Law) for the imposition of Fiqh-i-Ja’afaria (Shiites law) alongside the Sunni Sharia.471  To register their protest after talks with the government had failed, 
two	  Shiites	  members	  of	  Zia’s	  Islamic	  Ideology	  Council	  — Syed Muhammad Razi 
and	  Mufti	   Ja’afer	  Hossein	  — resigned and the following day observed Protest Day on Friday 4 May 1979.472  Zia met with a Shia delegation assuring them that their beliefs would be respected and they would not be forced to accept any law that was against their faith.473   However, without concrete concessions, the Shias were not satisfied, and they reiterated their demands and continued to boycott the Islamic Advisory Council.474  Despite the opposition of Sunni clerics led by Mufti Mahmood in favour of a uniform Sunni law for all, the Fiqh Jafarai leaders stayed firm.475  
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Seeing how reluctant the Zia regime was to back down on this issue, the Supreme Council of the Movement for the Implementation of Fiqh-i-Ja’fria under Mufti Jafar Hussain, called for direct action after the announcement of the national budget for 1979-80. On the call of the Mufti on 23 June 1979 for all Shias to withdraw their money from banks before 30 June, ten million rupees ($US0.1million) was taken out of banks in Sialkot district within two days of the call, and forty million rupees (US$0.4million) from Gujrat districts alone.476   These two districts in northern Punjab are particularly important centres of industry.  Musawat reported that a total sum of 250 million rupees (US$2.5million) had been withdrawn from all over the country during these few days.477    The members of the Standing Committee of Implementation of Sharia’	  were asked to resign from their positions. Political parties, in particular TI, came forward to support these demands.478  Following a popular strategy in nonviolent resistance, they staged a two-day sit-in in front of Parliament in which tens of thousands of protestors participated.479 Eventually, Zia declared that Zakat law would be implemented only after an accord had been reached with the Shias.480 In five months, the Shia community achieved their objective through united and disciplined action by their rank-and-file.  Unfortunately, the rivalry between Sunnis and Shias that gained such traction at that time stoked a 
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sectarian-based politics in the country that has remained a major problem in Pakistan to this day.481 All this was not well received by some important public figures, such as the Governor of Punjab who determined that it demonstrated need for a quick return to democracy.482   Elements in the military were also alarmed by the 
implications	  of	  Zia’s	  extremism	  in	  this	  respect,	  and	  a	  few	  military	  officers	  under	  Major Tajammul unsuccessfully plotted against him in the early 1980.    Instead of bringing stability to the political life	  of	   the	  country,	   the	   ‘Islamic’	  ordinances	  and PCO-II thus backfired.   
Trade Union Militancy: Due to denationalisation and price-hikes in the country many labour unions were on strike between 1979 and 1983.  For example, the All-Pakistan Banks Officers Federation’s	   one-hour pen-down strike started in April 1979 and continued for ninety-one days. Employees of the National Bank of Pakistan, United Bank Limited, Habib Bank Limited, Muslim Commercial Bank, and Allied Bank Limited were involved in this.483  Inventing a new form of protest, these 
officers	  started	  selling	   ‘protest	  pakoras’	   (traditional	  snack,	  made	  of	  gram	  flour	  which is mainly sold by impoverished hawkers). These officers remained peaceful and continued to deal with the public.484  There were also strikes by the All Pakistan Postal Employees Union (ten days),485 the Pakistan Nurses 
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Organisation joined by doctors and surgeons (18 days), 486  Anjuman-i-
Mulazimeen-i-Baldia (Organisation of Town Council Employees) in Punjab, including small units of unions	  such	  as	  rickshaw	  drivers	  (Karachi)	  and	  Sahiwal’s	  women sweepers (Punjab),487 and the Fruit and Vegetables Associations (Punjab).488 These strikes were mainly due to the price-hikes, with demands for increases in pay and improved conditions.  The most powerful of all of the strikes was by the Karachi shipyard workers led by their recognised union, the CBA, in late 1978 demanding pay rises and better allowances.   The dispute was resolved initially when the labour department intervened in favour of the workers.  The agreement was however later reneged on by the employers, leading to a resumption of the strike on 30 May 1979.  On 18 June, six thousand workers were suddenly fired by the Labour Court and CBA was banned for its support of the earlier strike, which was held to be illegal.489     The workers staged a protest demonstration that was attacked violently by the police, with Kaniz Fatima, President of Pakistan Trade Union Federation, being arrested.  This all shocked workers across the country as well as their sympathisers, and labour unions as far away as KPK protested in sympathy, and PPP expressed its support.490  The shipyard workers and the federation extended their demands to the release of Fatima and her colleagues, the reinstatement of the sacked workers, and a change of management.  One 
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thousand blackleg workers were hired on contracts of Rs.20 (US$2.00) per day to break the strike.  The authorities closed their eyes to this.  Many workers were forced to resume their jobs due to financial hardship, though 3,500 workers continued the boycott.491  This involved a long and tiring satyagraha that lasted seventy-five days until finally the concerned authorities agreed to negotiate.  Three leaders – Bashir Ahmad, the Central General Secretary PFUT, Anis Hashmi, Member Central Committee, and Salim Raza, General Secretary Karachi – were appointed to talk with the Federal Minister for Labour, General Faiz Ali Chishti, the Sindh Provincial Government and the shipyard management.  The negotiations went in favour of the satyagrahis, with the 
authorities	   issuing	   a	   public	   notice	   on	   7	   August	   accepting	   the	   ‘unconditional	  reinstatement of the labour without any victimisation, advance payment to release their economic hardship, as well as the liberation of the detained labour leaders’.492   The union and the general body of workers unanimously agreed to call off the strike on 12 August.  This action achieved its objectives due to it having a simple and clear set of objectives along with unity in the rank-and-file. The anti-Zia political leaders might have learnt lessons from this on how to organise an effective and compelling protest.  
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‘Real	  Martial	  Law’: The debacle inflicted on the Zia regime in the local body elections of 1979 led him reconsider his promise to hold a non-party based general election later in that year.  The PPP CEC had decided to support people standing under the 
Awam Dost rubric.    Following the advice of five leaders of the PNA, Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah, Pir Pagara, Sardar Abdul Qayyum, and Sardar Sikander Hyat that western democracy was hostile to Islamic teaching, Zia announced that he was cancelling the general election on the grounds that there was no mention of such elections in the Quran.493  Instead he imposed a new phase of martial law, Provisional Constitutional Order-II under MLO no. 48, on 
16	   October	   1979,	   declaring	   it	   the	   ‘real	   martial	   law’.494  At the same time, he 
made	   it	   ‘quite	   clear’	   that	   his	   ‘is	   not	   a	   perpetual	  Martial	   law	   regime’	   either.495  The MLO deprived political leaders and the public of any political platform, and imposed fourteen years rigorous imprisonment, confiscation of his/her property and twenty-five lashes to those who violated it.496  On 22 October, military courts were given more power to try both civil and criminal cases without interference from any civil court under MLO 72.497 100 military courts, including mobile courts, were established as well.498  Giving the logic of the imposition of PPA 1979, Zia said that holding free and fair elections were a                                                         
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threat	   to	   the	   ‘integrity,	   sovereignty,	   and	   Islamisation	   of	   Pakistan’.499 Referring 
to	  the	  victors	  in	  the	  local	  polls,	  he	  said	  that	  the	  voters	  ‘knew	  nothing	  beyond	  the	  
four	  walls’,	   and	  were	   illiterate	   and	  uneducated	   as	   they	   had	   shown	  when	   they	  
had	  elected	  ‘impious	  persons’.500 Without	  ‘positive	  results’,	  the	  country	  did	  not	  deserve to have elections.501  Likewise, MLO No. 49 made the editors of print media liable to severe punishment of ten lashes and twenty-five years of rigorous imprisonment if they published any material or opinion prejudicial to Islamic ideology or sovereignty, the integrity and security of Pakistan, or morality and the maintenance of public order.502  Not	   only	   writing,	   but	   ‘caricatures,	   cartoons,	  
sketches,	   symbols’	   were	   put	   under	   restriction	   also.	   	   Four-member committee were set up in every division headquarter to scrutinise print material twice before its final publication.  They began work immediately on the night of 16 October, issuing letters of warning, notices, and closure orders on some publications, such as the PPP paper Musawaat, Sadaqat, and Newsweek.  A number of editors such as Abbas Athar, President of Lahore Press Club, Salamat Ali of Far Eastern Economic Review, the editor of Sadaqat, and many other journalists were arrested. 503   A government spokesperson told the BBC that 300 leaders and political workers had been imprisoned or put under house arrest in the three week after 
the	   promulgation	   of	   	   ‘real	   martial	   law’,	   including	   BB,	   Nusrat	   Bhutto,	   Farooq	  Leghari, General (rtd) Tikka Khan, Sh. Rafiq Ahmed, Asghar Khan.   Unofficial                                                         
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reports spoke however of several thousand political prisoners.504  There were large numbers of summary military trials.  Amnesty International (AI) declared that two-hundred persons were flogged publicly in a two-week period at the start of this phase of martial law.505 The district magistrate Lahore declared that 
‘shouting	   of	   slogans,	   making	   demonstrations,	   carrying	   placards’	   were	   also	  prohibited in the city, and those found with lathis (wooden sticks), daggers, and loudspeakers would considered	  as	  being	  in	  possession	  of	   ‘lethal	  weapons’	  that	  might be used against the regime.506   
Building an Anti-regime Political Alliance Bringing the various political parties under one banner was not a new experiment in the political history of Pakistan as four years earlier the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had shown in its opposition to ZAB.  It was however 
difficult	  initially	  to	  reconcile	  the	  ‘murderer’	  — PNA — and	  the	  ‘grieved	  party’	  — PPP.   The execution of ZAB in 1979 had made the relationship so fraught that it seemed impossible that they could ever come together.  The hostility towards the PNA was reiterated in the PPP meeting of May 1979.507  Aijaz Ahmed argued that BB and Asghar Khan were suspicious of each other.508   Nonetheless, for the benefit of the greater good, a great leader has to forgo personal grievances.  Both Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto rose to this challenge.     
                                                        
504 Viewpoint, V (14), 11 November 1979, p.11. Amnesty International,  ‘Letter  to  CMLA  Zia-ul-Haq’,  1  
November 1979, MSS.34/4/1/pk10, MRC, pp.1-6. 
505 Amnesty International,   ‘Letter   to  CMLA  Zia-ul-Haq’,   1  November  1979,  MSS.34/4/1/pk10,  MRC,  
p.2. 
506 The Muslim. 16 February 1981. NAP.  
507 Musawat, 27 May 1979. 
508 Aijaz  Ahmed,   ‘The  Rebellion   of   1983:  A  Balance   Sheet’,   South Asia Bulletin, vol.IV, No.1, Spring 
1984, p.36. 
 117 
The failure of PPP to save the life of its founder pushed them into the realisation that it was hard to topple General Zia alone.  Not only had the regime crushed the opposition ruthlessly, but it had managed to win support from important public figures such as Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the ex-governor of Punjab, and Masood Ahmad, former head of the notorious Federal Security Force (FSF), who had both acted as witnesses against ZAB.  Nusrat Bhutto told 
BB	   that	   ‘we	   have	   to	   outmanoeuvre	   Zia	   before	   he	   outmanoeuvres	   us’.509  They realised the crucial need for a united opposition front.   They also saw that it would be counterproductive to fight the Pakistan armed forces as an institution and that they should, rather, focus on Zia as an individual, gradually winning over his main pillars of support.510  Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto knew that they would have to take the lead, as they headed PPP, the strongest of the opposition parties.  After the execution of ZAB, most of PNA leaders had been dismissed 
unceremoniously	   from	   the	   Federal	   Cabinet,	   leaving	   them	   in	   a	   ‘political	  
wilderness’.511  Many in PNA realised that they had limited power and position under the general, and that they had little to lose and much to gain from withdrawing their support from him.512   There were a few political parties in the alliance that were willing still to back the regime, such as JI, PML (Pagara), due to its Islamisation programme. 513  However, the PNA alliance was disintegrating.  TI left it in October 1977, followed by JUP on 6 July 1978 and                                                         
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NDP on 16 August 1978.514  Noorani	  (JUP)	  declared	  PNA	  a	  ‘dead	  horse’	  and	  his	  party celebrated the Day of Deliverance on 20 April 1979.515  Existing histories state that the MRD was formed in early 1981.516 This thesis argues that it had already in effect come into existence by late 1979, even 
though	  the	  alliance	  of	  parties	  was	  not	  described	  at	  that	  time	  as	  the	  ‘MRD’.	  	  Major	  party leaders had shown their interest in mid-1979 in forming an anti-Zia alliance.517  Smaller regional and left-wing parties were also looking for some big platform to expand their stature at national level and launch a campaign against the dictatorship.518 The Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) led by Fatehyab Ali 
Khan	  and	  Mairaj	  Muhammad	  Khan’s	  QMA	  were	  key	  figures	  in	  bonding	  the	  left-wing forces.519  On the demand of all progressive parties, a committee of four senior persons – Farooq Leghari (Punjab), Yahya Bakhtiar (Balochistan), Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao (KPK), and Abdul Fateh Memon (Sindh) –was set up to cultivate cooperation with like-minded progressive organisations.520 This all fed into the success of Awam Dost in the local elections of 1979.  On 9 October 1979, BB invited all democratic parties to forget their petty issues and come together for the cause of national integration, stating that it                                                         
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was	   time	   ‘for	   all	   parties	   claiming	   to	   be	   democratic	   to	   stand	   above	   party	  affiliation, to stand to compel the Junta to hold the promised election as per 
schedule’.521  An invitation was forwarded to trade unions and peasants to 
evolve	   ‘a	   line	  of	  action’	  whereby	   the	  people	  were	  enabled	   to	  have	   ‘democratic	  self-rule’.	   	   The	   party	   also	   condemned	   attacks	   on	   students	   in	   Sindh	  University	  and Karachi University hostel.522  It was in this atmosphere that Zia cancelled the promised general election.  Zia then prevented any further moves towards opposition unity by arresting the leaders, so that they had to wait to finalise the agenda.    The process was restarted in September 1980, when PPP set out a two point agenda – to form a committee to negotiate with the former PNA parties and draft an agreement between them.  The committee consisted of BB, Farooq Leghari, Yahya Bakhtiar, Mairaj Khalid and Piar Ali Allana.523  Pir Pagara and Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan took the lead in talking with PPP on these points.  This was in many respects a return to the situation in 1977, when ZAB and the PNA sat round a table together to solve the crisis created by allegations that the election of that year had been rigged.  Now, however, largely the same players 
(with	   ZAB’s	   notable	   absence)	   were	   forming	   an	   alliance	   to	   fight	   for	   a	   larger	  cause.  BB and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan both agreed to restart the dialogue that had been broken on 4 July 1977.524 With much hesitation and reluctances 
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from both parties,525 they	   finally	   agreed	   on	   one	   broad	   agenda	   ‘Pakistan	   and	  
martial	  law	  cannot	  exist.’526  Finally on 6 February 1981, three major demands were put before the regime under the umbrella of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which will be discussed in the next chapter.    
 
Figure 4 BB chairing the MRD in process meeting in 1980. Courtesy Shahid Sheikh 
International Support: Despite suspension of US military and economic aid on 4 April 1979 due to General Zia continuing programme to acquire nuclear energy, the Western powers did not come forward to support democracy in Pakistan.  There was an understanding that Zia provided a reliable ally against the designs of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  The Daily Telegraph (UK), for instance, was predicting a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as early as 3 June 1979.527   Left-wing groups in Pakistan were seen by US intelligence to be aligned with the communist bloc, particularly the radical element in PPP that Nusrat Bhutto was inclined to at this 
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time.528  US intelligence reports had suggested that the Pakistani nuclear enrichment programme was reaching its final stages,529 and on 16 October 1979, a high-level US delegation that included Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, met with Zia and his government to discuss the nuclear issue.   After accepting Pakistan assurance that their nuclear development was for peaceful purposes, the US government resumed	   aid	   in	   the	   form	   of	   ‘humanitarian’	   assistance	   for	  Afghan refugees in Pakistan.530  The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at the end of December 1979 led to more positive support being given to Zia as a front-line ally in the anti-Soviet war.  The British foreign minister replied to UK journalists who had asked him whether he would shake hands with the 
dictator	   that	   ‘he	   (Zia)	   was	   a	   son	   of	   bitch	   but	   he	   was	   our	   (British)	   son	   of	   a	  
bitch.’531   The PPP failed to break this nexus, as they were continuing to reach out to people who were an anathema to the Western allies.  This was made clear after the party sponsored the Bhutto Shaheed (martyr) Memorial Trust that 
announced	  the	  awarding	  of	  a	  number	  of	  ‘Bhutto	  Shaheed	  Medals	  of	  Democracy’	  in 1979.532  The medals – in two categories of gold and silver – were given to the individuals who had raised their voices in trying to save ZAB from execution.  Gold medals were awarded to President Assad of Syria, the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, the President of the UAE Sheikh Zaid Bin Sultan                                                         
528 National   Foreign   Assessment   Centre,   ‘The   Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Search   for   Power,   An  
Intelligence   Assessment’,   Central Intelligence Agency, September 1981, CIA-
RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, pp. 2-3. 
529 Richard  Burt,  ‘U.S. Aides Say Pakistan Is Reported to Be Building an A-Bomb  Site’,  New York Times 
online, 17 August 1979, 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00B17FC385D12728DDDAE0994D0405B898BF1D
3# (21 August 2013) 
530 Viewpoint, V (11), 21 October 1979, p.13. 
531 Quoted by Karamat Ali, interview, 15 March 2012, Karachi. 
532 Musawat, 8 August 1979.  
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Al Nahyan, and the pro-Soviet President of Afghanistan, Nur Muhammad Taraki.   Although some westerners who had spoken up for ZAB were awarded silver medals, they were mostly oppositional figures.533   Such gestures were hardly likely to endear the PPP with the US government and its allies.   
Conclusion: PPP not only successfully reinvigorated itself after the loss of ZAB, but it managed to win over most political parties in Pakistan to its side during this period.  According to theories of civil resistance, building alliances among the opponents of a regime is crucial for any such movement.534  The PPP was clearly winning this particular battle.  In the next chapter we shall go on to see how this all bore fruit in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.    
                                                        
533 Musawat, 27 August 1979. 
534 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, pp.32-33 and 40-42. 
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Ch. 3. The Movement for Restoration of Democracy 1981-84 The year 1981 saw the start of a new struggle for democracy in Pakistan. Opposition parties and like-minded political groups or parties created a joint strategy to get rid of the dictatorship and restore democratic norms in the country. Announced publicly on 6 February 1981, the movement faced a ruthless reaction from the regime but it was able to inspire the citizens to struggle for their democratic rights.  Most historians and political scientists have considered that this movement was ultimately a failure.  This dissertation 
argues	   however	   that	   it	   was	   part	   of	   a	   continuum	   in	   a	   ‘gradualist	   democratic’	  movement that eventually paved the way towards holding elections and ending martial law in 1985. This chapter analyses the structure, strategies, and the results of the movement during the 1981-84	   period,	   as	  well	   as,	   the	   dictator’s	  oppression of the predominantly unarmed resisters. 
Objective and Strategies: The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) had one major guiding 
principle,	   namely	   that	   ‘Pakistan	   and	   martial	   law	   cannot	   exist’.535  It issued a statement: We, therefore, demand that Zia-ul-Haq quit and martial law be lifted immediately; failing which they will be removed by the irresistible will of the people, that free, fair and impartial elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies be held within 3 months in accordance with the unanimously adopted Constitution of 1973 and power be transferred to 
                                                        
535 Hussain, Politics of Alliances, p.128. 
 124 
the elected representatives of the people and the interests of the four federating units be fully restored and protected.536  In forming such a multi-party alliance against an authoritarian ruler, we can see parallels with campaigns of civil resistance elsewhere in the world.   In the anti-Pinochet movement in Chile, for example, staunch Allende-era Socialists and Right-wingers came together in August 1985 to establish Union Democratica 
Independiente (Independent Democratic Union-UDI), and agreed on one agenda 
called	  ‘National	  Accord	  for	  Full	  Transition	  to	  Democracy	  (Acuerda Nacional).537 There was a similar concord between parties of very different ideological persuasion in the anti- Milošević	   alliance	   in	   Serbia	   in	   2000.538    In Pakistan, representatives of nine parties signed a draft declaration, which they announced publically on 6 February 1981.539 At first, the organisation was haphazard and inept. Bizenjo, coming from Quetta, failed to be included in the collective signing.540  Leaders of two Left parties, Mairaj M.Khan and Fatehyab Ali Khan, were brought in at the last minute before the signing.541  They even failed to devise a name for their initiative, and it was left to the press reporters, 
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after getting the impression from the objectives of the alliance, to coin the name 
‘Movement	  for	  the	  Restoration	  of	  Democracy’.542   It is hard to determine the numerical strength of the different parties due 
to	   the	   regime’s	   ban	   on	   them.	   	   Nonetheless,	   collating	   figures	   from	   interviews	  with people who were able to estimate figures for Lahore, it appears PPP members had up to one hundred thousand members there, as the city was divided into ten zones, and every zone had 100 units with hundred members in 
each.	   	   Shahida	   Jabeen,	   lady	   councillor	   on	   the	   women’s	   seat	   in	   Lahore said seventy-two	  councillors	  out	  of	  hundred	  in	  Lahore	  were	  PPP’s	  workers.543  Other parties had very few members by comparison, e,g. PDP-30, TI-1000, NAP-50, Qasim ML-12, PMKP-20 and Khwaja Khairuddin hardly a single member.  Against this, JI was strong and well-organised	  due	  to	  the	  regime’s	  support.	    Between the establishment of the movement and the hijacking of a PIA plane, discussed later in this chapter, the party leaders and jyalas demonstrated impressive enthusiasm. For example, defying the strict prohibition on any political activity or meetings, Nusrat Bhutto travelled by train to Lahore from 
Karachi	   on	   27	   February	   1981	   disguised	   as	   ‘a	   grandmother	   in	   a	   burqa (veil), 
accompanied	   by	   her	   ‘grandson’,	   the	   thirteen-year-old son of one of her staff.  Other members of the alliance arrived at the meeting by various convoluted routes.  They agreed to commemorate every key national date with protests, and fixed the first one for Pakistan Resolution day on 23 March 1981.  The 
                                                        
542 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.260. The same was the case with the Lahore resolution of 1940, 
which was not declared as the ‘Pakistan  Resolution’  at  the  actual  meeting  of  the  Muslim  League,  but  
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Lahore meeting was eventually raided by the police and the leaders were expelled from Punjab including Nusrat Bhutto after a brief arrest.544  The planned protest for 23 March was however cancelled due to the PIA hijacking, discussed below.  The hijacking had an irreversible impact on the movement as it led to a severe crack-down by the Zia regime.  From the date of 
the	   hijacking	   to	   14	   August	   1983,	   MRD’s	   attempts	   to	   organise	   protests	   were	  
nipped	  in	  the	  bud	  time	  and	  again	  by	  the	  regime’s	  harsh	  reactions.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  on the eve of Pakistan Resolution day in 1982, the top leadership of MRD, including Nusrat Bhutto, Sher Baz Mazari, Fateh Yab and Khair-ud-Din, planned to organise a public rally at Nishtar Park, Karachi, but the government was able to prevent it.545 That gap however, provided them a time to revisit their 
strategy;	  hence	  they	  added	  more	  demands	  into	  the	  movement’s	  objectives.  According to Ackerman and Kruegler, it is important for a movement to have clear and unambiguous objectives.546   These not only serve to give notice to the opponent but should also be designed to marshal support from a wide range of groups in civil society, and the public both within and outside of the country.  Gandhi had achieved this brilliantly in 1930 when he took up the issue of the Salt Laws despite misgivings	   from	   other	   nationalist	   leaders.	   	   Gandhi’s	  judgement was proved correct, and millions were mobilised in an iconic nonviolent protest.547  Unlike	   UDI’s	   major	   demand	   for	   ‘free	   and	   competitive	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election’	  under General Pinochet,548 MRD demanded the resignation of their own Pinochet-figure, General Zia, as well as the holding of free and fair election.  Later on, BB learnt by hard experience that it was advisable merely to demand that elections be conducted under the military ruler – whether this was Zia on her return to Pakistan in 1986, discussed in chapter 5, and later General Musharraf in 2007.549 The MRD leaders found that their programme was not attracting the necessary widespread support, with the educated and middle classes in particular lacking enthusiasm for their campaign.  They therefore came up with a second charter of demands on 10 May 1983 that were designed to attract wider participation in the movement.  Comprehending the need to mobilise students, labourers, lawyers, and women groups along with the general public, Nusrat Bhutto advised her Left partners in the alliance to bring them on board.550  The charter contained thirty-one-points, which included demands for greater provincial autonomy, assurance of an independent judiciary, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, freedom of press, addressing the issues of labour and the current discriminatory policies against women and minorities and greater accountability of the armed forces and civil bureaucracy.551   The new agenda sought to demonstrate to groups such as the judiciary, lawyers, journalists, women, students, workers, and seekers of                                                         
548 Ibid., pp.289-90. 
549 With Musharraf, BB signed an agreement called National Reconciliation Order in 2007. Besides 
removal of financial corruption cases against her and other leaders, it was agreed that Musharraf 
would put off his uniform after holding the election, and BB would re-enter in politics. See, for 
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Publishers, 2011), pp.311-12. 
550 Nusrat Bhutto advised Mairaj M. Khan, a Karachi based labour leader with strong links with 
radical Left students and Baluchi groups, and Sheikh Rasheed, a Punjabi lawyer to develop 
relationship   with   students,   women’s   groups,   lawyers,   and   labourers.   Central   Intelligence   Agency,  
‘Pakistan:   Prospects   for   the   Zia   Government’:   An   Intelligence   Assessment’,   February   1981,   CIA-
RDP06T00412R000200070001-1, NARA, p.13. 
551 Hussain, Politics of Alliance, pp.129-30  
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provincial autonomy that the alliance was not a front for power-hungry politicians, but rather stood for democracy, civil and human rights, and greater devolution of power in Pakistan.  It was also agreed that each party in the alliance should head it in monthly-rotation equally, regardless of their membership numbers.   This was both a strength and a weakness.   It allowed parties with small bases, or those whose main base was in the subordinate provinces, to shape the agenda.  But it also meant that leadership was fractured and diffused.    The scholarship on civil resistance emphasises that every dictatorial government has its pillars of support, such as police, army, and judiciary that the opposition has to try to win them over by devising a programme that will appeal to such groups.552   One	   of	   Zia’s	   firmest	   pillars	   was	   as	   a	   self-styled defender of Islam.  He built on the Nizam-i-Mustafa movement that had opposed Bhutto’s	   secularist	   policies.553  Zia implemented one ordinance after another 
under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   ‘Islamisation’,	   and	   for	   this	   he	   had	   received	   handsome	  public support.  His patriarchal agenda and his exploitation of religion to serve his own vested interests did not deceive better-informed members of the public, but many believed somewhat naïvely that he was driven primarily by his religious commitments.  So, separating his regime from this support-base was important, and the MRD worked on it. Makhdoom Muhammad Zaman Talib ul Maula of Hala, a respected Sindhi pir from Hyderabad, provided a fierce critique 
of	   the	   military	   regime’s	   Islamisation	   process	   and	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	                                                          
552 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 11, 26, and 43-48; Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic 
Nonviolent Conflict, pp.40-42. 
553 In response, Bhutto did amend the constitution by introducing some Islamic clauses e.g. ban on 
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countering	   Pir	   Pagara’s	   alliance	   with	   the	   regime	   in	   Sindh.	   	   Likewise,	   when	  General Zia made plans to hold non-party based elections on the advice of the Ansari Commission,554 many Islamic parties, for instance JUI and JUP, turned against the political reforms and declared their support for MRD.  While the Jaamat-i-Islami approved of Zia’s	  plans	  publicly,	  some	  of	  its	  members	  joined	  the	  opposition.555 Preaching the MRD slogans, Mian Tufail, a member of JI, received an   extradition order from Balochistan, and the student wing of JI joined hands with the Democratic Students Alliance (DSA) along	  with	   the	   students’	  wing	  of	  PML, PPP and TI.556  In this way, the demand for democracy made people choose 
between	  dictatorship	  and	  democracy.	  	  MRD	  rejected	  the	  regime’s	  constitutional	  amendments under the auspices of Islam and managed to build a broad consensus on this stance.   
Call for Civil Disobedience August 1983: By 1983, the situation appeared more favourable for a campaign of civil disobedience.  The MRD decided to hold protests on certain significant dates. The first was the second birth anniversary of the movement on 6 February 
1983,	  which	  would	  be	  celebrated	  as	  the	  ‘Day	  of	  Democracy’.	  	  The	  second	  was	  5	  July, the sixth anniversary of the declaration of martial law – to be known as the 
‘Dark	   Day’.	   	   The	   third	  was	   the	   14	   August,	   Pakistan	   Independence Day, which 
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was	   to	  be	   the	   ‘Day	  of	  Renewing	   the	  Pledge’.557   On the first two such days in February and then in July, public meetings were held, black flags were flown, and black armbands worn.558  They were successful throughout the country.  On 5 July, several hundred people were reported to have attempted to join a procession in Karachi and 25 MRD leaders and supporters were arrested.  However, all were granted bail in a few days. In Rawalpindi, lawyers boycotted the court that day.  There were no demonstrations as such, but black flags had been taken down by the police. A planned meeting was banned, so a Press Conference was held later on to publicise the banning of the meeting.  Arshad Chaudhry and three journalists were arrested, and later released on bail.  In Lahore, a protest meeting of some 200 people was reported as having taken place near the high court.  Seven of the organisers were arrested and sent to Kot Lakhpat Jail. They were charged under Martial Law Regulation No.13 Section 124-A, and were not bailed out unlike those in Rawalpindi and Karachi. In Quetta, three students and several MRD leaders were arrested for wearing black armbands.559   The third such day, the 14 August, was selected as the occasion for the start of active civil disobedience.   This was to involve offering voluntarily arrests in Lahore, Karachi, Quetta, and Peshawar, resignation from government jobs, and withholding taxes in all over the country.560    This programme was rolled out on 10 May, which gave plenty of time to publicise the aims and                                                         
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objectives.  The reasons for civil disobedience were stated to be discontent with the government in its conduct both externally and internally.   Externally, the major grievance was that in becoming a front-line ally of America in the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan had opened itself to being inundated with drugs, weapons and terrorists.561 Internally, issues such as price-hikes, the implementation of PCO, the Ansari Commission, and lack of press freedom were cited.  The MRD addressed also the specific grievances of peasants and workers. They criticised the Islamic tax on agricultural income known as usher, which was a severe burden in a year of poor harvests.  They condemned the corruption and mismanagement in Pakistan steel mills, discussed in Chapter 1.   The MRD also appealed to sympathetic government officials and members of local government bodies to resign from their posts. Nusrat Bhutto advised BB to limit her political confrontation with the regime at that juncture so as to avoid arrest and thus be available to lead the protest. 562    After four months of organisation, publicity and propaganda, the protest on 14 August was inaugurated from the mausoleum of the Quaid-i-Azam, 
Muhammad	   Ali	   Jinnah,	   in	   Karachi.	   	   	   MRD’s	   acting	   convener	   Abid	   Zuberi	   and Secretary General Khwaja Khairuddin offered themselves for arrest on that day, and Mairaj M. Khan and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi on the next day. In all, fourteen people were arrested in Karachi on those two days.563 In Lahore, sixteen political leaders including Farooq Leghari and Major (rtd) Ejaz Ahmed were arrested from Minar-i-Pakistan in front of a large crowd that had gathered to                                                         
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support their leaders. 564  Lahore’s	   working	   women’s	   Khwateen Jamhoori 
Committee	  (Women’s	  Democratic	  Committee)	  came	  out	  of	  the	  street in protest against the brutalities committed in Sindh against Sindhiani Tehreek.565 From Peshawar, seventy persons were detained at the Masjid Mahabat Khan.566  In Quetta, Ali Ahmed Kurd, former Secretary-General of PPP-Baluchistan, and Rehman Bugti, son of Nawab Akber Bugti were arrested.567    In short, there were demonstrations, protest rallies and sit-ins all around the country. A wide range of martial law regulations had been defied, including those that banned political parties, political meetings, processions, and criticism of the regime, the President and the Armed Forces.568 According to Amnesty International, there was enthusiastic support for the protest all over Pakistan in the first two days, after which the main resistance continued in Sindh.  This 
contradicts	   Roedad	   Khan’s	   argument	   that	   the	   movement	   lacked	   national	  appeal.569   AI also mentioned that twenty thousand protestors in Karachi who were protesting nonviolently were stoned by supporters of the regime.570  The reports that there had been growing violence in rural Sindh brought a gradual disassociation of other parts of the country from the campaign. I shall analyse this point further below.   In Sindh the movement continued from August to December. Over three hundred bureaucrats and councillors resigned their offices, including some 
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members of Majlis-e-Shura.571  50,000 disciples of Makhdum of Hala blocked the national highway connecting Karachi to the rest of the country.572  Although not a member of MRD, Sindhi Awami Tehreek (SAT),	  with	  its	  student’s	  and	  women’s	  wings, still played a noteworthy role during the 1983 movement, particularly in the districts of Thatta, Dadu, Larkana and Sanghar.573  The peasants-followers of SAT – including women and children – went to jail.  The youngest was Mustafa Talpur from Badin, who was only fourteen years when he was arrested.574  
Their	  solidarity	  revealed	  the	  hollowness	  of	   the	  regime’s	  claim	  that	   the	  masses	  were united with it under one banner.  The name of Rasool Bakhsh Palejo, President of SAT, was well known to the Punjabi protestors, while in Sindh speakers of the Sindhi, Urdu and Punjabi languages all participated, especially in Karachi.  Sindhi activists courted arrest from non-Sindhi areas in Karachi like Liaqatabad.575 SAT’s	  workers	  stopped	  the	  landing	  of	  General	  Zia’s	  helicopter	  in	  any part of interior Sindh.576  In short, due to the strong links of QMA with workers in Karachi, and Hyderabad, and significant mobilisation of SAT in rural Sindh along with being the home province of ZAB, the movement spread out from urban city centres to the small villages in the province.   There was however violence in Sindh from day one, and this spread all over the province.577  The supporters of Makhdoom Khaleeq-uz-Zaman of Hala truned violent after his arrest, and there was no strong leader to check this.  In 
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Ghotki, protestors attacked the railway station, robbed its treasury and destroyed the railway track.  In Sanghar, they attacked a police station in an effort to try to free their arrested members from the lock-up during the first week of the campaign.578  Ackerman, and Kruegler warn that the most difficult task for nonviolent leaders and their operational corps is to maintain strict nonviolence by the civilian rank-and-file.579 In their opinion, preservation of nonviolence is crucial if the violent opponent is to be wrong-footed.580  One violent event, it is argued, can derail the whole movement, as in the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat Movement in India, when violence exploded in Chauri Chaura in 1922, leading Gandhi to call off civil disobedience.581  In many cases, people were accustomed to expressing their resentment against the violence of their oppressors by adopting their own counter-violence.  This is an accustomed mode of resistance.  Violence may also be caused by the intrusion of free riders, ill-advised 
enthusiasts,	  opportunists,	   ‘agent	  provocateurs’,582 and criminals – or goondahs, as Gandhi called them in the case of the Calcutta riots in 1947.583 Such groups can easily derail the nonviolent discipline of the movement.  A government may try to provoke violence so as to justify its crack-down.   This was the case in Mexico City in 1968, where the government planted barrels containing rocks at 
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the protestors’	  sites.584  In practice, as Schock points out, it is extremely hard to maintain complete nonviolence in a highly charged struggle.585  In some cases, low-intensity violence has not badly damaged a movement – as was the case 
with	  the	  Lawyers’	  Movement	  in Pakistan, when Lawyers beat policemen at one place and some protestors humiliated a sitting federal minister.586  In the case of the MRD movement in Pakistan in 1983, the violence in Sindh hurt the campaign as a whole, even though it was unplanned and against the wishes of the leaders.    The regime was ready to respond to violence with an iron hand. The Joint Security Committee chaired by Roedad Khan that was tasked with monitoring the law and order situation had several meeting before 14 August to make contingency plans. 587   The Sindh provincial government, however, communicated to the committee that the province would remain silent and in order during the movement.588  This provides strong evidence that the MRD leaders did not engineer the violence, as intelligence officers would almost certainly have picked this up and would have issued some kind of warning.   Three full army divisions were called in to crush the movement in Sindh. 589 Air-gunship helicopters fired on unarmed villagers in Sakrand, Lakharot, and Punnel Chandio. Bombs were dropped on Tayyab Thaheem (Sanghar) and Khairpur Nathan Shah (KNS), and there was direct firing at protestors who were near the house of Makhdoom of Hala in Moro.   In a rally taken out in protest at                                                         
584 Kurlansky, Non-violence, p.162. 
585 Schock, Unarmed Insurrection, p.xvi. 
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the Moro incident, the protestors who were out on the road reciting the Quran were run over by army vehicles.590   Reacting to the state violence, protestors in Moro and KNS killed 125-150 military personnel.591  Houses and public buildings were burnt, banks were looted, and railway traffic was disrupted by removal of the tracks.  There were large numbers of arrests, with political activists being tortured in jail.  A break-out was engineered from the Hyderabad sub-jail by political prisoners in which many professional criminals also escaped. 592   While the political prisoners later turned themselves in voluntarily,593 the criminals took refuge in areas of Katcha, the dry river-beds and ravines that were densely covered by bushes, and started robbing passengers on the National Highways and in nearby towns.   The government claimed that between August and December less than one hundred protestors and law enforcements personnel were killed, though independent observers put the figure three times higher than this.594 Due to this violence, the MRD leadership called off civil disobedience in December 1983. 
Government Tactics towards the Movement: Rizvi has highlighted four strategies that a military regime will commonly take to counter open opposition by its opponents.595  There will be restriction (including censorship) on the press, imposition of bans on inter-city and intra-city travel, threatening and warning politicians of the dire consequences for                                                         
590 Almost every Sindh interviewees referred to the episode during my investigation. Aslam Khwaja, 
Mustafa Talpur, interview. 
591 Aslam Khwaja, Fateh Marri, Mazhar Abbas, Mehtab Rashidi, Hadi Butt, interviews. 
592 Hadi Butt, interview, 21 March 12, Sukker.   
593 Aslam Khwaja Interview. 
594 Amnesty International,   ‘Further   Information   on   arrests   and   Imprisonment   in   Pakistan,   August-
December  1983’,  5  September  1984,  MSS  34/4/1/Pk  28,  MRC,  p.3.     
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them of any anti-regime statements or meetings, and lastly intermittent arrests of prominent leaders and prominent activists.  General Zia followed all these strategies in letter and spirit.   The only effective counter is a strong political organisation from top to bottom and a strong operational corpse.  The MRD lacked such strength in 1981-83.  On 27 February 1981 MRD called for a secret meeting in Lahore in violation of martial law.  The regime began arresting the main political leaders 
and	  deporting	   them	   from	  Punjab	  under	   the	   ‘public	   safety	   and	  maintenance	  of	  
public	  order’.	  On	  the	  day	  itself,	  police	  tightened security and carried out checks on every vehicle to catch members of the alliance. 596 The PIA hijacking of 2 March 1981 was a blessing for Zia, allowing him to order a wave of arrests of so-called	  ‘anti-social	  elements’.	  	  	  In	  the	  three	  weeks	  after the hijacking the leaders and thousands of MRD activists were arrested.597   Benazir was put in solitary confinement in Sukker Jail, and Nusrat Bhutto was jailed in Karachi.   More arrests continued over the following months. After the intelligence service received information in February 1982 about a plot to murder some high officials in the following month, there were a large number of arrests. While Zia himself stated at this time that 2,132 arrests had occurred in the last couple of weeks,598 Amnesty International put the figure at some 10,000. The daily newspaper The Muslim reported on 6 March 1982 and the prisons and police lock-ups in Punjab and Sindh were full up, with the jail administrators refusing to take more prisoners.   Although the government                                                         
596 ibid. 
597  Amnesty International,   ‘Background   to   Political   Arrests   in   Pakistan   since   January   1981’,  
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stated that the arrests included political workers, drug-dealers, alcohol vendors, and weapons dealers, a senior police officer stated most of those arrested were 
PPP	  members	  suspected	  of	  being	  implicated	  in	  a	  ‘plot	  of	  killing	  high	  officials’	  in	  March 1982.599   Likewise, the regime started its round-up campaign four days before the start of the 14 August 1983 protest, and arrested four hundred persons on the day throughout the country.600 According to AI, several thousand persons – many hundreds of whom AI considered	   ‘prisoners	   of	   conscience’	   – were detained throughout Pakistan in connection with political protests.601 However, on submission of a written apology, as per Zia-ul-Haq’s	  order,	   three	  thousand were released.  Other political prisoners were released gradually over the following months.602   Many prisoners were treated harshly, including being flogged in jail. For example, between 15-17 April 1983, 216 men were flogged in Karachi Central Jail on the order of SMC; whereas 130 prisoners were sentenced to flogging during the first week of September.603  In response to such cruelty, the Executive Committee of the Pakistan Medical Association-Karachi Branch 
passed	   a	   resolution	   on	   9	   September	   that	   flogging	   ‘is	   not	   only	   inhuman,	   and	  against the dignity of man, but this can cause serious physical damage and 
irreversible	   psychological	   trauma	   specially	   on	   young	   people’.	   The	   Pakistan                                                         
599 Amnesty International,  ‘Pakistan  Update  (since  January  1982-December 1982) MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, 
MRC, pp.1-2. 
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Junior Doctors Association also appealed for the flogging to end.   They also wrote a letter to the British Medical Association describing neuromuscular damage to the victims.604  Some jyalas and suspected members of Al-Zulfiqar were incarcerated in long-term torture cells, the most notorious of which were in the Shahi Qila (the famous Lahore Fort).   Although probably not on the same level as the cruelty, torture and mass murders carried out by the Nazis in Germany or by the Dirección de Inteligencía 
Naciónal (DINA) under the direction of General Pinochet in Chile, the methods used by General Zia were not far behind. According to Amnesty International, while torture was carried out in regular jails and police interrogation centres, the worst places for this during the Zia period were the Shahi Qila (also known as the Red Fort) in Lahore, Baldia Camp (Karachi), Attock Fort, and the military intelligence centres of Islamabad/Rawalpindi.605  The Lahore Fort had a 
particularly	   appalling	   reputation	   as	   the	   ‘mother	   of	   all	   prisons’.	   	   This	   Mughal	  building, with its splendid architecture, was made into an interrogation centre for nationalist rebels by the British in the 1920s.   After independence, it was used for the punishment of anyone considered to be an enemy of Pakistan.  Those suffering the worst punishment were placed in eight-by-ten-foot subterranean cells in the basement in constant darkness and with only a hole for bodily excretions, with no visitors or conversation with other prisoners allowed.606 Prisoners knew that it was morning only when tea and a biscuit 
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were brought to their cells.607  One person who was jailed in this way was twenty-year-old  Zahid Chaudhry.  Arrested on 28 September 1983, he was kept in the fort for five months. He was often deprived of sleep for several days.   He was tortured by being made to lie between two beds with each of his hands and feet tied to one bed – they were then pulled apart so as to cause him extreme pain.  He was also suspended upside down by a bar that was passed behind his knees, to which his hands were tied, and the soles of his feet struck. Throughout the period he was kept in solitary confinement.608  Others talked of burning red chilies being put under their nose, creating a suffocating smoke, and wooden rollers placed on their thighs.609   Dr. Aslam Naro, who was being confined there for fifteen months, 
suffered	  the	  longest	  single	  stay	  in	  that	  jail	  amongst	  all	  of	  Zia’s	  prisoners.	  	  Many	  women were also imprisoned in the Lahore Fort.610  Shahida Jabeen spent seven months there	   and	   tried	   to	   maintain	   her	   morale	   by	   chanting	   ‘Das Kore Khain 
Gain, Bhutto ku Bachain Gain’	  (We	  will	  happily	  receive	  ten	  lashes,	  but	  will	  save	  Bhutto).611  Being locked up with women who were there for criminal offences, she and her companions would hold political discussion among themselves to assert their political identity.  The majority were put in jail without any arrest warrant or on the basis of a fake F.I.R. (First Investigation Report).612   Those                                                         
607 Jahangir   Badar,   Javed   Iqbal   Mo’azzam, Dr. Aslam Naro, Shahida Jabeen, Farkhanda Bukhari, 
intreviews. All were the prisoners in the Lahore fort.  
608 Amnesty International,   ‘Further   Information   on   arrests   and   Imprisonment   in   Pakistan,   August-
December  1983’,  5  September  1984,  MSS  34/4/1/Pk  28, pp.6-7. 
609  Some of ex-prisoners whom I interviewed could not bring themselves to describe their 
imprisonment or the torture they were subjected to.  
610 Such  as  young  Punjab  University’s  students  Nusrat  Tarar,  Summaya,  Sabiha,  and  Hameed  Apa. 
611 Shahida Jabeen, interview. Farkhanda Bukhari, interview. 
612 Javed  Mo’azzam   said   that   the   army   arrested   him   on   the   charge   of   rebellion   against   the   State  
under section 211/81; however after his release he found out that the F.I.R was for a charge for 
theft. Javed Iqbal Moazzam, interview.   
 141 
who spend time in Lahore Fort were particularly revered in the movement as 
Shahi Qila Sathi (Companion of the Fort). Many suffered life-long incapacity of one sort or the other as a result.613    Besides imprisoning and torturing its opponents, the government also put pressure on individuals to leave the MRD.   It had its first success when Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, the then convener of MRD, resigned from his position on 21 March 1981, followed by Jamiat-i-Ulmai-Islam (Fazal), who accused the Bhuttos of being devious and plotting the hijacking.614 The Islamic parties, consisting of JI, JAH, KT and JUI (Darkhawasti) proposed a new alliance to counter MRD.615   Army generals in uniform were appointed as governors of all the states.616  By giving a generous share of power to his military colleagues, Zia hoped to limit the possibility of a military backfire against his rule.  Although General Chishti did criticize him after his retirement, it had little impact.   On 24 December 1981, Zia announced the expansion of his cabinet, consisting of military and civilian members, and a larger federal advisory assembly — the 
Majlis-i-Shoora — of three hundred fifty members.617  As appointment to this latter body was by nomination only, Zia was able to pick only those who supported him, including sixty former members of PPP who he felt he could                                                         
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trust.618  Some big political figures were appointed to the Cabinet as advisors without any power of legislation. 619   Maluka, Rizvi, Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko have held that the Shoora was appointed according to the Ansari Commission policy of Islamisation, while Talbot points out astutely that it 
harked	   back	   to	   the	   sort	   of	   ‘consultative	   assembly	   of	   nominated	   members’	  favoured by the British in colonial times.620 The constitution of 1973 was still inactive; political activities and the parties were still restricted and the press was still under strict censorship that was becoming worse.  Nonetheless, this 
action	  saw	  some	  dissolution	  of	  Zia’s	  power,	  just	  as	  the	  authoritarian	  rule	  of	  the	  British was moderated with the Minto-Morley reforms of 1909 and the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919.   Such comparison shows that the politics of Pakistan repeatedly replays the history of the anti-colonial struggle in South Asia.  Zia, in common with the British Viceroys, governed autocratically and repressed the opposition, with the MRD repeating the role of the Indian National Congress, with its campaigns of non-cooperation and civil disobedience.  Like the erstwhile freedom fighters of India, members of the MRD took pride in their times in prison – even when the sentence was in fact imposed for corruption.   It seems that Pakistan finds it hard to escape this history.   In response to the establishment of the Majlis-i-Shoora, MRD countered on 2 February 1982	  that	  ‘it	  is	  an	  undemocratic	  attempt	  to	  hoodwink	  the	  nation	  
and	   outside	   the	   world’	   and	   demanded	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   within	   ninety	                                                          
618 Hussain,  ‘Politics  of  Alliances’,    p.132. 
619 Ali Ahmed Talpur (Defence), Hoti (Railway), Mahmood Haroon (Interior), Illahi Bakhsh Soomro 
(Industry), Ghulam Dastgir (Labour and Manpower), Raja Zafrul Haq (Information), Niaz Muhammad 
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days.621  It also rejected unanimously the proposal of Pir Pagara for setting up an interim government minus PPP under the martial law regime. Rather, they focused on reinvigorating their peaceful strategy to mount a more effective challenge to the regime.   Zia also sought to control local government bodies by banning those politicians who had been a member of any political party since 1970-1.  This tactic was similar to the one used by General Ayub Khan to ensure that local boards were filled with people loyal to him. Zia remarked slyly that the parties that stood for the restoration of democracy lacked their own internal democratic culture.622  Some groups in Karachi, mainly Urdu speaking, started a 
Zia Himayat Tehreek (Zia Support Movement) to strengthen the hands of the 
government	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  mainly	  to	  counter	  QMA	  and	  Noorani’s	  influence	  in	  the city.  They were the group who threw stones on	   MRD’s	   members	   on	   14	  August.623 Although MRD declared a boycott of the local elections in 1983, it failed to stop people voting in any numbers except in Sindh.   
Promulgation of PCO: Because their seizure of power has violated the constitution, every military dictator in Pakistan has tried to force the judiciary to accept their illegal action.  After staging a coup they have each in turn met with the Chief Justice of Pakistan to inquire whether his support would be forthcoming or not. If not, he was ousted from his post.   Civilian rulers have often indeed done the same.  The judiciary has not always caved in, for example, the Sindh High Court gave a 
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verdict against the coup of 1958 and termed it illegal. In general, however, the judiciary has conformed initially to whoever has taken control of the state.  Later on, they have in some cases turned against the ruler.  The most obvious example of this has been the revolt by the judiciary headed first by Chief Justice Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui, and then by Chief Justice Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry against the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf.      Despite martial law, the judiciary were considered by many to provide a door of appeal   against the unlawful measures of the regime.   Under Zia, there were a number of cases lodged in the courts, including the petition of Nusrat Bhutto challenging the validity of Martial Law [PLD 1977 Supreme Court (SC657)]. 624    To stop this, Zia came up with the Provisional Constitutional Order on 24 March 1981 to strengthen his hold over the country. It authorised his power to promulgate an emergency in the country and disallowed challenges in the courts to martial law.625   BB noted that this order overruled the verdicts given by some judges that that led to the freeing of certain political 
workers,	  and	  stated	   ‘we	  could	  be	  arrested,	   tried,	   sentenced	  and	  executed	  by	  a	  
military	   court	   without	   any	   legal	   recourse	   at	   all’.626 Clauses related to the 
‘function	  of	   the	  parliament,	  elections	  and	  fundamental	  rights	  were	  omitted’.627 Certainly, such a drastic constitutional step invited discomfort among the civil judges as they had to take fresh oath under the new order.  Nineteen judges of the Supreme Court and High court resigned from their posts rather than do so.  Justice Anwar-ul-Haq, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan who was the head of the                                                         
624 Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism, p. 262. 
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bench who ordered the hanging of ZAB, and Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmad, Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, who sentenced Bhutto to death initially, were not even asked to take oath.  Many lawyers also denounced the order and organised meetings to protest against it in Karachi and Lahore, and JUI (Fazal) also opposed the diktat.628  International law associations and Amnesty International protested against the law but all in vain.  That ordinance removed one avenue of hope for the protestors during a reign of terror.    
Role of Means of Communication: 
One	   of	   a	   regime’s	   methods	   of	   repression,	   Sharp	   underlines,	   is	   the	   control	   of	  communication and information.629 Theoretical work on nonviolent resistance that focuses on the sources of power,630 stresses the importance of the media and communications,631 as discussed in previous chapters.   The newspapers in 
Pakistan	  were	   censored	  by	  Zia.	   	   Initially,	   as	  per	   the	   regime’s	  order,	   they	  were forced to leave a space blank when there was censored news.  The blank space soon became a symbol of resistance – as people understood the reason for the empty space – and the regime, in response, ordered them to fill those spaces as well.  The editor of Hurriat,	  a	  daily	  newspaper,	  placed	  a	  camel’s	  image	  instead,	  which, later on, became a sign of censored news.632  The print media became under particularly severe attack by the regime after the PIA hijacking.  TV, by contrast, was under the total control of the government. Indeed, 
TV	   became	   an	   instrument	   of	   propaganda	   for	   Zia’s	   Islamisation	   programme.	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631 See, for example, Peter and Ackerman, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, p.31. 
632 Aslam Khwaja, interview.  
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From January 1984, the Pakistan Television, state-run TV, aired news in Arabic as well.633  Women presenters had to wear dupatta/hijab, and around a hundred TV advertisements, such ones for lotion and soap, were banned due to their alleged sexual appeal.634   Continuous with their persistent opposition to the Press and Publication Ordinances and demand for the restoration of democracy in the country, journalists kept on joining the anti-Zia political forces during 1981-84, and supported civil disobedience.  Supporters of the MRD had difficulty in 
publicizing	   their	   objections	   to	   the	   regime.	   Sayeed’s	   argument	   that	   there	   was	  comprehensive media coverage on the movement was based on English newspapers, Daily Dawn, The Muslim, The Times of India, and The Times (London), and the Weekly Viewpoint alone.635  These had a limited readership in Pakistan.  Otherwise, as Cohen argues,636 the mainstream media posed a pin-drop silence over the launch of MRD during the first whole week637 and remained deaf to the movement in general.  Aman, and Sadaqat (Karachi based daily newspapers) were somehow the provider of news in Urdu. Later on in January 1984, SAT started the publication of their own Organizational Magazine 
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Parore to spread the message of the movement to the larger public in rural Sindh.638 The BBC was thought to be an effective source of information during this period. However, according to Anwer Abbasi, the BBC-Urdu service, the biggest source for a supposedly objective coverage,639 depicted the Civil Disobedience campaign as a rebellion of Sindh against the State.  BBC reported 
that	  ‘four	  tribes	  of	  Sindh	  – Khoso, Jamali, and Jatoi – were revolting against the 
regime’.640 Such coverage generated negative propaganda for listeners outside the province and internationally.   Protest movements have historically found ways around this, such as through secret presses and cyclostyled newssheets – e.g. the Satyagraha 
Patrikas during the Bardoli Satyagraha  of 1928, the carrying of significant symbols and signs such as a twig, by leaflets writing, or even, as in Argentina, 
writing	   ‘where	  are	  our	  disappeared	  children?’	  on	  currency notes.641  The same sort of methods were used in Pakistan. The resisters publicised their activities by word of mouth, short pamphlets and the secretly-published weekly magazines Al-Fatah and Me’yar.   Irshad Rao, editor of Al-Fatah, and forty workers including journalists were rounded up in the wake of the discovery of what the	  police	  described	  as	  this	  ‘clandestine	  publication	  group’	  that	  published	  anti-state literature.642  During Jail Bharo Tehreeek, ten journalists courted 
                                                        
638 Mustafa Talpur, Fateh Marri, interviews. 
639 Almost every worker and leader in interviews referred to BBC for objective news and analysis. 
640 Anwer Abbasi Naqvi, cited in Shakir, MRD, p. 108. 
641 Ackerman, and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, p.272. 
642  Amnesty International, ‘Background   to   Political   Arrests   in   Pakistan   since   January   1981’,  
MSS.34/4/1/Pk12, MRC, p.2. Mushtaq Lasharie, one of the distributers, told me that Irshad Rao and 
the group would publish Musawat in the underground press, but they would stamp Dubai as its 
place of publication. They were the group who were part of the Al-Zulfiqar  terrorists’  activities.    And,  
most of the prisoners exchanged after the PIA hijacking were among them. Mushtaq Lasharie, 
interview. 
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arrest each day against the law.643 Responding to my question how they managed to spread the word in the face	  of	  the	  regime’s	  strict	  surveillance,	  some	  
members	   of	   PPP’s	   occupational	   corps	   responded	   that	   they	   adopted	   various	  creative ways to dodge the security agencies.644  A few of the tactics used were 
sending	   invitations	   of	   a	   relatives’	   wedding	   to	   party	   workers, gathering for 
birthday	   parties,	   and	   visiting	   on	   the	   death	   of	   some	   worker’s	   relatives	   in	   the	  guise of mourners.  This was called Seena Gazette (chest gazette, word of mouth).645 Taj Haider646 told me that they even organised a mock death ceremony when an emergency meeting was required to organise a protest, and they met at a mock grave.  That grave was also used to hide many wanted workers.   There was an ongoing struggle over the question of the Islamisation of literature.  This was a long-standing issue in Pakistan.  Fatwas had been issued against the supposedly objectionable literature written by Muslims since the 
1930’s.647  There was a fresh discussion on this after the establishment of Pakistan.  During the 1950s, Jamat-i-Islami	   propagated	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘Islamic	  
literature’	  and	  people	  began	  to	  show	  their	  commitment	  to	  this	  ideal	  by	  sending	  greeting cards with images of date trees and camels – which were symbols of Arab culture – and so on.  Zia took this agenda up with enthusiasm. The writing                                                         
643 Abbas Athar, Ahmad Faraz, Shahid Mahmood Nadeem, Fehmida Riaz, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Shuhrat 
Bukhari, Farigh Bukhari, Hamraz Ahsan, and many TV and theatre artists were among them. 
Journalist Rehmat Shah Afridi went to jail and was exiled later on. Waris Shah also wrote against 
Martial Law and faced severe repercussions.  Naheed,  ‘Urdu  Adab  aur  Sahafat’.   
644 Sheikh Shahid, Shahida Jabeen, Javed Iqbal Moazzam. 
645 Interviewed, Qazi Sultan Mahmood, 17/04/12, Islamabad. 
646 Taj Haider, interview. 
647 Rubaiat of Yaas Yagana Changaizi published in Sidq-Jadeed Lakhnow, Abdul  Haleem  Josh’s  work  
‘Dil  Gudaz’,  Sultan  Hiader  Josh’s   ‘Masawat  Mard-o-Zun’.   (Kishwar  Naheed,  Urdu  Adab  aur  Sahafat’,  
Daily e-Jang, 13 October 2012, <http://e.jang.com.pk/10-13-2012/pindi/page6.asp> 13 October 
2012. 
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of Hamd-o-Na’at	   (verses praising Allah and Muhammad, the Prophet) were projected as exemplary literature, while supposedly anti-Islamic writing was censored.  The latter included the seminal work of Manto,648 and even Quranic verses that talked of the rights of women and wives.    Many writers and journalists had to go to exile because of the hardship they were facing; even then, they did not stop fighting against the draconian laws in exile.  On producing a cartoon of Zia-ul-Haq’s	   and	   describing	   him	   as	  
‘cruel’,	  Dr.	  Abdul	  Hameed	  Khan	  had	  to	  flee	  from	  one	  place	  to	  the	  other	  from	  the	  police to save his life.649 Likewise, three lecturers of Quaid-i-Azam University,650 
the	   President	   of	   the	   Karachi	   University	   Teachers’	   Association, 651  three professors of Punjab University, and two senior professors in Baluchistan University were arrested for distributing and possessing what the government 
called	   ‘subversive’	   literature	   and charged with sedition and unlawful political activity.652   Satirical political songs and poetry are also recognised methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion. Giving the example of such songs, Sharp states that fourteenth-century France witnessed songs against prevailing corruption among the clergy and nobility of that time. In this context, he mentions the Buddhist struggle in South Vietnam in 1963.653  In South Asia, such                                                         
648 Sa’adat  Hassan  Manto  (1912-1955) was a famous short stories writer, who was tried for obscenity 
for his writing six times in total. Last year, he was posthumously awarded the Nishan-i-Imtiaz, the 
highest honour that can be conferred by the State of Pakistan. 
649 Naheed,  ‘Urdu  Adab  aur  Sahafat’. 
650 Jamil Omar, Tariq Ahsan, and Mohammad Salim in November 1983. 
651 Amnesty   International,   ‘Arrest  of  Dr.  Hasan  Zafar  Arif   – Pakistan’,  25  October  1984,  p.1-2. MSS 
34/4/1/Pk 29, MRC. 
652 Amnesty International declared them Prisoner of Conscience. Amnesty International,   ‘Pakistan  
Special Action-Update  No.1’,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk  15,  MRC,  p.1.  Rasheed  Khalid,  interview,  21  April  2012,  
Islamabad. 
653 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp.149-152. 
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satire has a particular emotional appeal.  In Muslim culture, Mushaira (poetic symposium), and Mursiya (elegiac poem) are very important for disseminating ideas that can be adverse to social or political norms.  T. Graham Bailey654 stated that Mursiyas historically narrate the story of the death of Imam Hussain, grandson of Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w); however, Muhammad Husain Zamir 
(Delhi)	  incorporated	  the	  historical	  events	  such	  as	  ‘accounts	  of	  battles,	  individual	  
heroes,	  and	  their	  prowess’	  with	  the	  view	  to	  increase	  religious	  fervour.	  Marxists	  poets in Pakistan, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Habib Jalib, disseminated dissident ideas in this way during movements. The most popular poems of Habib Jalib,655 
Dastur (Norms/Constitution), Main Nahi manta, Main nahi janta (I do not accept, I do not comprehend), presented during the anti-Ayub movement, and 
Dunya ki Tareekh Gwah hi, adal bina jamhoor na huga (World’s	   history	   is	  witness that democracy without justice does not prevail) by Barrister Aitzaz 
Ahsan	  during	  the	  Lawyers’	  Movement	   invigorated	  the	  supporters	  of	   that	   time.	  	  So did dastur and other poetry during MRD.656  Talbot has elaborated the Sindhi literary resistance of the MRD, Sindhi Mursiyas of Khaki Joyo (MRD), Jameel 
Somro	  (Fateh	  Mulk)	  or	  Ahmed	  Faraz’s	  Urdu	  poem	  Paishawur Qatilo tum sipahi 
nahi (Professional killers! You are not soldiers), regarding MRD were a few popular verses.657 However,	   portraying	   the	   struggle	   of	   BB	   in	   poetry,	   Jalib’s	  poem named Nihati Larki (unarmed	   girl)	   ‘Darte hain bandooqon wale ik nehti 
                                                        
654 See, for example, T.M.Grahame, The History of Urdu Literature (online, 1932), pp. 60-69. 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00urduhindilinks/bailey/bailey.html> 20 May 2014 
655 He was also a member of NDP. He produced this poem during the Ayub Khan period.  
656 Mehdi Hasan, Aslam Khwaja, Mazhar Abbas, Dr. Riaz Shaikh, interviews.  
657 Short   stories   include   Afzal   Tauseef   ‘Testimony’,   Badar   Abro’s   ‘Furnace   Days’,   Siraj’s   ‘The   Eight  
Men’,   Niaz   Hamayooni’s   ‘Love   for   Homeland’,   and   Rashid   Hasan   Rana’s   Punjabi   poem   ‘Faceless  
People’,  translated  into  English  by  H.  Rahman  (ed.),  Resistance Literature, cited in Talbot, Pakistan: A 
Modern History, pp.253 and 259. 
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larki	   se,	  phele	  hain	  himmat	  ke	  ujale	   ik	  nihati	   larki	   se’	   (armed men have a fear from an unarmed girl, the dawn of uprising has been spread by an unarmed struggle)658 became the talk of the resistance.  It was a masterpiece of art that rejuvenated discontent against the dictatorship. 
Civil Society On Board: According to civil resistance scholars, defining a clear objective, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the key to success of a movement.659  Good examples of effective demands were those of Solidarity in Poland for independent trade unions or in 
Argentina	   for	   ‘disappeared’	   sons	   to	   be	   produced	   alive.	   	   Aijaz Ahmed, Hussain and the analysts at the US Embassy argued that there were too many disparate objectives in the MRD campaign, which led to a dilution of the protest movement.  There was the demand of workers for nationalisation and union rights, the demand of journalists for an end to the Press and Publication Ordinances, the demand of progressive students for strong action against the hooliganism of IJT on campuses across the country, the grievances of lawyers over PCO 1979, and progressive women over the Islamisation programme.   Hussain has argued that MRD needed to find a way to unite these various demands, and its failure to do so was a reason for its lack of success during its initial phase.660  It is the argument of this dissertation that such an argument is overstated.   The MRD leadership was aware of the need for a clear objective and they chalked out their plan of action and deployed people to follow up these                                                         
658 Mujahid Brelvi, Fasana Raqam Karain, (Lahore, Jamhoori Publications, 2010), p.47. 
659 Ackerman and Kreugler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, p.24. 
660 Hussain,   ‘Politics   of   Alliances’,   p.   130;   Directorate   of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   Zia’s   Divided  
Opposition’,  March  1984,  p.6;  Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  pp.28-36. 
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actions. Important dates of commemoration were marked for increasing pressure on the regime.   The various demands of specific civil society groups fed into this, strengthening the movement as a whole.  As it is, many powerful civil resistance movements have incorporated multiple demands under a single umbrella.   The Civil Disobedience Movement led by Gandhi in 1930-31 was inaugurated, for example, with a list of eleven demands that were designed to appeal to a wide range of different groups in India.  Gandhi then focused on breaking the salt laws, but his followers in various parts of India took up a range of grievances, including high land taxes and agrarian rents.661 None of this weakened the movement – rather, the multiple issues that it catered for actually strengthened its power, bringing the British to the negotiating table in March 1931.  In Pakistan, a number of grievances were expressed through the movement.  In the case of the lawyers, there was a strike by those in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar on 2 March 1981, in which they demanded the restoration of democracy. 662 In response, the regime	   promulgated	   ‘Legal	  
Practitioners	   (Amendment)	   Ordinance’	   that	   prohibited	   Bar	   Associations	   and	  
Bar	   Council	   members	   from	   ‘indulging	   in	   any	   political	   activity,	   directly	   or	  
indirectly’	  on	  15	  July	  1982.663 The lawyers responded by announcing a series of actions across the country.  A boycotts of courts, and resignations from bar councils starting from 21 July. Two thousand lawyers attended an All Pakistan Lawyers Convention in Lahore on 7 October demanding the restoration of civil                                                         
661 Arnold, Gandhi, pp. 144-51. 
662 The Muslim, 3 March 1981. 
663 Amnesty International, ‘Pakistan  Update   (since   January  1982-December 1982), December 1982, 
MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3. 
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liberties and immediate lifting of Martial Law, with transfer of power to elected representatives.  This all related to key MRD demands.  The convention 
established	   a	   National	   Coordinating	   Committee	   of	   Lawyers	   (NCCL)	   ‘to	  
implement	  resolutions	  passed	  during	  the	  convention’.664  Students and workers afterwards joined them in the procession.665 Several lawyers were arrested between 8 and 19 October. 19 October 1983 was organised as a day of protest by lawyers and the Bar Associations were urged to hold their own meetings and processions defying MLRs.  On that day, 100 lawyers protested in Karachi and ten were arrested.  The Pakistan Bar Association issued a public statement that arrested lawyers should not defend themselves before the courts due to the lack 
of	   ‘facilities	  for	   justice’.	  Likewise, in the following year, lawyers participated in the call of MRD for civil disobedience, and many were arrested under MLR 33 and 53.666     William L. Ritcher has argued that religious parties – mainly IJT and Anjuman-i-Tulbai-Islam (ATI) – were growing in popularity in educational institutions at this time.667  The argument in this dissertation is otherwise.  
While	   it	  might	  appear	  that	  Ritcher’s	  argument	   is	  validated by the fact that the 
Peoples’ Student	   Federation	   (PPP’s	   student	   wing)	   was	   defeated	   in	   students’	  
bodies’	  election	  in	  Punjab	  and	  Sindh	  in	  December	  1983,668 in the case of Punjab out of 275 seats, independent candidates stood first in winning forty per cent of                                                         
664 Amnesty International, ‘Pakistan  Update   (since   January  1982-December 1982), December 1982, 
MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3; Amnesty International, ‘Arrest   of   Lawyers   in   Pakistan’,   MSS  
34/4/1/Pk 23, MRC. 
665  
666 Details in this paragraph, and quotes from Amnesty International, ‘Pakistan Update (since January 
1982-December 1982), December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.5-5; Amnesty International, 
‘Arrest  of  Lawyers  in  Pakistan’  MSS  34/4/1/Pk  23,  MRC. 
667 William  L.  Richter,   ‘Pakistan   in  1984:  Digging   In’,  Asian Survey, 25 (2), A Survey of Asia in 1984: 
Part II (February 1985), p.148. 
668 In KPK and Baluchistan, student unions were banned since early 1983.  
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the seats, whilst IJT and ATI took second and third place.  PSF stood the fourth in line, winning eight presidential and vice-presidential seats.669 As it was, PSF backed independent candidates in places such as Lahore and Rawalpindi to 
avoid	   violent	   confrontations	   with	   the	   notorious	   ‘Black	   Eagle	   squad’,	   the	  weaponised group of IJT – Ghafoor Ahmed.  Hence stating that the progressive students were severely defeated in these elections was only one side of the coin. Otherwise, the progressive students courageously fought the hooliganism of IJT and the oppression of the regime towards them. For example, the ordinance of 1981 that authorised tighter control by the regime over educational institutions, led to countrywide protests and strikes.670  Along lines similar to the lawyers, progressive students came together and established Students Action Committee (SAC).671   Amnesty	   International	   reported	   of	   the	   regime’s	   support	   to	   IJT	   by	  
providing	  evidence	  that	  twenty	  seven	  IJT’s	  students	  were	  arrested	  in	  Lahore	  in	  March 1984 but set free on 4 June 1984.  By contrast, three students detained since March 1981 – Imdad Hussain, Sher Muhammad and Mohammad Khan –– were sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and 10 lashes by the Special Military Court in Hyderabad in November 1982.672  Responding to the peaceful protests and strikes, the government gradually banned student unions.673 However, the ban on the student union later backfired as JI opposed it strongly and made it a                                                         
669 Viewpoint, 29 December 1983, XI(21), p.13. 
670 Cohen,   and  Weinbaum,   ‘Pakistan   in   1981:   Staying  On’,  Asian Survey, 22(2), A Survey of Asia in 
1981: Part II (February 1982), p.138. 
671 National   Student   Organisation,   National   Student   Federation,   People’s   Student   Federation   and  
various groups of Balochistan Student Organisation. 
672 Amnesty International ‘The  alleged  Torture  and   Ill-Treatment of   Students   in  Police  Custody’,  15  
June 1984, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 26. MRC. 
673 In Baluchistan and KPK in April 1983, and Punjab and Sindh in February 1984 after clashes 
between opposing student groups. Amnesty International, ‘Pakistan   Update   (since   January   1982-
December 1982), December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3. 
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reason for joining the struggle of MRD at a later stage, as discussed in the next chapter.   Eleven major trade union federations formed an alliance to struggle jointly for the rights of workers on 2 August 1983.  Amongst the eleven point manifesto – price-control, fixation of minimum, inflation-related wages, jobless allowances, end of feudalism, and land reforms – the chief demand was for the restoration of the 1973 constitution and fundamental rights.674    Progressive women were involved in a fight against the discriminatory 
‘Islamisation’	   process.	   This	   was	   initiated	   by	   the	   Pakistan	   Women	   Lawyers’	  Association and it culminated in the establishment of the Women Action Front (WAF) in 1983.  There was resistance to the Hudood Ordinances and the new Law of Evidence, both of which made women submissive to the regime as well as to the patriarchal society at large.   Besides these campaigns, some women associated with MRD	   spread	   the	   MRD’s	   message	   at	   an	   international	   level	   as	  well.675  These	  women’s	  organisations	  represented,	  however,	  a	  relatively	  small	  elite, and they failed to bring out the mass of women into the streets. 
Sympathy in the Army: The demand for the restoration of democracy received support from some members of the armed forces.   Seventeen officers, civil and military, and a lawyer were tried by the regime on an allegation that they were plotting to mount a coup.676   One of the convicted soldiers, F.M. Shahzad (Sq. Leader-Air 
                                                        
674 Viewpoint, 11 August 1983, IX (1), p.30. 
675 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  p.6. 
676 Lt. Colonel (Col.) Khalid Mahmood; Lt. Col. M Iqbal; Squadron (Sq.) Leader, Tahir Maqsood; Sq 
Leader M. Ismail; Major M. Sadiq; Major Akber Niazi; Lt Col M Akhter Shirazi; Sq Leader Shehzad 
Khan; Sq leader Karim Khan; Major Nisar Hussain; Major Abdul Qayyum; Major Aftab Ahmed; Major 
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Force) denied that there was any such plot, and that they had rather launched a campaign that they called Soldiers for the Restoration of Democracy (SRD).677  Historians have been either silent about this episode or have treated it according to the official line of that time.678  The regime claimed that information was received of a plot by soldiers to stage a coup, and Operation Galaxy was mounted near Indian border to arrest the culprits.679  They were prosecuted under three charges — waging war against Pakistan with the help of 
India,	   conspiring	   to	   overthrow	   the	   ‘legal’	   government	   of	   the	   country,	   and	  concealing information about the conspiracy.680  The resulting trial was called Attock Conspiracy Case-II.   17 were tried, while five of those arrested became approvers who testified for the prosecution after being subjected to torture.  
Amnesty	   International	   reported	   that	   ‘the	   officers	   were	   subject	   to	   torture	   to	  confess their crime by stuffing chillies into their anus, electric shocks, strapped 
                                                                                                                                                             
Waseem Ahmed; Major Athar Ali; Major Zulfiqar Ali; Major Munir Ahmed Parvez; Major Adul Razzaq; 
Major Javed; Capt. Syed Sibtain; Major M Khalid; Major Mustafa Kamal; DIG, Mian Zaheer Ahmed; 
Inspector Riasat Ali; Raza Kazim, an advocate. Amnesty International, ‘Trial  of  Military  Officers’,  31  
July 1985, MSS 34/4/1/Pk42, MRC, pp.1-2. F.M.Shahzad, interview, 22 February 2012, Lahore. 
677 F.M.Shahzad, interview. 
678 Rizvi, for example, highlighted their arrest in 1984 at the Indian border while attempting to 
smuggle  in  weapons  with  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  Zia’s  regime. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in 
Pakistan’,  p.241. 
679 Jabbar  Mirza,  ‘Pakistan  k  Tarikhi  Operations’,  Daily Jang, 20 June 2014.  F.M.Shahzad claimed that 
they were accused falsely of smuggling arms.  It was alleged that Major Nisar Bukhari, Major Sadiq 
and Sq.Leader Tahir, were caught at Nawan Kot, an area near the Indian border in Kasur District, 
with one maund of Gold and 40 maunds of silver besides arms. They were alleged to be involved in 
an illegal arms and goods trade. F.M.Shahzad, interview. 
680 The case against 17 military officers began on 19 January 1985 in Attock fort, on the charge of 
Section  121(A)  of  PPC,  ‘with  conspiracy  to  wage  or  attempt  to  wage  war  or  abet waging war against 
Pakistan, through planning the kidnap of the President and planning assassinations and bombings, 
and Section 124A with Section 120B of PPC with sedition, in holding meetings and publishing 
seditious literature in an attempt to excite disaffection against the government. And Under 123 of 
PPC  with  concealing  with  intent  to  facilitate  design  to  wage  war.’   
The 17 were convicted. Two, DIG Mian Zaheer and Inspector Riasat Ali, were from the police; Raza 
Kazim, an advocate, was a civilian while thirteen were from the army and one from the Air force. 
F.M.Shahzad, interview. Asia Times Online, 22 December 2004, accessed on 12-12-2012 at 
[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FL22Df03.html] 
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to blocks of ice, burned with cigarettes, beaten, deprived of food and kept in 
shackles…’681  In an interview, Shahzad told me one of their grievances was that prices of basic commodities had increased in the border areas near Afghanistan due to the UN dispersing dollars and expensive items of daily use to Afghan refugees.682 These Afghans would sell these goods in exchange for basic commodities.  The local population held the army responsible for this problem. He said that although political parties were already agitating publicly for democracy, the hatred among civilians, friends and shopkeepers against the armed forces was the major reason to initiate the campaign within their own rank and file for the revival of democracy under Major Aftab, who was the main coordinator.  The objective was the same as that of the opposition political parties, to bring democracy back in the country and get the army back to its barracks.  According to him, their method was neither to join the political agitation nor to help them, but to educate and create awareness among the forces about the emergence of discontent against them by the general public.  Organising talks, lobbying with their seniors and spreading the message through pamphlets and word of mouth for supporting the cause of civilian rule were some of their activities.  Such activities were never intended to provoke an army coup, but were merely to persuade the army to support the restoration of 
democracy.	   	   In	   Shahzad’s	   opinion,	   Ghulam	  Mustafa	  Khar	   and	  Ghulam	  Mustafa	  Jatoi were used by the army to give credence to the allegation that they were working with India to overthrow the regime, and also as a means to make MRD                                                         
681 Amnesty International, ‘Trial  of  Military  Officers’, 31 July 1985, MSS 34/4/1/Pk42, MRC, p.2. 
682 He was posted in Kohat, near Peshawar (KPK) at Inter-Services Selection Board (ISSB), where the 
candidates are examined before recruiting them in the Pakistan Army. F.M.Shahzad, interview. 
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appear to be working with traitors. 683   This episode brought out the 
psychological	  impact	  of	  Zia’s	  unpopular	  rule on many lower officers and officials who were stigmatised and hated for their association with the regime.  Shahzad also stated that BB, after being sworn in as Prime Minister in December 1988, immediately ordered their release.  
Al-Zulfiqar	  and	  PPP’s relationship: Besides the nonviolent struggle, a violent movement was launched to remove General Zia, which was named Al-Zulfiqar,	  and	  was	  operated	  by	  ZAB’s	  two	  sons	  
– Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnwaz Bhutto. This dissertation not only analyses the movement but it produces new evidence that the formation of Al-Zulfiqar was 
executed	  after	  a	  green	  signal	  from	  PPP’s	  high	  command	  vis-à-vis Nusrat Bhutto and BB, which has otherwise been denied or left ambiguous.684   During the late 1960s and 1970s a rhetoric of violent revolution became fashionable in progressive circles all over the world, with invocations of Mao, Castro, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh.685  This had its impact in Pakistan, particularly among young members of the elite who had embraced leftist doctrines.686  Some radical young PPP activists decided to launch an armed struggle after the Lahore High Court sentenced ZAB to death.  The main ones 
                                                        
683 Khar while in exile in England, had stated that he would return to Pakistan on an Indian Tank and 
he confessed of having relationship with SRD.  Shahzad rejected his statement and accused him of 
being planted by the military junta. 
684 Bukhari, ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi hai; Butt, Kai Soolian Sar-i-Rah thin; Anwer, The Terrorist Prince; 
Cohen,   and  Weinbaum,   ‘Pakistan   in   1981:   Staying   On’,   pp.136-134.   Shahid   Javed   Burki,   ‘Pakistan  
under Zia, 1977-1988’,  Asian Survey, 28 (10), (October 1988), p.1098; Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern 
History; Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, A Political History of Pakistan; Rizvi, The military and 
politics; 
685 On this, see Arendt, Hannah (1970), On Violence (San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), pp. 11-
12, 19-21.  
686 Nadeem F. Paracha, in an interview to Viewpoint, ‘A  Misguided   Adventure’,   Viewpoint, online 
issue (163), 8 August 2013, p. 1. 
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were Maulana Kausar Shah, 687  a PPP worker from Lahore, Nadeem F. Paracha,688 and Agha Muhammad Waseem,689 and they have subsequently provided details of the formative phase of such work.  In 1978, they requested Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, a bosom friend of ZAB, for his support for a campaign of armed resistance to General Zia-ul-Haq.  Agreeing to the proposal, 
Col.	  Gaddafi	  asked	   them	  to	  bring	  ZAB’s	  sons	  on	  board.	   	  At	   the	   time	   they	  were	  
leading	  peaceful	  protests	   in	  London	  and	  Washington	   for	   their	   father’s	   release,	  and without their involvement Gaddafi was unwilling to play a very active role. He agreed however to allow the young radicals to come to Libya for training in armed struggle.690  The United Arab Emirates (UAE), another fast friend of ZAB, 
funded	   the	   People’s	   Liberation	   Army	   (PLA)	   as	   a	   Marxist	   guerrilla	   group	   and	  aided the establishment of Kabul camp base.691 Noor Muhammad Tarakai, a die-hard socialist, paved the way in Kabul for this organisation and establish its main station at Ali Mardan, an industrial area of the city.   Libya, Syria, KHAD (Russian Intelligence agency through Kabul),692 bank robberies in Sindh,693 PIA labour unions, and Banks694 were the subsequent financers of the organisation. 
                                                        
687 Maulana Kausar Shah was already involved in sabotage of railway tracks. Agha Muhammad 
Waseem, Interview, 1-12-2012, via Skype from Sweden.  
688 Paracha,  ‘A  Misguided  Adventure’,  p.1.   
689Agha Muhammad Waseem, Interview. 
690 Those who visited Libya for training were arrested on their return, and the case against them was 
popularly known as the Libya Conspiracy Case. Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview, Muhammad Agha 
Waseem, Interview, and See, for example, on Libya Conspiracy case Bukhari, Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai, 
pp.85-107. 
691 Paracha,  ‘A  Misguided  Adventure’,  p.1.   
692 Directorate of Central Intelligence,   ‘The  Soviet   Threat   to  Pakistan’,  12  August   1981,   342,  NARA,  
pp.6-7. 
693 Paracha,  ‘A  Misguided  Adventure’,  p.1. 
694 Abdul Aziz Menon, President of United Bank Limited, Usman Ghani of (Muslim Commercial Bank, 
and  Habib  Junejo  of  Habib  Bank’s  union  presidents.  Mushtaq  Lasharie,  interview.   
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India provided transit facility to Al-Zulfiqar members to travel to and from Kabul and organised the training of a few men close to the border with Sindh.695    After	   ZAB’s	   execution,	   the	   PPP	   high	   command	   decided	   to	   launch	   a	  militant struggle.696  BB, in her book, blamed the circumstances for driving them to this.697  Strategy	   in	   this	   respect	   was	   discussed	   at	   the	   central	   executive’s	  meeting on the forty-days death anniversary of ZAB in Larkana.698  Nusrat Bhutto, referred to the fourteen underground militant organisations and stated 
‘if we needed we can contact them’.	  	  She	  tried	  to	  bring	  other	  political	  parties	  on	  board, but failed.699  ZAB’s	   two	   sons	   Murtaza	   and	   Shahnawaz	   had been campaigning in England for the reprieve of their father.  Shahnawaz had studied in France – a hotbed of radical thought at that time – and then gone on to Oxford.  He had been impressed by romantic forms of violence through his reading of suspense novels as a hobby since childhood.   After the execution of their father, they decided to join up with the armed struggle of the young PLA radicals based in Kabul.  Shahnawaz secretly joined a Palestinian camp for training and coaching in armed struggle, where he spent one and a half months.700  The two sons then went to Kabul and took over the leadership of the organisation in June 1979 and renamed it as the Al-Zulfiqar Organisation 
                                                        
695 Directorate of Central Intelligence, ‘The  Soviet   Threat   to  Pakistan’,  12  August   1981,   342,  NARA,  
pp.6-7. See also Asia Week,  ‘Phansi  di  gai  tu  Nishana  Khud  Pakistan  hu  ga’  (9  March  1979)  in  Saleem  
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696 National  Foreign  Assessment  Centre,  ‘Pakistan:  Prospects  for  the  Zia  Government,  An  Intelligence  
Assessment’,   Central Intelligence Agency, February 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1, 
NARA,  p.12.  National  Foreign  Assessment  Centre,  ‘The  Pakistan  People’s  Party: Search for Power, An 
Intelligence   Assessment’,   Central Intelligence Agency, September 1981, CIA-
RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.12. 
697 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.283. 
698 Salman  Taseer,  ‘Around  Al-Murtaza’,  Viewpoint, 24 June 1979, p.9. 
699 Sardar Abdul   Qayum   stated   of   her   request   was   ‘we   neither   want   any   violent   politics   nor  
contacting  with  the  underground  organisations’.  Shakir,  MRD, p.43. 
700 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p. 238; Bhatti, Bhutto ka Beta, pp.12, 34. 
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(AZO).701  The name has a double meaning – in Arabic it is associated with the celebrated sword captured by the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) in one of his early battles and it symbolises Islamic justice and militancy; and secondly, it refers to the name of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.   Murtaza Bhutto was the head of the organisation, whereas Shahnawaz was said to be its operational head.  Karachi,702 Lahore,703 and exiled PPP workers were the main recruiting ground.  The CIA reported that there were 1600 to1800 members with varying degrees of commitment to the cause.704 Despite heavy security at Pakistani airports since July 1978,705 the biggest achievement of AZO was the hijacking of Pakistan International Airline (PIA) flight 326 from Karachi to Peshawar on 1 March 1981 by Salam-Ullah Tipu along with his two aides.706  The objective was to barter the release of 55 political prisoners707 with 148 hostage passengers.708 The pilot was forced to fly to Kabul, and Murtaza Bhutto came to the airport there and declared the action to be a triumph in a press statement.  The flight was then forced to go on to Damascus.  The	  regime	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  hijacker’s	  demands until they killed Tariq Rahim, a Pakistani army officer who the 
                                                        
701 Muhammad Agha Waseem, interview. He was awarded Medal of Democracy by PPP in August 
1979. Daily Musawat, 30 August 1979. See, for example, Anwer, The Terrorist Prince; Bukhari, ye bazi 
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702 Masroor Ahsan, Manzar Alam, (recruiters from Karachi), Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. Qayyum 
Nizami, 
703 Major Imtiaz Ali, a fromer Military Secretary to ZAB, and PPP student activist from Faisalabad, 
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705 Viewpoint, IV(50), 22 July 1979, p.5. 
706 Widely  circulated  in  media.  Kutty,  ‘Sixty Years in Self-Exile, p.447.  
707 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.174. Agha Muhammad Waseem, Farkhanda Bukhari, Asif Butt, 
interviews. The last two were among the exchanged prisoners. 
708 BBC,15-03-1981, 
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hijackers wrongly believed was the son of General Rahimuddin Khan, an 
important	  member	  of	  Zia’s	  martial	  law	  regime.	  	  	  Zia	  then	  caved	  in	  and released a number of PPP activists.  On 15 March, the remaining passengers and flight crew were set free at Damascus airport.   In public, the PPP denied any relationship between BB and Nusrat Bhutto and the hijackers, and this is repeated in histories of this period,709 including in the memoirs of BB and others.710  BB mentions an argument she had with 
Murtaza on adopting violent methods to remove Zia.711 In response to the hijacking, she made an ambiguous statement	  ‘All	  hijacking	  is	  bad,	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  
                                                        
709 See, for example, Ian Talbot, Pakistan: Modern History; Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan; 
Shakir, MRD; Ghafoor Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, Arif, Working with Zia, Hussain, Politics 
of Alliances in Pakistan; Kutty, Sixty Years of Exile; Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, A Political history 
of Pakistan. Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983. 
710 See, for example, Bhutto, Daughter of East, Bukhari, ye bazi ishq ki bazi hai, Butt, Kai Soolian sare 
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711 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.282. 
 
Figure 5 Salaullah Tipu waving his hand and a Klashinkov with the celebration of the successful PIA 
hijacking. Courtesy Agha Muhammad Waseem 
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plane	  or	  a	  nation’.712 However, Mushtaq Lasharie stated that BB directly led the AZO-related activities in 1979-81 and that she knew of the hijacking plan.713   Only once she saw how it had affected the MRD and the democratic cause did she disassociate herself from AZO.   She sent a coded message to her brothers 
‘yahan	  sardi	  khatm	  hu	  gai,	  kumble	  ki	  zarorat	  nahi’	  (winter	  has	  come	  to	  its	  end,	  so we do not need blankets anymore).714   She	  quit	   any	   involvement	   in	  AZO’s	  activities and disowned its members in public.715  Peter Ackerman and Du Vall argue that when violence is deployed alongside a nonviolent movement, victory may be compromised or delayed.  For example, when Danish groups used sabotage to slow Nazi exploitation, there were harsh reprisals.  Those who threw stones and Molotov cocktails compromised the Palestinian intifada.716  In Chile, the Popular Democratic Front (MDP) and Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the hardliner leftist guerrilla group fighting the regime of General Pinochet, launched ten missiles in Santiago, the capital city in September 1985, few weeks after the Acuerda Nacional (National Accord), which undermined it badly.717 Kurt Schock argues that the anti-apartheid armed insurgency of the African National Congress (ANC) alienated many non-white supporters of the movement.718 In their statistical comparison of predominantly violent with nonviolent movements since the start of the twentieth century, Chenoweth, and Stephan argue that nonviolent 
                                                        
712 ibid., p.169.  
713 He was an employee in PIA, and was in contact with BB through Irshad Rao and Masroor Ahsan. 
Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. 
714 Agha Muhammad Waseem, interview; Javed Iqbal Moazzam, Interview,  
715 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.14. 
716 Ackerman, and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, p.495. 
717 Ackerman, and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, pp.293-94. 
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movements had a higher success-rate.719 However, not all scholars agree on this. For example, Peter Gelderloos, argues that a violent wing helps nonviolent struggles as it makes the latter appear relatively moderate, so that the regime is more prepared to negotiate with it.720    In the case of Pakistan in 1981, the hijacking backfired badly on the movement in general.721   General Zia	  took	  it	  as	  a	  ‘blessing’	  and	  stated	  ‘hijackers	  
cannot	   bring	   democracy’.722  The MRD uprising against the regime had been gaining popularity among the masses and many civil society groups had already joined the cause, as stated above. In the week following the hijacking, one thousand leaders, as reported by Amnesty International, were rounded up and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment.723  Despite the ruthless torture of those arrested, they did not provide any evidence of the involvement of either Bhutto ladies in the act.724 The alliance cancelled the demonstration planned for 23 March.  Sardar Abdul Qayyum and two other parties quit the alliance in protest, 
stating	   that	   the	  Bhutto	   ladies	  believed	   in	   the	   ‘politics	  of	   revenge’.725 Even pro-movement elements in the	  army	   ‘pulled	  strongly	  behind	  Zia	  and	  strengthened	  
                                                        
719 See, for example, Chenoweth, and Stephan, Why Civil resistance works. 
720 Peter Gelderloos, How Nonviolence Protects the State, Cambridge Mass: South End Press, 2007). 
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his position.726   The moderate group in PPP openly started defying the policy of the radicals in the party, and called on the ladies to resign their leadership and leave the country.727  In short, it led to a hiatus for the movement between 1981 and 1983.  It undermined all that MRD had been working for, allowing the regime to regain the initiative.    
MRD Failure and Success 1981-84 
Gradualist Democracy: 
Stephen	  Zunes	  has	  used	  the	  term	  ‘gradualist	  democracy’ in cases of movements that failed to bring down a dictator immediately, but despite this paved the way for eventual democratization.728  Existing histories see the MRD as a failure as it did not achieve its major objectives while it was at its height – namely the end of martial law, holding of free and fair election within three months and transfer of power to the elected representative under the Constitution of 1973.  The martial law regime continued and the restoration of democracy seemed as far away as ever.  A number of reasons can be underlined for this failure.   Concerned scholars729 and almost all those engaged in the movement who were interviewed highlighted as a major reason the absence of fervour and 
                                                        
726 National   Foreign   Assessment   Centre,   ‘The   Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Search   for   Power,   An  
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from Washington DC.  
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commitment to the cause in Punjab.730  Shakir, quoting Anwer Abbas, stated if all those who took part had been from Punjab alone, the outcome of the movement would have been different.731 Not only was Punjab the home of seventy per cent of Pakistan army personnel,732 but also Zia, being an immigrant from East Punjab was the first Punjabi ruler.733  Likewise, Talbot argues that Punjab was the largest receiver of remittances from Middle East labourers, and 
the	  chief	  beneficiary	  of	  economic	  aid	   in	   lieu	  of	  Pakistan’s	  status as a front-line ally in the war in Afghanistan. 734  There is no doubt that Punjab is the driving force in the life of Pakistan.   Analysis by US diplomats carried out during Zia time, argued that the Pakistan Army was not only the controlling authority in the country, but that its power rested above all from the support of conservative 
social	  groups	   in	  Punjab.	   	   It	   further	  stated	  that	   ‘no	  government	   is	   likely	  to	   long	  
survive	   if	   it	   ignores	  either’s	  opinion.’735  When the defence and stability of the country and the interest of the conservative groups in Punjab was secured, and economic prosperity continued, all regimes (civilian or military) could be confident that they would retain power.736   In their work on civil resistance, Chenoweth and Stephan give great significance to the degree of support a movement enjoys from the population as 
                                                        
730 Robert   M.   Gates   (Deputy   Director   for   Intelligence),   ‘Pakistan:   Scenario   for   Dramatic   Political  
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732 Cohen, The Pakistani Army (Berkeley: University of California, 1984), pp. 44-45. 
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a whole.  They find that when about 1.5 per cent or more of the population participated in a resistance movement, the success-rate was eighty per cent or over.737  Unfortunately, no accurate figures are available of this type for MRD.   Historians have struggled to appraise any such figures, even at the regional level, and the obstacles to doing so are formidable due to the strict press and publication ordinance.  According to the Census of 1981, Sindh made up almost twenty-two per cent of the Pakistani population.738   Much of this population in Sindh was rural. A major chunk of the population of every district of rural Sindh, from Sukker to Badin, was actively on the streets in support of MRD at one point or another, with a lower degree of support coming from the people of Karachi and Punjab.   The ruthless reaction by regime in rural Sindh that has already been mentioned provides evidence of this. Thus, well over one-and-a-half percent of the population of Pakistan was mobilised in support of the movement. Yet, the regime was not toppled.  Against this, a few killing of civilians by the police in Lahore on 9 April 1977 during the PNA movement was provided as a reason for the army to topple	  ZAB’	  government.	  	  This	  dissertation	  
thus	  questions	  Chenoweth	  and	  Stephan’s	  argument	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  1980s. There, the overall percentage of the population that was mobilised was less significant than the relative importance of that population in a country as a whole.    This dissertation argues, however, that the support for the movement from Punjab has been greatly underestimated.   Despite the top leaders being                                                         
737 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, pp.39-40.  
738  Sindh accounted for 19 million out of the total Pakistani population of 87 according to the 1981 
Population Census report. Quoted in Population Census Report 2006, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 
Government of Pakistan, 2006. 
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based in Sindh, large numbers from this province, according to various Amnesty International reports, stood firm against the regime even during 1983 Civil Disobedience. 739  Owing to the imprisonment of ZAB in the Punjab cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi, the province was a focus of the resistance.  Amnesty International reported in 1981 that between1977 and 1979 more than eighty percent of the participants in protests were from Punjab, mainly from Lahore and Rawalpindi.740  150 journalists were arrested when they went on hunger strike in protest of the closure of the pro-PPP daily newspaper, Musawat, in May 1978 and four of them were flogged – all from Punjab. Women,741 lawyers,742 and students743 all participated in Punjab. Several hundred to several thousand political prisoners were held at any one time between 1977 and 1981.  Furthermore, six of those who committed suicide in protest at the execution of ZAB between March 1978 and April 1979 were from Punjab, and only one –Abdul Aziz – from Sukker in Sindh.   Among nine political workers executed by the regime, four were Punjabi, while two were settlers in Karachi from KPK and the rest were from Sindh.  Of 192 people flogged, all except 18 times were from Punjab.744  The notorious Shahi Qila prison contained seventy-three prisoners including seven women, of whom ninety-five percent were from Punjab.  Dr. 
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 169 
Aslam Khan Naru, who was arrested on 24 February 1981 and spent fifteen months in solitary confinement in Shahi Qila – the longest such spell recorded for such confinement – was also from Punjab.    The figures for those arrested who were from Punjab over this entire period are impressive.745 Likewise, the majority of the exiled workers were from urban centres of Punjab such as Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, and Gujranwala, and they continued struggling against the regime when abroad. 746  We shall return to these exiles in Chapter 4.  Besides contributing handsome support to the nonviolent movement, Punjab was to the fore also in the violent activities of AZO.  Agha Muhammad Waseem and Asif Butt, who were guerrillas of AZO, told me that among 250 commanders of the organisation, 186 were from Punjab, whilst 40-50 were from KPK and FATA (Federally Administrated Tribal Area), and 30-35 from Sindh. In the hostage-exchange deal, the majority of those political prisoners released were 
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who were MRD leaders from Punjab, were placed under house arrested or exiled from Punjab. 
Punjab MRD Secretary Rao Irshad along with five others were arrested on 19 December 1982.  
Sixteen prominent MRD leaders from Punjab including Farooq Legari (Secretary General of PPP), 
Rana Shaukat Mahmood (Secretary MRD) Major Ejaz Ahmad (Punjab President ML Khairuddin) Dr. 
Israr Shah, Student leader, Suleman Khokar and Abdul Qayyum (TI), Anjum Rashid (QMA), and 
second tier of leadership like Jahangir Badar, Aabid Hassan Minto, Begum Mehnaz Rafi mainly from 
Lahore were also put behind bars before the launching of civil disobedience movement in Punjab, 
cited in Viewpoint, IX(2), 18 August 1983, pp. 13-14. 
746 Qayyum Nizami in Canada and USA, Sardar Mazhar Ali, Mian Iqbal, Mukhtar Rana, Khadim Nasir, 
Mushtaq Lasharie, Ali Jaffar Zaidi, Shahid Nadeem, Prof. Amin Mughal, Qayyum Butt, Rao Raza 
Hashim in UK, (Qayum Nizami, Shahid Nadeem, Mushtaq Lashari, Mian Muhammad Iqbal., 
interviews); Likewise, Farooq Tariq, Tanvir from Faisalabad, Ayub Goraya (those four who carried the 
banner  ‘Accelerate  the  Struggle  in  Pakistan  against  the  Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship in the hockey stadium 
Amsterdam during Pakistan versus Netherland match, in June 1982) were a few names in a long list. 
All were from Punjab. Nusrat Bhutto’s   permission   to   travel   abroad   for   her   medical   treatment   in  
November 1982 was as a result of the untiring efforts of the exiled workers of PPP, cited in The 
Struggle, the  exiled  PPP’s  workers  journal  founded  in  1980-81, published from the Netherlands, UK, 
and Belgium, No.7, January 1983, 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
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Punjabis.  Most Punjabi activists refused, however, to join this militant movement.747    After the hijacking, six thousand political workers were arrested within three weeks, a large number of whom were from Punjab.  The movement then lost its intensity in Punjab, with Sindh becoming the epicentre thereafter.   Despite this, many Punjab activists came forward in the Jail Bharo Tahreek (Voluntary Courting Arrest Campaign) 1983, including from smaller cities, and were incarcerated by the regime.748  When Sindhi villages were attack by air force planes and shot at and bombed during this campaign, there was not however any significant protest in sympathy in Punjab.   However, the claim made by Aijaz Ahmed, and Belokrenistsky and Moskalenko that the upsurge in Sindh at this time was fuelled by secessionist sentiments and that the Pakistan army – still smarting from the loss of East Pakistan – crushed it so ruthlessly because of this is misplaced.749  As Lawrence Ziring has shown, none of the political parties involved in the civil resistance in Sindh at that time were 
                                                        
747 Agha Muhammad Waseem and Asif Butt, interviews.   
748 On 10 August 1983, four persons including secretary MRD-Multan from Multan and Five MRD 
leaders from Pakpattan were detained even before the protest was formally launched for 
distributing  the  pamphlet  ‘Lahore  Chalo’  (let’s  go  to  Lahore).  Viewpoint, IX(2), 18 August 1983, p.16. 
Besides a big show of strength at Quaid-i-Azam Mazar, Karachi on 14 August 1983, there were 
protests in Lahore at Lakshmi Chowk and Lohari Gate. Volunteers courted arrest there, and also in 
the cities of Gujranwala, Sargodha, Bahawalpur, D.G.Khan, Multan and Faisalabad.  In its issue of 25 
August 1983 Viewpoint, gave the following numbers of the arrest for the previous few days. On 15 
August: 13 leaders were arrested including Aitzaz Ahsan (TI) from Lahore. On 16 August: 11 were 
arrested. 17 August: Syed Imtiaz Ali Shah President PNP, 18 August: Syed Manzoor Gillani (TI), 19 
August, despite heavy rain and walking through the streets knee-deep water, Aslam Gordaspuri and 
Ch. Liaqat Hussain courted arrest at Lakshmi Chowk. And SMC No.2 sentenced twelve persons under 
MLRs 13 and 33 to one-year rigorous imprisonment.  Federal Information Secretary presented the 
data on arrested persons to the Federal Cabinet on 21 August, and said that seven hundred arrests 
were made in total since 14 August, composed of 117 from Punjab, 335 from Sindh, 209 from KPK 
and 54 from Balochistan.  Viewpoint, IX (3), 25 August 1983, p. 33. 
749 Ahmed,   ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  Belokrenistsky  and  Moskalenko,  A Political History of Pakistan, 
p.287. 
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secessionist.750    Only later did such parties emerge – namely Jiye Sindh in 1985751 and the Sindh, Pukhtoon, Baluch Front (SPBF) in 1986.  These were established to fight the economic disparity between the smaller provinces and Punjab.752   According	   to	   a	   CIA	   report,	   Zia	   manipulated	   the	   ‘Jiye	   Sindhudesh’	  slogan in an attempt to divide and rule the country.753  Zia, visited the home of G.M.Syed, the Jiye Sindh leader, and supported him as a counter strategy to PPP in rural Sindh.  Syed in turn tried to manipulate this support to accelerate the separation process of Sindh from Pakistan.754  ZAB, BB and PPP never used any Sindhi separatist slogans, fighting only in the name of Pakistan. Even, after the assassination of BB in the Punjab city of Rawalpindi, her husband and successor Asif Ali Zardari ordered PPP partisans to refrain from any Sindhu desh slogans 
and	  cry	  only	  ‘Pakistan Khappe’	  (long live Pakistan).   The outbreak of violence in Sindh in 1983 damaged the movement in Punjab, and divided its MRD leaders.  TI Acting President, Mr. Fazal Husain 
Samra	   said	   that	   ‘violence	   would	   be	   fatal	   for	   the	   passive	   resistance’.755  Sympathisers in other provinces were similarly put off, so that the movement became more obviously a regional one after this.  On top of it, as Burki has                                                         
750 Lawrence  Ziring,  ‘Public  Policy  Dilemmas  and  Pakistan's  Nationality  Problem:  The  Legacy  of  Zia  ul-
Haq’,Asian Survey, 28 (8),  (August 1988), p.806. 
751 Dr. Hameeda Khoro was appointed Chairperson of the movement. G.M.Syed was amongst few 
who raised the issue of Sindhudesh. Mahmood Mirza, Aaj Ka Sindh, pp.71-74. 
752 They argued that the judges, who sentenced ZAB to death in the larger bench hearing, were 
Punjabis and those who were against of the verdict, were non-Punjabis. Sindh shared only two per 
cent in the armed forces while; local Sindhis ran five hundred out of two thousand industrial units in 
the province. Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, 249; Omer Noman, Pakistan and Zia: era and 
legacy, p. 53 also mentioned the imbalance division of resources between Sindh and Punjab. See 
also,   for   example,   Shahid   Javed   Burki,   ‘Zia’s   eleven   years’,   in   S.J.Burki,   and   Craig   Baxter   (eds.),  
Pakistan under the military; Sayeed,‘Pakistan   in   1983’,   pp.219-228. Though, K.M.Arif denied this 
disparity by saying sixty per cent of industrial units were set up in Sindh, cited in Arif, Working with 
Zia, p. 313. 
753 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  p.1. 
754 Mahmood Mirza, Aaj Ka Sindh, p.72. G.M.Syed, cited in weekly Takbeer, 20 April 1984. Shakir, 
MRD, p.117. Fateh Mari, Mustafa Talpur, interviews.  
755 Mr. Fazal Hussain Samra, Viewpoint, IX (3), 25 August 1983, p. 12. 
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argued,	   Indira	   Gandhi’s	   statement	   that	   ‘Indians	  would	   support	   all	   democratic	  
movements	  in	  Pakistan’,	  the	  organisation	  of	  an	  International	  Sindhi	  Conference	  
in	  New	  Delhi	  under	  Congress’s	  auspices,	  and	  Moscow’s	  hue	  and	  cry	  in	  favour of 
MRD’s	   demands	   through	   its	   media	   all	   fed	   into	   Zia’s	   propaganda	   that	   the	  movement threatened the security and national integrity of Pakistan and was the interest of its main enemy, India.756  Faced with all this. The MRD leadership including Nusrat Bhutto had to call off the movement before it had achieved its goals.   One	  popular	   argument	   on	   the	   Punjab’s	   relative	   lack	   of	   response	   to	   the	  protest in 1983 has been that there was good economic growth there and as a 
result	   satisfaction	  with	   Zia’s	   rule.757  An influx of remittances from 1.5 billion workers sending $25 billion between 1975 and 1985, an increase of exports by 16.7 percent, and a growth rate of 8.5 percent in 1984-85 with $390 per capita increase, are some of the figures presented in support of this argument.758 
Shrewdly,	   Zia’s	   inclusion	   of	   economic	   heavyweights	   into	   the	   Federal	   cabinet	  built his ties with the economically dominant class, so that they were not attracted to MRD. 759  Nonetheless, besides the economic growth, the country was laden with a	   ‘burgeoning	   foreign	   debt,	   decreasing	   overseas	   remittances,	  
                                                        
756 Burki,   ‘Pakistan  under  Zia,  1977-1988’,  Asian Survey, 28, (10), (October 1988), p.1098.  See also 
Hussain,  ‘Politics  of  Alliances’,  p.138;  Mahmood  Mirza,  Aaj ka Sindh, (Lahore, Progressive Publishers: 
1986), p.1.Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  24  November  
2013, (document no) p.4. 
757 Burki,  ‘Pakistan  under  Zia,  1977-1988’,  pp.  1082-1100;  Richter,  ‘Pakistan  in  1985:  Testing  Time  for  
the  New  Order’,  Asian Survey, 26 (2), A Survey of Asia    1985: Part II (February 1986), pp. 207-218; 
Talbot, Pakistan: A New History, p.118; Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp.249 and 277-279. 
Cohen  and  Weinbaum,  ‘Pakistan  in  1981’,  pp.142-43. 
758 Burki,  ‘Pakistan  under  Zia,  1977-1988’, p.1093; Ian Talbot, Pakistan, p.118; Cohen and Weinbaum, 
‘Pakistan  in  1981’,  pp.142-43;  Richter,  ‘Pakistan  in  1985’,pp.214-15. 
759 Ali Ahmed Talpur (Defence), Hoti (Railways), Mahmoud Haroon (Interior), Ilahi Baksh Soomro 
(Industry), Ghulam Dastgir (Labour and Manpower), Raja ZafrulHaq(Information), Niaz Muhammad 
Arbab(Tourism),  Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  p.37. 
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and the uncertain social consequences of the continuing privatization of the 
economy’.760  $200 million was spent on the Afghan refugees761  On top of it, expenditure on the military increased by fourteen times, which was a big 
burden	  on	  Pakistan’s	  economy.762  The Zia regime failed to ensure that the mass of the people benefited much from all this.  Talbot has argued that the low 
investment	  in	  human	  capital	  led	  the	  ‘youth	  bulge’	  towards	  extremist	  politics.763   Ahmed Rashid held that the skewed nature of the economic policy was a major cause of criminal activities in Sindh, where the economic situation was particularly dire.  Even graduates became involved in crimes such as robbery and kidnapping for ransom.764 Therefore, the employed and working classes, as discussed briefly in Chapter 2, protested intermittently against the regime during this period.765  For instance, rallies of striking teachers and doctors took 
                                                        
760 Richter,  ‘Pakistan  in  1985’,  p.207;  Cohen  and  Weinbaum,  ‘Pakistan  in  1981’,  pp.142-43. 
761 The social and economic impact of the Afghan refugees was the major reason of the launching of 
Soldier  for  the  restoration  of  democracy’s  movement,  as  aforementioned. 
762 Cohen  and  Weinbaum,  ‘Pakistan  in  1981’,  pp.142-43. 
763 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, p.117. 
764 Quoting  a  graduate’s  testimony,  Ahmed  Rashid  narrated  ‘Ghulam Husain, with a Master degree, 
who  has  been   jobless   for  eight  years,   says   some  of  his  MA   friends  are  dacoits.’  The  writer   further  
revealed the figures that during 1986-88, five thousand kidnap cases and murdering of one thousand 
common persons and fifty policemen occurred in dacoit-related violence in Sindh. Ahmed Rashid, 
Unrest in Sindh, Viewpoint, XIII (22), 14 August 1988, p.10. 
765 The strikes and protests organised between 1979-83 by an immense numbers of unions and 
groups requires separate research,  especially   the  Karachi  Shipyard  Workers’   successful  Satyagraha 
for seventy-five days to reinstate their six-thousand employees. For example, All-Pakistan Banks 
Officers  Federation’s   ‘one-hour  pen  down  strike’   started   in  April  1979  and   lasted  ninety-one days, 
affecting the National Bank of Pakistan, United Bank Limited, Habib Bank Limited, Muslim 
Commercial Bank, and Allied Bank Limited. Cited in Viewpoint, 6 May 1979, p.13. There was the All 
Pakistan Postal Employees Union ten days strike, Viewpoint, 10 June 1979, p.14, the Pakistan Nurses 
Organisation 18-days strike, joined by Doctors, and Surgeons, Daily Musawat, Viewpoint, August 
1979, the Karachi Shipyard workers seventy-five days long strike, Viewpoint, June-September 1979, 
the Anjuman-i-Mulazimeen-i-Baldia (Organisation of Town Council Employees) in Punjab, including 
small   units   of   unions   such   as   Rickshaw   drivers(Karachi),   the   Sahiwal’s   women   sweepers   strike  
(Punjab), Viewpoint, June 1979, and the Fruit and Vegetables Associations (Punjab) stike, Viewpoint, 
August 1979. All these strikes were mainly due to the price-hikes, with demands for increases in 
their pay and packages.  
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place at various locations.766 In Lahore, 20,000 teachers carrying banners protested against price-hikes shouting ‘Give us Bread, not Islam’, which was 
similar	  to	  the	  slogan	  of	  the	  Lenin	  Shipyard	  workers	  in	  Poland	  ‘we	  want	  bread!	  
Down	  with	   Gomulka’	   (Władysław	  Gomułka).767  Moreover,	   USA’s	  military	   and	  economic direct aid to the Budget of Pakistan meant that the government placed less emphasis on the culture of tax-paying,768 which was to be a big problem for future governments of Pakistan.   Taking all this evidence, it is hard to sustain an argument that the people of Punjab were soothed by any great economic prosperity.   The real reasons for their stepping-back from the MRD protest in 1983 were political ones.    
Problems of Leadership and Organisation:  The scholarship on civil resistance places a lot of emphasis on the importance of good leadership.    In some cases this has come from a charismatic leader such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, or Aung San Suu Kyi.   Nonetheless, in cases in which these leaders have been jailed, it is important that there be a dynamic subordinate leadership that can step in.  Thus, although Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for twenty-seven years, the African National Congress (ANC) was able to generate a succession of subordinate leaders who maintained the strength of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, until it                                                         
766 In Peshawar on 14 March, in Lahore on 18 March, and Peshawar again on 24 March. Amnesty 
International, ‘Pakistan   Update   (since   January   1982-December 1982), December 1982, 
MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3. 
767 Solidarity  Movement   1980s’,   See,   for   example,   Ackerman   and   Duvall,   A Force More Powerful, 
pp.113-174. 
768 Asma Jahangir, Interview. USA financed fifty per cent of the trade gap and fifty per cent of total 
investment through the period 1978-88.  Asad  Sayeed,  ‘State-Society Conjunctures and Disjunctures: 
Pakistan’s  Manufacturing   Performance’,   in   S.M.Naseem   and   Khalid   Nadvi   (eds),   The Post-Colonial 
State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), cited 
in Ian Talbot, Pakistan, p.227. 
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eventually achieved its ends.769  In other cases there have been successful movements that lacked any obvious single leader of this sort.  This was true of 
the	   movement	   by	   the	   mothers	   of	   the	   ‘disappeared’	   in	   the	   Plaza	   de	   Mayo	   in	  Argentina, the students movement against Pinochet in Chile, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the OTPOR movement	   against	   Milošević	   in	   Serbia,	   the	  Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the youth movement of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunis. Such movements were not led by charismatic leaders but by coteries of leaders who generally adopted a low profile in the media while they directed the protest on the ground.770     In South Asia, however, there has been a tendency to elevate particular charismatic figures, as discussed in Chapter 1.   In the MRD, leadership was however dispersed and rotating.  Leaders at all levels were arrested and jailed or put under house arrest, and thus removed from the scene.771 There was a lack of good leaders at the secondary and tertiary levels.  Local people ended up by adopting their own methods of protest that came into conflict with the principles of the movement as a whole.  This caused the movement to fracture. Thus, when Sindh turned to violence, Punjab disassociated with it. Eventually, 
the	   leaders	   failed	   to	   bring	   a	   ‘positive	   culmination’	   to	   the	   movement	   at	   this	  juncture.772  Aijaz Ahmed has advanced a further reason for the failure of the protest of 1983. He argues that discontented groups failed to unite properly, so that 
                                                        
769 See Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Kindle Edition, 2013); Ackerman and Duvall, A Force 
More Powerful, pp.336-368.   
770 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, p.27. 
771 Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Asghar Khan, Nasrullah Khan, and Wali Khan, were in jail 
from1979 except a brief period of out of the imprisonment, in which they tried to mobilise people. 
772 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.261.  
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Sindhi protested as a Sindhis, workers as workers, women as women, while 
students	  were	   interested	   only	   in	   their	   ‘corporate	   politics’.773  While this is all true, we have to seek a deeper reason for this state of affairs. The argument of this dissertation is that there could have been a unity of all these groups that would have fed into and strengthened the movement as a whole, but that the leadership required for this was lacking.   The leadership was, rather, fractured by political rivalries and mutual mistrust. The individual ambitions for power of the leading politicians held back the return of democracy for several years.    If the leaders had been more united, there might have been the sort of unity seen 
in	   the	   Students’	   Movement against General Ayub Khan in 1967-8 and the 
Lawyers’	  Movement	  against	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf	   in	  2007-9.  This would have placed much greater pressure on the regime and greatly enhanced the chances for its success.   Internal differences, couple with	   the	  Pakistan	  People’s	  Party’s	  desire	   to	  be the largest and most powerful party in the coalition, all delayed the return of 
democracy	  in	  the	  country.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  unity	  that	  was	  forged	  among	  KOR’s	  diverse groups,774 or in the anti-Milošević	  movement in Serbia of 2000,775 the movement in Pakistan was undermined by internal strife in MRD and PPP, as well as refusal by PPP to follow MRD decisions.  As an example of this internal strife, Farooq Leghari, the acting chairman of PPP at that time, stated that the party was prepared to participate in local elections in defiance of a collective 
                                                        
773 Aijaz Ahmed define the term in the Gramecian sense where each group stands for their own 
particular  interest,  even  after  a  formation  of  one  larger  group.  Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  p.33. 
774 The first fourteen founding members were historians, sociologists, lawyers, writers, philosophers, 
and priests having their ideology on Catholic intellectuals, social democrats, and liberals. Ackerman 
and Kruegler, A Force More Powerful, p.127. 
775 Danijela  Nenadić  and  Nenad  Belčevic,  ‘Serbia-Nonviolent  Struggle  for  Democracy’. 
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decision	  to	  boycott	  all	  	  election	  taken	  by	  MRD.’776  NDP’s	  Punjab	  President,	  Rao	  
Mehroz	  Akhtar	  declared	  this	  ‘a	  conspiracy	  against	  the	  MRD	  mass	  movement’.777  The radical wing of the party reacted similarly.778 Although PPP rescinded the decision a week before the launching of the 14 August campaign, the party workers wasted crucial time in preparation for the election.779 Leghari had hardly helped his own cause when he made a demoralising statement comparing the 210 million rupees of the PNA election funds to the less than 2.1 
million	  for	  	  MRD’s	  campaign.780 This was criticised harshly by his colleagues in PPP.     US consulate correspondence disclosed that Nusrat Bhutto had advised Farooq Leghari to boycott the elections; which contradicts the claim of Leghari 
himself	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   participate	   was	   taken	   ‘on	   the	   advice	   of	   Begum	  
Bhutto’.781  The consulate further notes how Zia-ul-Haq used his influence to put pressure on moderate and conservative politicians in the local areas to disassociate themselves from the election boycott.782   Leghari’s	   attempt	   to	   fight	   the	  election,	   though	  abandoned,	  widened	   the	  gap between the radicals and the moderates of PPP in Punjab.   On the 
complaint	  of	  the	  workers	  to	  the	  chairperson	  on	  the	  ‘refusal	  to	  delegate	  power’	                                                          
776 Viewpoint, 28 July 1983, VIII (51), p.13. 
777 ibid.,p.12. 
778 Sheikh Rasheed had almost declared the boycott the election. PSF and labour unions come out 
against the party. ibid.,p.12. 
779 The  decision  was  followed  by  the  rejection  of  1200  nomination  papers  out  of  1409  of  PPP’s  allied  
candidates in Baluchistan on the ground that they were associated with PPP. Viewpoint, ‘Grapes  are  
sour’,11  August  1983,  IX  (1),  p.12.    The  moderate  Punjabis  wanted to control the local development 
funds for funding grass roots activities, whereas the Sindhis, on the basis of the 1979 local bodies 
election, argued that they could hardly control such resources through such means. US Consulate 
General  Lahore,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  Directorate of Intelligence, March 1984, p.8. 
780 Husain  Naqi,  ‘Grassroots  essential’,  Viewpoint, 28 July 1983, VIII (51), p.11. 
781 Farooq Leghari announced that the five out of twelve steering committee members present at 
the  meeting  held  in  Lahore  on  15  July  decided  ‘on  the  advice  of  Begum  Bhutto’,  who,  according  to  
Leghari, held that taking part in the local elections would be preferable to doing nothing under the 
prevailing conditions. Viewpoint, 28 July 1983, VIII(51), p.12. 
782 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  24  November  2013,  
(document no) p.8. 
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to lower level by the acting heads, a twelve-member steering committee was set up to look into the matter, but it failed to achieve anything of significance.783   Some key party leaders who had organised the mobilisation of urban areas resigned.784  The house arrest of BB and the sickness-based exile of Nusrat Bhutto, left a further vacuum in the conduct of party work.  Every major leader wanted to put the party crown on his head.785  Party workers aligned themselves with one leader or another, causing rival grouping to develop within the party.   There was no democracy in the party, with even Zia criticising it for its lack of internal elections.786   The role of the ninety-three year-old Baacha Khan in shaping events in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) at this time has been ignored, except for a brief passing reference by Aijaz Ahmed in his discussion of the Afghan refugees 
factor,	   and	   the	   fear	   of	   USSR’s	   invasion.787   Although the National Democratic Party (NDP) leader Begum Nasim Wali (who had made history in 1977 as the first woman to be elected from KPK province) had condemned the execution of ZAB as the revenge of the tribunal,788 Zia-ul-Haq had made friendly overture towards Baluchis and Pushtuns, including Baacha Khan,789 since the imposition 
                                                        
783 US   Consulate   General   Lahore,   ‘Pakistan:   Zia’s   Divided   Opposition’,   Directorate of Intelligence, 
March 1984, p.8. 
784 Malik Azmat Hayat Khan of Tumman, Malik Salim Iqbal of Talagang, Malik Muhammad Aslam of 
Shamsabad, Ex-Advisor to ZAB Malik Muhammad Hayat Khan of Tumman were among them. 
Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  p.37. 
785 Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, known as the Father of Socialism, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Ghulam 
Mustafa Jatoi, and Generals Tikka Khan were in this category. 
786 Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  p.36 
787 Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  pp.  33  and  37. 
788 Begum Nasim Wali Khan, interview. 
789 From the start of martial law, Baacha Khan was given special respect by Zia-ul-Haq, and allowed 
free movement between the Durand and Radcliff Lines vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India respectively. 
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of martial law. NDP had, however, joined MRD.790  Baacha Khan held a controversial Press Conference on 12 August 1983, just two days before the launching of the civil disobedience movement, that gave an irreversible setback to the movement in the two provinces of KPK and Baluchistan. He appealed to 
Pukhtoons	  to	  reactivate	  their	  energies	  for	  a	  course	  of	  action	  ‘in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
Bannu	  Resolution	  of	  1947’.791  Despite his inactivity in politics by then and his advanced age, his long-standing political struggle for the community in the form of Khudai Khidamatgar was still highly respected in these two provinces. At a time when the movement needed the sort of inspired leadership that he was remembered for, his intervention had a demoralising impact not only in KPK and Baluchistan, but for MRD as a whole.  The NDP leaders Ghulam Ahmed 
Bilour	   and	  Abdul	  Khaliq	   resigned	   from	  MRD.	   	   Even	   though	  Bacha	  Khan’s	   son,	  and the head of NDP, Khan Wali Khan and Begum Naseem Wali Khan courted 
arrest	   in	  Peshawar,	  Baacha	  Khan’s	   statement	  kept	  many	  of	   those	   loyal	   to	  him	  away from the protest.  In general, the protest had little impact in these two provinces. 
External Support: Chenoweth and Stephen highlighted the skewed behaviour of the international community towards nonviolent movements by revealing the fact that less than ten percent of nonviolent movements throughout the world have received                                                         
790 In reaction to the killing of Arbab Sikander Khalil, the former Governor of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, 
on 7 March 1982, NDP led by Wali Khan became more militant. Wali Khan and Naseem Wali Khan 
organised a protest rally on 14 March 1982 at Yadgar Chowk in Peshawar, but the police disrupted 
the crowd by tear-gas and baton charges and arrested thirty-eight persons. Nawa-i-Waqt, 9 March 
1982. 
791 The   Bannu   Resolution  was   adopted   in   the   wake   of   Pakistan’s   creation   in   June   1947   to   hold   a  
referendum for the Pukhtoons to choose between Pakistan and Independence, instead of Pakistan 
and India as the British had intended. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Press Conference, Peshawar, cited in 
Viewpoint, 18 August 1983, IX(2), p.15.. 
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material support from foreign governments in comparison to thirty-five percent of violent movements.792 This dissertation argues that this was the case also in Pakistan.  Western governments poured money into the war in Afghanistan, and alongside it a vast amount of funding for the Pakistan Army.  BB criticised the $525 million aid given annually for military and economic purposes to Pakistan 
during	  1980s	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  principle	  that	  ‘No	  assistance	  may	  be	  provided	  
[…]	  to	  the	  government	  of	  any	  country	  which	  engages	  […]	  in	  gross	  violations	  of	  internationally recognised human rights,	   including	   torture	   […]	   prolonged	  
detention	   without	   charges”.793 Despite	   MRD’s	   appeal	   to	   link	   US$3.2	   billion	  military and economic aid to Pakistan to the restoration of democracy,794 the MRD failed to attract international backing from the Western governments.  It received some irregular support from the Soviet Union, Libya, and UAE.   The international political situation in Asia led to support being channelled mainly to the Zia regime.  The anti-western revolutions in Iran (1978) and Afghanistan (1979) left the Western nations looking to Zia as an ally in the region.795  Incidents such as the shooting down of the scheduled airplane KAL-007 (Korean Air lines) by the Soviet Union without warning due to it entering their no-fly zone route on 1 September 1983 all added to the tensions.  They had a vested interest in opposing any movement to dislodge Zia, as it was                                                         
792 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, p.54. For state support to violent 
campaigns, see Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). For international support for both violent and nonviolent 
movements, see Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International 
Activism (New York:  Cambridge University press, 2005).  For transnational advocacy networks in 
supporting local nonviolent campaigns, Schock, Unarmed Insurrection; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink,  Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press 1998. 
793 The Nation, cited in Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.257. 
794 Amnesty International,  ‘Pakistan  Special  Action-Update’,  no.1,  MSS.34/4/1/Pk  15,  MRC,  pp.2-3. 
795 Directorate of Central Intelligence,   ‘Global  Showdown:  The  Russian   Imperial  War  Plan for  1988’,  
24 July 1985, p. 190. 
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felt it might destabilise the region and bring a less dependable government to 
power	   in	   Pakistan.	   	   	   In	   an	   interview,	   Stephen	   Cohen	   stated	   that	   ‘we	   (the	  Republicans), as well as Mr. Wolson, leader of the gang in Congress want to 
defeat	   Soviet	   Union.	   Pakistan’s	   nuclear	   programme	   was	   troublesome	   but	   not	  
central.	   And	   Pakistan’s	   Army	   ruling	   in	   Pakistani	   politics	   itself	   was	   not	  
central’.796  Instead, US benefited from	   ‘the	   [Pakistan]	   Army’s	   good	   relations	  
with	   the	   United	   States’	   and	   it	   attempted	   to	   preserve	   its	   rule.797  CIA reports suggested that the radical element in PPP, mainly worked under direct 
command	   of	   Nusrat	   Bhutto,	   would	   have	   been	   a	   threat	   to	   Islamabad’s	   policy towards Afghanistan, and eventually to the US government, as it was feared that a PPP-led government would re-establish ties with the Soviet Union and India.798 Although, the Bhutto ladies had agreed to withdraw their accusation that the US had been involved	  in	  ZAB’s	  removal,	  US	  intelligence	  reports	  indicate	  that even if Zia been removed through civil resistance, the USA would still have pressed for him to be replaced by someone from the army.799  Washington’s	  geo-political interests in this region ensured that the US authorities were deaf and blind to the crimes against humanity committed in Pakistan.   From the perspective of the Arab world, which had once pleaded with Zia 
to	   spare	   ZAB’s	   life,	   the	   fear	   of	   expansion	   of	   Shia	   Islam	   after	   the	   Iranian	  revolution saw them change their stance and support Zia rather than the                                                         
796 Stephen P. Cohen, interview. 
797 Directorate of Central Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  p.12. 
798  Directorate of Central Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   The   Succession   Problem’:   An   Intelligence  
Assessment’,  April  1982,  CIA-RDP83B00232R000100070006, NARA, p. iv and 9; Directorate of Central 
Intelligence ‘Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  March  1984,  pp.  iv  and  12.  Directorate of Central Intelligence, 
‘The  Pakistan  People’s  Party:  Search  for  Power’:  An  Intelligence  Assessment’,  September  1981,  CIA-
RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.10. Directorate of Central Intelligence, ‘The  Soviet  Threat  
to  Pakistan:  Special  National  Intelligence  Estimate’,  12  August  1981,  342,  NARA,  p.6. 
799  Directorate of Central Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   The   Succession   Problem’:   An   Intelligence  
Assessment’,  April  1982,  CIA-RDP83B00232R000100070006, NARA, p.4. 
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movement	   led	   by	   ZAB’s	   daughter.	   Shia	   Islam	   was	   seen	   to	   challenge	   the	  Wahabism of the Al-Saud ruling house of Saudi Arabia.  They favoured the autocratic rule of a Sunni General in Pakistan hoping it would keep the expansion of Shiaism in check.  The gender of the two main PPP leaders counted against them in Wahabi circles, and also the Shia identity that was commonly attributed to Nusrat Bhutto.   The religious parties in Pakistan, hitherto marginalised in the politics of the country, saw their chance to assert 
themselves	   in	   alliance	  with	   Zia.	   	   They	   supported	   the	  war	   against	   the	   ‘atheist’	  Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and benefited from the financial largesse that was showered on them in support of this agenda.800  
Conclusion Its critics claimed that MRD achieved little.801 Yet, despite all the repression and the setbacks, Zia did respond to it with some concessions – albeit small ones.  
Such	   concessions	   helped	   gradually	   to	   remove	   Zia’s	   pillars	   of	   support.	   	   	   Zia’s	  position up until 1983 was that Pakistan was not ready for any democracy at all.   In that year, faced with the reinvigoration of the MRD movement, he set out a roadmap towards a gradual restoration of electoral politics.     Anticipating a strong response to the call of civil disobedience for 14 August 1983, General Zia declared a political roadmap on 12 August, just two days beforehand, in an attempt to defuse the agitation.  He announced that there would be multi-tiers election in three stages. Within one-and-a-half years, there would be local elections to local bodies, and later on provincial and then 
                                                        
800 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.261. 
801 Ahmed,  ‘The  Rebellion  of  1983’,  p.37. 
 183 
national elections.802 Following the recommendation of the Ansari Commission report, Zia announced these multi-tiers elections would be on a non-party basis. The pro-Zia parties, ML (Pagaro) and JI, welcomed the announcement and these conditions. However, MRD reminded the public of his previous broken promises 
of	  holding	  elections.	  	  The	  promise	  to	  hold	  elections	  in	  ‘ninety	  days’	  that	  he	  made	  on seizing power in 1977 had been forgotten and there had instead been six years of dictatorship. They threated to boycott the election if there was no preceding lifting of martial law.  Though the political plan of 12 August made no mention of a referendum on his rule, the pressure of MRD drove General Zia to seek legitimacy both inside and beyond Pakistan by later holding a referendum in support of his policies and to give himself some constitutional standing.803  
Cohen	  commented	  on	  this	  that	  Zia	  was	  doing	  ‘enough’	  to	  show	  them	  [USA]	  for	  democracy but less on the ground in Pakistan.804   Ruthnam Indhurty and Ritcher argue that the declaration of 12 August 1983 was perhaps due to the pressure from MRD.805  Roedad Khan is more certain that Zia was forced into these concessions by the campaign of MRD, as it caused him anxieties about the legitimacy of his position and he came to believe that his rule could be stabilised by democratic concessions, however small.806   After the declaration of 12 August, the next task of the MRD was to ensure that General Zia did not turn back from this roadmap and also at the same time lift 
                                                        
802 Arif, Working with Zia, p.313. 
803 ibid., p.326. 
804 Stephen P. Cohen, interview. 
805 Ruthnam  Indurthy,   ‘The  Fragility  of  Democracy   in  Pakistan:   the  Military  as  the  Root  Cause’,   The 
Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July - Sept., 1991), pp. 314-315. William L. Ritcher, 
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martial law. By the beginning of 1984, BB was in exile in London after her request to go there for ear surgery was accepted.  While the opposition to Zia was now driven by others within Pakistan, she now set about winning international support for her cause.  The next chapter analyses these developments.    
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 Ch.	  4.	  Decline	  of	  the	  Dictator’s	  Power	  1984-86 After the sudden calling off of the civil disobedience movement in December 
1983,	  MRD’s	  protests	  started	  declining	  without	  any	  clear	  announcement	  of	  any	  further programme, which suggested to their opponents that the alliance had gone into the political wilderness. Many political scientists concluded that the MRD had failed to achieve its objective and dissolved discreetly. For example, not a single protest was taken out by MRD against martial law on the eight anniversary of its imposition on 5 July 1984.807  On his release from jail in January 1984, Mazari, one of the core leaders of MRD, stated that the movement had failed.808    Despite this, the MRD did not die away, as we shall see in this chapter.   
Benazir	  Bhutto’s	  departure	  from	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  Struggle in Exile: Having been under house arrest since March 1981 (after the plane hijacking case), BB was allowed to leave the country for her ear treatment on 10 January 1984 after immense international pressure.809  Since late 1982, Nusrat Bhutto had already been in Europe for cancer treatment. Her departure was also through international pressure. Some of my exiled interviewees, Farkhanda Bukhari, and Shahid Nadeem810, told how they struggled for the release of Nusrat Bhutto on medical grounds. Even Indira Gandhi, besides writing a letter to General Zia, in her letter to President Reagan dated 28 October 1982 
                                                        
807 Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.158. 
808 Sher Baz Mazari, cited in Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.167. 
809 It was not an exile, as she stated herself in her book. She was sent to London for an operation on 
her ear.  However, the title of the chapter in the book suggests otherwise. Bhutto, Daughter of the 
East, pp.251-52. 
810 Farkhanda Bukhari, interview; A memorandum was handed in to the Indian High Commission 
London requesting Indira Gandhi to use her office for the release of Nusrat Bhutto on humanitarian 
grounds, cited in Bukhari, Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai, pp.147-49. Shahid Nadeem, interview. 
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requested his good office for her release.811 So did BB.812  Her departure was kept secret until she had left Pakistan.  On her arrival at Heathrow airport BB told journalists that she had not been sent into exile but had come to the UK for medical treatment.813   PPP’s	   sources	  denied	   that	   she	  had	  pleaded	  with	  Zia	   in	  this respect, though Zia stated otherwise.814  General (rtd) S.M.Abassi,815 ex-Governor of Sindh, claimed that her departure was allowed after she had agreed that though she might struggle while abroad for democracy and seek help from foreign sympathisers, she would not criticise Zia or the armed forces directly.816 He failed to provide any documentary evidence for this claim, though it is 
significant	   to	   note	   that	   BB	   refrained	   from	   criticism	   of	   the	   Pakistan	   army’s	  political role during her trip to USA right after her arrival in UK. She supported 
USA’s	  military	  aid	  to	  Pakistan	  instead.817 PPP and BB, though, kept denying any secret deal with Zia.  The advantage to Zia was that he could rule without the presence of any strong internal opposition.  It nonetheless allowed BB to promote the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan and expose 
                                                        
811 In a letter to President Ronald Reagan, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi updates him on news 
that Nusrat Bhutto, wife of the late Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, is seriously ill and 
has been denied the right to leave Pakistan for necessary medical treatment. Gandhi has written to 
Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq requesting him to consider this matter on purely 
humanitarian grounds. Letter. WHITE HOUSE. Issue Date: 28 Oct 1982. Date Declassified: 23 May 
2000. Complete, p.1. 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&slb=KE&locID=warwick&srchtp=basic&c=5&i
mg=.25&ste=4&txb=Nusrat+Bhutto&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349710948> (19 March 
2014) In a letter to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, President Ronald Reagan assures her that 
Nusrat Bhutto, Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's wife, will be allowed to travel abroad for 
medical treatment for her life-threatening illness. Letter. White House. Issue Date: 29 Nov. 1982. 
Date Declassified: 23 May 2000. Complete, p.1. 
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?txb=Nusrat+Bhutto&slb=KE&vrsn=1.0&locID=warwick
&srchtp=basic&ste=3> (19 March 2014). 
812 Farkhanda Bukhari, interview; also cited in Bukhari, Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai, pp. 147-49. 
813 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, p.252. 
814 Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.167. 
815 General (rtd) S.M.Abbasi, 17 November 1985, cited in Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.217. 
816 Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. 
817 The Struggle, No.12, May-June 1984, 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
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the brutality	  of	  Zia’s	  regime.818   In this, BB was building on initiatives that had dated back to the campaign to save ZAB from execution.   Little has been said about this campaign in the literature, though it was behind the release of BB and Nusrat Bhutto themselves.  We shall start by saying more about it here. On the day of the sentence of death on 18 March 1978, the Bhutto brothers — Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Shah Nawaz Bhutto — sped up their 
struggle	  to	  mobilise	  international	  actors	  and	  media	  for	  saving	  their	  father’s life.  From their base next to the Pakistani High Commission in London they travelled to Iran, USA, UAE and Libya meeting government functionaries and requesting them to put pressure on the Zia regime to save their father.819 After the final decision of Supreme Court, the Bhutto brothers planned an international convention for 7 April 1979 to expose the flaws in the case against ZAB case, it however became a posthumous event.820  The Netherlands chapter of PPP workers organised a Bhutto day in Amsterdam on 19 August 1979 in which Mustafa Khar, Mir Murtaza Bhutto, Shamim Ahmad Khan, and Mukhtar Rana gave speeches demanding a return to democracy.821  After experiencing a cold response from the international community, and with the failure of the nonviolent campaign to save their father, the Bhutto brothers launched the violent Al-Zulfiqar movement, as mentioned in the previous chapter.  Practically underground after the many unsuccessful attempts to murder General Zia, the brothers took shelter in France.  Tragically, Shah Nawaz Bhutto died in July 1985 whilst the Bhutto family were on holiday in Cannes.  His death                                                         
818 Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p.18.  
819 Bhatti, Bhutto Ka Beta, p.13-14. 
820 Ibid., p.15; Musawaat, 2 August 1979. 
821 Musawaat, 20 August 1979. 
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was	  mourned	  widely	  in	  Pakistan,	  irrespective	  of	  people’s	  party	  affiliations.	  PPP	  workers put out condolence messages and held protest rallies around the country.  Students were to the fore in this.  The Zia regime tried to discredit him by claiming that he had died from acute alcohol poisoning. The Bhutto family countered this by alleging that it was a murder committed by agents of the Zia regime.822  A massive crowd turned up to receive his dead body in Pakistan.  SIPAF called a complete strike and boycotted the educational institution in Sindh. In Lahore, despite warning from the college administration, and the regime, PSF (Pakistan Student Federation) summoned all Punjab students to a 
mourning	   session	   in	   Dyal	   Singh	   College	   with	   the	   hoisting	   of	   PPP’s	   flag	   along	  with a black flag over the building.  Similarly events were held in Okara, Gujrat, Rawalpindi, Sialkot Bahawalnagar, Qasur and Multan including in the jails in these cities where PPP workers were imprisoned.823  International groups campaigned with some success also.  There was for example a strong demand for the release of Khalid Chaudhry, a Pakistani journalist from Lahore arrested in April 1978. 824   Miss Mybret of Amnesty International, who was based in Sweden, established a Khalid Chaudhry Release Committee and the campaign was backed by some leading human rights activists in Germany, France and the UK.825  They contacted the Government of Pakistan and took the issue up with journalists in various countries. They also 
                                                        
822 Bhatti, Bhutto ka Beta, p.45; Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, pp.218-9; the French police 
failed to find any evidence of murder. 
823 ibid., p. 53-56. 
824 Khalid Chaudhry had married a German woman while studying in Germany, and her father was 
the second highest authority in German Church. This connection also helped in his release. Her wife 
is  the  same  person  who,  with  her  Swedish  friend,  smuggled  ZAB’s  jail  diary  out  of  Pakistan  that  was  
later  published  with  the  title  ‘If  I  am  assassinated’.  Khalid  Chaudhry,  interview. 
825 Musawaat, 17 August 1979; Khalid Chaudhry, interview. 
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prepared a report on the persecution of journalists by the Zia regime over the previous two years. The committee included the cases of other journalists such as Hussain Naqi, and Mazhar Ali Khan.826  Due to this pressure, Chaudhry was kept in Shahi Qila jail for only two months and then released.   At the same time, the PPP workers held marches and the rallies in key European capitals. In Belgium, over eighty members marched through Brussels waving PPP flags. In London hundreds demonstrated outside the Pakistan embassy.  In the Netherlands, there was a Black Day march by hundreds of protestors to the Pakistani embassy in The Hague in response to the detention of Qayum Butt for five months as an illegal immigrant.827   Seeing so much pressure built by such tiny groups and organisations, the Zia regime sought to counter this through diplomatic channels.  This extended to feeding false information to foreign governments so as to harass anti-Zia activists.  For example, 2500 planned to demonstrate in Bonn in August 1982 to 
highlight	   Zia’s	   human	   rights	   abuses	   in	   Pakistan.	   	   Having	   failed	   to	   stop	   the	  demonstration, the Pakistani authorities misinformed the German police about their legal status in that country. Coaches taking them to Bonn were diverted to police stations and their right to be there was investigated.  Only the production of a special order from a judge forced the authorities to allow the march and a rally addressed by Dr. Ghulam Hussain.828   The Dutch police were similarly fed false information about an alleged plot to hijack a PIA plane from Schiphol airport on 17 October 1981.  500 plain-clothed and heavily armed Dutch police raided houses in various cities in the Netherlands and arrested eighteen PPP                                                         
826 Musawaat, 3 August 1979. 
827 The Struggle (England, Holland, and Belgium, January 1983), No. 7, 601/R/23/19, MRC, p.4. 
828 ibid. 
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workers, who were stripped and interrogated on the charge of the plot a hijacking. Tanks ringed Schiphol Airport.  Some members of the Dutch Labour Party were also held for questioning. An elderly Dutch woman and her husband were picked up and stripped naked in a police station in the Hague as well.  Sixteen of them were soon set free because of a lack of any evidence from the Pakistan government, but two were kept in custody as they were found to be in the country illegally.   They later sought political asylum on the advice of human rights activists, and thus avoided being deported.  These people later sued the Dutch Government for damages of fl. 18 million (over £4 million).829   The exiled resisters failed however to save six people from being arrested and detained in Vienna, which was a real failure for their campaign.830 The MRD established an office in London in 1981, and Ghulam Mustafa Khar was made President of the organisation in the UK.831  A PPP convention was held in London on 16-17 October 1981, with resolutions being passed for 
an	  end	  Zia’s	  dictatorship,	  permission	  to	  be	  granted	  for	  Nusrat	  Bhutto	  to	  travel	  abroad for medical treatment, and for party organisation elsewhere in Europe.832 After	  Khan	  Abdul	  Qayum’s	  resignation	  from	  MRD	  Pakistan	  in March, however, the Kashmiri diaspora quit the movement. Later on, the unpopularity 
of	   Khar,	   and	   rifts	   among	   the	   PPP’s	   overseas	   leadership	  weakened	   the	   British	  organisation.833 So, when BB arrived in London in 1984, she had to revive this body, which she managed to do quite quickly.  
                                                        
829 Hartal, No.1, April 1983, 601/R/23/19. MRC, p.10. 
830 Rafiq Babar, Yaqoob Cheena, Ashraf Manawa. 
831 Anwer Abbas Naqvi, cited in Shakir, MRD, pp.110-111. 
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Ackerman	   and	   Kruegler	   have	   observed	   that	   ‘just	   as	   generals	   need	  
adequate	   supplies	   of	   bullets,	   boots,	   and	   bandages’,	   financial,	   human	   and	  infrastructural resources are crucial for a nonviolent movement.834  BB was well aware of this as she rebuilt the opposition to Zia in London. She rented a flat in 
the	  Barbican	  complex,	  which	  soon	  became	  the	  ‘de	  facto	  command	  center’	  of	  the	  party for England and the units abroad. 835  She established an efficient management structure, with political workers-cum-volunteers being assigned a range of responsibilities.  She ensured that their communication system was effective, with a good-quality fax machine, phone-lines, and audio and video cassette players operated by young volunteers.836  Bashir Riaz, a journalist, acted as a spokesperson and disseminated information and arranged media interviews.   The former information minister Naseem Ahmed was put in charge of the lobbying of British MPs to support their call for an end to British aid to the Zia regime.837   In 1985, PPP established a young wing of the party with the objective of providing ideological training in preparation for future party activities.838  Despite this, publicity was never easy, as in those pre-internet times there was no easy way of disseminating a point of view through the mass media.   Access to television channels and the national press was very hard to obtain.  One way round this was to self-publish material that could then be distributed.  
Pakistan Today, for example, was written by Qayum Nizami in Ottawa and                                                         
834 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, pp.30-31. 
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837 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, pp.260-61. 
838 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan  People’s  Party:  Pretenders  to  the  Throne’,  Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, 21 November 1986, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, NARA, p.29. 
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photocopied for distribution among interested persons in North America.839 The magazine ’Amal (Action) was launched in London under the direct supervision of BB and sent to political workers and prisoners in Pakistan to keep their morale high.840   The regime managed to put obstacles in the way of printing of such magazines abroad. For example, the calligrapher of ’Amal	  suddenly quit the job on the instigation of Pakistani embassy in London. Nevertheless, the magazine continued to be published as the editor retained a pool of calligraphers to replace them in such an emergency.841  
In	   order	   to	   convincingly	   demonstrate	   the	   regime’s	   brutality	   to	   the	  outside world, documentary evidence was necessary.   So the party in exile established a secret network of sympathetic jail guards, policemen, post office workers, airline workers, and relatives of exiled activists who helped smuggle such evidence out of Pakistan to London, from where it was disseminated internationally.842 
BB	  stated	  that	   ‘I	  decided	  to	  mount	  an	  international	  campaign	  to	  expose	  
the	   regime’s	   maltreatment	   of	   the	   40,000	   political	   prisoners	   still	   in	   jail	   in	  
Pakistan.’843 She travelled extensively in the UK, Europe and North America demanding the release of political prisoners in Pakistan.  She met parliamentarians, executive heads of governments, and leaders of non-
governmental	  organisations.	   	  She	  strengthened	  and	  expanded	   the	  movement’s	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network of foreign offices. According to Qayyum Nizami, ex-Minister of Information: BB made me representative of North America. I established party units in New York, Detroit, Montreal, Washington DC and Toronto and kept in contact with BB from London. [In] 1984, BB came to USA and I visited with her. I invited her to Canada, but [she] could not come due to the murder of Shahnawaz in the following year.844  BB lobbied to save the lives of opposition activists sentenced to death by the Zia regime. She failed to achieve this in the cases of Nasser Baluch and Ayaz Samoo, who were executed in March and June 1985 despite strong international mobilisation against their sentences, with mercy letters, diplomatic pressure and Amnesty International pleas to Zia.845  Two weeks after going into exile, BB travelled to the USA.  The USA was the main international supporter of the Zia regime, providing financial aid while being blind to its abuses of human rights.846  Speaking before an audience of State and Defence department officials, members of Congress, former Ambassadors and members of the press at Carnegie Endowment for 
International	  Peace	  she	  stated:	   ‘We	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  confused	  and	  disappointed	  
by	   the	   backing	   given	   to	   Zia’s	   illegitimate	   regime’. 847   She recalled her participation in protests against the American involvement in Vietnam a decade before, and said that she was now in the USA to protest to them about another injustice, namely US support for a regime in Pakistan that was committing                                                         
844 Qayyum Nizami, Interview. 
845 Bhutto, Daugther of the East, pp.274-77. 
846 ibid. 
847 ibid., p.259. 
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atrocities against its own people.  BB found that US newspapers were eulogising 
General	  Zia	  as	  a	  ‘benign	  dictator’.848   She met as many influential politicians and persons as she could.849  For example, she Directed the attention of US 
Congressman	   Solarz’s	   to	   the	   execution	   of	   four	   political	   activists	   – Nasser Baloach, Essa Balaoch, Malik Ayub, and Saifullah Khalid – for their alleged involvement in the hijacking of the PIA plane in 1981. He was unaware of the 
military’s	  brutal	  policy	  against	  political	  activists,	  and	  he	  took	  immediate	  action	  after confirming the report from Amnesty International by sending a confidential telegram850 to the Assistant Secretary Elliot Abrams to take action against the execution.  Likewise, she drew the attention of Senators Kennedy, and Moynihan to the cases of Raza Kazim851, who was charged on the attempt of assassinating General Zia-ul-Haq, and Rasool Bakhsh Pallejo, 852  General Secretary Sindhi Awami Tehreek and under arrest since 1981.  When asked by these US political leaders, the US embassy officials in Islamabad professed ignorance of the events. BB already personally knew some leading figures in the US establishment, such as Peter Galbraith – then a staff member for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – whom she had befriended earlier at Harvard.  Galbraith lobbied for her cause at that time.853   She also contacted the 
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UN Secretary General.   Not only did these activities help make the US government accountable to its covert-cum-overt operation in this region, but they put pressure on the Pakistani regime as it knew that it was now being scrutinised for its activities.   US Senators John Glenn and Alan Cranston presented an amendment to the Foreign Relations Committee on 28 March 1984 that required the President 
of	   the	  United	   States	   to	   assure	   in	  writing	   that	  Pakistan	   ‘neither	  had	   a	   “nuclear 
explosive	   device”	   nor	   was	   acquiring	   material	   to	   manufacture	   or	   detonate	  
one’”854 before releasing aid to Pakistan, which was passed in the committee unanimously.855  BB expressed her concerns about this to Senator Percy, the 
head	   of	   the	   committee,	   stating:	   ‘Senator, cutting off the aid will only create 
misunderstandings	   between	   our	   two	   countries’.	   She	   argued	   that	   aid	   should,	  rather, be linked to the restoration of human rights and democracy in the country.856  The amendment – due to immense pressure from the Reagan’s	  administration – was changed into a requirement of a certificate from the US President stating Pakistan did not have the nuclear bomb, after which aid was continued.857  Some opposition leaders in Pakistan were critical of BB in this respect. Sh. M. Rashid	   condemned	   strongly	   BB’s	   support	   of	   military	   aid	   to	  Pakistan.858 He	   wanted	   to	   ‘stop	   aid	   to	   army	   dictatorship	   completely’,	   the	  continuation of the class struggle, and a dialogue between Afghan and Pakistan to solve the refugee issues.  BB also called for the withdrawal of the Soviet army 
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from	   Afghanistan,	   contrary	   to	   Nusrat	   Bhutto’s	   decision	   in	   a	   party	  meeting	   in	  1980.  Moreover, the party workers had been chanting slogans against imperialism vis-à-vis USA since 1967, as had ZAB.859  BB was thus working for a radical change in direction for her party and the opposition in Pakistan.860  BB also campaigned in Europe.  She sent case histories and photograph of political prisoners who were under sentence of death in Pakistan to Members of Parliament in the UK, European foreign ministers, lawyers, syndicates and international trade organisations, and to Amnesty International, appealing to them to put pressure on the Pakistan government to lift the sentences.   It was through her campaigning in these respects that many influential politicians and 
activists	   in	  the	  USA	  and	  Europe	  began	  to	  question	  their	  governments’	  support	  for the Zia regime.   Her work led to pressure being brought to bear by the European Parliament on Prime Minister (PM) Junejo regarding the political detainees. Commissioner Claude Cheysson of the European Economic Community discussed the matter with Junejo and reported back to the European parliament in January 1986, stating that Junejo assured	  him	  that	   ‘all	  political sentences passed by the special military courts will be referred to the 
civil	   courts…In	   my	   opinion	   it	   represents	   the	   best	   guarantee	   possible	   in	   a	  
country	  returning	  to	  democracy’.861 The Voice of America reported the protest of a New York based Human Rights organisation, which accused Reagan’s	  administration of underplaying cases of human rights violations in Pakistan.862  
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This work of BB abroad played an important role pressurising the regime to restore some elements of democracy in the coming years.  On a visit to Pakistan in early 1984 – before she began this work – George Bush, the then Vice-President	  of	  USA,	  had	  not	  uttered	  a	  single	  word	  in	  MRD’s	  favour	  during	  a	  four-day official trip.  Afterwards, when during her brief visit to Pakistan for the burial of Shah Nawaz Bhutto BB was placed under house arrest, the US State Department stated that this punitive action provided a hurdle towards the 
‘restoration	  of	  constitutional	  government’.863  The British parliamentarians Max Madden, and Lord Avebury also expressed their concerns directly to General Zia on her house arrest.864 Moreover, five-hundred protestors gathered against the 
action	  in	  Bradford.	  Unfortunately	  PPP’s	  newly	  nominated	  CEC	  refused	  to	  launch	  a campaign to free her. They claimed it could delay the lifting of Martial Law promised for the beginning of the year – a	  ‘Wait	  for	  January	  1st 1986’	  policy.	  	  BB	  
also	   responded	   to	   the	   demand	   of	   a	   movement	   by	   the	   workers	   to	   ‘wait	   for	  
January	  1986’.	  So	  did	  the	  CEC.865 
Restoration of Elements of Democracy: Zia had reneged on his promise to restore democracy on 12 August 1983, though as a token gesture on 4 March 1984 he appointed some civilians as ministers in charge of departments that dealt with civil affairs.  Zafarullah Jamali and Sirtaj Aziz replaced General Rao Farman Ali and General Abbas Khan Abbasi as Federal Ministers, and thirty-nine new non-military members were nominated for the Majlis-i-Shoora.   When Lt. General Jahandad Khan was made 
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Governor of Sindh, twelve members of the cabinet appointed from the Sindh assembly were from political parties, including five ex-PPP members.866  Already, in January 1984, Zia had allowed BB to leave Pakistan.    During the course of the next four months between January and April 1984, 288 political leaders and activists were set free.867  Zia had been making ambiguous statements about the future for a time.  Despite promises that the censorship of newspapers under the Press and Publications Ordinance would soon be lifted; he continued to clamp down on freedom of expression throughout 1984.868    He hinted that he might hold a general election and then retire and play golf.   In an interview with the 
Financial Times of 4 August 1984 he changed his stance and said when asked that he would accept the post of President if offered it.  Right after that, Baluchistan passed a resolution to request him to be a candidate in the Presidential election.869  He then took the public by surprise when he suddenly announced on radio and TV on 1 December 1984 that a referendum was to be held on 19 December.870    During a whirlwind tour of the country in the following days, Zia played the Islamic card in an attempt to whip up support for his candidacy.  He advocated the principles of the Quran and promised to promulgate Zakat and the Ushar system, the Hudood Ordinances, Nizam-i-Salat, and the end to the paying of interest on debt.  He maintained that casting a vote                                                         
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in his favour was basically a vote for Sunnah.  The state-run TV and Radio propagated him as the saviour of Islam and champion of an Islamic nation. He was projected by his cronies as Mard-i-Momin,	   or	   ‘the	   pious	   man’	   for	   his	  
‘services	   to	   Islam’.	   	   JI	   supported	   the	   referendum,	  as	  did	   the	  Shia	  Ulemas,	  who	  had supported civil resistance against his Zakat Ordinances during 1979-81.871  The question posed in the referendum was: Do you agree with the actions of General Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, which he  has started to strengthen the ideology of Pakistan by the implementation of Islamic  laws of the country according to true spirit of Quran and Sunnah? And, do you  support the idea of the continuation of the process of handing over the powers of the  government to the elected representatives of the country?872 In this underhand way, the notion that Zia would now rule Pakistan as President was slipped onto the ballot paper without that being the actual question posed.   All parties except JI and ML Pagara opposed the referendum.873  On the call for a boycott by MRD, the regime tried to counter their opposition by promulgating three ordinances on 5 December.  Anyone inciting boycott or even refusing to vote could be punished with up to three years imprisonment and/or five-hundred thousand rupees fine.  Such persons would also be banned from running for any elected public office for the next seven years.    Zia also demanded that the one million councillors and 35,000 members of the Zakat and Ushr committees turn out to vote, as he expected them to vote in his 
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favour.874  Despite	  all	  government’s	  efforts	  and	  General	  Zia’s	  whirlwind	  tour	  of	  twenty-four major cities of the country in eight days 8-16 December, the boycott ensured an embarrassingly low turnout.875  Independent sources 
including	  US	   embassy’s	   reports876 indicate less than thirty per cent cast valid votes.  Government officials rectified this by filling the ballot boxes with fake votes.   Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, (ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan, who was at that time with General Zia) exposed the rigging in his book by stating that on his visit to one polling station in Shujabad, Multan, he found it out that numbers of the votes were more than the registered voters.877 Fazal Ullah Marwat commented on the referendum that his father, who was a lawyer, was told that his vote had already been cast when he went to the polling station on the day of the referendum.878 General Fazl-i-Haq also commented that it was due to the MRD boycott that they could fill in the empty boxes with votes.879 Ghafoor Ahmed, a member JI – a party then supporting Zia – expressed surprise at the declaration of the result the very next day by the regime, which seemed impossible due to lack of time to collect the returns from far-flung areas.880   According to the official figures put out by the Election Commission, of the 62.17 per cent of the 
electorate	  that	  cast	  a	  vote,	  97.21	  per	  cent	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  Zia’s	  resolution.881   Political commentators saw it as a twofold success for MRD.  Firstly, the 
pressure	   of	   MRD	   and	   the	   people’s	   power	   had	   pushed	   General	   Zia	   to	   try	   to	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legitimise his position with a public poll, and secondly the success of the boycott 
proved	   the	  public’s	   loyalty	   to the forces of democracy.  Should the MRD have 
campaigned	   for	   a	   ‘no’	   vote	   instead?	   	   In	   Chile,	   for	   example,	   when	   General	  Augusto Pinochet held a plebiscite in 1988 that was aimed at perpetuating his rule, the opposition successfully mobilised the public to vote	   ‘no’.882  While failure to vote could be interpreted as being due to apathy or laziness rather 
than	   the	   result	   of	   an	   active	   boycott,	   it	   was	   only	   by	   putting	   ‘no’	   on	   the	   ballot	  paper that the full extent of the opposition to the dictator could be revealed.   
The	  crucial	  difference	  in	  Pakistan	  was	  that	  ‘Islam’	  was	  the	  candidate	  rather	  than	  
a	  secular	  leader,	  and	  asking	  the	  public	  to	  vote	  ‘no’	  to	  Islam	  would	  have	  been	  a	  non-starter for the opposition.  Despite this difference between Chile and Pakistan, the oppositions in both countries were similar in that they kept up their opposition by one means or other despite reverses until they eventually prevailed.    The same was true of the opposition to General Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina.883     Following the referendum, with resistance to his rule continuing and under growing international pressure, the General decided to hold a general election, as promised originally on 12 August 1983.  Khalid B. Sayeed884, though, 
doubted	   on	   the	   General’s	   intention	   to	   hold	   the election once the General unfurled his political roadmap on 12 August 1983. In public, he had kept stating that holding of the election on party-basis or without parties would be a 
                                                        
882 Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions, pp. 85-86. 
883 Ackerman and Duvall, A Force More Powerful, pp. 267-79. 
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decision of the Federal Cabinet, and Majlis-i-Shura.885 On the query of the mechanism and characteristics of the election, General Zia always responded that everything was in my head.886  This was a cover for him to do whatever he wanted according to circumstances as they arose.   As it was the decision to hold the election on a non-party basis had in fact been taken before 19 January 1984, according to the US consulate secret documents.887  The decision was made public on 12 January 1985.  Zia also issued a MLO 65, which permitted him to allow the participation in the election of any member of a defunct political party.888 This was designed for the pro-Zia parties such as JI rather than anyone else. Zia sought to create a parliamentary system that would be entirely malleable to his strong control.  Contrary to his previously stated objective of creating a balance of power between the Executive and the Head of the State, he ensured that most power was held by President.   The Revival of Constitutional Order of 1973 in 1985889 (RCO), later on the Eighth Amendment, promulgated by Zia even before the oath-taking ceremony of the newly-elected Assembly was even held.  Twenty-five per cent890 (67 out of 280 articles891) of the 1973 constitution was changed through this amendment. The notorious clause 2(b) of article 58 of the Amendment put the major decisions including the appointments of chiefs of the armed forces in the hands of the President.  The                                                         
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incoming Prime Minister was made a puppet in the hands of the President. The notorious Article 58-2(b)892 strengthening the authority of the President over the elected Prime Minister by providing the power to remove him.   Zia was to use this power on 29 May 1988.893  In all, this provided for a radical shift of power in favour of the President.     Besides assuming these new constitutional powers, Zia also sought to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state, with him in the role of Caliph.   Following his 
‘Islamisation’	   programme,	   the	   words	   ‘Muslim’	   or	   ‘Islam’	   were	   inserted	   into	  
legislation.	   	   For	   example,	   ‘Muslim’	   was	   added	   before	   the	   word	   ‘members’	   in	  article 51 of the constitution, with people of minority religions being given 
separate	  seats.	   	  Many	  legal	  experts	  including	  Zia’s	  former	  Chief	  Justice,	  Anwar-ul-Haq, criticised such legislation, stating that it changed the genre of the constitution.894  As it was, such measures satisfied hardly anyone.   The 
opposition	   questioned	   Zia’s	   authority	   to	   make	   such	   changes,	   while	   Islamic	  groups, such as JI, felt that he had not gone far enough in the Islamization programme.895  Zia rejected the multi-party democratic systems of the UK and USA, stating that Pakistan required a form of Islamic Caliphate in which there were no political parties.896 After the exit of BB, and the waning position of MRD, he became increasingly arrogant and contemptuous towards the opposition, as 
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shown by Ghafoor Ahmed.897  Despite his declared commitment to an election, political parties continued to be banned in 1984.  Zia appointed a Constitutional 
Amendments’	  Commission	  chaired	  by	  Maulana	  Zafar	  Ansari	  to	  review	  the	  issue,	  which obediently reported in favour of a non-party based system. The American authorities bent over backwards to accommodate him in this, with Vice-President George Bush implicitly accepting the legitimacy of a non-party system 
when	  he	  stated	  during	  his	  trip	  to	  Pakistan:	  ‘America,	  though,	  does	  not	  take	  non-party election as a democratic norm; however, many countries around the 
world	   follow	   it’.898   By contrast,	   Zia’s	   own	   hand-picked Chief Justice for the Federal Sharia Court, Justice Aftab Hussain Sheikh, stated that there was nothing in Islam that forbade a party-based polity and that 1973 constitution could be considered Islamic as many Ulama (Muslim scholars) had put their signature to it.899   The elections for the national and provincial assemblies were held on 25 and 28 February 1985 respectively, with no political parties being allowed to contest as such.   The election to the upper house involving 83 seats was held subsequently in mid-March.  No party symbols, public gatherings or criticism of the regime was permitted.900 1,093 individuals fought for 237 seats (which included ten reserved for minorities and twenty for women) of the National Assembly and 3,631 for the four Provincial Assemblies.901  There was no debate on major issues such as policy towards the war in Afghanistan and problems                                                         
897 Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.169. 
898 George Bush, Vice-President USA, cited in Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.164. 
899 Justice Aftab Hussain Sheikh, Interview to a Daily newspaper November 1984, cited in Ahmed, 
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900 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, pp.272-73. 
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caused by the influx of Afghan refugees, the powers of state governments within the federation, or various major social problems.  Instead, the candidates 
generally	   focused	   on	   local	   issues	   such	   as	   ‘sanitation,	   education,	   and	   property	  
right.’902     The	   government	   propagated	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   ‘divine’	   agenda,	   which	  meant creating a polity and society that accorded with Islamic principles. 
Candidates	  were	  meant	   to	  be	  selected	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   their	  supposed	   ‘Muttaqi 
aur	  Perhaizgar’ (virtue	  and	  piety),	  with	  Zia	  stating	  that	  ‘I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  flood	  
the	  efforts	  of	  last	  seven	  years	  to	  make	  the	  country	  Islamic’	  by	  allowing	  previous	  corrupt politicians back into parliament.903 Zia limited the expenses for the national and provincial assemblies to 40,000 rupees (US$2600.00), and 25,000 rupees (US$1620.00)904 respectively.905  Of the 237 members elected to the national assembly, most were moderates or conservatives.  Of them, 176 were from the traditionally privileged classes – 117 were rural landlords, 42 were businessmen, and 17 were tribal chiefs.  Among the rest, twenty-one women and ten non-Muslims elected from the reserved seats.906  Rather than being a sweeping away of the supposedly discredited old political order, two-thirds of the new MNASs were found to have had previous political careers.907 Ghafoor Ahmed, 908 a die-hard 
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903 Zia stated that alcohol abusers and smugglers would not be allowed to seek election. General Zia-
ul-Haq, 12 March 1984 in Peshawar Political gathering, cited in Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, 
pp.151 and 161. 
904 Directorate  of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:  Elections  at  Last’,  North East and South Asia Review, in 15 
February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA. 
905 General Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the delegates of Convention on the Implementation of Islam, 30 
January 1985, Islamabad, cited in Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, p.182. 
906 Directorate   of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   Prospects   for   the   Junejo   Government’,   Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, in November 1986, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, NARA, p.1. 
907 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Prospects  for  New  Political  System’,  Near Eastern and South 
Asia Office, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, NARA, p.2. 
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member of the JI, found that over eighty per cent of the MNASs were former elected politicians or belonged to the same families.909  Only thirty-six per cent had twelve years of education.  Despite the rules that specified imprisonment and/or fine for anyone who exceeded the specified financial limits, the regime spent lavishly on the election.   No one was prosecuted for this, and Zia then ruled that no newly-elected MNAS had to submit their expenses to the Election Commission.910 The so-called	  ‘Islamic’	  election	  was,	  so	  far	  as	  Zia	  was	  concerned,	  a show that he had put on to consolidate his rule.     The election helped to worsen social and religious divisions in Pakistan, as candidates exploited every difference in society based on gender, sex, class, and religion to whip up support, rather than appeal to party loyalties.  Zia had anticipated that he could control the Assembly through a divide-and-rule policy, though after the election was over he was faced with the daunting task of having to win support on an individual basis.911  He tried to do this through financial inducements, horse-trading912 and/or arm-twisting.  He used such measures to ensure the passage through parliament of the Eight Amendment to the Constitution and the annual budgets.913  He also handed out a five million 
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rupees development fund to each member of the National Assembly without any effective audit.   This all served to further corrupt the polity.  The MRD boycotted the election in protest at its non-party form.  Previously, BB had rejected proposals for a boycott of the local elections in 
1979.	   ‘Electoral	   fields	   should	  never	  be	   left	   open’,	   as	   her	   father	   told	  her.914  In July 1984, now in exile in the UK, BB had set out a nine-point election manifesto that demanded a general amnesty for all political prisoners (resumption of the activities of political parties; handing over the government to the largest winning party after holding the election; and smooth participation in the election).915  BB stated her intention of running in the election being promised at that time by Zia.  She had also expressed interest in returning to the country if the party had decided to fight the election.916  She welcomed, however, the call 
of	  the	  MRD	  to	  boycott	  the	  referendum,	  and	  told	  US	  diplomats	  that	  ‘they	  would	  win two-thirds	  of	   the	  vote	   in	  a	   fair	  election.’917  She now threatened expulsion from the party of any members who partook in the election.918 And, later on, she endorsed the decision of the Abbotabad meeting giving the reason that the election was not being held under the 1973 Constitution.919  The MRD wanted to use the boycott to put more pressure on the regime to declare party-based elections; however, it did not work out like that.920  BB hoped that a successful boycott would encourage junior Army officers to demand that the regime hand                                                         
914 Bhutto, Daughter of the East, pp. 25 and 271. 
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over government to the largest civilian party. And in her vision, the largest party 
was	  the	  PPP.	  	  However,	  a	  poll	  suggested	  where	  ‘twenty-four per cent said PPP is the most popular party, forty-nine per cent made the party they disliked the 
most.’ As it was, BB and Nusrat Bhutto, living abroad, could not comprehend 
the	  realities	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  accepted	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  party’s	  core committee, especially Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, to boycott the election.921  In interviews, Taj Haider, and Mazhar Abbas told me that Jatoi was being controlled by the army, and that his return from self-exile in 1984 had resulted from an agreement he had made with the army.922  US intelligence reports noted that Jatoi made a special trip to Lahore to discourage any possible participation by the Punjab PPP in the election,	  as	  it	  would	  ‘undercut	  his	  leverage	  with	  Zia.’923 Moreover, General Zia told Mir Khalil-ur-Rehman, Editor-in-Chief of Jang, that he was in a constant contact with Jatoi during the meeting in Abbotabad at which the boycott was discussed, and when the decision went in favour of boycott, Zia offered prayers of thanksgiving.924 It appears that Jatoi thus played a duplicitous role.   There were severe rifts between the Punjab and Sindh PPPs over the boycott.  Seventy per cent of former Punjab PPP parliamentarians from Punjab were estimated to have stood for election despite the boycott.925  The boycott was thus ineffective.  Fifty three per cent of voters turned out for the                                                         
921 Taj Haider, interview. 
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923 Directorate   of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   The   People’s   Party   Braces   for   Election’,   North East and 
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National Assembly election, and fifty eight per cent for the election to the provincial assemblies, which was only slightly, lower than the previous two elections of 1970 and 1977. 926  Anti-Zia candidates mostly won, with four out of 
five	  of	  Zia’s	  former	  ministers	  being	  defeated.	  	  	  The	  assemblies	  were	  thus	  elected,	  but the MRD was now out of the picture. BB subsequently regretted her decision to support the boycott.   The	   other	   political	   parties	   in	   the	   MRD	   held	   that	   Zia’s	   constitutional	  package was intended to create pliant assemblies so that he could get constitutional cover for his illegitimate rule.927   They denounced any attempt to make him a democratic head of the state since their whole struggle sought to present the General as unfit for such a role.   In response to the MRD boycott, the regime turned its full weight against the leadership.  3000 political opponents were held under house arrest or behind the bars.928  The	  CIA’s	  monthly	  review	  that was based on reports from US diplomats in Pakistan  described the repressive measures at that time.929 The media was not allowed to say that there was any	  boycott	  or	  publish	  statements	  by	  ‘individuals	  not	  participating’	  in	  the election.  Anyone who violated these rules was threatened with grave consequences.  PPP members were targeted in particular.    The opposition resorted to circulating handbills or encouraging the boycott by word-of-mouth.  In an attempt to divide the opposition, Zia allowed members of any political 
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party including the MRD to participate in the election, so that he could gain the 
people’s	  admiration	  for	  his	  supposed	  statesmanship	  and political generosity.930  Members of parties who did compete filled many seats at the cost of those parties that remained in MRD, and particularly PPP.   Members of JI won fifty-three seats, and PML (Pagara) sixty-eight.931   Boycotting the election in 1985 was	  a	  blunder	  for	  the	  MRD’s	  blunders	  as	  it changed the whole face of the political struggle in Pakistan.  Later on, BB confessed that they had made a mistake. Being in exile, the control and command of the party was loose; therefore they followed the decision to 
boycott	  of	  MRD’s	  central	  committee	  meeting	  held	  on	  19	  January	  in	  Abbottabad.	  Moreover, if the party had gone for the election, BB and her close aides feared that it could have been hijacked completely by politically strong members such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.  The worst immediate outcome of the decision was the further division among the leaders and the rank and file of the parties of MRD, which further diminished their attractiveness to the public after their boycott call. US diplomats of Lahore and Karachi identified the concerns in a report sent to their government.  A few leaders tried to engage themselves with the regime932, including Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi933 of PPP.   MRD failed to expose the false propaganda of the regime over its supposedly effective economic policies, or its cynical use of Islam.  This all left the field open for those who opposed the 
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radical politics associated with the PPP.  Many anti-PPP landlords felt that they needed to participate in the election to safeguard their interests.934     Chile’s	  resistance	  against	  the	  Pinochet	  regime’s	  referendum	  in	  1988	  and	  
the	   defeat	   of	   the	   regime’s	   candidate	   in	   subsequent	   election	   provides	   a	   good	  example for civil resisters against dictators of the advantages of participation in the electoral process.935  The election in Pakistan had the potential to strengthen democracy in the country and undermine military rule.  Although the party-less format of the election made it hard for campaigning by parties, MRD candidates could have fought as individuals and then worked to unseat Zia 
from	   the	  Presidency.	  After	   the	   removal	  of	  Chilean	  dictator	  by	  people’s	  power,	  Chile has yet to see a return to military rule in the country. Pakistan, conversely, had seen nine years of another military rule afterwards.    
Post-election Scenario: Hoping to gain credibility in Sindh, Zia decided to designate Muhammad Khan Junejo, who came from that province, as his new Prime Minister.936   Zia soon found that some of the new MNASs were less malleable than he had anticipated.  An Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG) emerged through the efforts of few MNASs.937  This	  opposed	  the	  regime’s	  candidate	  for	  speaker	  – Khawja Safdar – and put up instead Syed Fakhar Imam, who won the election.  Moreover, the group demanded the lifting of martial law as well as inviting party leaders such as BB and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan to their gatherings.938  As US diplomats 
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had anticipated before the elections, a significant number of MNAs refused to 
act	  as	  Zia’s	  lackey,	  adopting	  the	  attitude	  of	  ‘You	  are	  stranger	  in	  the	  House’.939   Rather than acting as a rubber stamp, the government benches went 
through	   ‘line-by-line’	   reviewing	   the	   regime’s	   internal	   and	   external	   policies before passing the first budget.940 Designated Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Khan Junejo made clear to the regime that civil government could not perform well under martial law; therefore, the sooner martial law was removed, the better the government would perform for the country. 941  He, at once, established a special committee of delegates to examine the post-martial law legal repercussions; so that on the advice of the committee, he could advise the Chief of Army Staff-cum-President of Pakistan to abrogate martial law.942  US intelligence feared the Army generals would take action if the civilian setup 
challenged	   the	   army’s	   interests	   in	   foreign	   policy,	   the	   supply	   of	   new	  weapons,	  and the ongoing penetration of the army into the bureaucracy, diplomatic corps, and state corporations.943  As it was, Junejo started confronting the Army in these respects from the very first day.  In his maiden speech, he called for simplicity in public life, and demanded that the generals, bureaucrats and politicians replace their Toyota Coronas with Suzuki cars.  
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  In May 1985, MRD announced as its objective a comprehensive reform programme in the areas of economic, political and foreign affairs.944   This was devised in April by a Karachi-based Central Action Committee under the convener ship of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo.945   The	   committee	   opposed	   Zia’s	  constitutional amendments and demanded greater provincial autonomy.   Observing the rhythm of the newly National Assembly, especially during the 
Speaker’s	   election,	   and Junejo’s	   concern	   about the martial law, the MRD built 
oppositional	  pressure	  to	  weaken	  the	  General’s	  grip	  on	  the	  government.	  Owing	  to the fresh civilian government, and the relaxation of repression, the opposition leaders held many public gatherings and meetings throughout the country to solicit public support for their new demands.946 The alliance built a relationship with the IPG.   Despite all this, Zia ensured that his Eighth Amendment Bill was passed in October 1985.  It skipped some of the proper constitutional process before being presented to the National Assembly.947  The IPG made a big hue and cry about this, to no avail.   A Ninth Amendment was promised for the future that 
would	   implement	   supposed	   ‘Islamic	   principles’,	   but	   this	   never	   happened.	   The	  
military	  junta’s	  programme for Islamisation was thus not altogether fulfilled.    
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Before 1985, Zia had taken advice from regular Martial Law Administrators (MLA) conferences that had discussed foreign and internal policy.   After the 1985 election, with civilian governors taking charge of the provinces, there were fewer MLA conferences on provincial issues. 948  
Responding	  to	  the	  opposition’s	  taunts	  that	  he	  was	  a	  ‘puppet	  and	  disabled	  Prime	  
Minister’,	  Junejo	  empowered	  civil	  representatives	  in	  the	  cabinet	  and	  made	  them	  the decision-making body rather than the MLA conferences. He further asked Zia to remove two of his caps – Chief Martial Law Administrator and the Chief of the Army Staff (C-in-C) – and become a full civilian President as promised earlier.  The revival of the political parties in the country was another of his demands.   Zia argued in response that it was an advantage if he held multiple 
offices,	  as	  he	  was	  ‘playing	  a	  role	  like	  a	  bridge	  between	  the	  civilian	  government	  
and	   the	   military.’949 He promised to retire as C-in-C in 1990, when the next election was due.  He refused to allow party politics.950  The National Assembly had a heated discussion on the issue on the grounds that it was unconstitutional for the President to hold military office as well.    On 1 June 1985, the Provincial Assembly of KPK including the handpicked Chief Minister, Arbab Jahangir, was 
the	  first	  to	  pass	  the	  resolution	  demanding	  Zia’s	  resignation	  from	  military	  office.	  	  They were followed by the Punjab and Baluchistan assemblies on the same day, and the Sindh assembly on 16 June.   The Senate established a committee to discuss the restoration of political parties in July 1985 that recommended that they should be restored after registration with the government on the condition                                                         
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of not receiving any funds from abroad and not proclaiming any anti-Islamic or anti-Pakistan sentiments.951 On 2 June 1986, the opposition group in the 
assembly	   protested	   against	   Zia’s	   extension	   as	   COAS.952 General K.M. Arif also asked for a fulltime and professional COAS instead.953  During the celebrations at Minar-i-Pakistan	   on	   Pakistan’s	   day	   of	  independence on 14 August 1985, Junejo declared	   that	   ‘citizens	   of	   Pakistan	  would not wake up on 1st January of the next year under martial law but Islamic democratic country. Pakistan was not made to live	  under	  martial	  law.’954  Both the National Assembly and Senate followed him by passing resolutions supporting his statement.   This pressure, combined with the ongoing MRD opposition, led Zia to announce that martial law would be lifted on 1 January 1986, and he promised to hold talks with all those, including the MRD, who had been struggling for the restoration of democracy. 955  Right at the end of 
December	   1985,	   he	   declared:	   ‘The	  Declaration	   of	   5	   July	   1977	   is	   cancelled;	   all	  powers to the Chief Martial Law Administrator has been confiscated, and the 
military	  courts	  have	  been	  dissolved.’956 Martial law offices were closed and all martial law orders except those which were passed under the Eighth Amendment were annulled as well.  Punjab and KPK got civilian governors on 29 December. In this way, Pakistan emerged from martial law after eight-and-a-half years.  The leading politicians all tried to claim credit for this.    BB, in her                                                         
951 Directorate  of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:  Prospects   for   the  New  Political   System’,  Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.4. 
952 ibid., p.128. 
953 Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara Saal, p.83. 
954 Muhammad Khan Junejo, 14 August 1985, Lahore, cited in Ahmed, General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal, 
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956 General Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the Joint Session of Parliament 30 December 1985. 
 216 
book,	   stated	   ‘on	   the	   eve	   of	   my	   departure	   from	   Zurich	   to	   Pakistan	   with	   my	  brother’s	  body’957 the regime took the decision to uplift martial law to silence the thousands of protestors who came to greet me on my arrival. Conversely, 
Syed	   Yousaf	   Raza	   Gilani,	   Minister	   of	   Railways	   in	   Junejo’s	   government,	   stated	  that it was he who advised the Prime	   Minister	   Junejo	   to	   declare	   ‘the	   end	   of	  
martial	  law	  and	  the	  emergency’	  on	  the	  38th Independence Day of the country.958    Cohen has pointed out how these political developments provided a face-saver to the USA in its support of Zia, although they hardly brought major changes on the ground.959  Zia continued to manipulate political developments as best he could.  He followed a carrot and stick policy, rewarding those who went along with him and punishing those who did not.  Opponents continued to be thrown in prison, tortured and killed.    Even after declaring a non-party	  based	  election,	  and	  the	  MRD’s	  decision	  to boycott it, draconian actions continued to be taken against those loyal to the opposition parties.  BB states that when she left the country; 40,000 political prisoners were still in jail.960 Eighteen were under trial in Rawalpindi military court, accused of conspiring against the government; fifty-four were being held in Kot Lakhpat jail in Lahore, charged with criminal conspiracy and sedition for their alleged involvement with Al-Zulfiqar.961 MRD leaders were rounded up on various occasions: for example, on 21 October 1985 when they were heading towards 70 Clifton for a meeting.962  When the notorious Eighth Amendment 
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was being debated in parliament, MRD activists came on the streets in protest. The government responded by placing the leaders either under house arrest or banned them from entering Punjab province. The government made the holding 
of	   MRD’s	   session	   in	   Lahore	   on	   23	   September	   1985	   impossible	   owing	   to	   the	  arrests of many leaders.963 200 persons including twenty women were arrested when they tried to participate in the MRD public meeting outside Mochi Gate on 25 December 1985.964 Amnesty International estimated that at least 100 
persons	   were	   detained	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   ‘nonviolent	   political	   beliefs	   and	  
peaceful	   political	   activities’.965  It also recorded that sixty other political prisoners were tried in Haripur, Attock, and Karachi jails in 1985.  A few hundred prisoners were sentenced by military court to terms of 10-25 years. The government failed to provide any evidence to refute this claim by Amnesty International.966  Rather,	  Zia	  responded	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘political	  prisoners	  are as 
less	   in	  numbers	  as	  paisa	  in	  a	  rupee’,	  and	  that	  these	  few	  would	  be	  freed	  before	  the election, and that they were being basically being allowed a period of rest to rethink their misguided attitudes.967  Despite a national and international outcry, political activists continued to be executed during the period.  Ignoring protests by Amnesty International, the Bar Association, and international human rights activists mobilised by BB, three young men were hanged in August 1984 after being found guilty of 
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charges of murdering a police officer and involvement in Al-Zulfiqar. They were Usman Ghani aged 19 – who was reported to have been under 18 at the time of the commission of the offence – Idrees Khan aged 20, and Idrees Beig aged 21.   The regime described them as terrorists.968  Among civil society groups, students remained the worst hit.  They were 
persecuted	   regardless	   of	   political	   affiliation.	   	   	   The	   ban	   on	   students’	   unions	  initiated in early 1983 in KPK was gradually imposed on the rest of the country.969 Reacting	  to	  the	  ban,	  students’	  bodies	  launched	  countrywide	  protests,	  which were answered brutally by the regime. Students were jailed on a wide-scale in 1984, especially after the eight blasts in Punjab University in March. Ghafoor Ahmed suggested that after muting the voice of MRD, the regime took more severe actions against the students. They even took into custody parents, including the mothers970 of those students who were not caught in the police raids on their homes.  A procession of the Sindh Students Federation on 17 October 1984 was fired on, with several students being killed and many injured.971  Bashir Qureshi, leader of Jie Sindh Mahaz, was imprisoned many times during the reign of Zia.972 On 18 October 1985, police attacked the students of Sindh University Jamshoro and killed five persons including three students. Eighty-eight people including fifty-one students were arrested on charges of speaking against the government, burning the Pakistani flag, and                                                         
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robbery.973  This incident enraged students across the whole province and invigorated their movement.974  Zia continued to implement his policy of Islamisation.  Before the referendum, he had introduced Nizam Salat Ordinance on 14 August 1984, which required all adult men to have prayer breaks during their working time. Salat committees were set up under Nazimin Salat in each district who directly reported to the Governor of the concerned province.  The committees lost this power when some of the Nazimin abused their authority, and the President issued a clarification that these Nazimin did not have any political authority.  Zia ordered in October 1984 that anyone standing in future elections would have to take an oath of allegiance to the policy of implementation of Islamic teaching in the country.975  In December 1984, Sharia Law (Islamic jurisprudence) was established in Pakistan.  In 1985, Zia put pressure on the new civilian government to establish a	   ‘true	   Islamic	   system’	   in	   the	   country.976 Twenty-five members of the National Assembly responded with a declaration on 16 June that the President of the country had the responsibility to execute Islamic principles in the country since he was given a vote in the referendum for that purpose.977 
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 Zia was well aware of how the Western powers were trying to use Islam to their advantage in countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and sought to 
turn	   this	   to	   Pakistan’s	   advantage.	   	   	   Barely a few months after the implementation of Sharia Law in Pakistan, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 166 (NSDD 166) in March 1985, which authorised ‘stepped-up	   covert	   military	   aid	   to	   the	   Mujahideen’	   as	   well	  support for religious indoctrination.  Michael Chossudovsky assessed the imposition of Sharia in	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  “radical	  Islam”	  as	  serving	  American geopolitical interests in South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.  Many present-day ‘Islamic	   fundamentalist	   organizations’	   in	   the	   Middle	  East and Central Asia, were directly or indirectly the product of US covert support and financing, often channeled through foundations from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Missions from the Wahhabi sect of conservative Islam in Saudi Arabia were put in charge of running the CIA sponsored madrassas in Northern Pakistan.978  Because of all this, US diplomats stationed in Pakistan continued to consider Zia the person most likely to support American interests in the region.979 Although they appreciated the strength of the opposition to Zia,980 they were suspicious of what they saw as the close ties that the MRD had with Soviet Russia and China.  There appeared to be too many risks involved in either 
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replacing Zia with another General or the coming to power of an MRD-led civilian government.981  They thus ignored the ongoing human rights abuses of the regime.   
The MRD – its Failures and Achievements  The MRD was undermined at this time through intense internal divisions.   There were ongoing tensions between Punjabis and Sindhis, and also amongst Sindhis after the departure of BB from Pakistan.982   In a report of March 1984, 
the	   CIA	   judged	   that	   ‘the	   parties	   are	   badly	   fragmented,	   and	   have	   little	  
leverage’.983    Zia of course did his best to foment such splits in the opposition.  One such divide related to the sentence of death passed on ZAB in which the regime played Punjabi and non-Punjabi judges off against each other to get a judgement in its favour.   Forgetting the stance that many Punjabi political 
workers	  took	  in	  agitating	  to	  save	  ZAB’s	  life,	  the	  blame	  game	  was	  initiated	  on	  the	  provincial basis.  In Punjab, Farooq Leghari, a moderate PPP secretary general and a prominent landlord of Southern Punjab caused a big setback to the party by tendering his resignation from the position as well as the party membership to make a deal with General Zia.984  Some years later, Ghulam Mustafa Khar stated that he used to meet with the regime on the advice of ZAB and that the 
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PPP could have saved his life if they had acted more cautiously. 985  At the time, BB had been highly suspicious of Khar, and later, instead of designating him as President of PPP-Punjab, appointed Jahangir Badar – a	  person	  who	  proved	  ‘too	  
small	   a	   man	   for	   his	   post.’986  The divide became particularly apparent at the time of the elections in 1985, when many MRD members from Punjab wanted to fight the election, while the majority of Sindhi members did not.987  Significant 
elements	  of	  Punjab’s	  PPP	  disobeyed	  BBs	  orders	  despite	  her	  threat	  to	  expel	  the	  
‘rebels’.988    To counteract the influence of BB and PPP in Sindh, the regime sought to use three leaders whose support-base was in rural areas – Mumtaz Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Mukhdoom Amin Faheem.  The regime was less concerned about the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad as they were dominated by non-Sindhis and non-PPP constituencies. Except for Mukhdoom Amin Faheem, the other two leaders fell into the trap.  Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was already unhappy with certain decisions of BB.989 He enjoyed considerable authority in rural Sindh because of his longstanding association with ZAB, his opposition to the Zia regime, and his fifteen months in detention.  He was now prepared to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the Zia regime.  He stated 
in	  a	  private	  meeting	  with	  a	  US	  diplomat	  in	  1984	  that	   ‘the	  1973	  Constitution	  is	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not	   sacrosanct’,990 and he was ready to shrink the power of Prime Minister in favour of the President.  He also promised that not a single army man would be castigated for deposing ZAB and his government.   He had however to be cautious over his relationship with Zia as being seen to be too close to the dictator would have lost the respect of many of the PPP workers.991  Though both Jatoi and Zia denied any agreement between them, there were rumours circulating of a secret deal - ‘Jatoi Wazir-i-azam na manzoor, Bhutto family hero 
hero, baqi sub zero zero’.992  The PPP expelled both Jatoi and Mumtaz Bhutto on the grounds that they were associating with the Sindhi, Baluchi, and Pashtun Front (SBPF), and both have remained in the political wilderness until today.     BB’s	   position	   in	   PPP	  was	   also	   challenged	   by the so-called	   ‘uncles’	  who	  had been prominent in the party under ZAB.993   Once in exile, BB had time to reflect on her strategy and devise ways to reinvigorate the party.   This was a time when the old jyalas were being replaced with the fresh blood, such as Jahangir Badar, who was appointed Party President for the Punjab instead of 
Khar.	  	  	  Likewise,	  Jatoi’s	  brand	  of	  compromises	  was	  abhorred	  by	  the	  rank	  and	  file	  
of	   the	  party.	   	  Moreover,	   ‘the	   failure’	  of	   anti-Zia protest movement made these leaders reconsider their strategy towards the regime.994  Regionalism gathered strength during the Zia period, which also weakened the over-arching national cause of restoration of Democracy in the                                                         
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country.  A Muhajir students’	  group	  formed	  Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in 1984 in Karachi to fight for the rights of this community of immigrants. 995  A Sindhi, Baluch, and Pashtun Front (SBPF) was set up by Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafeez Pirzada to represent people from these regions who were living in Karachi.   Wali Khan, President of the Awami National Party that had its main base in NWFP, focused mainly on local issues, such as renaming the province as PukhtoonKhwa, and the devolution of economic power and foreign trade to the local government.   There were other linguistic and sectarian divides, particularly in Karachi – a city populated by people from all parts of Pakistan.   These antagonisms could flare up violently at times. For example, the killing of a college girl by a speeding bus driven by a Pustun in Nazimabad (Muhajir area) was turned into a communal clash between Muhajirs and Pushtuns. Pamphlets, and handbills were distributed to instigate the hatred between the communities. During the subsequent riots, 51 people were killed, and 117 injured in less than a month. 996 Likewise, on the basis of political ideology, the Left-wing parties of MRD – Pakistan Musawat Party, the Pakistan National Party, and the Mazdoor Kissan Party – merged into a single party in January 1986.997 Such division further limited the power of MRD.  The MRD missed a good opportunity to expose the failures of the 
regime’s	  so-called economic development.  From the start, Zia had maintained that his rule would lay the basis for a new economic prosperity in Pakistan.  Initially he was fortunate, as there were bumper crops during the early years of                                                         
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his rule.  Zia claimed that his regime was being blessed by God for his Islamisation of the country.  The main beneficiaries were nonetheless the elites of the Punjab, merchants and businessmen, rather than the peasantry.   Government expenditure increased by 300 percent during the period of martial law, from Rs. 20,197.4 million in 1977-78 to Rs. 69,717.9 million in 1984-85. The defence budget increased from Rs. 4 million in 1977-78 to Rs. 14 million in 1984-85.  In 1984-85 the budget deficit was Rs.3.8 billion. Despite the 400 per 
cent	   increase	   in	  workers’	   remittances	   from	  $577.74	  million	   to	   $2,450	  million,	  and the US war aid of $3.2 billion, there was a balance of payment deficit, rising from $941 million in 1976-77 to $1928 million in 1984-85.     The situation became critical in the mid-1980s, when there were disastrous harvest failures that in particular affected cotton – Pakistan’s	  main	  cash crop.  Nothing was said now by Zia about divine judgement.  There was a decline in remittances from overseas labourers.    Although considerable sums were coming from aid for jihad from USA and Arab Countries, much of this was used to purchase the support of politicians or manufacture new political cronies.998  By 1985, the economy was in disarray.999  The government asked for an IMF stand-by loan to stabilise the economy, which was given on condition that the rupee was depreciated, and the subsidies on exports, wheat, fertilisers and edible oils were eliminated.1000 Asma Jahangir pointed out that widespread and growing tax-evasion as one of the causes of the economic crisis.1001 
                                                        
998 Imran Khan, Pakistan: A Personal History (London: The Bantam Books, 2011), p.90; Hashmi, 
interview. 
999 Directorate  of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan: Prospects   for   the  New  Political   System’,  Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.9. 
1000 Viewpoint, XI (23), 16 January 1986, pp.11-12. 
1001 Asma Jahangir, interview. 
 226 
Therefore, the expansion of the domestic tax net was one of the conditions IMF imposed in 1986.1002 The government cut subsidies on basic items such as foods, fertiliser, and reduced spending on defence.  This all hit the poor hard.  Zia tried to blame the newly elected government for the economic deterioration.1003  The opposition could have made much more about the 
economic	  failures	  of	  Zia’s	  government.	    Despite these various failings, MRD also had its successes.   Although still banned after the election of 1985, with many of its leaders remaining in jail or under house arrest, the fact that elections of any sort were held and martial law lifted can be judged as an achievement for the movement.   Also, on 10 March 1985, 252 out of 280 articles of 1973 constitution were restored.   The extremist parties – Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakisan (JUP), Jamaat-i-Ahle-i-Hadith (JAH), Tehreek-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria (TFJ)1004, and most importantly JI – gradually stepped back from supporting the regime as well. According to the well-known	  aphorism	  that	  ‘my	  
enemy’s	  enemy	  is	  my	  friend’,	  JI	  eventually	  publicly	  declared	  it	  would	  work	  with	  MRD for the restoration of democracy in the country.1005   The scholarship on civil resistance reveals how important it is for opponents to remove the main pillars of support for an authoritarian regime.    One of the main such pillars is that of the army and security forces.   The success of civil resistance in Chile, East Germany and the Philippines during the 1980s can be attributed above all to defections from the regime by the security forces.   
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In Chile, for example, many navy, air force and police commanders refused to impose martial law after the plebiscite vote, which paved	  the	  way	  for	  Pinochet’s	  downfall.1006  BB eventually realised that her hitherto strong anti-army stance in which she blamed the military as a whole for the killing of her father was unlikely to undermine Zia, and began working to build allies against him within the armed forces.   Neither BB nor the PPP leaders were prepared to admit this in public – it would have been political suicide for them to have done so.1007  Nonetheless, after meeting a close colleague of BB, a US diplomat reported to the CIA in March	  1984	  that	  after	  the	  ‘unsuccessful’	  struggle	  against	  Zia-ul-Haq, 
BB	  began	  believing	   that	   ‘the	  PPP	  must	  cultivate	  Army	  support	  against	  Zia’.1008  The fact that the US government was prepared to put pressure on Zia to allow 
BB’s	  return	   to	  Pakistan	  also	  suggests that they were confident that she would not try to undermine an army that supported the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.     Although there were some weak attempts by army officers to dislodge Zia from early on in his period of rule, their discontent was becoming far more serious by the mid-1980s.  Eight years of authoritarian rule had undermined respect for the army among citizens and increasing numbers of military men resented the way that they were losing support within the wider society.  Few officers had gained personally from martial law, and they resented the 
‘dishonest	   policies’	   associated	   with	   those	   who	   administered	   martial	   law.1009 They could see that a relatively small group that had vested interests in                                                         
1006 Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions, pp. 128-9. 
1007 PPP members whom I interviewed still refuse to accept that such a shift occurred, taking it as a 
criticism of their commitment to their long struggle against military rule. 
1008 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Zia’s  Divided  Opposition’,  Office of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Analyses, in March 1984, CIA-RDP84S00927R000300100002-9, NARA, p.7. 
1009 Directorate  of  Intelligence,  ‘Pakistan:  Prospects  for  the  New  Political  System’,  Near Eastern and 
South Asia Office, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, pp.6-9. 
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perpetuating a system that protected their personal power.  Consequently, for them, the end of martial law was necessary to regain the esteem of the people.    The politician Ayaz Amir noted that there was pressure by the Army generals on Zia to relinquish his post as army commander.1010 The tussle, indeed, had created a disciplinary issue in the sole disciplined organisation of Pakistan. Politically, the low turnout in the referendum, and the defeat of key players of 
Zia’s	  cabinet	  in	  the	  recent	  election	  indicated	  the	  unpopularity	  of	  the	  General. His hand-picked candidates and three hundred members of Majlis-i-Shoora all failed to be elected. 1011    These sentiments were reinforced by similar feelings amongst many US intelligence agents.   They saw that the US support for Zia was being criticised publically by some army officers and officials in the Pakistan Foreign Office.1012 In an interview, Stephen P. Cohen responded in a laconic way 
to	  my	  question	   in	   this	   respect:	   ‘well,	   yea	  we	  were	   getting	   tired	   of	   Zia	   by	   that	  
time.’1013   
Conclusion: The New York	   Times	   wrote	   that	   ‘simply	   ending	   emergency	   rule	   did	   not	   end	  
oppression	   in	  Poland,	  Chile,	  and	  the	  Philippines’.1014  Similarly, in Pakistan the lifting of the martial law did not mean an end to military rule.  Democracy is not a gift that falls from heaven, it is rather achieved through the exertion of sweat and tears.   General Zia-ul-Haq was not removed from power during the period covered in this chapter; however, the continuing pressure of the MRD, and 
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1011 Ramu, Badshah Khan, p.137. 
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particularly PPP, forced the regime to hold an election, which brought parliamentary politics back to life in the country.  One great achievement was that of the mobilisation of external pressure through meetings with foreign parliamentarians, and holding of public meetings, press conferences and seminars.   After hearing from the exiled leaders of the PPP of the human rights abuses perpetuated by the Zia regime, several American senators raised questions in public about US support for Zia.  Although American intelligence had at that time little confidence in the ability of MRD to mount an effective challenge to Zia, their opinion began to change as a result of the work of Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto.  Nonetheless, Zia did his best to hang onto his power.  On 29 December 1985, the day before he announced the lifting of martial law, he issued two MLOs.  MLO 106 transferred power from the Chief Martial Law Administrator to the Prime Minister, while MLO 107 transferred cases that were pending before the military courts to the ordinary courts.   Zia anticipated that the new prime minister would be in his pocket, and that the ordinary courts would inflict similar punishments on dissidents as had been passed by the military courts.1015  Commenting on this, the renowned jurist Abid Hassan Manto remarked that there had hardly been a restoration of fundamental rights in Pakistan since the 30 December order only revoked the Proclamation of 5 July 1977; whereas the Provisional Constitutional Order of 24 March 1981 was standstill.1016   Such legal and political issues drove the movement forward to its final phase.                                                          
1015 Cited   in  Mahmood  Zaman,   ‘Rights,  Parties   stand  Restored’,  Viewpoint, XI (22), 9 January 1986, 
p.12. 
1016 ibid. 
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Ch. 5. Revival of Democracy and End of the Dictator 1986-88: On the declaration of the annulment of martial law on 30 December 1985, Khan 
Abdul	  Wali	  Khan	  made	  the	  prophetic	  comment,	   “it	   is	   like	   facing	  a	  person	  who	  has not used his gun for some time but who continues to hold it in his hand and 
can	  wield	  it	  any	  moment”.1017  This	   ‘gun’	  was	  turned	  towards	  Zia’s	  handpicked	  Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo when he removed him from office along with the national assembly in June 1988 and called a fresh election in 
three	   months’	   time.	   	   MRD,	   the	   alliance	   for	   a	   democratic	   Pakistan had condemned the so-called	   ‘democratisation’	   process	   in	   1985	   and	   had	   declared	  the elections illegitimate at a meeting held in January 1986.   Despite the revocation of martial law, Zia continued to oppress his opponents and curb the freedom of the press.   On 10 April 1986 Benazir Bhutto received a mammoth welcome on her return from exile, which set alarm bells ringing in the house of the dictator, suggesting that people were still demanding their right to democracy, and not just the political leaders. Benazir Bhutto asked the General 
‘to	  leave	  the	  country	  gracefully’	  as	  she	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  revenge.1018  The MRD failed, however, to put adequate pressure on Zia, and failed to bring him down before he was killed suddenly in an air-crash. This meant that he was never strongly discredited with either the military or foreign supporters. This chapter 
analyses	  the	  history	  from	  the	  end	  of	  martial	  law	  to	  Zia’s	  death.  After	   the	   establishment	   of	  Muhammad	  Khan	   Junejo’s	   government	  with	  the 1985 election, the political landscape had changed. One of the major                                                         
1017 Khan Abdul Wali Khan stated this at a political gathering in Lahore on 2 February 1986. Cited in 
Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.15. 
1018 Benazir Bhutto, Speeches to Public gathering in Punjab. Cited in Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, 
p.13. 
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demands of the opposition parties including MRD was fulfilled. Due to the party-less election under the Political Parties (Amendment) Act 1979, MRD and JUP boycotted the election. Many political scholars such as R.B Raees1019, Babar Ali1020, and Hasan-Askari Rizvi1021 were of the opinion that the post-martial law period saw the civilianisation of the martial law, and that the Junejo government did have reasonable freedoms. Freedom of the Press, liberty of political 
opposition,	  and	  protests	  were	  permitted.	  Rather	  it	  was	  the	  ‘most	  open,	  and	  in	  a	  
sense,	   most	   democratic	   government’1022 in the history of Pakistan. However, before the oath-taking ceremony for the members of the National and Provincial 
Assemblies	   General	   Zia	   issued	   the	   ‘Revival	   of	   the	   Constitution	   1973	   Order’	  which had altered the basic face of the constitution and shifted the power into the hands of the forthcoming President of the country, as examined in the previous chapter. On 23 March 1985, the day the members took their oaths, they also elected General Zia-ul-Haq as the sixth President of Pakistan as per the pre-poll conditions to elected members.  In its first session, the assembly passed the notorious Eighth Amendment to the constitution of 1973 – ‘granting	  constitutional protection to the military take over of 1977, the Presidential 
Referendum,	   and	   the	   RCO’	   –and thus cut its sovereignty in favour of the President. Declaring the abrogation of martial law from the country, the General stated however that they were not in a period of transition from one regime to another but were continuing the previous system – enforcing Islamic principles,                                                         
1019 Rasool  Bakhsh  Raees,   ‘Pakistan  1988:  Command   to  Conciliation  Politics’,  Asian Survey, 29(2), A 
Survey of Asia 1988: Part-II (February, 1988), pp.199-206. 
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1021 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan-1947-86, (Delhi, 1988).  
1022 Babar    Ali,    ‘Aftermath  of  MRD  Movement’,  Economic and Political Weekly, p. 1571. 
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continuing domestic and foreign policies, and maintaining the advisory role of Parliament.1023 The	   General’s	   own	   original	   ‘power-sharing	   formula’	   sought	   to	  constrain the power of the Junejo government.   Junejo did not however prove to be as malleable as Zia had anticipated when he had hand-picked him as Prime Minister.    However, the opposition (mainly MRD) questioned the legitimacy of both 
Zia	  and	  Junejo	  and	  rejected	  the	  ‘controlled’	  democracy	  as	  a	  sham,	  with	  Zia	  still	  holding a gun to their head.  I.A. Rehman stated that all parties except two boycotted the election, so, under the universal conventions, the victorious party could hardly claim to be the democratic and representative government of the country, particularly as it was held under a dictatorial regime with restricted voting rights.1024 Hence, they continued to call for civil resistance until the 
holding	   of	   a	   ‘free	   and	   fair’	   party-based election, with full ruling power being transferred to the newly elected government.  Sharon E. Nepstad has noted five key factors in any campaign of civil resistance. They are: widespread grievances, such as economic failure, material deprivation, rigged elections, and restrictions 
on	  freedom;	  the	  winning	  over	  of	  an	  opponent’s	  strong	  pillar	  of	  support	  in	  your	  favour; highlighting the injustice of the regime to the public; unity among the civil resisters; and the recruitment to the cause of civil society groups – all of which together provide the necessary strength.1025  The civil resisters in Pakistan of that time could have turned the situation to their favour strongly at 
                                                        
1023 General Zia-ul-Haq Viewpoint, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.5. 
1024 I.A.Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, (Lahore, 1990), p.275. 
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this time, as many of these elements were in place in Pakistan.   They failed, however, to do this.   
The Junejo Government: 
The	   people	   of	   Pakistan’s	   continuing	   thirst	   for	   democracy	   never	   allowed	   their	  dictators to rule unchallenged.  Although they might have either welcomed martial law or stayed quiet when it was declared initially, they invariably turned against despotic rule after a time.  As a result, the dictators tried to manipulate the democratic system to win support from politicians and provide a veneer of democracy to their autocratic rule.   As it is, time and again in Pakistan, those in power have selected seemingly humble and harmless people for key subordinate roles, anticipating that they will be easily-controlled, who then suddenly show their teeth.  In this way Bhutto selected General Zia, Nawaz Sharif selected General Musharraf, and Musharraf in turn selected as Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry – all of whom turned against the ruler who had promoted them.   In the case of Zia, he selected Junejo as his Prime Minister – a seemingly nondescript and malleable politician.   Junejo was proposed by Pir of Pagaro and Zia selected him in preference to a stronger candidate, Illahi Bukhsh Soomro, on 18 March 1985.1026   General Zia met him for the first time on 20 March 1985 and informed him that he had accepted the proposal that he be appointed Prime Minister.  Junejo, without thanking him, asked when he was 
going	  to	  lift	  martial	  law,	  and	  ‘Zia	  was	  shocked.’1027 Zia allowed him, however, to be sworn in on 23 March.  
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Junejo’s	  biggest	   challenge	  was	   to	   restore	  democratic	   culture,	  with	   the	  General	  being the biggest hurdle to this.  What started as petty differences between the two gradually turned into a wider gulf.  During the first year of controlled civilian government, rifts between Junejo and Zia surfaced.  First of all, Junejo made it his mission to bring an end to martial law.  He promised the nation on 14 August 1985 that it would welcome the sunrise on the New Year of 1986 free from martial law.  He made this announcement on the suggestion of Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, who himself later served as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012.  Gillani revealed to the researcher that in the Cabinet meeting held to organise the celebration of Independence Day 1985 in Lahore, he suggested that Junejo could make the occasion memorable by declaring the date for the end of martial law; otherwise it would have been better to cancel the political gathering.  Junejo later called Gillani on the official phone line and told him that he was going to do this.1028  In taking cover under the electoral process, Zia was manoeuvred into lifting martial law.1029 However, the President reneged on his pre-poll agreement to cease wearing his uniform. After the removal of martial law, the next challenge to Junejo was to restore democratic culture in the country. Laying down five points – establishment of an Islamic democratic system in the country on the basis of Pakistani ideology, a just economic system, an end to illiteracy, scientific progress, jihad against corruption and bribery, and following a non-aligned foreign policy in favour of strengthening national sovereignty – as per his government policy statement, he began to work on them.  Moreover, right after the establishment of the                                                         
1028 Syed Yousad Raza Gillani, interview 26 July 2014, Multan. 
1029 Rasool  Bakhsh  Raees,  ‘Pakistan  1988:  Command  to  Conciliation  Politics’,  p.199. 
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truncated democracy, the MNAs began to demand greater parliamentary powers, and a parliamentary group was set up to address constitutional issues on 3 June 1985.  190 out of 207 MNAs participated in the meeting to organise this, which was a shock to Zia.  A special committee was set up to look into the matter of the legal position post-martial law and examine the issue of restoring party politics.1030  Likewise, to create a British-style democratic structure, some members set up an Independent Parliamentary Group (IGP) under Haji Saifullah 
as	   an	   opposition	   to	   the	   government’s	   group.1031 Prompted by the criticism of General Zia regarding the functioning of National Assembly, Haji Saifullah moved a privilege motion in the assembly.1032 Similar demands for greater democracy were heard in the provincial assemblies as well.   Junejo declared the Pakistan Muslim League to be the governing political party, and in June 1985 the General reluctantly began to work towards this goal.1033  Zia, who earlier had publicly denounced political parties as being contrary to Islamic political principles, amended the law to allow this.   Junejo had joined the Pakistan Muslim League before it was registered.1034 170 out of 237 MNAs and 50 out of 87 Senators joined the official Muslim League.1035  
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There was now a ruling party headed by Junejo.1036  Parties had to register under new rules provided by the government – they had to have a distinctive name, register their financial transactions, and submit their accounts and audit 
reports.	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	   General	   was	   still	   sitting	   in	   the	   President’s	   house	  wearing military uniform, and MLR-48 of 1979 still remained in place.   This regulation required all new political parties to register themselves with the election commission before contesting elections held under the Electoral Commission of Pakistan.  BB subsequently challenged these rules in the Supreme Court, which decided in her favour in June 1988 by ruling that the registration requirement was null and void in any future election.1037   Despite 
all	  this,	  Zia’s	  cronies	  still	  controlled	  the	  key	  federal	  ministries.	  	  Dr.	  Mahboob-ul-Haq was Finance minister, Iqbal Ahmed Khan, ex-Shura council member, was the minister of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Aslam Khattak, an ex-Shura member, was the Interior minister, and so on.1038  Junejo, however, gradually reduced the numbers of the Zia-backed ministers to two alone – Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan and Planning Minister Mahboobul Huq – in the Federal Cabinet. The rest were now his supporters.   To	  reduce	  the	  government’s	  expenditure,	  Junejo	  successfully	  adopted	  the	  
policy	  of	  ‘simplicity’	  following	  the	  principles	  of	  Islam.	  	  He	  announced	  this	  policy	  in his first address in 1985, and he was keen to demonstrate this by ordering that everyone, including ministers and generals travel in Pakistan-made Suzuki cars. 1039   Such	   an	   ‘Islamic’	   simplicity	  was	   hard	   to	   stomach	   for	   the	   self-styled                                                         
1036 Viewpoint, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.16. 
1037 Viewpoint, XIII (46), 23 June 1988, pp.12-13. 
1038 Azhar Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara Saal (Lahore, year is missing), pp.91. 
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‘preacher	   of	   Islam’	   for	   the	   last	   eight	   years	   – General	   Zia.	   	   Junejo’s	   most	  provocative act was placing the Defence Ministry in his own hands.  The Defence Cabinet Council – the top policy making body on defence and internal security issues 1040 – on which General Zia-ul-Haq sat as Chief of Army Staff, now came 
under	   Junejo’s	   signature.	   	   Within	   the	   first	   year	   of	   his government, Junejo ordered all military personnel that had already spent three years in civil departments on deputation back to the barracks; 1041 he appointed a new Navy 
Chief	   of	   Staff	  who	  was	   not	   Zia’s	   candidate;	   and	   his	   efforts	   to	   control	  military	  assignments and retirements showed him to be more than just a ceremonial Defence Minister.1042  In this role, Junejo also established a good working relationship with General Arif, which alarmed Zia. Later on, General Arif was sent to Beijing as an Ambassador. To replace Arif, Junejo named the most senior General without consulting General Zia on the matter.1043   Also, according to the US embassy, Junejo took the political decision to open the Khokrapar-Munnabao 
Southern	   Rail	   service	   between	   India	   and	   Pakistan	   ‘almost overruling security 
officials’.1044  The breaking-point was reached in 1988 over two issues.   The first concerned the negotiations then going on to resolve the Afghan issue which culminated in the Geneva Accord of 14 April 1988, in which the Soviet Union agreed to start its withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed not to                                                         
 1040 The Council consists of three services chiefs of forces, the Ministers of Interior, and Foreign 
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interfere in the internal affairs of that country.  Junejo organised an All Parties Conference (APC) of all political leaders to discuss the issue, including BB but excluding Zia.    Seven MRD leaders were in favour of signing of the accord, as were the other political parties.  BB was in favour of setting up an interim government to resolve the local feuds to avoid bloodshed in the country.1045  Zia did not want to end the war until Russia	  was	  on	   its	  knees,	  and	   in	  R.B.	  Raees’s	  
opinion,	   Junejo	  was	   acting	   here	   in	   an	   ‘unauthorised’	  manner,	   and	   it	   caused	   a	  fissure between the two.1046   The second issue was that of the explosion on morning of 10 April 1988 of the Pakistan army ammunition stockpile at Ojhri, Faizabad.    More than 100 died and thousands more were injured in the blast.   Junejo set up two committees – one military and one parliamentary – to probe the cause of the disaster.1047 Although the reports have yet to be published to this day, it was said that the military report recommended that General Akhtar Abdur-Rehman, the right hand of General Zia, and then ISI chief, be court marshalled. The parliamentary committee that was led by the Defence Minister concluded on the 
other	  hand	  that	  ‘no	  one	  was	  responsible,	  it	  was	  the	  Act	  of	  Allah.’1048  However, the Minister of State for Defence, Rana Naeem Mahmood accused the senior generals including General Akhter Abdur Rehman of being involved in and mishandling the incident, and recommended they be court martialled.  Dr. Kamal Hussain stirred things up by arguing that the money spent on the 
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armaments that were lost at Ojhri should have been used for social and economic uplift of the country instead. According a the report, published in The 
Nation on 20 April, Rs.6.75 billions- worth of weapons were burnt in the disaster, along with the loss of life, injuries and destruction of surrounding properties and materials. Dr. Hussain argued that with this money 25.44 million people could have been provided with clean drinking water and 50.94 million with health cover, 0.228 million people could have lived in their own houses, and 4.4 million children could have gone to schools to brighten their futures.1049  Therefore, the protest rally against the existence of the ammunition dump in Ojhri that was led by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and attended by all political parties in opposition, including MRD, brandished 
slogans	  such	  as	  “Send	  Ojhri	  to	  the	  Pentagon”,	  “Peace,	  not	  Bombs”,	  and	  “Food,	  not	  
Ammunition.” The	  committee	  set	  up	  by	  Junejo,	  and	  its	  statement	  ‘to	  punish	  the	  
culprit	  whoever	  they	  are’1050 was	  the	  final	  nail	  in	  his	  government’s	  coffin.	  	  Zia	  ul	  Haq could never have thought his hand-picked Prime minister would cause him so much difficulty. 1051  So, on 29 May 1988 he ordered the dissolution of the government and the national assembly, which was followed by the dissolution of provincial assemblies by their respective Governors, and the chief Election Commissioner was told to hold a general election in ninety days.  There was no 
                                                        
1049 Dr.  Kamal  Hussain,  ‘Political  Arithmetic  of  Ojhri’,  Viewpoint, XIII (38), 28 April 1988, p.12. 
1050 Muhammad Khan Junejo, speech in the Parliament, Viewpoint, XIII(38), 28 April 1988, p.34. 
1051  BBC Urdu report 29 May 2013 
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/multimedia/2013/05/130529_junejo_dismissal_revisited_uk.shtml] 29 
May 2013.  
 240 
declaration of Emergency.1052  Zia established an accountability board to review cases of corruption against 140 MNAs of the defunct parliament.1053    Zia’s	  allegation	  that	  the	  government	  had	  not	  made	  the	  implementation	  of	  Islam a priority was one of the publicly-stated reasons for the dissolution.  Religious leaders such as Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP) in addresses at Mochi Gate on 10 April 1986 were still looking for a Nizam-i-Mustafa system to 
solve	  Pakistan’s	  problems.1054 So too did Zia, who in his speech to Parliament on 7 April 1988 criticised the apathy of the government on its implementation of 
Islam.	  	  He	  further	  clarified	  his	  powerful	  role	  in	  the	  government	  by	  stating	  ‘he	  is	  
neither	   Chaudhry	   Fazal	   Ellahi	   nor	   Queen	   Elizabeth’1055 who sat idly by whilst their governments performed poorly. In response, the Independent Parliamentary Group in the National Assembly brought a motion against the General, which further provoked him.  General Zia had himself admitted that he had failed to establish a complete Islamic system in Pakistan in all the years that he had ruled absolutely, and asking the limp democracy to implement it in a shorter period was clearly unreasonable.  After the dissolution of the assembly, he issued the Sharia Ordinance.   According to CIA and the US embassy reports, the dissolution of the 
Junejo’s	  government	  had	  already	  been	  mooted	  before	  all	   this,	  with	  the	  Afghan	  agreement and the Ojhri Camp disaster being used as excuses.     General Arif quoted General Fazal-i-Haq on the issue of the gulf between General Zia and 
Junejo,	  who	   forecasted	   that	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1987	   “Mr	   Junejo	   has	   completed	   his	                                                          
1052 General Zia-ul-Haq, Dissolution Statement, Viewpoint, XIII (43), 2 June 1988, pp.13-14. 
1053 Viewpoint,   XIII   (45),   16   June   1988,   p.22;   R.B.   Raees,   ‘Pakistan   1988:   Command   to   Conciliation  
Politics’,  p.200. 
1054 Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.16. 
1055 General Zia-ul-Haq, Speech in the Parliament, Daily Jang, Rawalpindi, 8 April 1988. 
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days.”1056  US	  embassy	  reports	  claimed	  that	  ‘should	  Zia	  use	  his	  authority	  against	  Junejo, we believe the military – by all accounts still loyal to Zia – would side 
with	   him’.1057 The	   absence	   of	   the	   army’s	   resistance	   to	   the	   dissolution	   of	  Parliament shows that this was the case.   
MRD:	  Shift	  from	  Restoration	  of	  Democracy	  to	  ‘People’s	  Sovereignty’:1058 Publically, the MRD leaders categorically rejected	   the	   claimed	   ‘new	   dawn’	   for	  
democracy	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  BB’s	  statement	  issued	  from	  Cannes	  (France)	  was	  in	  this	  vein:  Gen.	   Ziaul	   Haq’s	   latest	   moves	   are	   nothing more than a cunning act of  political camouflage, designed to dupe the people of Pakistan and placate  political and opinion leaders in the Western countries whose support  and economic assistance are vital for his regime.1059  American intelligence claimed that this opposition was only a façade.1060  Whatever the truth of this, the repeal of martial law gave the MRD a breathing space. On 29-30 January 1986 the MRD Action Committee met to revisit its policy and decide on a course of action for the post-martial law era.  It was the first open gathering of the MRD after the end of 102 months of martial law. Every party in the MRD marched towards the Mochi Gate in a big procession carrying the symbols and placards of their respective leaders and parties.  The workers of the Khaksar Tehrik let off firecrackers, and the others chanted                                                         
1056 Arif, Working with Zia, p. 351. 
1057 Directorate  of   Intelligence,   “Junejo  and  Zia:  Uneasy  Partners   in  Democracy”,   24   June   1986,   24  
November 2013, p.3. CIA-RDP88-00434R000400970009-8, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. 
1058 In  January  1988,  Central  Executive  Committee  of  MRD  launched  a  ‘public  contact  campaign’  for  
bringing  People’s  Sovereignty  in  the  country. 
1059 Benazir Bhutto, Viewpoint, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.16. 
1060 Directorate  of   Intelligence,   “Pakistan:   The  Opposition   since   the  Election”,  Near East and South 
Asia Review, on 7 June 1985, 24 November 2013, pp.11-12. CIA-RDP85T01184R000301490002-
8,CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. 
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slogans against the government.1061 This provided not only a show of strength to their opponents but to the fellow parties in the alliance as well.    One major issue that came up for the MRD was that of the balance of power between provinces.   Weak provincial self-determination and an imbalance of power between provinces have always been major issues in the politics of Pakistan.   Although a federal system, crucial powers have been held by the centre.  The same problem was found in the 1980s also in India, where the Congress Government practised an overbearing and centralised form of rule.   This was a legacy of British imperial rule, which had always had a highly centralised authority.  The proposals under the 1935 Government of India Act for a federal system were not realised in a genuine way, as the centre could always dismiss governments.  The same issue has also plagued Pakistan.  This led to demands for secession.  The failure of handling this issue had already resulted in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, which further set back the legitimate demands of the smaller provinces as the centre became more vigilant in protecting its power citing security risks to the state as its justification.   The 
national	   leaders,	   and	   their	   parties	   including	   ZAB	   and	   his	   party’s	   government	  who had witnessed the break-up of the country, missed the chance to solve the issue for good.  S. Akber Zaidi divided them into two groups. The former is liberal, and the latter right-wing.1062    In the aftermath of martial law, the issues of the status of the federated units was made paramount. The MRD working body recommended reserving six subjects to the national government while representatives of the smaller                                                         
1061 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p13. 
1062 S.Akber   Zaidi,   ‘Regional   Imbalances   and   National   Question   in   Pakistan:   Some   indications’,  
Economic and Political Weekly, 24 (6), 11 February 1989, pp.300-314. 
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provinces wanted only four in this category – defence, foreign affairs, currency, and communication. NDP rejected this, as it felt that the MRD was dominated by the larger provinces, and particularly Punjab.  After prolonged discussions, it was eventually agreed on 3 August 1986 that there would be full provincial autonomy, with only the four subjects centralised, with other powers devolved to the provinces.1063 Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the current convener of the MRD, declared in the press conference that: 
…the	  document	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Pakistan	  that	  when	  the	  Alliance or any single party in it comes into power, it will amend the 1973 constitution suitably to ensure that the Autonomy Declaration is implemented in letter and spirit so that undue interference in provincial affairs ends once for all.1064  However, the declaration could not be implemented until 2009 following the Charter of Democracy (CoD), signed in 2006 in London.  Interestingly, the MRD 
declaration	  proposed	  compulsory	  military	  training	  for	  ‘all	  adult	  citizens’, which seems to include girls and boys.1065   The alliance partners had to resolve the internal issue of turning the movement into an electoral alliance.  The smaller parties pressurized the partners to provide a joint programme to mobilise the general public.1066  It was argued that this would strengthen them against the regime and its allies.  The smaller parties reminded the bigger parties, like the PPP, of the support they gave them during their lowest moments, and the debt of gratitude they were                                                         
1063 C.G.P.   Rakisits,   ‘Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government’s  
and  the  Opposition’s  Approaches’,  Pacific Affairs, 61(1), Spring 1988, p.91. 
1064 Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, Viewpoint, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12. 
1065 Viewpoint, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12. 
1066Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.264. 
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subsequently owed.1067  Their demand for a disproportionate electoral share caused problem.   For example, TI asked for forty per cent.  Opponents of a joint electoral pact argued that this might be counter-productive, especially at the local level, where the candidates of each party had their own various personal preferences and levels of public approval.1068 They argued that the election could resolve the issue without the need for joint electorates. Thirdly, the joint election agenda would diminish the individual identity of each party, which was unacceptable for the big parties.1069  PPP, for example, insisted on maintaining its separate electoral identity.  BB however gave an assurance that cooperation 
would	   continue	   with	   the	   MRD	   both	   “in	   struggle	   and	   the	   government.”1070    Drafting a joint declaration, overhauling the existing policies either in favour of smaller nationalities or removing their historical grievances and dealing with the socio-economic deprivation of federating units, while maintaining the integrity of the nation as a whole were all issues that had to be addressed by the political parties.1071   Because of all these competing agendas, the MRD was unable in the end to build a joint platform to contest the election, and later on, the PPP having a simple majority in 1988 election had to kneel down before the terms and conditions of the	   establishment	   and	   took	   the	   oath	   of	   a	   ‘truncated’	  democratic government.  Of all the parties, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal proved hardest to integrate within the alliance.   It declared that it would associate with the MRD only at the 
                                                        
1067 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.264. 
1068 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.265. 
1069 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.266. 
1070 Benazir Bhutto, Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13. 
1071 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, p.265. 
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national level.1072  The party later	  on	  declared	  its	  opposition	  to	  ‘Bhuttoism’	  in	  a	  way that damaged the alliance.1073  In	  the	  party’s	  views	  stated	  in	  an	  open	  letter	  to the Secretary General of the MRD, Malik Qasim, in August 1986, it was alleged 
that	  Bhuttoism	  ‘meant	  conspiring	  some	  Generals to break up Pakistan in order 
to	   gain	   power…the	   killing	   of	   factory	   workers	   and	   the	   murders	   of	   political	  
opponents…strangulation	   of	   the	   promises	   of	   the	   Press	   and	   a	   betrayal	   of	   the	  
promises	   made	   to	   the	   “kisans”	   and	   the	   poor	   of	   the	   country.’1074 Moreover, it rejected	  BB’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  1977	  elections	  were	  not	  rigged	  and	  that	  the	  PNA	  
movement	   was	   financed	   by	   the	   USA.	   TI	   also	   criticised	   BB’s	   alleged	  understanding with USA and Saudi Arabia for her to win power in Pakistan.1075 
The	   ANP’s	   leader’s	   provocative	   statement that the establishment of Pakistan 
was	   ‘a	   sin’	  was	   condemned	  as	  well.1076  Because of these issues, TI eventually quit the alliance at the time when unity was needed to oust the regime.   Since the beginning of the MRD, having a woman as a potential head of state remained controversial.  This was despite the fact that most of the parties 
including	   JUI,	   Jama’at-i-Islami’s,	   had	   supported	   Miss	   Fatima	   Jinnah	   in	   the	  Presidential election against General Ayub Khan.  However, the parties in the alliance were reluctant to place any woman as head of the state during the anti-Zia movement.  JUI (Fazal-ur-Rehman	  group)	  refused	  to	  accept	  BB	  as	  Pakistan’s	  
                                                        
1072 Mahmood   Zaman,   ‘Decisions   deferred   as   differences   surface’,   Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 
1986, p.14. 
1073 Viewpoint, XI (30), 6 March 1986, p.22. 
1074 Asghar Khan, Open letter to Malik Qasim, Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16. 
1075 Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16. 
1076 Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16. 
 246 
future leader on grounds of her gender.1077 Women’s	   rights	   group	   such	   as	  
Punjab	  Women	  Lawyers’	  Association	  declared	  the	  stand	  ‘a	  hypocrisy.’1078   Except for the submission of financial accounts to the Election Commission to fulfil constitutional requirements, the meeting of 29-30 January 1986 could not decide unanimously on the burning political issues – provincial autonomy and the conversion of the movement into an electoral alliance. But, the committee wisely agreed to let the issues remain open for discussion in 
their	   particular	   party’s	   committees	   and	   to	   re-meet after two months.1079 However, the alliance re-pledged their stance on the rejection of the 1984 Presidential Referendum, the illegitimacy of the 1985 General Election, and the instalment of the civilian government afterwards.  In front of a mammoth crowd at Mochi Gate, the alliance declared its opposition, and its continuous struggle against the regime. The action committee also passed resolutions to strengthen its ties with the workers as well with civil society.  They demanded the release of all political prisoners including Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo, and Fazil Rahu of Awami Tehreek; the repeal of Press and Publication Ordinance, and an end to restrictions imposed on newspaper publishers requiring them to deposit advanced securities of between Rs. 500,000 ($3333.33) and Rs. 3 million ($20 thousand).1080 The committee warned the government of the negative impact of the un-checked	   infiltration	   of	   Afghan	   refugees	   into	   the	   country’s	   domestic	  economy and politics, which was overseen by Jamaat-i-Islami and the 
                                                        
1077 Viewpoint, XI (27), 13 February 1986, p.34. 
1078 Viewpoint, XIII (24), 21 January 1988, pp.15-16. 
1079 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.5. 
1080 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.5. 
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government.1081 They also decided to hold frequent meetings.  The next two meetings were organised in the following month in Faisalabad and Multan.   At the Faisalabad meeting of February 1986, two demands were presented to government – the Resignation of General Zia-ul-Haq, and the holding of a fresh election on a party basis. A peaceful movement would be launched to achieve these objectives.1082 Tehreek-i-Istiqlal did not show up and registered its party independently. The Multan meeting on 21 February reiterated their demands. It also attracted hundreds of protestors. The central Action committee meeting in August in Lahore demanded a firm schedule for the election by 20 September 1986.1083 The committee reaffirmed its threat of launching a peaceful movement against the regime if the election had not been held. The CEC meeting on 2 August 1986 under the convenership of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman reiterated its stand that the martial law of 1977 had no justification. The meeting also paid tribute to the sacrifices of the workers during the 1983 campaign.1084 After the declaration, Ayaz Amir, the renowned political analyst, warned the MRD that it would need to be strong to avoid an embarrassing failure. The current conditions were favourable to be exploited by MRD.1085  Husain Naqi on the other hand felt that the alliance had sufficient strength already.   As it was, despite the issuing of the long-awaited declaration on provincial autonomy, the alliance was still not adequately united.  
                                                        
1081 Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.13. 
1082 Viewpoint, XI (28), 20 February 1986, p.12. 
1083 Viewpoint, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12. 
1084 Viewpoint, XI (52), 7 August 1986. 
1085 Ayaz  Amir,  ‘Adjusting  to  reality:  better  late  than  never’,  Viewpoint, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.18. 
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 Individual parties in the alliance continued to squabble with each other.  There was an attempt to force greater unity among parties on the Left.1086 Five Left-wing parties – MKP, NDP, PNP, QMA, and Awami Tehreek – were eager to merge the parties into one,1087 and finally emerged as a united Awami National Party (ANP).1088 The parties such as SAT, and ANP who were part of the MRD established the Sindh National Alliance under the leadership of G.M. Syed, the anti-MRD leader of Jiye Sindh Mahaz.  Nawabzada Nasrullah declared in an interview that this was due to the failure of MRD to keep the parties intact.1089 
The Return of Benazir Bhutto: According to the civil resistance scholarship, the leader or group of the leaders plays a key role in the success of a movement. In the culture of South Asia, the importance of the leaders is like that of a devta (deity); the devotion accorded to leaders in South Asia frequently has a quasi-religious quality, with followers having a faith in their leader that is generally unrealistic about what they are capable of achieving.  It also tends to preclude questions and prevents any debate about their suitability or qualities as leaders.   After a decade-long struggle against the regime, BB had become the devta of the majority of the Pakistani people, who considered her as a Messiah. The receivers and bearers of the longest and toughest punishments, the workers had built up highest expectations from her. Likewise, being the largest party and having 
                                                        
1086 Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.13. 
1087 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.17. 
1088 According to a US embassy report, the alliance was supported with the help of Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan. On the day of its formation, several Afghan diplomats were present there. Abdul Wali 
Khan. 
1089 Nawabzada  Nasrullah  Khan,  cited  in  Husain  Naqi,   ‘More  Sinned  against  Sinning’,  Viewpoint, XIII 
(42), 26 May 1988, p.18.  
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strong public support, PPP indeed was believed to strengthen the alliance. Unlike the 1981-84 period of the anti-Zia resistance, BB mainly remained free during the 1985-88 period with the exception of a few brief arrests, so the smaller parties in the alliance had expected more from her and her party to run a successful campaign against the regime. Unfortunately, BB failed to respond to both groups for two major reasons. One was the unmanageable split in the PPP due to numerous reasons, including her undemocratic behaviour in running the party. The other was its go-it-alone policy.  On the declaration of the annulment of the martial law, BB was in exile in 
the	   UK.	   Seeing	   the	   Junejo	   government’s	   commitment	   to	   restore	   the	   political	  parties and the democratic culture in the country, BB decided to return to Pakistan.  Reorganising her party, securing the federation of Pakistan, struggling for holding the free and fair election under 1973 constitution and establishing a 
people’s	   government	   in	   that	   result	   were	   her	   major	   political	   targets	   on	   her	  return to Pakistan. She had taken the lesson from her father of not being rigid and dictator in party affairs, which led to his downfall and death.1090 She chalked out her programme to pressurize the government in three steps.1091  1. 'Seeing and meeting' the people.  2. To organize peaceful demonstrations/court arrest.  3. After December, if the regime failed to lift up the martial law as promised, then decisive struggle would be launched.  
                                                        
1090 Abbas Kazim, Benazir Bhutto Beti, p.32. 
1091 The Struggle, issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, p4. 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
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Some scholars1092 as well as the government took the return of the BB to Pakistan as the revival of the democratic culture in the country.  The concerned quarters assumed that an agreement between the General and BB paved the way smooth to her return. The current research confirms that there was a deal that was secured between the General and BB under very strong pressure from 
America.	  	  Junejo’s	  push	  for	  greater	  democracy	  was	  not	  an	  element in this.   To check the political water in the country, Mumtaz Bhutto, and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi returned to Pakistan after fifteen months of self-exile on 7 February 1986 and 21 March 1986 respectively. After the reshuffling of PPP in Sindh, Jatoi was believed	  to	  have	  become	  an	  opponent	  of	  BB’s	   leadership.	   	  His	  followers planned a mammoth welcome for him and were supported in this by pro-Zia MNAs.  The sources report that more than three million rupees were spent for this welcome show. Newspapers gave a figure of 50,000 who came to 
receive	  Jatoi.	  	  However,	  the	  PPP’s	  die-hard workers took over the show chanting the slogan wazir-i-azam Benazir (Prime Minister Benazir) instead. 1093 However, the assassination of Noora, the servant of ZAB, in his house along with his niece on 3 February 1986 led BB to suspect that it was a political assassination. 1094 
                                                        
1092 Abbas Kazim, Benazir Bhutto Beti, p.28. 
1093 Viewpoint, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.29. 
1094 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.22. 
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Figure 6 welcome receptions to BB on her return to Pakistan on 10 April 1986. 
Taken from Viewpoint 17 April 1986.   On 5 February 1986, BB announced that she would return to Pakistan.  Following this, the MRD organised twenty-three public rallies in Punjab alone on 23 March 1986 demanding a fresh election and the resignation of General Zia.1095  On	  BB’s	  revealing	  the	  intentional	  plan	  of	  creating unrest in Punjab, the US Embassy sources1096 stated that BB believed that blocking roads and closing down the factories would create unrest in Punjab province. To counter the unrest, the regime would call in the army, which would refuse to fire on its fellow Punjabis. Resultantly, the army would remove General Zia and hold elections.  
                                                        
1095 Viewpoint, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.22. 
1096 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   Directorate   of   Intelligence,   “Pakistan:   Prospects   for   the  
Junejo  Government”,  November  1986,  24  November  2013,  CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, 
NARA, College Park, MD. p.6. 
 252 
BB arrived in Lahore on 10 April 1986 to a mammoth welcome.  This showed that the province was still the stronghold of PPP.1097 In the last nine-and-a-half years, the regime tried hard to root Bhutto(ism) out of the country using the tactics such as buying off big political families like Jatoi in Sindh and Khar in Punjab, 1098 through media and judicial trials;1099 and the torture and the murders of PPP workers. However, the reception on her arrival rejected all their evil efforts.1100 Viewpoint,	   in	   its	   editorial,	   summarised	   her	   arrival	   stating	   ‘Can	  the Phoenix of democracy in Pakistan rise again from its ashes and obtain for itself a longer span of life?  ...the prospects of such a resurrection have become 
much	  brighter.’1101 The stupendous reception to BB revealed the affection and adoration of the people towards their leader who had stood firm against the harsh regime for eight-and-a-half years. It was the demonstration of their reverence to the dead body but living soul of ZAB. The fifteen-kilometre passage from Lahore airport to the Iqbal Park, the place of the public gathering, took ten hours to cover the distance, in which, according to conservative counting, 700,000 persons participated.1102 Likewise, on 5 July 1986, 100 small and large towns in Sind came to a standstill to welcome her back to her home province. Fruit, vegetables, and cigarettes were not available that day.1103 It demonstrated that the people of Pakistan still stood for democracy, and their right of freedom to live, think and act freely in the country. 
                                                        
1097 Abbas Kazim, Benazir Bhutto Beti, (Ikhlaq Hussain and Company, Lahore:1986), p.5. Viewpoint, XI 
(34), 10 April 1986, p.19. 
1098 Azhar Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara Saal (Lahore, year is missing),p.42. 
1099 Abbas Kazim, Benazir Bhutto Beti, p.23. 
1100 Roedad Khan, Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998), p.92. 
1101 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.5. 
1102 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13. 
1103 The Struggle, issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, p.3. 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
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 On her arrival, every politician, friend and foe, political analysts, national and international media and the general public, were anxious to hear of her plans in the current political scenario. Amongst the domestic and foreign policies,1104 she affirmed her struggle for democracy, rejected the December referendum, asked General Zia-ul-Haq	  ‘to	  leave	  (the	  country)	  gracefully’,1105 and expressed	  her	   readiness	   to	   accept	   Junejo’s	   government	   as	   a	   caretaker	   to	  hold	  
free	   and	   fair	   election	  on	   the	  party	  basis.	  Her	   action	  plan	  was	   “Throw	  Zia	   out,	  
Bring	  in	  Democracy.”1106 Addressing the suppressed sections of the society – the labourers – she made her commitment to raise the minimum wages of a labour to 1,000 rupees ($63) per month.1107  Moreover, she repudiated any policy of 
revenge	   for	   her	   father’s	   murder.	   By	   refraining	   from	   vengeance,	   she	   gave	   the	  message to the Pakistan army in general that her access to the power of the country would neither bring any misery to either the institution or any individual.  Pakistani political analysts and workers compared her return to 
Pakistan	  with	  Cory	  Aquino’s	  struggle	  and	  return.1108   
                                                        
1104 Domestic policy: Resignation of President Zia and new party-based elections, release of all 
political prisoners, full restoration of 1973 Constitution, raising the minimum wage to 1,000 rupees 
($63) per month, rehiring of workers fired from government enterprises, mixed economy; no further 
nationalization of industries, ceiling on landholdings, reduction of taxes for small farmers while 
imposing agricultural taxes on large landowners. Foreign policy: genuinely nonaligned foreign policy, 
equally good relations with US and the Soviet union, aid with no strings attached, withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan and return of Afghan refugees (PPP was publicly silent on issue of 
direct talks with Kabul), and gradual normalisation of relations with India on basis of 1972 bilateral 
Simla Accord. Cited in Near Eastern and South Asia  Office,   “Pakistan  People’s  Party:  Pretenders   to  
the   Throne”,   Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.28. 
1105 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13. 
1106 Near Eastern and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.27. 
1107 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13. 
1108 The Struggle, issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
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 Revealing her three-staged strategy to achieve her objectives to a US diplomat,1109 she said that the first would be a series of political rallies across Pakistan in April and May to exhibit the popularity of the party. Boosting up the morale and enthusiasm of the party workers before the reorganisation of the 
party,	   and	   the	   call	   for	   ‘nonviolent	   civil	  disobedience	  movement	   – fasts, labour 
strikes,	  and	  demonstrations’	  – as stated by BB were laid down the second and third strategies respectively for the campaign. Her aim was to force the government to hold a new election by the autumn of 1986.1110  A deal between BB and General Zia-ul-Haq was made before her return to Pakistan, which was managed by the Americans. This was revealed both in interviews1111 and documented evidence.  BB, who before going into exile publicly blamed the Pakistan Army vis-à-vis Zia and the USA as murderers of her father and refused any agreement with the regime and the General on any terms, now returned to Pakistan after a secret understanding with her adversaries.  She had understood the realpolitik of the world.1112 Stephen P. Cohen, while denying any written agreement between the parties, saw it as an 
                                                        
1109 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.27. 
1110 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.27. 
1111 Asif  Butt,  the  student   leader  of  Pakistan  People’s  Party,  and  a  member  of  the  militant  anti- Zia 
struggle from Kabul 1979-84. Interview with the researcher, 26 February 2012, Lahore; Dr. Mehdi 
Hassan, Professor of Journalism, and PPP worker, interview with the researcher May 2013 Lahore; 
Dr. Mubashar Hassan, the architecture of Socialist manifest of PPP, Federal Minister during ZAB 
government, ex-General Secretary of PPP, interview with the researcher 28 May 2012 Lahore. 
1112 Asif Butt, interview with the researcher. 
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‘understanding’:	   ‘It	   was	   not	   the	   deal	   but	   the	   understanding.	   These	   are	   not	  formal agreements but probably verbal understandings between	  officials.’1113   During the last decade of the Zia regime, the USA exerted a powerful influence over his regime due to their unrestricted penetration in the 
government’s	  business.1114 Knowing the fact on her return, Benazir developed her strategy not to antagonise USA and its allies but Zia-ul-Haq alone during her 
resistance	  campaign.	  Analysing	  the	  evidence,	  Abdullah	  Malik	   in	  his	  book	   ‘Teen 
Virastain’,	   and	   Babar	   Ali	   in	   his	   article	   ‘Where	   is	   the	   Opposition	   in	   Pakistan’	  stated that BB not only stopped four party workers burning the USA flag during her welcome rally but expelled the workers from the party who did that. Moreover, she clarified that her democratic struggle was not against the Pakistan Army but General Zia.1115 Ian Talbot does not confirm the existence of any evidence showing an agreement; however he does not root out the 
possibility	  either.	  ‘I	  mean	  there	  is	  not	  much	  evidence	  of	  this.	  BB	  would	  probably	  
be	  given	  the	  green	   light	   to	  return.	   	  And	  that’s	  kind	  of	   indication,	  do	  not	   forget	  that Zia has civilianised	  his	  martial	  law	  by	  this	  stage.’	  	  He	  further	  stated	  that	  the	  General was looking around for some kind of exit strategy, some kind of working agreement, as long as it was on his terms, with BB and PPP.1116  However, her trip to Washington and Saudi Arabia before returning to Pakistan, the absence of the popular slogan, Asia Surkh Hai1117 (Asia is red vis-à-
vis	  communist)	   in	  PPP’s	  meetings	  before	   the	  arrival	  of	  BB	   in	  Pakistan	  and,	  on	                                                          
1113 Stephen P. Cohen, Ex-Official of State Department USA on Pakistan and the best friend of 
General Zia-ul-Haq, interview with the researcher, 20 November 2013, Washington D.C. 
1114 Rehman, Pakistan under Siege, pp.277-80. 
1115 Abdullah Malik, Benazir; Teen Virastain, p.90.  Babar  Ali,   ‘Where  is  the  Opposition  in  Pakistan?’,  
Economic and Political Weekly, XXII (47), 5-12 September, 1987, pp.1538-1539.  
1116 Ian Talbot, Interview with the Researcher, 9 July 2013, The University of Warwick (Coventry).  
1117 Viewpoint, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.14. 
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the	  day	  of	   arrival,	  BB’s	   forbidding	  her	  workers	   from chanting slogans such as 
‘America	  ka	  ju	  Yaar	  hi,	  Ghaddar	  Ghaddar	  Hi’1118 (A friend of America is a traitor) indicated the agreement among BB, USA and the Army. The uncharitable 
comment	   from	  her	   rivals	  was	   that	  she	  was	   ‘an	  Aquino’1119 returning along the 
‘“old	  route”	  to	  political power – London-Washington-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan.’1120 She responded that the purpose of her visit was to ensure that aid – the USA approved $4.02 billion after her trip – was given to Pakistan conditional on the human rights situation in the country, and to thank the State Department for getting her released last summer.1121 However she later criticised the Western aid for strengthening the Zia regime.1122   Moreover, on the eve of Libya-USA	   crisis,	   the	   call	   of	   the	   US’s	   Seventh	  Fleet Ships at Karachi port, the action in Gadoon,	   and	  her	  own	  party’s	  protest	  
against	   the	   USA’s	   aggression,	   BB’s	   trip	   to	   Washington	   DC	   brought	   harsh	  criticism from her rivals as well as from her own party workers. Col. Moammer Qaddafi1123 of Libya was a close ally of ZAB, and it was he who had supported Pakistan financially on	   ZAB’s	   request	   after	   the	   East-Pakistan debacle. The US 
intelligence	   reports	   of	   November	   1986	   clearly	   defined	   the	   US’s	   cordial	  relationship with BB, though was still wary of her.1124 It stated BB would maintain cordial relationships with USA; however, her government in future 
                                                        
1118 Mazhar Abbas, Interview with the researcher, 13 March 2012, Karachi. 
1119 Viewpoint, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.14. 
1120 Husain  Naqi,  ‘The  City  waits  with  bated  breath’,  Viewpoint, XI(33), 3 April 1986, p.19. 
1121 Voice of America, cited in Viewpoint, XI (33), 3 April 1986, p.14. 
1122 Benazir Bhutto, Interview to BBC Urdu Service, 11 May 1988. 
1123 He was the Libyan leader and the USA was hostile to his regime. 
1124 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.31. 
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could diverge from US policy interests on issues such as Afghanistan, narcotics, and nuclear non-proliferation. 1125  Mazhar Abbas stated in an interview that BB had understood where power lay in the world, therefore she adjusted with it.1126 Her stepping away from her previous position led to a difference of opinion with Murtaza Bhutto, who claimed that she must be power-thirsty	  to	  shake	  hands	  with	  their	  father’s	  murderers. 1127  Her assurance to not create any problem for the civil government on her return1128 indicated the Noora kushti (fake wrestling) between the two parties. It meant that she had accepted the general election of 1985 and compromised on the demand of MRD for the reelection. Contrarily, BB asserted that	   ‘this	   represented	   a	   message	   to	   the	   United	   States	   to	   stop	  
supporting	  dictatorships’.1129  It was not always easy for BB to win support for her change of stance from the rank-and-file of the PPP workers. In the CEC meeting in Karachi from 30 January to 1 February 1988, the party passed a 
resolution	  to	  maintain	  its	  previous	  position	  of	  ‘Islam	  is	  our	  creed.	  Democracy	  is	  
our	   polity,	   socialism	   is	   our	   economy,	   and	   all	   power	   to	   the	   people.’1130 Senior Vice-President of the party Shaikh Mohammad Rashid reiterated that the	  party’s	  manifesto for the election to come would be a socialist one.1131  The biggest challenge for BB lay in re-organising the party and keeping it 
united.	  Despite	  the	  welcome	  she	  received	  in	  April	  1986,	  BB’s	  control	  over	  party	                                                          
1125 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.31. 
1126 Mazhar Abbas, Interview with the researcher, 13 March 2013, Karachi. 
1127 Agha Muhammad Waseem, Skype Interview with the researcher,  2013 from Sweden. 
1128 Husain  Naqi,  ‘The  City  waits  with  bated  breath’,  Viewpoint, XI(33), 3 April 1986, p.19. 
1129 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.14. 
1130 Viewpoint XIII (27), 11 February 1988, p.11. 
1131 Viewpoint XIII (28), 18 February 1988, p.16. 
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workers had decreased. It was visible when BB directed the party workers in 
Multan	  to	  vote	  for	  Yousaf	  Raza	  Gillani’s	  group	  for	  the	  Chairman	  Multan	  district.	  All except one favoured the opposing candidate, Shah Mahmood Qureishi.1132 Without unity, BB knew it would be hard to accomplish her plans as mentioned above.   M.B. Naqvi, a renowned journalist and an activist, placed two important 
issues	  before	  PPP	  after	  BB’s	  return.	   	  One	  was	   to	  get	   the	  army	  to	  return	  to	  the	  barracks, and the second was to enthuse the masses for their continuous participation in politics.1133  In effect, a revolution was needed to remove the military from political power, and for this, the party needed mass enthusiasm and support.  The journalist pointed out that three major steps were required to mobilise the general public: the charisma and credibility of the party leadership should be revived among the masses; the idealistic programme of the revolution that would inspire the youth should be developed; and the third capability was to guide the people on all questions as they arose from day to day.1134   BB did not act democratically in her nominations of office-bears for the party. She depended on names given to her by her close aides.  These were often based on personal friendship or companionship in jail.1135  Names that the aides disapproved of were absent from the list handed over to BB.1136   A dissident group in PPP accused her of violating party procedures in this respect.  This so-
called	  ‘Gang	  of	  Four’	  – Malik Meiraj Khalid, Rao Rashid, Afzal Sandhu, and Mian 
                                                        
1132 Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, Chah Yousaf Se Sada, p.109. 
1133 M.B.Naqvi,  ‘PPP’s  Dilemma-IV:  The  Ultimate  Test’,  Viewpoint, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.20. 
1134 M.B.Naqvi,‘PPP’s  Dilemma-IV:  The  Ultimate  Test’,  Viewpoint, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.20. 
1135 Jahangir Badar, interview with the researcher, 5 May 2012, Islamabad. Shahid Sheikh, interview 
with researcher, 5 May 2012, Islamabad  
1136 Asif Butt, Interview with the researcher, 26 February 2012, Lahore. 
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Ehsanul Haq – resigned from the CEC of the party in protest. One of their major grievances concerned the appointment of Rana Shaukat Mahmood as the President of PPP-Punjab.  Undoubtedly many of the nominations were based on merit such as those of Salman Taseer, Malik Hakmeen Khan, Gen (rtd.) Tikka Khan; however such nomination not only strengthened the rifts between the dissident group and the Co-Chairperson, but it also set the undemocratic tone of nominating the office bearers of a democratic party, which has continued ever since.  Sh. Rashid, the Senior Vice-Chairman of PPP, in his interview accused the party of abandoning its socialist principles and acting in a neo-imperial way in this respect. To back this up, he stated that his party workers were beaten in the 
party	  meeting	  of	  Qilla	   Gujjar	   Singh	  on	   the	   ‘charge’	   of	   raising	   socialist	   slogans.	  His membership was also suspended.1137 Dr. Mubasher Hassan, a member of the Principles Committee, reiterated the demand for holding of intra-party elections from the levels of Chairperson down to union councils so as to strengthen the party throughout the country.1138  This all revealed that BB and other senior leaders had not learnt from their own experiences during eight years of harsh struggle and exile and were continuing in the old authoritarian and unjust ways.  Furthermore, BB failed to reconcile the right-wingers and left-wingers in the party. Right-wingers of PPP eventually made BB remove Dr Ghulam Hussain, a left-winger, from the Secretary General position of the party, being replaced by General Tikka Khan.1139  Workers formed a committee against the action. 3000 workers in Pakistan marked the first anniversary of the hanging of Irdees Toti, 
                                                        
1137 Shaikh Rashid, interview with Viewpoint. Cited in Viewpoint, XIII (33), 24 March 1988, p.29. 
1138 Dr. Mubashar Hassan, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (40), 12 May 1988, p.17. 
1139 The Struggle, 7 (Winter 1986-7), p.10. 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
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Idris Beg, and Usman Ghani in Lahore to show solidarity with Dr. Ghulam Hussain.1140  Moreover, she failed to apprehend the emerging circumstances in Sindh. The weekly magazine Viewpoint reported similar reasons behind the resignations –‘lack	  of	   democracy	   in	   the	  party,	   top-down decision making, and the enforcement of these decisions without the active involvement of the cadre 
and	   the	   absence	  of	   a	   responsive	  organisational	   structure.’1141 In less than two years, Sindh saw three provincial heads of the party: Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, President of the party in Sindh was dismissed on grounds that he had enjoyed a suspiciously long and firm relationship with the Zia regime; his successor, Makhdoom Khaliq-uz-Zaman, was then removed; and his successor, Mir Hazar Khan Bajrani, resigned in January 1988 after his failure in the local election in December 1987. An MNA told US diplomats that Zia had contacted Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Ghulam Mustafa Khar as potential partners to break the power of PPP and to campaign against BB. 1142  After some time, Jatoi and Khar 
from	   Punjab	   had	   established	   National	   People’s	   Party1143 in August 1986 in retaliation, collecting the moderate and anti-Bhutto elements of PPP.1144 The government continued hounding PPP-Sindh	   leaders	   to	   join	   Zia’s	   party,	   and	  
                                                        
1140 The Struggle, 6 (Winter) 1985-6, p.3. 601/R/23/19, MRC. 
1141 Viewpoint, XIII (24), 21 August 1988, p.14. 
1142 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   Directorate   of   Intelligence,   “Pakistan:   Prospects   for   the  
Junejo  Government”,  November  1986,  24  November  2013,  CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, 
NARA, College Park, MD. p.10. 
1143 The   opposing   group   of   PPP   named   it   National   ‘Puppet’   Party   due   to   its   split   done   by   the  
establishment. 
1144 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
Directorate of Intelligence, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-
RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.29. 
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achieved this when Talib-ul-Maula of Hala joined the official Muslim League in March 1988.1145  The rivalry of the SPBM of Mumtaz Bhutto – who	   also	   shared	   ZAB’s	  legacy – and the rise of ethnic-based politics in the shape of MQM dramatically altered the course of politics in the province. The major reason of the change of 
BB’s	  policy	  was	  the	  defeat of PPP in local elections December 1987 throughout much of the country including Punjab and Sindh, with further divisions in the election between urban and rural politics. The recently-emerged Muhajjir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)1146 swept the election in Karachi and Hyderabad, whereas Sindh-Baluchistan-Pukhtoon Front (SBPF) won in Northern Sindh as well as in the majority of Karachi District councils.1147  The only major exception to this was in victories under Aftab Sherpao  in Peshawer.   In general, PPP, vis-à-vis BB, was outclassed in the local body elections of 1987.    PPP was now at the lowest ebb in its decade-long struggle against the regime.  The optimism felt when the mammoth crowd received BB at Lahore airport less than a year before vanished as the results of the polls came in, 
caused	   by	   the	   party’s	   (and	   BB’s)	  missteps.	   Seeing	   the	   defeat	   of	   his	   archrival, General Zia – on 29 December 1987 – firmly rejected holding a general election before the term of the existing parliament expired in 1990. On the other hand, 
the	   civic	   polls	   led	   to	   a	   change	   in	   BB’s	   demands,	   from	   re-election to the 
‘guarantee	   for	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   in	   1990’,	   and	   she	   appealed	   for	   renewed	  
struggle	   for	   justice	   and	   people’s	   rights	   in	   the	   new	   year	   of	   1988.1148  In her                                                         
1145 Viewpoint, XIII (35), 7 April 1988, p.34. 
1146 MQM represents Urdu speaking migrants from India except those who came from East Punjab. 
1147 Viewpoint, XIII (23), 14 Janaury 1988, pp.9-10. 
1148 Viewpoint, XIII (22), 7 January 1988, p.34. 
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interview to a Karachi Daily,1149 BB	   confessed	   that	   ‘wherever	   the	   party	   was	  
divided…we	  did	  not	  do	  well.	  ’1150  She attributed it in part to the employment of untrained political workers in the elections instead of those who had 
experienced	   ‘jail,	   street	   and	   back’.	   	   	   	   Equally,	   she	   also	   pointed out the 
conspicuous	   role	   of	  money:	   ‘a	  minimum	  of	  Rs.100,000	  per	   constituency	  were	  
needed	   by	   the	   PPP	   to	   give	   a	   decent	   fight’	   in	   the	   election,	   which	   also	  worked	  against them.  Not only was it a setback to the party itself, but also to the MRD, as the party	  represented	  a	  large	  chunk	  of	  the	  alliance’s	  strength.	    Reorganisation of the party was sorely needed after this debacle.  BB 
called	  for	  a	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  the	  party’s	  office	  bearers,	  and	  she	  appointed	  a	  new team in Punjab under Rana Shaukat Mahmood, President of PPP-Punjab.1151  She held an internal party election in Punjab in June 1987. According to the US consulate to Lahore, the elections resulted in a stronger and more unified PPP in Punjab.1152  However, the most conspicuous outcome of the new team was the lack of focus on the struggle to remove General Zia and demand for fresh elections.  BB was now accused by radicals of adopting a quietist approach.  The Struggle, a bi-annual	  journal,	  criticised	  her	  policy	  of	  ‘wait	  
and	  see’	  and	  talked	  of	  ‘Benazir’s	  Gandhism’,	  as	  BB	  refrained	  from	  deploying	  any	  violence to achieve her objectives.  
                                                        
1149 Benazir Bhutto, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (23), 14 January 1988, pp.15-16. 
1150 Benazir Bhutto, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (23), 14 January 1988, p.16. 
1151 Provincial General Secretaries Gen. (rtd) Tikka Khan, and Mumtaz Ahmad Kahlon, Vice-Presidents 
Arif Iqbal Bhattti, Pervaiz Saleh, Fakhar Zaman, and Chaudhry Mohammad Ikram, Additional General 
Secretary Malik Hakmeen Khan, Finance Secretary Syed Nazim Hussain Shah, Information Secretary 
Salman Taseer, Public Relations Secretary Col. (rtd) Sarwar Cheema, Secretary Records  Begum 
Rehana Sarwar, Secretary Events Ghulam Abbas. Cited in Viewpoint, XIII (32), 17 March 1988, p.14. 
1152  Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   ‘Evolving   Party   Politics   in   Pakistan’,   Directorate of 
Intelligence, October 1987, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP88T000700920001-4, p.7. 
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 In all of this, there were tensions between the strategies of BB and the MRD.  This had started when BB was still in the USA, when she stated the Junejo government was the first step towards democracy. Her statement received 
heavy	   criticism	   in	   the	   Central	   Action	   Committee’s	   meeting	   of	   MRD	   in	   March	  1986 in Karachi.1153  This	   committee	   described	   the	   Junejo’s	   government	   as	   a	  
‘gimmick’;	   democracy	   was	   yet	   to	   come.	   The	   committee	   condemned the continued incarceration of hundreds of political workers and demanded their immediate release. One resolution also demanded the release of workers of other parties such as Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo of Sindhi Awami Tehreek.  The meeting, nonetheless, seemed to be confronted with its own internal conflict, as it also said the emergence of factions would not be tolerated.1154  The party held a public meeting alongside this in which 15,000 party workers participated. The meeting asked the unconstitutional government to quit, and re-hold the election according to the 1973 Constitution.1155   Seeing the stupendous reception on her return to Pakistan, BB wanted to exploit the situation in her favour in an early election.1156  She was at that juncture reluctant to enter into an electoral alliance with MRD, whereas the smaller parties of the alliance were well aware of their fate in the proposed 
immediate	  election.	  According	  to	  the	  US	  consulate	  in	  Lahore’s	  cable,	  they	  were	  
reluctant	   to	   support	   the	   PPP’s	   demand,	   and	   asked	   for	   a	   ‘prearranged	  
                                                        
1153 Viewpoint, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.17. 
1154 Viewpoint, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.15. 
1155 Viewpoint, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.17. 
1156 Mahmood Mirza, Aaj Ka Sindh, p.86. 
 264 
apportionment	   of	   parliamentary	   seats’	   between	   the	   PPP	   and	   the	   other	   MRD	  parties.1157  In the Central Action Committee meeting of MRD on 6 August, PPP agreed upon collective action against the regime if the government did not meet the election demand by 20 September. However, snubbing the collective decision, PPP called on a civil disobedience campaign on 14 August. The party asked the workers to be peaceful and disciplined during the continuous course of struggle against the post-martial law regime.    
Black Thursday (14 August 1986): The unilateral decision by PPP to launch a campaign of civil resistance on 14 August was a humiliation for the MRD, which had agreed that individual parties should not act on their own in this respect.1158  The MRD had already planned a public meeting at Mochi Gate in Lahore on 14 August 1986, and PPP took the lead in turning this into the launch of the civil disobedience movement.  PML had also planned to organise a public gathering at Minar-i-Pakistan on the same day, to be addressed by Prime Minister Junejo.1159   TI and JUP decided not to participate, but its local organisations were involved individually in the campaign.   This all created an explosive situation on that day.  The MRD leaders tried to maintain peace. When Junejo and the MRD had their public assemblies in Lahore not very far from each other, the senior leaders of MRD took quick 
                                                        
1157  Near Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   ‘Evolving   Party   Politics   in   Pakistan’,   Directorate of 
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1158 Shabbir Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal, pp.132-33.; Viewpoint, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12. 
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action	   to	   stop	   its	   workers	   from	   engaging	   themselves	   with	   the	   government’s	  supporters who were tearing down their posters.1160  They were unable however to stop the violence that then exploded throughout the city.   
 
Figure 7 Provinicial Government's violent response to the MRD's peaceful protest on 14 August 
1986 in Lahore. Taken from Viewpoint 19 August 1986 The Shaheen Squad of the Punjab police took charge of dealing with the protest 
of	  14	  August	  at	  Mochi	  Gate.	   	  One	  of	   the	  accounts	  of	   the	  day	  stated	  that	   ‘in	   the	  morning the situation was deceptively calm. A group of us pundits who toured 
the	  city	  confidently	  said	  that	  nothing	  “much”	  would	  happen.	  A	   few hours later we were eating our words as the Circular Road and the innumerable lanes feeding it erupted into the worst street battles the city has seen since the height 
                                                        
1160 Viewpoint, XII (1), 14 August 1986, p.5. 
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of	  the	  PNA	  agitation	  in	  1977.’1161    The Lohari Police Station, on the way to the Mochi Gate, was besieged and attacked by protestors. According to a Government	  Press	  note,	   ‘the	  police	  used	   tear gas shells and fires in the air to 
disperse	   the	  mob	  which	  was	   bent	   upon	   setting	   the	   police	   station	   on	   fire’.1162  The press, however, accused the police of the embattled garrison of using 
excessive	   force:	   ‘Forget	   about	   lathis and	   teargas…Bullets	   were	   used	   with	   an	  abandon rare ever by our permissive standards.  Shaheen Squad toughs were firing their Chinese-made	   Kalashnikovs	   at	   the	   slightest	   provocation’.1163 Four people were killed at the spot. A joint press conference of District Magistrate Lahore and the Deputy Inspector-General	   of	   Police	   agreed	   that	   ‘none	   of	   the	  
processionists	  was	  found	  carrying	  firearms.’1164  Nonetheless, Shabbir Ibn-i-Adil stated in his book that it was policemen who were killed on the day by the mob.1165  The media reported that undoubtedly the protestors had brick-batted the police from two sides, from Bansanwala Bazar and Shah Alam Market. But the arrival of the reinforcements to rescue them altered the power in favour of the police. Firing with Lee Enfield rifles, they killed a protestor on the spot, followed by three more.1166 These four were PPP workers, and were named as Sheikh Muhammad Sarwar, Secretary PPP Okara Tehsil, Muhammad Zafar Iqbal of Kharian, Azmat Butt of Akbari Mandi Lahore, and Babu of Seetla Mandir Lahore.  The government press note on the day did not mention the killing of any policemen during the attack on the police station but stated rather that                                                         
1161 Ayaz  Amir,  ‘Courage  at  the  Barricade’,  Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18. 
1162 Government of Punjab Press Note, cited in Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.13. 
1163 Ayaz  Amir,  ‘Courage  at  the  Barricade’,  Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18. 
1164 District Magistrate Lahore and Deputy Inspector General of Police Lahore, Press Conference, 
cited in Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.13. 
1165 Shabbir Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal, pp.133-34. 
1166 Ayaz  Amir,  ‘Courage  at  the  Barricade’,  Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18. 
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‘twenty-six members of law-enforcement agencies received injuries of various 
description…’1167 Ayaz Amir in his article blamed Nawaz Sharif, the then-Chief Minister of Punjab and his advisors for being culpable in the killing of the protestors.1168  And Husain Naqi, a journalist, described it as revealing the 
‘power	   and	   might	   of	   the	   rising	   strength	   of	   Muslim	   League	   under	   Nawaz	  
Sharif’.1169 The use of violence against the demonstrators, the large majority of 
whom	  were	  peaceful,	  validated	  the	  MRD’s	  belief	  that	  the	  country	  was	  still	  under	  martial law.   Already on 13 August a major crackdown had started all over the country, including in Multan, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore in Punjab. The 
People’s	  Lawyer	  forum	  took	  out	  a	  procession	  on	  13	  August	  in	  favour	  of	  MRD’s	  recent agenda as well to demand the release of political prisoners that was baton charged by the police, with seventeen being taken into custody briefly. On 14 August, it was reported that magistrates of the areas were asked to be in the police station with ready-made orders of detention from three to fifteen days for the political arrestees.1170    There were similar measures in Sindh also.  BB was arrested in Karachi and sent to the Central Jail for thirty days. Later on, the government registered a case of rebellion against her; however she was released from the jail on 8 September. Two deaths occurred after street clashes in the city.1171 In Peshawar and Quetta arrests continued before and after the 14 August. Police carried out lathi (wooden stick) charge and tear-gassed crowds 
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in Peshawar.1172  On 29 December during the question hour in the Senate, it was stated that 37 persons were killed and 217 were injured in total during the campaign1173, whereas 150 political leaders and workers were detained on 14 August alone for fifteen days, according	  to	  the	  government	  functionary’s	  press	  conference.1174 Thirty deaths, mainly in Karachi and rural Sindh, were recorded over a two-week period of the movement. Thirteen people were killed on 14 August alone.1175 The regime banned the public rallies, and rounded up five thousand political leaders and workers including BB,1176 as claimed the Sind PPP leaders.1177 The violence mainly initiated by the regime was contrary to 
Junejo’s	  stated	  policy	  of	  respecting	  the	  opposition’s	  right	  to	  protest.	  	  The	  regime	  blamed the MRD protestors for the disturbances, but this lacked credibility.  This attempted campaign of civil disobedience failed.   The MRD leaders except those of PPP were reluctant to launch such a campaign at an immature stage, and there was a lack of overall coordination. The gathering of over a million to welcome Benazir had led her to have inflated hopes of such a protest, which was a miscalculation.  As it was, she could not even make the most of the five deaths in the police firings of 14 August. According to US embassy sources,  BB blamed Punjab for the failure of the campaign. 1178  She asserted that she felt deceived by the local Punjabi leaders who kept away from the campaign.  This                                                         
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was unfair, as there was strong Punjabi involvement.  From Sialkot to Multan, party workers, lawyers, student bodies of MRD including Tehreek-i-Istiqlal’s	  Sialkot President Mr. Khurshid Alam, and Mr Khudai Nur of Quetta were arrested.1179  Workers were on the streets chanting slogans against the regime. 
More	   than	  500	  were	  arrested	  or	   injured.	   	  This	  all	   reveals	   that	  BB’s	  accusation	  against Punjab was wholly unjustified.   Although BB publicly stated that the removal of Makhdoom Khaliq-uz-Zaman from his post was because of his failure to mobilise the people during this campaign, the American embassy reported 
that	  it	  was	  due	  to	  his	  public	  criticism	  of	  PPP’s	  Punjab	  President	  Jahangir	  Badar 
for	   his	   failure	   to	   bring	   ‘Punjabis’	   out	   in	   support	   of	   the	   campaign.1180  BB’s	  ambitious plan to win over Punjab had faltered badly.1181  PPP resumed public rallies in Sind and Punjab after the failure of the August civil disobedience in an attempt to restore the	   morale	   of	   the	   party’s	  workers. However, according to the US consulate in Lahore, she attracted only relatively small crowds.1182  A peasant rally was held at Toba Tek Singh by PPP in October 1986 that BB addressed.  Due to the less mobilisation by the PPP’s	  workers 30,000, fewer than expected came to the gathering.1183 Later, BB confessed that the opposition movement was unprepared for the August 
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confrontation1184, and her political party direly needed (re)organisation to transform its popularity into a force that could remove the general. 
MRD and PPP Smaller parties in MRD complained of the highhandedness and ignoring of their opinions by PPP.  TI left the coalition on the issue of the registration with the election commission as well as the Bhuttoism preaching by PPP. Moreover, the muted criticism by BB towards the USA made for a hostile relationship with the far-left parties of the coalition, which wanted to have a more radical approach to the political events in the country especially given the role of the USA in 
‘prolonging	   the	   Afghan	   war	   and	   endangering	   Pakistan’s	   security’.1185 PPP 
condemned	  the	  resolution	  proposed	  by	  the	  six	  leftist	  parties	  in	  MRD’s	  meeting	  
in	  June	  against	  the	  US’s	  policy	  towards	  the	  war.1186 Likewise, PPP had strained relations with the ANP on the issue of provincial autonomy.  In mid-August 1987, MRD held the conference of opposition parties including those outside of the MRD, but PPP walked out over the issue of the signing the declaration of the conference at the end, leaving the meeting in disarray.  MRD was inactive over the next few months, holding only insignificant meetings.  A 
Viewpoint editorial	  of	  January	  1988	  stated	  of	  the	  MRD	  that	  ‘the	  setback	  has	  not	  resulted from their inability to achieve the results promised but more from their 
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failure to make earnest efforts to do so.1187  In February 1988, for the first time in the history of the struggle, the families – sisters, wives, mothers, brothers, and friends – of the political workers of PPP and NPP demonstrated in front of residence of Sheikh Rafiq Ahmad where the meeting of Central Committee of MRD was going on, to push the alliance to agitate more strongly for the release of their loved ones.1188  There was a strong feeling that the party leaders were not doing enough for the workers who had suffered much for their party work over the past decade.       Nevertheless, it did keep pressurising the government. Realising the diminishing participation from the common persons, the Central Executive 
Committee	  announced	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  ‘public	  contact	  campaign’	  in	  the	  meeting	  in Rawalpindi, and set 12 February 1988 as the date to initiate a struggle for 
‘People’s	  Sovereignty’,	  starting	   in	  Lahore.	   	  The	  objective	  was	   to	  pressurise	   the	  government to hold an election under the 1973 Constitution. The meeting, however, did not come up with any timeframe to the government for holding the election. That was the results of the failure of earlier campaigns and thus a face-saving device for the alliance. Nawabzada Nasruallah Khan, head of PDP, was also furious at	   the	   ‘state	   of	   dormancy’	   of	   the	   alliance;	   he	   rather	   stated	   it	  
should	   be	   disbanded,	   if	   it	   could	   not	   lead	   the	  masses	   against	   the	   Zia’s	   puppet	  government.1189 For	  political	  analysts,	  the	  alliance	  looked	  as	  if	  it	  was	  ‘waiting	  for	  
Godot’	  instead.1190  
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 A resolution of the Afghan issue had also become a matter of urgency, and the MRD considered how this could be brought about in a way that brought 
peace	   and	   benefited	   Pakistan.	   Junejo’s	   invitation	   to	   MRD	   for	   an	   all-political 
party’s	   roundtable	  discussion	  on	   solving	   this problem focussed their minds in this respect.     Besides these internal divides, MRD was faced with a continuing onslaught from Zia. This took several forms.1191 One was an ongoing campaign of propaganda against the alliance.   It was alleged that MRD was in alliance with the Soviet bloc and that if it gained power it would damage the interests of Western powers. The agitation in Sindh was said to be steered by India.1192  The opponents of PPP also spread rumours that a victory for the party would lead to martial law.   It was also alleged against the alliance that party-based elections would create political anarchy and a return to power of criminals.1193  PPP was said to be financed by some foreign hand such India, Iran, Libya or the Soviet Union. General Zia publicly insinuated that India backed the movement financially. However, he could not produce any proof of it. A close friend of Zia told US officials that Iran supported Nusrat Bhutto due to her being Shia.1194 The US embassy reports, however, could not find any evidence supporting this; rather, they found that funding was coming from Pakistanis sympathetic to the 
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movement at home and abroad as well as the Bhutto family assets.1195  Khwaja Alqama, son of the Khwaja Khairuddin (founding General Secretary of MRD) revealed to the researcher that PPP asked the Ahmadis – a sect which was declared to be non-Muslim by ZAB – for funding.1196  Such rumours were spread tactically to discredit the PPP and MRD in the eyes of the public.   The government also threatened the large landowners and businessmen who funded the campaigns of PPP.1197  The Junejo government announced a $120 million National Employment Fund for unemployed youth and they raised 
the	  lowest	  wages	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  counter	  the	  BB’s	  popular	  slogan	  of	  Roti, Kapra 
aur Makan (food, clothes and housing).   Besides this, the martial law courts continued punishing the political workers on the basis of their ideology.  The Peshawar Special military court sentenced ninety-eight workers including Murtaza Bhutto to long terms of imprisonment and fines for anti-state activity. 1198  Karachi Prisoners Aid 
Committee	   expressed	   misgivings	   about	   the	   government’s	   declared	   intent	   to	  release detained political prisoners. 1199  The	   Political	   Prisoners’	   Release	  Committee, comprised of talented lawyers, had been working to lessen the miseries of the political prisoners. For example, in the Libya Case, in which five persons were awarded life imprisonment, and two fourteen years, the 
committee’s	  lawyers	  managed	  to	  get	  the	  terms	  reduced	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  seven                                                         
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years as per the law.1200 Its secretary general Mr Liaqat Warraich released a list of seventy-seven persons in Punjab1201, forty-five in KPK1202, and 143 in Sindh and Baluchistan1203 who were still in jail after the declaration of the government that it had released all the prisoners in 1986, whereas the World Movement for the Restoration of Human Rights reported 1,112 political prisoners in Pakistan by January 1988.1204 Amnesty International also urged the government to release 150 political prisoners who were convicted after unfair trials under martial law, and asked it to respect the assurances given to the European 
Parliament	   that	   ‘all	   political	   prisoners	   convicted	   by	   military	   tribunal	   would	  
either	   be	   released	   or	   have	   their	   judgements	   referred	   to	   civilian	   courts’.1205 However, the government categorically rejected the former claim, and stated that military courts had convicted those claimed as political prisoners for crimes other than political.1206 Negating their own statement, the Punjab Home Department allowed a team of nine advocates to interview twenty-four political prisoners in the following weeks.1207 Moreover, the national government also disclosed that it was keeping seventy political persons on exit-control-list.1208 In February 1988 the government offered a conditional amnesty to political 
prisoners	  who	  could	  be	  considered	  ‘hardship	  cases’,	  which	  included	  those	  tried	  in absentia and those persons aged under eighteen or over sixty-five who were                                                         
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sentenced to death who should never been awarded capital punishment in the first place, or those who could prove themselves as the sole bread-winner of their family.1209 There was however a difficult procedure required to be classed 
as	  a	   ‘hardship	  case’.	   	  The	  prisoners	  had	  to	  submit	  their	  application	  within	  two	  months of the declaration of the amnesty after collecting all the relevant documents.  300 applications were submitted by March 1988, mostly by the families of the prisoners.1210    Speeches against the regime were prohibited and thirty PPP workers were registered in a Police Case under the charge of making objectionable speeches (MPO-16 and Section 188 of the Cr.PC).1211 Likewise, Pakpattan Police, one of the districts of Punjab, arrested political workers of ANP, PPP, PNP, and several others under section 144 on the charges of speaking against the police atrocities in the city.1212  BB was attacked at night at the house of a PPP leader whom she was staying with in Lahore by Major (rtd) Abdul Qayyum who said that he was looking for BB with a weapon. He was caught red-handed, but the police later declared that he was mentally ill.1213   At this time, the Punjab government carried out public hangings of five persons.1214 Civil society organisations such as the Movement for Service of Humanity protested against this inhumane act.  Prime Minister Muhammad 
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Khan	   Junejo	   nonetheless	   came	   forward	   to	   support	   the	   Punjab	   government’s	  action.1215 
The Role of Civil Society in the Resistance: Civil society groups also agitated against the regime during the period of the Junejo government.   Despite the removal of martial law, student unions were still banned – as they had been since 1983.   There were protests about this in Lahore and other towns in Punjab.1216 The Pakistan Democratic Students Federation (Lahore Branch) held its annual convention on 29 March 1986 to demand the release of the student leaders, the end of the ban on student unions, and the end to violence at the educational institutions.1217 The student body disclosed in 1988 that 61 students were killed, and 587 were injured during the past four years in student-police encounters on various universities campuses of the country.1218  Progressive writers came together to organise a four-day conference for the establishment of freedom, peace, justice and humanism in the country. Along with their other demands, the writers asked the government to release political prisoners and repeal the Press and Publication Ordinance and restore freedom of speech. The declaration of the conference also rejected the Presidential Referendum 1984, the General Election 1985, and demanded fresh polls under the 1973 constitution.1219 Two poetry books on the resistance against the regime and the deaths of ZAB and Murtaza Bhutto – Khushboo ki Shahdat, and 
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Jue-i-Khoon – were published in August 1986.  The Chair of the launching ceremony Ms. Alys Faiz commented that these publications ‘give	  new	  hope	  and	  
courage	  to	  the	  people.’1220 The banning of books continued during this period as well. The Punjab Government banned books such as Haq ki Talash (In search of Truth) by a Shia scholar, the pamphlet Shia Mazhab ki Kahani Shia kutub ki 
zuban (The	  Story	  of	  Shia	  Religion	  through	  the	  Sources	  of	  Shia’s	  books)	  and	  the	  Netherlands-based	  magazine	  ‘The Struggle’	  amongst	  others.1221   Civil Society groups, including poets, jurists, intellectuals, opinion makers, leaders and women activists, raised their voice for the release of political prisoners, and the rescinding of military court sentences on political workers. They also demanded a declaration of a general amnesty to those who opted to go into exile due to the	  regime’s	  atrocities	  on	  them.	  Mrs.	  Tehmina	  Khar,	  the wife of Ghulam Mustafa Khar, organised a seminar on the issue in February 1988.1222  After two years of consistent struggle, the government gave some niggardly relief to certain political prisoners.  The establishment of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan as an institution was another hallmark of the civil society campaign against the injustice prevailing in the country. The declaration of the commission stated its aim to be the repeal or amendment of unjust and discriminatory laws based on gender, religion, and sect. Moreover, it also demanded the repeal of the Political Parties Act, and the Press and Publications Ordinance.1223 After the Ojhri camp 
disaster,	   more	   than	   500	   lawyers	   of	   Lahore	   under	   the	   ‘Zia-ul-Haq resign                                                         
1220 Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16. 
1221 Viewpoint, XIII (25), 28 January 1988, p.16. 
1222 Viewpoint, XIII (28), 18 February 1988, p.14. 
1223 Viewpoint, XIII (35), 7 April 1988, p.5. 
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Committee’,	  which	  was	  led	  by	  the	  PPP	  activist	  Mansoor	  Ahmed	  Malik,	  signed	  a	  document urging Zia to quit.1224   The Pakistan Socialist Party held its workers conference on 28 March 1986, attended by 600 delegates. It had an anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism agenda. Goodwill messages were received from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’	  Party	  and	   read	  out.1225  However, it faced the same fate as the other political parties by having rifts and groupings in its two years of existence. A divide opened up between the party chief C.R Aslam and the Secretary General Abid Hasan Manto, with the latter ending up organising separate meetings of the party.1226  Political analysts such as Babar Ali and Hasan Askari have claimed that there was greater freedom for the press after the 1985 election.  The 
International	  Press	   Institute	   (IPI)	   expressed	   satisfaction	   ‘with	   the	  quantum	  of	  
Press	  freedom’	  in	  Pakistan,	  though	  this	  was a view from far away. 1227    A few minor steps were indeed taken in lieu of the annulment of martial law. The Sindh Governor allowed the revival of the Urdu daily Amn and weekly Meyaar which had been banned since 1983. However, the Press and Publication Ordinance	   was	   still	   in	   existence.	   CPNE	   (Council	   of	   Pakistan	   Newspapers’	  Editors) and PFUJ voiced their grievances in their meeting in January 1986 against the ordinance and demanded its repeal.1228  The abolition of the National Press Trust was among the demands of the Action Committee of the                                                         
1224 Viewpoint, XIII (39), 5 May 1988, p.15. 
1225 Viewpoint, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.16. 
1226 Viewpoint, XIII (39), 5 May 1988, p.14. 
1227 Viewpoint, XIII (22), 7 January 1988, p.8. 
1228 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.6. 
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MRD.1229  Newspapers and magazines – Time (USA), Lahore (Lahore) – were still proscribed on a charge of publishing objectionable material.1230   The Punjab police arrested four ANP workers on the charge of distributing anti-Zia pamphlets. 1231   The press thus continued to be subservient to the administration in all important respects. 
Cultivating International Support: Although US President Reagan welcomed the change in Pakistan, congratulating Prime Minister Junejo, and President Zia-ul-Haq,1232 for the first time ever 
during	  Zia’s	  rule	  the	   international	  community	  broke	   its	   long-term silence over 
the	  regime’s	  inhumane	  reaction	  to	  the	  peaceful	  demonstrations	  for	  democracy.	  
The	  US	  State	  Department	  Spokesman	  ‘regretted'	  the	  arrest	  of	  political leaders in 
Pakistan	   on	   14	   August	   1986,	   and	   stated	   that	   it	   was	   ‘unfortunate’	   given	   the	  
moves	   towards	   democracy:	   ‘the	   recent	   arrests	   negated	   the	   principles	  
expounded	   by	   the	   Pakistan	   Government’.1233 Moreover, the protest of Libyan President Col. Moammer Qaddafi, and West	  German	  Foreign	  Minister’s	   appeal	  
against	   the	  arrest	  of	  BB	  showed	  the	  that	  BB’s	  hard	  work	   in	  cultivating	  foreign	  support for her struggle was paying off.1234 That was the biggest achievement of her period in exile.   Furthermore, for the first time ever in the Pakistan-USA relationship, the Left circles in the USA requested the release of Jam Saqi from his long imprisonment. Eugene Newport, the Mayor of Berkeley and globally known for                                                         
1229 Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p13. 
1230 Viewpoint, XI (35), 10 April 1986, p.19. 
1231 Viewpoint, XIII (40), 12 May 1988, p.34. 
1232 Viewpoint, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.22. 
1233 US State Department Spokesman, cited in Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p. 14. 
1234 Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.22. 
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being a strong critic of the Reagan Administration on its support to dictators all 
over	   the	   world,	   sent	   a	   telegram	   to	   Prime	   Minister	   Junejo	   ‘requesting	   him	   to	  
release	   Jam	  Saqi	   from	   imprisonment	  and	  any	   further	   torture	   immediately’.1235  Others who demanded his release were Pedro Noguera, the then-President of 
Berkeley’s Student Union, a Professor of Economics and Computer Sciences of Berkeley University, Line of March – a pro-labour organisation, East Day 
Women	  for	  Peace,	  the	  youngest,	  Iranian	  People’s	  Fedaian	  North	  California,	  and	  Council of Muslim Association.  Line of March was particularly vigorous in this 
campaign	  for	  his	  release,	  publishing	  a	  report	  on	  the	  ‘plight	  of	  Jam	  Saqi’	  in	  their	  
fortnightly	  newspaper	  ‘Frontline’.1236  Various international pressure groups made their voices heard as well. Cambridge University Amnesty International Group campaigned against the continuation of imprisonment of political prisoners after the end of martial law.1237  The Organisation of Progressive Pakistanis (OPP) in Berlin (West) 
condemned	   the	   Zia’s	   regime	   for	   its	   oppressive	   policies	   and undemocratic actions and expressed its solidarity with the Pakistan working class.1238  The Federation of German Trade Union (DGB), along with the OPP, distributed 
pamphlets	   about	   the	   labour	   unions’	   struggle	   in	   Pakistan	   at	   the	   May Day celebration in 1988.  Although	   BB’s	   trip	   to	   Washington	   DC	   before	   returning	   to	   Pakistan	   in	  1986 was seen as a betrayal by those in Pakistan who were committed to an 
                                                        
1235 Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p. 24. 
1236 Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, pp.24-25. 
1237 Steven Russell, Sean Carroll, Rachel Bavidge, Emma Krasinska (President of Cambridge University 
Amnesty International) were leading persons behind the campaign. Cited in Viewpoint, XIII (31), 10 
March 1988, pp.3-4. 
1238 Viewpoint, XIII (43), 2 June 1988, p.26. 
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anti-imperialist	   revolution,	   she	   succeeded	   in	   gaining	  Reagan’s	   support	   for	  her	  democratic struggle.  He declared that	   ‘he	  would	  now	  support	  popular	  leaders	  
in	  the	  Third	  World	  rather	  than	  corrupt	  dictators.’1239 It was a big shift from his previous policy towards countries like Pakistan, which had until then remained unfavourable to BB and PPP in their opposition to Zia.  Despite welcoming the 1985 elections, the US government recognised that BB enjoyed widespread support in Pakistan.  Non-alignment and bilateral relationship would be the goal in the foreign policy for BB.1240  Before returning to Pakistan, BB visited two other centres of power that were critical for Pakistan at that time. After the USA, she visited Saudi Arabia and briefly Moscow, from 30-31 March, where it was 
reported	  that	  she	  met	  with	  the	  representatives	  of	  Soviet	  Women’s	  Committee,	  the Peace Committee and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.   Once the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan was about to be signed, BB reiterated her appeal to USA to support the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.1241  She feared that the USA might ignore this issue once The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. 1242   After	   the	   dissolution	   of	   Junejo’s	  
government,	  Charles	  Wilson,	  an	  American	  Democrat,	  stated	  in	  response	  to	  Zia’s	  
promise	   to	   hold	   the	   election	   in	   90	   days,	   ‘I	   am	   a	   very	   good	   friend	   of	   the	  
President’s	  and	  when	  he	  says	  we	  will	  hold	  elections	  I	  believe	  him…There	  is	  no	  question that it will be devastating as far as close Pakistan-US relations such as 
military	  programmes,	  etc.	  are	  concerned	   if	   the	  elections	  are	  stretched	  out.’1243 Likewise, the US Secretary of State reminded him of the friendship between two                                                         
1239 Viewpoint, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.14. 
1240 Viewpoint, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13. 
1241 Benazir Bhutto, London 18 April 1988, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (37), 21 April 1988, p.34. 
1242 Benazir Bhutto, 30 April 1988, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (39), 5 May 1988, p.34. 
1243 Cited in Viewpoint, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.14. 
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countries while hoping not to thwart the political process in the country.1244 Clearly, the US government was putting firm pressure on Zia to hold the election.1245  Moreover,	  the	  approval	  of	  Stephen	  Solarz’s	  resolution	  ‘to	  hold	  “free	  and fair party-based	  elections	  not	   later	  than	  November	  16”’1246 that was voted for in the House of Representatives added to this pressure on Zia from the USA.  
This	  was	  all	  in	  no	  small	  part	  due	  to	  BB’s	  constant	  pursuit	  of	  the	  USA	  to	  ensure	  that the election was held.1247  
The Final Days of General Zia-ul-Haq.: Following the dissolution of the Junejo government, BB set up an eight-member committee consisting of two members from each province to liaise with the MRD and the other political parties and referred to the PNA-PPP agreement of 1977 for the guidelines for holding a free and fair election.  At this juncture, Zia 
lost	  a	  strong	  pillar	  of	  support	  when	  the	  Jama’t-i-Islami for the first time joined hands with the MRD in protest at the imprisonment of its political workers.1248 The JI Naib Amir (vice-Chairman) Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed categorically supported the demand to hold a free and fair election under an autonomous Election Commission within 90 days.1249 JI-PPP’s	  agreement	  meant	   that	  support	   for	  Zia	  was limited to the Pir of	  Pagara’s	  faction	  of	  Muslim	  League,	  whom	  the	  General	  took into the caretaker cabinet to run the government.1250                                                          
1244 George P. Shultz, US Secretary of State, Daily Dawn (Islamabad), 17 June 1988.  
1245 Michael Armacost, US Under Secretary of State, Daily Dawn (Islamabad), 25 June 1988. 
1246  Economic and Political Weekly,   ‘Pakistan   After   Zia’,   27   August   1988,   p.1771.   [http://0-
www.epw.in.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/system/files/pdf/1988_23/35/pakistan_after_zia.pdf] 28 
December 2014 
1247 Benazir Bhutto, 21 June 1988, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (47), 30 June 1988, p.34. 
1248 Viewpoint, XIII (32), 24 March 1988, pp.21-22. 
1249 Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, Zia Ke Akhri Dus saal,  
1250 Rasool  Bakhsh  Raees,   ‘Pakistan  1988:  Command   to  Conciliation  Politics’,  Asian Survey, 29(2), A 
Survey of Asia 1988: Partt-II (February, 1988), p.201. 
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 MRD convener Mairaj Muhammd Khan called a meeting to evaluate the current situation.  MRD was the only alliance which had a national image and had all mainstream regional parties as its members.   On 6 June, all the party leaders except Wali Khan, who was abroad, met together for three days after a long time to work out a strategy. The biggest challenge was to replace the alliance with an electoral alliance for the upcoming election. MRD decided to take part in the election called by Zia and issued twenty demands, such as holding the election under the 1973 constitution within 90 days, and according to the 1973 rules without registration conditions, and under the supervision of a supervisory council with half of its members nominated by the government and half by the joint political parties. 1251  Despite agreeing on the post-election scenario and the required political steps,1252 MRD could not manage to form a 
united	  electoral	  alliance,	  but	  ‘decided	  to	  contest	  election	  almost	  jointly.’1253 PPP, 
however,	  declared	   its	  support	   for	   the	  MRD’s	   leaders	   in	  the	  coming	  election	  by	  not fielding its candidates against them. Except PPP, JUI, and ANP, the rest of the political parties established electoral alliances1254 mainly against PPP.1255  The reason was said by Wali Khan to be that PPP was assured of landslide victory in three provinces — Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan.   However, many of the political leaders such as Wali Khan, Abid Hassan Minto, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh 
                                                        
1251 Viewpoint, XIII (44), 9 June 1988, p.34. 
1252 Viewpoint, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.12. 
1253 Viewpoint, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.12. 
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1255 Rasool Bakhsh Raees, ‘Pakistan  1988:  Command   to  Conciliation  Politics’,  Asian Survey, 29(2), A 
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Bizenjo,	  and	  Asghar	  Khan	  were	  sceptical	  about	  Zia’s	  promise	  to	  hold	  elections	  in	  90 days.1256   BB seemed quite optimistic for the election, but raised questions on the selection of the caretaker government, which showed	   ‘old	  wine	  with	   the	   new	  
tag’.1257  However the rest of the political leadership was still bleak about the prospect of holding the election on time. MRD convener Mairaj Muhmmad Khan 
feared	   that	   there	   would	   be	   a	   ‘presidential	   form	   of	   the	   government	   in	   the	  country’	   after	   seeing	   the	   names	   in	   the	   caretaker	   government.1258 Despite holding the commitment to the election as per the 18th Amendment of the Constitution, the steps taken by General Zia after the dissolution suggested that it would be held only on certain conditions.  These included continuing to promulgate Islamic principles such as Sharia law and Islamic economics.  M.B. 
Naqvi,	   a	  political	   analyst,	   commented	   that	   this	   emphasis	   on	   Islam	   ‘on	   the	  one	  hand undercuts democracy and on the other, perpetuates the military’s	  
untrammelled	  and	  unaccountable	  power.’1259 Also, to adhere to the principle of 
‘Accountability	  First,	  and	  Election	  Later’,	  the	  regime	  issued	  a	  list	  of	  one	  hundred	  forty MNAs of the defunct parliament whose sources of income were to be checked due to allegations against them of corruption.1260  
Zia’s	   track	  record	  gives	   little	  confidence	   that	  he	  really	   intended	   to	  hold	  the election on time.  Despite the promise to take off his uniform after the abrogation of martial law, Zia had continued to wear it. Political analysts such as Babar Ali and R.B. Raees suspected if the general could not control the                                                         
1256 Viewpoint, XIII (44), 9 June 1988, pp.12-13. 
1257 Benazir Bhutto, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.15. 
1258 Mairaj Muhammad Khan, cited in Viewpoint, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.15. 
1259 M.B.Naqvi,  ‘After  President’s  new  Initiative’,  Viewpoint, XIII (45), p.9. 
1260 Viewpoint, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.22. 
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supposedly malleable Prime Minister Junejo how could he accept BB or Wali 
Khan	  or	  Rasul	  Bakhsh	  Palijo	  as	  his	  Prime	  Minister	  after	  holding	  a	  ‘free	  and	  fair	  election’?1261  The prospect for a free and fair election seemed bleak.   As it was, before his promise was put to the test, Zia died in a mysterious air-crash on 17 August 1988.   Along with him several high-profile officials of Pakistan and US were also killed, including the US Ambassador Arnold L. Raphel, Brigadier General Herbert Wassom, the head of the military assistance advisory group at the US embassy, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan General Akhter Abdur Rehman. The daily newspaper Dawn suggested that the death of General Zia-ul-Haq	  was	   ‘an	  “honourable”	  exit	   from	  
the	  political	  scene	  of	  Pakistan.’1262  The US and Pakistani agencies both declared after a joint investigation that a mechanical fault was the reason for the accident.     Many refused to accept this, with conspiracy theorists pointing accusing fingers at Mossad, KGB, KHAD, RAW and, in particular, the Pakistan armed forces.    US confidential reports indicate that there had been dissatisfaction with Zia in army circles for many years.1263  Observing the unsuccessful attempt of MRD during 1981-84	  to	  remove	  the	  general,	  the	  CIA	  report	  concluded	  ‘if	  Zia	  
is	  ousted,	  this	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  done	  by	  the	  army	  high	  command.’1264 Reports until 1984 forecasted the bloodless ousting of the general	   by	   ‘the	   army	   high	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command	   plus	   most	   or	   all	   of	   the	   seven	   army	   corps	   commanders’,1265 and intelligence analysts in South Asia had started to think of the implications if General Zia was to be assassinated in/during 1985. The low turnout in the referendum and the	   defeat	   of	   key	   players	   of	   Zia’s	   cabinet	   in	   the	   following	  election indicated to other soldiers the unpopularity of the general.   A report had spoken of how the unhappy military was ready to remove the general if 
‘Zia’s	   Constitution’	   was	   unable	   to	   mute	   the political unrest, and if a foreign policy vis-à-vis	   Afghanistan	   was	   not	   pursued	   according	   to	   the	   Army’s	  wishes.1266  The signing of the Geneva Accord, and the setting up the judicial 
inquiry	  to	  the	  Ojhri	  Camp	  disaster	  were	  both	  decisions	  converse	  to	  ‘the	  wishes 
of	   the	   Army’.	   	   The	   removal	   of	   Junejo’s	   government	   augmented	   the	   political	  
instability	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  Mian	  Tufail	  Muhammad	  of	  JI	  had	  just	  before	  Zia’s	  death	  tried to provoke the subordinate generals, General K.M. Arif, and General Rahimuddin, into taking control of the country.1267  Although no proof has ever been produced of an army conspiracy behind the air crash, it was observed that as soon as he heard of the disaster, the then-vice-Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg flew immediately back to Rawalpindi rather than visiting the site of the crash, even though he was only a few miles from it at the time.  This was seen as a suspicious move.  Despite all this, the army did not seize power.   It would easy to have been used the air crash as a reason to declare martial law 
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once more.   There was strong pressure on the Pakistan Army from the democratic forces such as MRD and the other power brokers within and outside of the country to hold the election as Zia had scheduled it.1268  Bowing to this pressure, the generals allowed the elections to go ahead on 16 November 1988, and for democracy to be fully restored in Pakistan.     
Conclusion: A US report of late 1986 summarised the performance of BB and the PPP after 
BB’s	   return	   to	   Pakistan	   in	   April	   of	   that	   year.  It stated that she received a tumultuous welcome in Punjab and that she reestablished the PPP as the primary and largest political party in the country. 1269  The turn-out demonstrated that the party still held on to its vote bank in urban and rural areas of the province. Nonetheless, she managed very quickly to fall out with the 
MRD,	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  PPP’s	  civil	  disobedience	  movement	  in	  August	  1986	  and the accompanying violence revealed serious weaknesses.  The PPP organisation in Punjab was seen to lack the capacity to sustain a confrontation in the streets. Despite having a strong student wing – the	   People’s	   Student	  Federation – the party failed to mobilise the students to any extent.  By allying with the left wing of her party, BB abandoned the middle ground in Pakistani politics and frightened off the urban middle class in Punjab and Karachi. The parties in the alliance other than PPP softly protested at various times against her attitude, but by trying to go it alone, she isolated herself from the wider                                                         
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Committee and Chairman Senate – decided to hold the election. Azhar Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara 
Saal (Lahore, year is missing), p. 12. 
1269 Near   Eastern   and   South   Asia   Office,   “Pakistan   People’s   Party:   Pretenders   to   the   Throne”,  
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alliance. Failure had however brought her back to it.    BB also failed to keep in check the dissident groups in her party, and the replacement of leaders of her 
father’s	   generation	   brought	   serious	   divides.	   	   The	   emergence	   of	   the	   National	  
People’s	   Party of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi in Sindh, and the rift with Ghulam Mustafa Khar in Punjab, were symptomatic of this.   Indeed, MRD in general and PPP in particular let down the people who had suffered for their ongoing support of the opposition.  These were the rank-and-file activists who had mobilised votes in elections, and who had put themselves on the line in the struggle against a ruthless dictator.  It was they who kept alive the memory of ZAB and revered BB as his rightful heir, with their 
slogans	  of	   ‘Zinda hi Bhutto Zinda’ (Bhutto is still alive),	  ‘tum	  Kinte	  Bhutto	  maro	  
ge?, hur ghar se Bhutto nikle ga’ (How many Bhuttos will you kill? Bhutto would come out from every house of the country).  They were badly served by the fractious leadership and damaging divides.   In all this, Zia was able to hold onto power until his sudden death.   
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 Dissertation Conclusion Pakistan is regarded widely today as a country in continuing turmoil, in which multiple centres of political and armed power compete with each other, using violence as much as due democratic processes to settle their differences.     It has an unenviable reputation for being a dangerous place to be, especially for foreigners.   This impression is reflected in one American commentary:   It has become a violent state, with attacks on its core institutions, notably the police, the army, and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, and assassinations of Benazir Bhutto, its most important politician; Salmaan Taseer, a serving governor; and Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian minister in the Cabinet. Moreover, Pakistan has the dubious distinction of being the most unsafe country in the world for journalists and diplomats.1270 
U.S.	   President	  Barack	  Obama	  has	   argued	   that	  Pakistan’s	  border	   region	   is	   “the 
most	   dangerous	   place	   in	   the	   world”	   for	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   head	   of	   U.S.	  
Central	  Command,	  General	  David	  Petraeus,	  noted	  that	  “it	  is	  the	  headquarters	  of	  
the	  al	  Qa’ida	  senior	  leadership,”	  which	  is	  planning	  attacks	  in	  the	  West.1271 It is common to trace this state of affairs back to developments during the time of General Zia-ul-Haq’s	   rule.	   	   This	   is	   the	   period	   in	   which	   Islamic	  extremism 1272 , sectarianism 1273 , ethnic violence 1274 , and the problems 
                                                        
1270 Stephen P. Cohen and Others, The Idea of Pakistan, p.xi. 
1271 Cited in, Seth G. Jones, and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2010), p. xi. 
1272 See, for details, Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan; Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, A 
Political History of Pakistan 1947-2007, pp.263-308;  Viewpoint  Special  Edition,   ‘The   Islamization  of  
Pakistan1979-2009’,  Middle East Institute (Washington DC) www.mei.edu. ;Marc  Gaborieau,   ‘Islam  
and   Politics’,   in   Christophe   Jaffrelot   (ed.),  A History of Pakistan and Its Origins, pp.237-252; Peter 
Bergen with Katherine Tiedmann (ed.), Talibanistan: Negotiating The Borders between Terror, 
Politics, and Religion; C. Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, et al, Pakistan: Can the 
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associated with hosting Afghan refugees1275 came to the fore, and a culture of violence was fostered and non-state actors gained huge power.  Ian Talbot has argued that the lack of investment in human capital, coupled with 
underemployment	   during	   a	   time	   of	   a	   “youth	   bulge”	   all	   helped	   stoke	   religious	  and ethnic extremism in the country during this era and subsequently.1276     In this conclusion we shall start by examining the impact of the military rule of Zia, then go on to look at the reasons for his longevity in power, and then the struggle for democracy in Pakistan.   
The Impact of Zia’s	  Military	  Regime	   When seizing power, the Pakistan military has claimed to be the saviour of the people from the venality of elected party politicians and the attacks of external enemies.  Every imposition of martial law in Pakistan has been declared valid 
under	  the	  ‘Doctrine	  of	  Necessity’	  or	  the	  Roman	  doctrine	  ‘Salus	  populi	  suprema	  
est	   lex’.	   However,	   as	   Justice	   Aftab	   Farrukh	   remarked	   during	   the	   hearing	   of	   a	  murder case this principle should be invoked only to frame but not to break the law.1277  As it is, the army has saved neither the people nor territory of Pakistan.  The loss of East Pakistan, the failure to repatriate the prisoners of war, and the continuous casualties since 1980s due to sectarian and extremist culture are                                                                                                                                                              
United States Secure an Insecure State?;Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan  Beyond   the   ‘Crisis  State’;  Roedad 
Khan, Pakistan, p.82. 
1273 See, for details, Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan. Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, A 
Political History of Pakistan 1947-2007.   Ishtiaq   Ahmed,   ‘Reclaiming   Pakistan’s   Pacifist   Religious  
Creed’,  in  Viewpoint  Special  Edition,  ‘The  Islamization  of  Pakistan1979-2009’.  Sohail,  General Zia ke 
Gyara Saal. Shabbir Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal, Senator   Pervez   Rasheed,   ‘Jirga’,   Geo TV 
Network, 16 November 2013. Accessed on 16 November 2013. 
1274 Talbot, Pakistan. Ibne Adil, General Zia k dus saal 
1275 Arif, Working with Zia.  
1276 Talbot, Pakistan, p.117. 
1277 Justice Aftab Farrukh, Lahore High Court. Viewpoint, V (17), 2 December 1979, p.12. 
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proof of that.   Military rule has if anything brought greater insecurity within Pakistan by its fostering of militant extremist movements that have been designed as a counter to political opposition, such as the militant Muhajjir Qaumi Movement (MQM) that was backed by Zia in Sindh after 1983.1278  Unlike Argentina, where the Supreme Court sentenced two generals to life imprisonment on 10 December 1985 on the charges of illegal arrest, and torture to death of thousands of Argentinians, Pakistan has still failed to effectively punish those who have imposed martial law and similarly persecuted, imprisoned, tortured and even killed its opponents.   Khwaja Asif, who became Minister for Defence in 2013, whilst speaking in the National Assembly has asked for a thorough inquiry on the Pakistan Army and its legacy since 1947.1279 This has yet to take place.  Although, martial law was imposed supposedly to make politicians accountable for their corruption, the military itself was corrupt.  For example, the Zia regime took out eight-nine corruption cases against politicians while at the same time illegally distributing seventy-six plots of land in Islamabad to cronies of the regime.1280  The Punjab Assembly was later informed that 450,000 acres of land were allotted to military officers between 1977 and 1988 for supposed services to the country.  While the penetration of the military into the economy of the country had been started during the Ayub era, it was 
consolidated	   during	   Zia’s	   period.	   In	   a	   book,	   Ayesha	   Siddiqa	   has	   set	   out	  
                                                        
1278 Mirza Aslam Beg, Interview, Daily Times (Islamabad), 5 September 2009. 
1279 Khwaja Asif, 14 November 2014. http://www.zemtv.com/2014/11/14/khawaja-asif-barking-on-
pakistan-army-old-video-real-face-of-khawaja-asif/ (14 November 2014). 
1280 Ashraf Sharif, Aao Pakistan ku Lootain Siasatdano, Bureaucrats and Military Generals ka 
Munshoor (Lahore: Dar-ul-Ilm Publications, 2000), pp.49-51. 
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thoroughly the facts and figures of businesses controlled by members of the 
military,	  a	  situation	  she	  calls	  ‘Milbus’.1281  The Army Welfare Trust – established originally in 1971 with a value of Rs.700,000 (US$ 12,000) – became the 
wealthiest	  amongst	  the	  army’s	  business	  ventures	  – being worth Rs.17.45 billion (US$ 30,086 million) by 2001. The trust has penetrated all three major sectors of the economy with 31 projects in agriculture, manufacturing and the service sector.1282 Mazhar Aziz has argued rightly that the intervention of military into 
politics	   was	   never	   really	   aimed	   at	   improving	   governance	   but	   ‘for	   the	  
preservation	   of	   institutional	   control.’1283  This has all been supported by the external world, particularly the USA.   There are many both in Pakistan and abroad who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the economic power of the Pakistan military.   Even civilian rulers, once they have regained power, have hardly dared attack the military as an institution, and instead focus on the misdeeds of individual generals, who they blame for the imposition of martial law.  Both BB and Nawaz Sharif individualised such cases, while rewarding other generals.   The ISI carries on a continuing public relations exercise designed to boost the popularity of the army by highlighting its achievements. It publicises the hard life of soldiers who secure the borders in miserable conditions such as at Siachen.  When 24 Army personnel were killed by NATO helicopters at the 
Salala Check Post in November 2011 strong action was taken against NATO; however the continuing civilian causalities in such attacks goes largely unregistered.                                                             
1281 See, for details, Siddiqa, Military Inc.:  Inside  Pakistan’s  Military  Economy. 
1282 Siddiqa, Military Incorporations, p.220. 
1283 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: A Parallel State, p.66.  
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Besides the ongoing repression of all opposition – which has been examined in detail in this thesis – the	  period	  of	  Zia’s	   rule	   is	  also	   considered	  a	  
‘dark	   age’	   for	   Pakistan	   as this was a period during which a new culture of violence, drug addiction and political venality came to the fore.    There was for example the growth of the so-called	  ‘Kalashnikov	  culture’.	  	  The tribal peoples of northwest and western Pakistan already had a strong gun culture, but this became much worse at this time.   This was brought about almost entirely through the impact of the war in Afghanistan that began with the Soviet invasion of late 1979 and the counter-promotion of an anti-Soviet 
‘Jihad’	  by	  the Afghan Mujahidin.   $75 million a year flowed from the so-called 
‘petro-dollar	  alliance’	  into	  the	  purchase	  of	  ammunition	  for	  this	  ‘Jihad’	  under	  the	  cover operation of the CIA and ISI.1284    The tribal areas of Pakistan became an open market for weapons such as rifles, pistols, automatic weapons, hand grenades, and landmines.1285  In 1985, a Kalashnikov rifle could be purchased for the price of Rs. 17000 only. In KPK there are now an estimated 300,000 Kalashnikovs.1286  Andrew Eiva of the Federation for American Afghan Action estimated that eighty per cent of the arms intended for the Afghan Mujahidin sent via Pakistan never reached them, with most slipping into the Pakistani market either with the connivance of the Pakistani authorities or through the selling of the weapons by the Mujahidin themselves.1287  Some drug smugglers, 
                                                        
1284 ‘Caravans  on  Moonless  Nights:  How  the  CIA  supports  and  supplies  the  anti-Soviet  gue’,  The Time, 
11 June 1984, 21 May 2014, (CIA doc no.) p.1; Coll Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA, 
Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001 (New York, NY: Penguin 
Press, 2004), pp.42-43. 
1285 Arif, Working with Zia, p.344.  
1286 M.B.Naqvi,  ‘Pakistan  in  1985  – a  retrospect’,  Viewpoint, XI (21), 2 January 1985, p.10. 
1287 Time Magazine, 9 December 1985. Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New Delhi, 
1986), p.67. 
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as reported by The Washington Post, even had an anti-aircraft gun mounted on the roof of their house in KPK.1288  It was alleged in the US Congress in 1987 that the ISI supported the manufacture of weapons, with factories in Dara Adamkhel making copies of Russian and Chinese Kalashnikovs and pistols that sold at about a third of the price of the originals.1289  Shopkeepers even provided a home delivery service for weapons – long before they ever provided such a service for groceries.   Arms licenses were issued freely,1290 leading to growing numbers being killed or injured by these automatic weapons in various disputes.   There was a general wave of violence that was often attributed to new forms of sectarianism, extremism and ethnic conflict.1291 The sense of panic was reinforced by rumours about killings inflicted by the so-called Hathora (hammer) group.1292  Young unemployed men found that they could earn big money through robbery and kidnapping for ransom.  According to Ahmed 
Rashid,	  those	  even	  with	  Master’s	  degrees	  became	  involved	  in	  such	  crime.	  	  This	  author further revealed that in the years 1986 to 1988, there were five thousand kidnap cases and murder of one thousand civilians and fifty policemen in dacoit-related violence in Sindh alone.1293     
                                                        
1288 Cited   in,   William   Vornberger,   ‘The   CIA   and   Heroin:   Afghan   Rebels   and   Drugs’,   Covert Action 
Information Bulletin, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. 
p.12. 
1289 Cited in Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p.97. 
1290 The Government of Punjab issued two hundred thousands arms licence in 1985 alone, under the 
scheme allowing legislators monthly quotas of chits that are converted into permits to buy guns – 
without the customary police check. Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.7. 
1291 Arif, Working with Zia, p.449 and 464. 
1292 There was a wave of fear throughout Pakistan over the killing of people with hammers while 
they slept at night. Their activities were believed to stretch all over the country.  I remember this 
from my childhood in the 1980s.  At that time, the origin of this group was unknown. In an interview, 
one Pakistani intelligence officer informed me off-the-record that the KGB was behind this group. 
1293 Ahmed  Rashid,  ‘Unrest  in  Sindh’,  Viewpoint, XIII (22), 14 August 1988, p.10. 
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This was also a period in which drug trafficking and heroin addiction became a major problem for Pakistan.   In 1979, there were only two registered heroin addicts, whereas there were over 300,000 regular users by 1984,1294 and 700,000 by 1989.1295  Most of them were in the 15-35 years age group.1296   This was despite the claim of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board to have reduced the production of opium in Pakistan from 800 tons in 1979 to 40 tons in 1984.1297 The notorious history	  of	  CIA’s	   involvement	  in	  drug	  trafficking	  during	  the wars in Nicaragua, Laos, and Vietnam was replicated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the anti-communist war being funded in part through opium smuggling.1298   The tribal areas of Pakistan became a major area for the refinement of opium into heroin.  The region as a whole, which included Iran, 
became	   known	   as	   “the	   Golden	   Crescent”.	   	   	   	   About	   75	   per	   cent	   of	   heroin	   in	  Western Europe and 50 per cent in the USA was smuggled from this region.1299  In 1983, 4.5 tons of heroin valued at $9 billion was shipped to the USA.1300  The closure of the Iranian and Russian borders with Afghanistan made Pakistan the 
                                                        
1294 Viewpoint, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.6. Alfred McCoy mentioned 1.2 million drug users in 
Pakistan, the highest steep increase in any country of the world. Alfred McCoy, ‘Drug   Fallout:   the  
CIA’s  Forty  Year  Complicity  in  the  Narcotics  Trade’,  The Progressive, 1 August 1997, cited in Michael 
Chossudovsky, America’s  War  on  Terrorism (Quebec: Global Research, 2005), p. 26. 
1295 Lawrence   Lifschultz,   “The   Heroin   Trail-1:   Zia’s   ‘adopted   son’   was   Drug   Ring   Leader,”   Times of 
India (New Delhi), 24 October 1988. Cited in Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p. 90. Alfred McCoy, Drug 
Fallout. 
1296 BBC in its report of January 1986 stated that Pakistan had 40000 large-scale smugglers, and 
about 5000 heroin smugglers were in jail. Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.34; Viewpoint, XI 
(24), 23 January 1986, p.6. 
1297 Viewpoint, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.3. 
1298 For   details,   see   Vince   Bielski   and   Dennis   Bernstein,   ‘The   Cocaine   Connection’,   Covert Action 
Information Bulletin, 28 (Summer 1987); Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the 
Global Drug Trade Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Columbia (Chicago: 2003). 
1299 William  Vornberger,  “The  CIA  and  Heroin:  Afghan  Rebels  and  Drugs”,  Covert Action Information 
Bulletin, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. Bhola, Benazir 
Bhutto, pp.91-92.  
1300 United Press International, 15 December 1983. 
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main route for this illegal trade.1301  Drug enforcement authorities in the USA admitted that CIA-backed Afghan rebels were responsible for the heroin trafficking from Pakistan and Afghanistan. 1302    This all had political 
implications.	  It	  was	  observed	  in	  1987	  that	  ‘it	  is	  really	  very	  simple,	  if	  you	  control	  the poppy fields, you will be so rich that you will control Pakistan.’1303  Once the Soviets were about to withdraw from Afghanistan, the USA changed its stance, threatening to halve aid to Pakistan worth of $650 million a year unless the country cracked down on the growing of opium and export of heroin.1304   The Pakistani army encouraged this trade as well as the CIA.    General Hamid Gul, the Director of ISI, asked permission from BB – once she came into the power in 1988 – to permit him to smuggle drugs to finance military expenditure.  Viewpoint claimed	   that	   ‘several	   Pakistani army officers had 
become	  millionaires	  overnight.’1305 Lawrence Lifschultz, an American journalist working for The Nation of New York exposed in a sensational story the links between heroin smugglers and the army high command in Pakistan.   He revealed that Hamid Hasnain, an adopted son of General Zia-ul-Haq and his wife Shafiqa, was arrested on a charge of heroin smuggling in a raid by the Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan with the Norwegian police on 27 October 1985 in Islamabad.1306  Hamid Hasnain was one of the vice-Presidents of the Habib Bank, and was posted during the early eighties at the Army GHQ Branch of the                                                         
1301 Sohail, General Zia ke Gyara Saal, p.16. 
1302 William  Vornberger,  “The  CIA  and  Heroin:  Afghan  Rebels  and  Drugs”,  Covert Action Information 
Bulletin, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. P.12. Lawrence 
Lifschultz,  “The  Heroin  Trail-1:Zia  ‘adopted  son’  was  Drug  Ring  Leader,”  Times of India (New Delhi), 
24 October 1988. Cited in Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p.95. 
1303 Herald Monthly, January 1987.  
1304 Washington Post, 16 June 1988. 
1305 Viewpoint, 27 October 1988, p.20. Cited in Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p.94. 
1306 His name was disclosed by Raza Qureshi who was arrested at Oslo airport in December 1983. 
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bank.   Investigators even went into the house of the Governor of KPK, according to the Norwegian police.1307 Likewise, one Pakistan Air Force officer along with nine others was caught at Heathrow airport trying to smuggle heroin into the UK.1308   Although the Zia government claimed that the problem was greatly exaggerated by the enemies of Pakistan,1309 it made a show of taking some measure by targeting a few drug dealers and heroin processors in areas such as the Kyber Agency and Karachi City.   This was all largely cosmetic, as the industry was in fact being backed by Lt. General Fazal-i-Haq, the Governor of KPK.1310  It was estimated in 1986 that	  ‘three-fourths of the anti-smuggling staff 
has	   been	   corrupted	   by	   the	   drug	   peddlers.’1311  This all contributed to a deterioration in law and order throughout the country.1312    The effect was to greatly add to levels of corruption in the politics in Pakistan.   Although foreign aid to pursue the war in Afghanistan brought a six percent growth in the economy of the country, much of this money was used to purchase political support and win elections.1313   In 1985, large sums were deployed to buy support for the regime from politicians, with housing plots, government contracts, lucrative licenses and bank loans being offered to those 
                                                        
1307 Lawrence  Lifschultz,  “The  Heroin  Trail-1:Zia  ‘adopted  son’  was  Drug  Ring  Leader,”  Times of India 
(New Delhi), 24 October 1988. Cited in Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p.92. Michel   Chossudovsky,   ‘9/11  
Analysis: From Ronald Reagan and Soviet Afghan War to George W. Bush  to  September  11,  2001’,  
Centre for Research on Globalisation, 9 September 2010. [http://www.globalresearch.ca/9-11-
analysis-from-ronald-reagan-and-the-soviet-afghan-war-to-george-w-bush-and-september-11-
2001/20958] (28 December 2014). 
1308 Viewpoint, XIII (40), 12 May 1988, p.34. 
1309 The Interior Minister of Pakistan from 1978 to 1984, Mahmood Haroon, claimed that such 
reports  were   aimed  by   its   enemies   to   give   a   “bad   name   to   Pakistan”.   Mahmood Haroon, cited in 
Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, p.96. 
1310 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, (Chicago, 2003), 
p. 477. 
1311  Jang , 29 January 1986. 
1312 Arif, Working with Zia, p.344. 
1313 Khan, Pakistan, A Personal History, p.90, Javed Hashmi, interview. 
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who sided with Zia.  Fifty lac rupees (Rs. 5 million) was said to be the rate of purchase for a member of the Upper House of Parliament.   The Chief Minister of Punjab distributed Rs. 340 million amongst 177 members of the Provincial Assembly for their services to the government.   Tehreek-i-Ittehad-Qabail (The Tribal Unity Movement) accused wealthy smugglers of buying the vote of members of the National Assembly from the tribal areas.1314 While the Pir of Pagara estimated that the cost for a Senate seat in Sindh would be Rs. 700,000, the cost in the end turned out to be Rs. 10,500,000.1315 In 1970, the elections had been contested on the basis of popularity – it was said at the time that a street light booth of ZAB would have won.   Money was not then a part-and-parcel of participating in the election.   Now, it is impossible to think of an election in Pakistan in which money is not to the fore.   Khan Abdul Wali Khan said in 1990 that with 200 crore (Rs. 2000 million) a person could become the owner of Pakistan.1316  During the Senate election of 2012, millions of rupees were paid to the members of Electoral College to buy their votes.1317 Electoral corruption on such a scale is widely held to have started with the efforts made in 1985 by Zia to get his non-party based supporters elected.1318     
                                                        
1314 Viewpoint, XIII (28), 18 February 1988, p.21. 
1315 Viewpoint, XIII (32), 17 March 1988, p. 16; Viewpoint, XIII (41), 19 May 1988, p.7. 
1316 Quoted in Nadeem Akhter and Athar Abbas, Jamhoriat, Army and Awam, p. 66. 
1317 The Pakistan Spectator, 7 March 2012, [http://www.pkhope.com/biggest-lesson-learned-from-
senate-elections/] accessed on 10 June 2013.  
1318 Mushahidullah, interview quoted in Dawn, 24 February 2012. Shahida Jabeen, interview, 26 
February 2012, Lahore. 
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Causes	  for	  the	  longevity	  of	  Zia’s	  Regime	   Although it is the argument of this thesis that the MRD realised its aim of restoring democracy in the long term in 1988, the struggle took much longer than hoped for, and at times appeared as if it would fail.  This was in contrast to 1969 when the first dictator General Ayub Khan was removed quickly from office through nonviolent resistance, and 2009 when the same fate befell General Musharraf as a consequence of	  the	  nonviolent	  Lawyers’	  Movement.1319  Ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani told the researcher that the blame for the longevity of martial law in Pakistan under Zia can be attributed largely to the failures of his political opponents.1320   It is this issue that will be addressed in this section.  As I hope that this thesis has brought out, a lack of unity and mutual mistrust among politicians and their parties was a major reason for the lack of success of the anti-Zia movement.   Scholars who have written on civil resistance have emphasised the great importance of strong and effective leadership.1321  This was lacking in Pakistan.  The nine parties of the MRD spent more time fighting among themselves than in working on a comprehensive strategy to	   force	   Zia’s	   removal	   and	   new	   elections.	   	   The	   return	   of	   BB	   only	  
widened	  the	  cleavages	  within	  the	  MRD	  by	  reinforcing	  the	  PPP’s	  dominance.	   	   It	  was a widespread complaint by the smaller parties of the alliance that the PPP, by far the largest of its parties, tended to ignore the opinions of the other leaders and were interested primarily in their own power. Almost every other                                                         
1319 For the latter movement, see Malik  Hammad  Ahmad,   ‘Quest   for  Peace  and  Justice   in  Pakistan:  
Lawyers’  Non-violent  Resistance’,  in  Priyankar  Upadhyaya,  and  Samrat  Schmiem  Kumar  (eds.),  Peace 
and Conflict: The South Asian Experience. 
1320 Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, interview. 
1321 Ackerman, and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, pp.26-27 
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party in the alliance registered their complaints against its dominance. Moreover, the political parties lack solidarity within and outside of their parties. The fourteenth-century Arab scholar Ibn-e-Khaldun stated that a lack of 
asabiyyah (the spirit of kinship) can lead to the defeat of a large and wealthy group by a poorer and smaller group.  While the PPP and its jyalas (partisans) struggled hard against the regime and were in large numbers, the sort of cohesion and solidarity that Ibn-i-Khaldun was talking about was conspicuously lacking.   There was too much individualism and not enough collectivism. The unity amongst the leadership was the key in the success of other civil society 
movements	   in	   Pakistan	   such	   as	   the	   Lawyers’	   Movement	   and	   the	   Students	  Movement in Pakistan, and elsewhere in the case of the mothers of the 
‘disappeared’	  in	  the	  Plaza	  de	  Mayo	  in	  Argentina,	  the	  students	  movement against Pinochet in Chile, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the Otpor movement against Milosevic in Serbia, the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the youth movement of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunis.   Nevertheless, the MRD survived the demise of its opponent General Zia.  The most persistent problem in MRD since its establishment was the complaint of the smaller parties that the PPP – being the largest party in the alliance – often ignored them.  Ackerman and Kruegler have emphasised the importance in nonviolent 
struggle	  of	   the	  existence	  of	  what	   they	  call	   an	   ‘operational	   corps’.	  By	   this,	   they	  mean a group analogous to the officers of an army who provide leadership in depth under the command of the overall leaders.  They state that this group 
‘…must	   instruct,	   nurture,	   and	   support	   the	   general	   population	   in	   the	  
performance	  of	  nonviolent	   conflict’,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   ‘the	  organisational	   glue	   that	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holds	  a	  nonviolent	  movement	  or	  organisation	  together’. 1322   In the case of the MRD, this sort of leadership-in-depth was generally lacking.   Because this was the case, it was relatively easy for Zia to subdue the opposition by arresting the 
main	   leaders.	   Zia’s	   undeniable	   comment on the parties-on-struggle whose leaders never have held elections in their own parties based on the bitter truth, which he exploited quite well. In part, this was because local democratic government had not been nurtured in Pakistan, with the result that local leaders could not cut their teeth in local affairs. Instead, they derived their power from direct relationships with the top leaders.  Although Zia held elections to local bodies in 1979 and 1983, those who were elected tended to be sycophants – so that this was not a forum for the growth of any dynamic opposition movement.1323   In this respect, we may attribute the success of the more recent 
Lawyers’	  Movement	   in	  part	   to	   its	   internal	  democracy,	  with	  annual	  bar	  council	  elections generating a multi-tiered structure of leadership.1324   This sort of internal democracy was conspicuously lacking with the MRD. And local bodies leaders can be a vanguard of democracy. It, however, remains a problem with party politics in Pakistan to this day.  
Instead, parties were highly centralised; often revolving around a dominant family.  This was the case with the PPP, which was controlled, and indeed still is controlled, by the Bhutto family or after his name.   Benazir Bhutto thus willed that her son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari should follow her as party leader after her death.   The party revolved around the idea of the jyala                                                         
1322 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, p.28. 
1323 Stephen P. Cohen, Interview. 
1324 Hammad  Ahmad,  ‘Quest  for  Peace  and  Justice  in  Pakistan’,  pp.166-67. 
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(partisan) whose allegiance to the party is absolute.    ZAB had projected himself as the saviour of the common people.   When I questioned lower level party workers on the reason for their great loyalty to the party, they replied that ZAB had made us regard ourselves as human beings; he had taught us what humanity means and being human is.  Otherwise, they said, we were kohlu k bail (blind-followers) of our masters.1325  In promising the three basic necessities of 
‘Roti, Kapra aur Makan (bread, clothing and housing) and in recognising humanity of his followers ZAB instilled a cult of Bhuttoism.   This was especially true after the disclosures about the way that twenty-two families had enriched themselves at the expense of the people under the rule of Ayub Khan.   Such loyalty ensured that the jyalas were able to withstand extreme forms of repression by Zia.   This mentality underpinned the dynastic politics of the Bhutto family. Unfortunately, the PPP has so far failed to provide the basic three necessities, despite it being in power for sixteen years in all between 1971 and 2013.  Because of its over-dependence on the leadership of members of the Bhutto family, it was hard for the PPP to carry on the struggle after they were arrested or went into exile.1326   Realising this fact during her period of exile, BB instructed the party to hold the long-awaited election for the party offices1327 – which had never been conducted during the entire existence of the organisation 
– after seeing the dismemberment of the party through serious internal strife due to the boycott of the 1985 election.  However, such an election has never                                                         
1325 Shahida Jabeen, Shahid Sheikh, interviews. 
1326 Musthaq Lasharie, interview. 
1327 Directorate   of   Intelligence,   ‘Pakistan:   The  Opposition   since   the   Election’,   Near East and South 
Asia Review, 7 June 1985, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301490002-8, p.11. 
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been held, even to this day. Once she gained power, BB employed thirty-six thousand jyalas during her first twenty months of government.1328  This has all led party workers towards bribery (financial, moral), buttering-up, backbiting against intra-party rivals, and claiming devotion to the leader so as to obtain political rewards.  The biographies of party workers and leaders provide a way to eulogise their leader and swear allegiance to whoever heads the family.   In this way, sycophants are selected for party offices at all levels, rather than people who have vigorous local support.   As it is, the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution that was passed in 2010, and which was designed to strengthen the power of parliamentary government in Pakistan and to prevent any future military dictatorship, also strengthened the power of party heads.  Opposing a party leader and casting a vote in the legislative assembly against 
the	  party’s	  wish	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  disqualification	  of	  an	  elected	  member	  from	  the	  Assembly as well as the party.1329  This has consolidated the cult of party leadership with all of its drawbacks.   Democratic government is based on a social contract between ruler and people, in which the people confer power on the ruler but expect to receive in return the basic necessities of life.  The continuing failure of the PPP to fulfil their promise to provide ‘Roti, Kapra aur Makan’	  when	   in	  power	  has seen the wider society turn against it, paving the way for fresh periods of military rule.   This was the case in 1990, when the then President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaque Khan – whom BB had thanked on her maiden speech as a Prime Minister –                                                         
1328 Khan Abdul Wali Khan, interview cited in Nadeem Akhtar and Athar Abbas, Jamhoriat, Army and 
Awam, p. 71. Ashraf Sharif states 26 thousand instead. Ashraf Sharif, Aao Pakistan ku Lootain, pp.86-
91. 
1329 Mahboob   Hussain,   and   Rizwanullah   Kokab,   ‘Eighteenth   Amendment   in   the   Constitution   of  
Pakistan: Successes  and  Controversies’, Asian Social Sciences, vol.8, No.1 (January 2012), p.86. 
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removed her from power.  Stating the reason for martial law in country, Raza 
Kazim	   metaphorically	   argued	   that	   democracy	   is	   like	   a	   “political	   contract”	  between a King and his people, and that after the civilian rulers failed to fulfill their side of the contract, military rulers stepped in with promises to do so instead, and that they have at the time enjoyed considerable public support.1330 Of course, the same has applied to military rulers as they have in turn failed in this task, leading to campaigns for their removal from power.   Strategically, it is important for civil resistance campaigns to maintain strict nonviolence.  This is another area in which the opposition to Zia failed.   The hijacking of the PIA aircraft in March 1981 by Al-Zulfiqar just two weeks 
after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  eleven	  parties’	  alliance	  of	  the	  MRD	  brought	  a	  split	  when Sardar Abdul Qayyum of the Muslim League (Qayum) quit in protest.  It also, predictably, legitimised a ruthless crackdown on the nonviolent movement.  Despite BB publicly denounced the hijacking, all the political leaders including her were rounded up, and the workers were tortured.  The regime made international capital from the fact that three Americans, one Canadian and one Swede were among the passengers.  This single incidence of violence badly undermined the MRD. This was followed two years later in 1983 by violence related to the movement in Sindh – such as the burning of bank buildings, the killing of law enforcement agency members, and bomb explosions at railway stations – which furthered this process of decline.    The literature on the strategy of civil resistance has discussed in depth the issue of international assistance for campaigns for democracy and human                                                         
1330 Raza Kazim, Dawn, 29 September 2014. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1134879/herald-
exclusive-in-conversation-with-raza-kazim >2 October 2014 
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rights in authoritarian and oppressive societies.   In general, it seen as being extremely important for movements to cultivate such support both in terms of bringing external pressure to bear on a regime in a diplomatic sense, as well as in the provision of material help through either financial assistance or advice on good strategy.     The opposition to Zia, whether by the PPP or the MRD, sought to obtain such external support for its cause.    They received strongest backing from left-wing organisations in the west as well as from the Soviet Union.  This was not however adequate, as neither were able to have much influence on the Zia regime. Realising this, BB astutely stopped blaming the USA and CIA of 
complicity	   in	  her	   father’s	  execution and instead sought Western assistance for her cause.  She had some limited success in this, through the US administration continued to have a vested interest in keeping in the good books of the Pakistan military and in the continuation of Zia’s	  rule.	  	  They	  were	  prepared	  on the whole to overlook the violation of human rights by the regime and the lack of any real democracy.   As elsewhere in the world, the USA was prepared to support authoritarian regimes and military dictators so long as they were seen as a bulwark against its numerous enemies – whether left-wing and communist groups within such countries who represented a threat to US capitalist interests or to its international rivals who threatened US security.   In Pakistan, according 
to	   Iftikhar	   Malik:	   ‘…the	   army’s	   dominance,	   buoyed	   up	   by	   US	   support,	   has	  
become	  stronger	  over	  the	  decades’.1331   The USA remained the highest aid-giver 
– providing approximately US$30 billion to Pakistan since its creation.  Fifty 
                                                        
1331 Iftikhar Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation, p.114. 
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percent of this aid was for military purposes or given in periods of military rule.1332 During	  General	  Zia’s	  period Saudi Arabia increased its aid from US$100 million dollar in 1979 to US$300 million in 1980.  But in 1985, when a controlled democracy was restored in Pakistan, it reduced this to less than 40 million dollar.1333 However, the kingdom deposited $250 million in 1985 and $275million in 1986 in a secret Swiss account on the request of the CIA to use it for Afghan mujahidin, as the doubled amount of aid given by the Reagan administration to Afghanistan was not enough.1334 In 1988, by contrast, the Pressler Amendment was imposed in a way that cut aid to the civilian governments in the following years.  Moreover, under National Security Decision Directives number 166 of 
1985,	  which	  was	   titled	   ‘US	  Policy,	   Programs,	   and	  Strategy	   in	  Afghanistan’,	   the	  Reagan administration provided support for the publication of textbooks from the University of Nebraska at Omaha for students of jihadi schools that emphasised the supposed Islamic justification basis to such warfare.1335  A team of three or four agents was financed to the tune of between $300,000 to more than $1million to train Islamic insurgents.   During the Afghan war, Islamabad had the largest CIA station in the world.  It funnelled growing amounts of paramilitary support to the rebels in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviet-dominated government.1336  America therefore contributed significantly, if not 
                                                        
1332 Noushad  Mahmood,  ‘US  Aid,  Pakistani  Anger’,  Times, 3 August 2014. 
1333 Directorate   of   Intelligence,   “Saudi   Economic   and   Military   Bilateral   Aid”,   29   August   1986,   24  
November 2013. CIA-RDP05S02029R000300820001-3, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. 
1334 Washington   Post,   20   June   1986,   p.   A30.   Cited   in   William   Vornberger,   “The   CIA   and   Heroin:  
Afghan   Rebels   and   Drugs”,   Covert Action Information Bulletin, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-
00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. P.12. 
1335 Khan, Pakistan: A Personal History, p.89.  
1336 For details, See Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of CIA, 1981-87, (Simon and Schuster 
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wholly, to a state of affairs that undermined democracy in Pakistan.  Interestingly, CIA reports between 1977 and 1988 invariably accused the Soviet Union and India for the domestic unrest in Pakistan, while ignoring US culpability.   
The Struggle for Democracy in Pakistan In contrast to many anti-imperial struggles in different parts of the world in the twentieth century, the nationalist movements of pre-1947 South Asia were largely nonviolent and democratic in nature, even though there were times during which violence came to the fore, as in the mass killings of 1947.   This has left a legacy in which there has been a firm relationship between the building and maintaining of democratic rights and freedom and ongoing traditions of civil resistance.  This has been the case in Pakistan.   Democracy in Pakistan, though often challenged, has reasserted itself time and again through the struggle of its people in campaigns of civil protest.  Many have sacrificed themselves for this ideal.1337  Because of this legacy, every military dictator in Pakistan has had to pay lip service to democracy.  As Cohen has stated, it has 
been	  either	  General	  Ayub’s	  ‘basic	  democracy’,	  General	  Zia’s	  formation	  of	  Majlis-
i-shura in	   disguise	   a	   ‘death	   knell’1338 to	   democracy,	   or	   Pervez	   Musharraf’s	  
                                                                                                                                                             
Paperbacks: New York:   2005)   cited   in   ‘Casey’s   Active   Counterterrorism’,   CIA-RDP90-
00965R000807540050-6, NARA, pp.5-6. 
1337 Unfortunately, not a single memorial or monument has been erected in Pakistan to those who 
have suffered in the struggle for democracy, nor is there any day of commemoration for those killed 
for the cause.  
1338 Indurthy, ‘The Fragility of Democracy in Pakistan’,  p.  313. 
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controlled democracy; each have tried to legitimize their rule in this way before the public.1339   In the case of the movement against Zia, there were many serious problems with the campaign for democracy. There was disunity amongst the political leaders, a failure to build an organised operational corps, and a lack of effective external support. Despite this, Benazir Bhutto demonstrated a commendable courage and firmness in the struggle. Over time, and with persistence, she gradually removed the major barriers, which included forging alliances with other political parties, reorganising her own party, and cultivating international support for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.    Her continuous engagement with civil society groups in Pakistan as well as abroad helped to increase pressure on the regime. Eventually, after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq,	  the	  army	  could	  not	  replicate	  General	  Yahya’s	  formula,	  and	  agreed	  to	  
hand	  over	  power	   to	   the	  victors	   in	   the	  elections	  of	  1988,	   the	  Pakistan	  People’s	  
Party.	   	   America’s	   outward	   approval	   of	   this	   change	   came	   in	   a	   letter	   from 
President	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	   that	   stated:	   ‘We	  are	   following	  with	   great	   interest	  your bold moves in restructuring your government, and are confident you will 
build	  a	  solid	  working	  relations	  on	  which	  democracy	  depends.’1340 The victory of BB was not only a victory for democracy but also for the women of Pakistan. This was in a country in which the evidence of a woman in a court of law was                                                         
1339 Cohen, The Future of Pakistan, p.4. 
1340 Letter to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto from President George H.W. Bush thanking her 
for her desire to seek a replenishment of funds for the World Bank's International Development 
Association (IDA). Bush assures Bhutto that the U.S. will assist Pakistan and other developing 
countries to strengthen their economies. Letter. WHITE HOUSE. OMITTED. Issue Date: Nov 27, 1989. 
Complete. 1 page(s) 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&slb=KE&locID=warwick&srchtp=basic&c=1&i
mg=.25&ste=4&txb=Benazir+Bhutto&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349634691 (19 March 
2014) 
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deemed to be worth only half that of a man.  Some political parties, such as JUI that was one part of the MRD, questioned whether a woman should be allowed to lead.  In this, her victory was two-fold.    Nonetheless, instead of accepting the conditions imposed by the Pakistan military after winning the election of 1988, Benazir Bhutto should have looked to public support to impose her own terms and run the country without having to constantly look over her should towards the military.  Rather than focus on the structural evils of military rule, she treated Zia as an aberration.  This was a let-down for her supporters in the pro-democracy movement.   She also failed to curb corruption and vote-rigging.     Despite the many failings of its democratic leaders, leading to the reassertion of military rule by General Musharraf in 1999, this tradition of civil 
resistance	  continued.	  	  The	  Lawyers’	  Movement	  that	  started in 2007 culminated in Musharraf’s	  fall	  from	  power	  in	  2008	  and	  the restoration of a democracy that lasts to this day.    Since then, there have been ongoing civil protests against various controversial actions of the elected governments.  Although Pakistan faces some extremely difficult and seemingly intractable problems, we may hope that the spirit that has come to the fore time and again in such struggles will provide a way forward in time towards a more equitable and less violent future for the country.   
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Dr. Mushtaq, 3 February 2012, Peshawar. Peshawar, ANP and former Khudai Khidmatgar member.  
Israr Shah, 19 April 2012, Islamabad. Rawalpindi, MRD Joint Secretary Student Affairs-Punjab from PPP. Currently, he is a central executive committee member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf.   
Qazi Sultan, 17 April 2012, Rawalpindi. Rawalpindi, A hotel porter turned politician. He was hardly 76 centimeters tall, and was imprisoned in Shahi Qila. Currently, he is a Central Executive Member of PPP.   
Mustafa Talpur, 1 June 2012, Islamabad. (Badin), the youngest MRD arrested during the 1983 movement from Badin.  
Hidayat Ullah, 1 February 2012, Peshawar. Dir (KPK), ANP member who was Provincial Minister for Livestock 2008-2013.   
Muhammad Agha Waseem, 25 February 2012, Lahore, Stockholm. Lahore, served in Al-Zulfiqar with Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnwaz Bhutto through the life of the organisation.     Academics  
Dr. Rafique Ahmed, 27 February 2012, Lahore. He was the President of Nazria-i-
Pakistan Center (Pakistan Ideology Center) Lahore.   
Dr. Mubarak Ali, 22 February 2012, Lahore. Hyderabad, He is a very renowned historian of Pakistan.   
Prof. Stephen P. Cohen, 20 November 2013, Washington DC. USA. He worked on the State Department, South Asia desk in the late 1980s. He is a Security Advisor on South Asia. Currently, he is a Fellow of Brooklyn Institute, Washington DC.  
Dr. Mehdi Hasan, 3 March 2013, Lahore. He is a professor of Journalism at 
 315 
Beaconhouse University, Lahore. He is also a brother of Dr. Mubashar Hasan.  
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